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Abstract 
Loan loss recognition and communication have been contentious issues in Vietnam 
recently. Before 2012, the State Bank of Vietnam and commercial banks 
continuously signaled that the banking system was under control, with the 
nonperforming loans (NPLs) ratio below 3%. However, a belief expressed through 
newspapers and other media was that the NPL ratio was much higher under 
international standards. This ratio became controversial when different figures were 
disclosed from different sources, and it has fluctuated strongly since 2012. The 
acceleration of NPLs in 2012 froze credit flows and the economy. Later, the NPL 
ratio steadily decreased until it reached the benchmark of 3%, which was announced 
as the safety level, and it has remained thus since 2014. However, many believe that 
the published figure of 3% represented just a part of the NPL iceberg. Most recently, 
the National Financial Supervisory Commission announced that the NPL was 9.5% 
at the end of 2017, while according to the banking industry’s report it was below 3%. 
Accompanying the different NPL numbers is the continuous change from 2012 to 
date in accounting regulation on debt classification and provisioning. 
That constant change represents the embarrassment of bank regulators in regulating 
loan loss recognition. It raises the research question why loan loss recognition and 
communication are contentious issues in the Vietnamese context. Answering this 
question is expected to equip Vietnam’s bank regulators with a theoretical basis for 
their decision-making in regulating loan loss recognition, and improve transparency 
in loan loss recognition as well. 
Seemingly, loan loss recognition used to be controversial in many other countries, 
such as Japan, the United States and China before, during and after their financial 
crisis. It led to the issuance of bank regulations such as Basel Accords I and II as well 
as new accounting standards - IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement, IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures and IFRS 9 Financial 
Instruments  - to resolve that controversy. Nevertheless, the phenomenon is repeated 
in Vietnam. It leads to the following subresearch questions: ‘Is Vietnam experiencing 
the same issue that occurred in other countries?’ and ‘Has Vietnam learned from 
history given that the country has been equipped with those new rules?’ 
xiii 
A review of the current literature shows that loan loss recognition and 
communication have been controversial in other countries and not only in Vietnam 
despite the issuance of various international regulations on loan loss recognition. It is 
because loan loss accounting can be treated differently from different perspectives, 
such as accounting, bank regulation, tax and other macro links, such as procyclicality 
or political views. Young (1995) and Chahed (2014) concluded that the meaning of 
‘right’ accounting has shifted in various ways depending on the interaction between 
the actors in the accounting environment. Few studies have examined this 
phenomenon in terms of loan loss recognition, although it has a critical relationship 
with the political and economic environment. The present research partly bridges that 
gap by examining the appropriate meaning of loan loss recognition and 
communication in the Vietnamese-specific context. Since the current international 
regulations on loan loss recognition derive from the developed countries, the 
Vietnamese context, a developing country with distinctive features, is selected to 
understand loan loss recognition from an alternative perspective. 
To answer the research questions, it is necessary to understand fully how particular 
ways of bank loan loss recognition and communication have emerged in the context 
of Vietnam by moving beyond the boundaries of the organisation and examine the 
phenomenon in light of the economic, social and political contexts rather than simply 
from the technical perspective, as common in the current literature. There is now an 
urgent need for research in this regard. 
Underpinning this perspective is a focus on the interplay between the way to 
recognise loan loss in Vietnam and the ways to manage its organisations and society. 
It requires an understanding of how changes in the society shaped a change in loan 
loss recognition and how that accounting change has affected the Vietnamese 
society. From this view, the study examines the communication among bank 
regulators, bank managements, foreign partners and specialists in terms of regulating 
loan loss recognition rather than just studying how loan loss is identified and 
recorded. 
While several previous studies focused on organisational processes of regulating loan 
loss recognition (macro level), some others switched towards a focus on bank 
management role in loan loss recognition (micro level). The present research argues 
xiv 
that examining these macro-level and micro-level positions alone is problematic for 
understanding the dynamics of organisational power in loan loss recognition and 
communication. Instead, adopting a sociological analysis of accounting that could 
blend both concerns would improve the understanding of the ways in which the two 
are mutually implicative and coproductive. The mix of both levels currently ‘remains 
largely an aspiration’ but is a challenge for researchers because it is ‘not even clear 
what concepts and issues would guide such a research agenda’ (Walker 2016, p. 42). 
In this study, loan loss recognition and communication is expected to be a rich issue 
for bridging the gap because of its profound effects on both micro and macro levels. 
For that purpose, the study adopted an interpretive paradigm and dialectical theory as 
a theoretical framework to gain more in-depth information and new perspectives in 
the area of loan loss communication. The content analysis was conducted on the data 
collected from the published records of regulations and practices in loan loss 
recognition in Vietnam, including background data, banking regulations, accounting 
standards, bank reports and public discussions. 
It was found that the dialectical contradiction of the Government and market control 
was underlying the regulation on loan loss recognition. Separation and neutralisation 
were the main styles of response to that contradiction. Those response styles caused 
confusion in loan loss communication because the contradictions in loan loss 
recognition were not resolved thoroughly. Vietnam has not learned well from 
international experiences in regulating loan loss recognition because it was 
embarrassed in responding to specific contradictions that were not common in a 
developed market. Hence, for bank regulators in Vietnam, the appropriate accounting 
for loan loss recognition should be the one that responds well to the contradictions in 
the Vietnamese context. 
The aforementioned finding is the rationale to equip bank regulators and the related 
parties with not only the knowledge of international standards in terms of loan loss 
recognition, but also the necessary skills to respond to the conflicts in the adoption of 
those standards in the Vietnamese context. For that purpose, International Financial 
Reporting Standards, Basel Accords and credit risk management towards 
international practices should be included in the bank training curriculum. The 
training and discussion of how to respond to the related contradictions should be a 
xv 
critical section in the curriculum. Further studies of how to react suitably to 
contradictions in loan loss recognition should be conducted. The present research 
also contributes to the dialectical theory literature by showing how this theory can be 
adopted to understand the communication among organisations in terms of loan loss 
recognition. Further research in dialectical theory adoption appears a promising 
research area. 
Key words: regulation, accounting standards, nonperforming loans, capital 
adequacy, dialectics, communication. 
xvi 
Conferences 
The preliminary empirical findings of the thesis have been presented at the 
conferences below: 
Huynh, T. N. A., Abraham, A. & Humphreys, P. 2014, ‘Bank loan losses in a quasi-
market economy: the case of Vietnam’, paper presented at 26th Asian-Pacific 
Conference on International Accounting Issues and 2014 Accounting Theory and 
Practice Conference, Taipei, Taiwan, 26–29 October. 
Huynh, T. N. A., Abraham, A. & Humphreys, P. 2014, ‘Bank loan losses in Vietnam: 
A challenge for a developing economy’, paper presented at The World Finance & 
Banking Conference, Singapore, 12–14 December.  
 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
Recently, loan loss recognition, which is mainly based on nonperforming loans 
(NPLs), has become a hot topic in Vietnam because it is believed to exacerbate the 
economic depression by downgrading the country’s global credit rating (Dang Duc 
Thanh 2015) and invalidating bank supervision, which partly led to a series of recent 
extremely large bank scandals (Diep Binh 2017). The following paragraphs present 
the public confusion as regards the different and constantly changing NPL ratio as 
well as the embarrassment of Vietnam’s bank regulators, who have been extremely 
concerned since 2011, in regulating loan loss recognition and communicating loan 
loss. 
The NPL amount is an important figure because it is the base for measuring bank 
loan losses. In the country, loan loss provisions are mainly driven by NPLs (Decision 
493 issued in 2005). In particular, NPL in Vietnam is the sum of three riskiest groups 
of 3, 4 and 5 with the highest provision rates1, thus critically determining the extent 
of the bank loan loss and being the key risk factor in addressing credit quality of loan 
portfolios. 
In addition, the measurement of NPLs is also of particular concern in relation to the 
NPL ratio, which is the ratio of NPLs to total outstanding loans. NPL ratio is 
                                                          
1 Under Decision 493, THE GOVERNOR 2005. Quy định về phân loại nợ, trích lập và sử dụng dự 
phòng để xử lý rủi ro tín dụng trong hoạt động ngân hàng của tổ chức tín dụng; 'Regulation on the 
debts classification, provisioning and use of provisions against credit risks in the banking activity of 
credit institutions'. In: VIETNAM, S. B. O. (ed.) 493/2005/QD-NHNN. Hanoi, Vietnam: State Bank of 
Vietnam., which has been updated by Circular 02 THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR 2013. Quy định về 
phân loại tài sản có, mức trích, phương pháp trích lập dự phòng rủi ro và việc sử dụng dự phòng để xử 
lý rủi ro trong hoạt động của tổ chức tín dụng, chi nhánh ngân hàng nước ngoài 'Providing on 
classification of assets, levels and method of establishing risk provisions, and use of provisions against 
credit risks in the banking activity of credit institutions, foreign banks’ branches'. In: VIETNAM, S. 
B. O. (ed.) 02/2013/TT-NHNN. Hanoi: State Bank of Vietnam, loans are classified into five groups 
based on their risk degree: standard debt, debts which need special attention, substandard debt, 
doubtful debt and potentially irrecoverable debt. The risk degree can be measured based on past due 
date, called the quantitative method, in which group 1 are current debts, and groups 2, 3, 4,and 5 are 
overdue for less than 90 days, 180 days and 360 days and more than 360 days, respectively. 
Alternatively, the risk can be assessed relying on banks’ internal credit rating system, which is named 
qualitative method. The different risk levels lead to different loan loss provision rates applied for each 
group: group 1—standard, 0%; group 2—special attention, 5%; group 3— substandard, 20%, group 
4—doubtful, 50%; group 5—loss, 100%). 
2 
commonly considered in Vietnam a key indicator representing the banking industry’s 
financial health. Vietnamese bank regulators consider the 3% threshold safe 
according to international practices (Dang Duc Thanh 2015; Vov.vn 2012; Vu Thanh 
Tu Anh et al. 2013; Zing.vn 2015). 
It is believed that the measurement of NPLs and NPL ratio, being a part of bank 
regulation, has improved towards international practices (State Bank of Vietnam 
[SBV] 2007) to implement the Doi Moi policy2 raised by the Government since 1986 
(Decision No. 136/2001/QD-TTg of 2001). It aims to build the capital and monetary 
market institutions for market development and global integration (Decision No. 
136/2001/QD-TTg of 2001). 
However, over several years, many banking specialists and press releases have 
continuously claimed that NPLs had been underestimated in Vietnam, and the gap 
between Vietnamese standards and international standards in NPL estimation has 
been attributed to the difference in NPL figures (Ha 2010; Suiwah 2009; Vietbiz24 
2012; Vietnam Investment Review 2011; Vietnam News 2011). The confusion as 
regards NPL measurement and communication was so severe at the end of 2011 that 
the Governor of the SBV, Nguyen Van Binh, had to express his opinion at the 
National Assembly meeting session in November 2011. He seemed to disagree that 
the difference in NPLs was problematic. In his answer, the Governor explained about 
that gap as follows: 
Some Members of Parliament have questioned that the current NPL ratio is much 
higher under international standards or according to some international 
organisations. However, it is very hard to say that. There are different international 
standards, and we have to mention clearly which standard is used to compare. 
(INFO.VN-NEWS 2011; translated by the author) 
It can be noted that his speech does not offer a clear explanation about what the 
differences between Vietnamese standards and international standards are in the 
estimation of NPLs and whether this gap distorts the NPL ratio in Vietnam. 
                                                          
2 ‘Doi Moi’ mean Renovation in Vietnam. Doi Moi policy is the top-down economic reform to divert 
Vietnam’s command economy to a free market economy. The reform was initiated in Vietnam in 1986 
following the 6th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam. It is a high-ranking political 
reaction to a severe economic crisis the country was facing, as the result of a centrally planned 
economy and Soviet aid decrease, which intensified Vietnam’s international isolation (Dang 2015).  
3 
Therefore, the explanation was vague and could not solve the debate on loan loss 
communication. However, the NPLs disclosed at about 3% for many years seemed to 
be correct until the Banking Supervision Agency informed that the NPL ratio was 
8.6% as at 31 March 2012. 
Then, NPLs suddenly accelerated to 256 billion dong, accounting for 10% of 
outstanding loans in Vietnam in the first six months of 2012; the most notable is the 
group of potentially irrecoverable debts3 (Figure 1.1). Before that time, NPLs 
fluctuated only between 38 to 78 billion dong during the three years of 2009, 2010 
and 2011, accounting for about 3% of total outstanding loans. The confusion around 
NPLs suddenly increased when the bank governor disclosed the NPL ratio of 10% at 
the end of quarter 2, 2012 (Hoang L 2012). NPLs of the Vietnamese banking 
industry tripled after just three months with the dramatic increase in NPLs of many 
banks in comparison with the figures at the end of 2011 (e.g., Vietinbank (+139%), 
Vietcombank (+40%) and Sacombank (+40%)) (Hoang L 2012). 
 
Source: Le Van Tu (2012) 
Figure 1.1: NPLs surged in 2012 
At that time, the NPL ratio became controversial when there were different figures 
disclosed from different sources and it fluctuated strongly in a short period (see 
Figure 1.2). SBV’s estimation was different from the data reported by commercial 
banks. As stated in Figure 1.2, SBV data said that NPL ratio had reached 8.86%, 
                                                          
3In Vietnam, loans are classified into five groups based on their risk degree: standard debt, debt which 
needs special attention, substandard debt, doubtful debt and potentially irrecoverable debt (Decision 
No. 493/2005/QD-NHNN). 
4 
twice as much as reported by commercial banks. There was also a large gap between 
SBV and international rating agencies (e.g., Fitch Ratings and Barclays) in the 
estimation of this ratio. At the time that SBV revealed the NPL ratio of 8.86%, Fitch 
Rating and Barclays stated it was 15% and 20%, respectively, which was much 
higher than the SBV’s figure (Figure 1.2). 
The Governor tried to calm the public’s concern on that issue by implying that the 
existence of the gap in determining NPL ratio was normal. Binh said at the 
interrogation session of National Assembly Standing Committee on 21 August 2012: 
I have been working in the banking system for 30 years. Over the last 30 years, 
there have always been two figures. One figure is given by credit institutions under 
the regulations of the central bank, while another figure comes from the central 
bank through an assessment of NPLs at commercial banks. (Vietnamnet 2012; 
translated by the author) 
 
Source: Trung Tam Thong Tin Du Lieu (2013) 
Figure 1.2: NPL ratio of Vietnam from different sources 
The Governor’s explanation was still confusing, since it did not mention the meaning 
of each figure so that users could use the information to determine how to use 
different figures for their decision-making. It is also questionable why that difference 
was not disclosed for over 30 years. Why was it disclosed now? 
3.1
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5 
Regarding the high NPL ratio issued by Fitch Ratings compared with the SBV 
estimation, he said this credit rating agency counted group 2 of debt classification 
under Decision 493 as NPLs while it was not included in NPLs under SBV 
estimation, which considered the last three groups of 3, 4 and 5 (Business Times 
2012). In addition, the Governor asserted that the SBV’s disclosure of NPL ratio 
should be considered the formal one rather than any other figure (Business Times 
2012). That explanation, without clarifying the meaning of each classification, led to 
more confusion in NPL communication in Vietnam at that time. The information 
users did not know clearly which figure was more appropriate to represent loan loss 
incurred and the financial health of the Vietnamese banking industry at that time and 
why. 
Therefore, regardless of the Governor’s disclosure and explanation, many banking 
specialists and financial journalists still believed that both NPL ratio and loan loss are 
underestimated in the Vietnamese banking industry based on the extremely high NPL 
ratio estimated by the international credit rating agencies (Ha 2010; Suiwah 2009; 
Vietbiz24 2012; Vietnam Investment Review 2011; Vietnam News 2011; World 
Bank 2002). 
In addition, loan loss provisioning in Vietnam has been questioned many times in 
terms of capital adequacy ratio (CAR) measurement. Although the current mandatory 
ratio of 9% under Circular No. 13/2010/TT-NHNN is higher than the minimum 
requirement under international practices (Basel II–International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework), many press 
releases insisted that this ratio would be much lower if loan loss provision was 
recalculated under International Accounting Standards (IAS) (Ha 2010; Suiwah 
2009; Vietbiz24 2012; Vietnam Investment Review 2011; Vietnam News 2011; 
World Bank 2002). If this claim were true, the Vietnamese banking industry might be 
at risk that its capital is inadequate to absorb its loss. 
Different from the view above, Le Hong Giang (2012), a financial specialist from 
TGM Fund in Australia, argued that there were no international standards for 
measuring NPLs. He said: 
One very common misunderstanding in the Vietnamese press and among many 
experts is that the Vietnamese NPLs standards are different from that of 
6 
international standards... First, it should be clear that the world has not yet had a 
standard set for NPLs classification; perhaps there are some practices adopted by 
many countries and a number of guidelines recommended by international 
organisations (e.g., BIS and IMF). Decision 493 issued by SBV also applies those 
practices for measuring NPL, so one cannot say ‘standard of NPLs’ in Vietnam is 
poor compared with ‘international standards’. (Le Hong Giang 2012; translated by 
the author) 
The controversy over the identification of NPLs has become increasingly acute as 
bank regulators become embarrassed in adjusting the accounting regulation for NPL 
measurement and loan loss provisioning. In this regard, bank regulators need reliable 
figures on NPLs to address the high acceleration of NPLs since it is believed to 
constrain credit growth and then economic growth since 2012 (Do 2012; 
Giaothongvantai 2014; Saigontiepthi 2012). Being concerned about what was the 
right NPL amount, the Governor, Nguyen Van Binh, questioned the SBV supervision 
department, ‘Can the supervisors operate effectively when they are not sure about the 
figure [NPL amount]?’ (Thuy Mien 2013; translated by the author). 
Conversely, bank regulators are concerned that if NPLs are fully acknowledged, a 
huge amount of NPLs will be recognised, leading to a substantial loss for the banking 
industry that can cause bankruptcy followed by financial system instability, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
Because of that embarrassment as regards revealing or concealing loan loss, Vietnam 
has witnessed constant changes in regulation on loan loss recognition from 2012 up 
to the present. Bank regulators have been fluctuating between information and 
disinformation on bank loan loss, which has caused many debates. In particular, as 
presented in Appendix 1, loan loss recognition was allowed to be delayed under 
Decision 780 dated 23/04/2012 by SBV. Then, it was required to be more transparent 
in terms of international practices following the issuance of Circular 02 dated 
21/01/2013 by SBV. Later, the implementation of Circular 02 was postponed with 
the extension of Decision 780 until June 2014 so that commercial banks could delay 
their recognition of loan loss for a longer period. Next, Circular 02 came into effect 
in June 2014 but loan loss recognition has remained far from IAS with the stipulation 
of the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) mechanism that has sharply 
increased the confusion regarding loan loss. 
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Specifically, the creation of the VAMC mechanism according to Circular 
19/2013/TT-NHNN on 6 September 2013 allowed commercial banks to clean up 
NPLs on their balance sheet by selling NPLs to the VAMC. VAMC was a firm 
established by the Government and run by the SBV for solving NPLs by buying them 
from commercial banks. Those arrangements are similar to debt factoring 
transactions that can be with or without recourse. Thus far, most of the NPLs have 
been sold with recourse, meaning that the sold debts would be returned to 
commercial banks after five years if VAMC could not collect from borrowers. Banks 
were required to make provision for those NPLs but were allowed to spread the 
provision over five years to avoid creating a huge cost burden at once for banks. 
Selling NPLs to VAMC was the critical reason for the quick reduction of NPLs in 
commercial banks to the 3% threshold since 2014 as the Government expected 
(Khanh Nhi 2015; Mai Ngoc 2016). However, many believed that ‘NPLs of 3% was 
just a decoration’ (Phuong Lam 2015). Doctor Le, a financial specialist from TGM 
Fund in Australia, criticised, ‘VAMC is actually just a form of “accounting tricks” to 
put NPLs off the balance sheets’ (Ngan Giang 2016; translated by the author) while 
the NPLs still reflect the relationship between the banks and their borrowers (Dang 
Duc Thanh 2015). He claimed that loan loss was late in recognition because the 
amortisation of loan loss provision relating to NPLs sold to VAMC help banks to 
‘spread their loan loss recognition over several years rather than recording the 
whole loss at once’ (Ngan Giang 2016; translated by the author). 
Expressing the same concern, a lawyer, Truong Thanh Duc, worried that the delay in 
loan loss recognition could lead to delay in taking corrective actions, and thus 
restrain the economy’s development, similar to the period called the lost decade in 
Japan: 
The incorrect NPL figures numbers led to a leisurely work psychology, resting on 
the belief that the market would soon recover, and that, thus, security assets’ value 
will be restored and enterprises will repay their debt. However, the reality can be 
exactly the opposite: that it goes not in a cycle of 10 years as asserted by Mr 
Sheehan [referring to Japan’s lost decade], but in a longer period, one and a half or 
doubled. (Thuy Mien 2013; translated by the author) 
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In addition, Dang Duc Thanh (2015) believed that the big gap in adopting 
international standards for recognising loan loss and the drastic increase of NPLs 
negatively affected Vietnam’s credit rating for borrowing abroad. Within the country, 
the delay of loan loss recognition led to dividend distribution in loss-making banks 
(Dang Duc Thanh 2015), thus threating bank safety. 
Especially, owing to the lack of transparency on NPLs, the SBV and market 
participants could not evaluate the banks’ performance and take timely, appropriate 
actions. That weakness led to several loss-making banks continuing to operate and 
adopting different ways to cover up their increasing loss from the public until the 
SBV bailed them out in 2015 when their loss had accumulated to result in large 
negative equity and extremely high NPL ratio. As at July 2015, Vietnam 
Construction bank (VNCB), OceanBank and GPBank had NPL ratios of 99.6%, 
59.7% and 48.3% and negative equity of 24,000 billion dong, 7,143 billion dong and 
9,195 billion dong, respectively (Thu Pham 2017; Tuyen Phan 2017). 
Specifically, Nguyen Xuan Thanh, an economic specialist of Fulbright university, 
said that if the SBV had restructured VNCB or allowed it to file for bankruptcy in 
2012, it could have limited the bank loss to 11,100 billion dong in 2012 rather than 
40,000 billion dong in 2015 (Thu Pham 2017). Similarly, the SBV had discovered 
many weakness and risks in the operation of GPBank since 2011 (Thu Pham 2017). 
Not until the SBV purchased GPBank compulsorily did it announce to the press the 
bad financial health of GPBank as of April 2015 with a negative equity and a record 
of high NPL ratios of 45.37% (Thu Pham 2017). OceanBank’s financial reports 
continued reporting profit for the years 2010–2014 until before being compulsorily 
purchased by the SBV. 
The three typical examples above show that the banks’ financial situation has been 
bad with large NPLs and negative equity in some years previously but was not fully 
disclosed to the public for earlier action when the loss was still low. The specialist 
Nguyen Xuan Thanh regretted the delay, stating that had the state acted in 2011, the 
loss in 2015 when the SBV purchased those weak banks would have been much 
lower (Thu Pham 2017). The lack of transparency in loan loss not only reduced the 
efficiency of the SBV’s supervision over the weak banks but also invalidated the 
market control over those banks, offering them opportunities to continue raising 
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money from the market for financing their inefficient activities, thus leading to a 
larger loss and worsening the economic depression (Dang Duc Thanh 2015). 
Surprisingly, loan loss recognition was still delayed once more by 10 years under 
Circular 08 dated 16/06/2016 in spite of these concerns. However, most recently, it 
has seemed that the bank regulators would like to improve the transparency of loan 
loss recognition to meet international standards by stipulating Resolution 42 on 21 
June 2017. Under that regulation, NPLs that occurred before 15 August 2017 under 
the VAMC mechanism were guided to be settled at market value rather than just 
transferring the NPLs from a bank’s books to the VAMC book at their historical 
value for ‘book decoration’ as before. 
In brief, since 2011, bank regulators have been very confused, passive, lacking a plan 
and inconsistent in communicating loan loss and regulating loan loss recognition. 
Specifically, bank regulators are inconsistent in the disclosure of NPLs with 
continuous change of disclosed figures and confusion in explaining their disclosures 
on comparing with the other sources. The NPLs incurred in the past and being 
revealed currently are much larger than those being disclosed by the SBV earlier. 
The regulation on loan loss recognition was embarrassingly revised many times in 
terms of the level of transparency on loan loss. 
Considering the negative effects of lacking transparency in loan loss recognition as 
aforementioned as well as the embarrassment of bank regulators, loan loss 
recognition and communication in Vietnam is the topic of the present research. The 
research question and research aim within this topic are discussed in the next section, 
seeking solutions for bank regulators to improve their performance. 
1.2 Research Question and Research Aim 
The phenomenon that loan loss recognition has become a hot discussion topic for 
many interested parties, with different suggested figures of NPLs, and the fact that 
bank regulation on loan loss recognition is changed constantly raise the research 
question: 
Why are loan loss recognition and communication contentious issues within the 
Vietnamese context? 
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Actually, the phenomenon of delay in loan loss recognition and the confusion in loan 
loss recognition and communication as described above is not new in the current 
literature. The U.S. Savings and Loan crisis and the Japanese banking crisis are two 
cases often cited in this context. 
The postponement of loss recognition was believed to provide insufficient warning of 
the significant deterioration of the value of U.S. mortgage loans in the late 1980s 
(Linsmeier 2011). Under the historical cost approach adopted in U.S. thrifts and 
banks, adverse economic conditions including the interest rate volatility and falling 
real estate prices were not recognised as indicators of impairment loss although they 
caused financial difficulties for banks and thrifts at that time. The underestimation of 
loan loss did not send sufficient signals for stakeholders for taking prompt actions to 
prevent bank managers from increasing investments that were riskier because of the 
adverse economic conditions, thus amplifying loss level later. 
More significantly, the postponement in loan loss recognition was claimed to be one 
of reasons that caused the banking industry crisis in Japan and then its lost decade of 
the 1990s (Fujii & Kawai 2010). For a long time, the historical cost accounting 
model applied in Japan had failed to reflect loan loss as the result of decreases in real 
estate price from historical cost to market value. Hence, for over a decade, bank 
managers continued to take more risk by continuing to lend to inefficient or ‘zombie’ 
companies, which need bailouts to operate, without signaling to the bank 
stakeholders the need to take appropriate actions, thus reducing the country’s 
productivity growth. 
Learning from the past crises, new accounting standards were issued, such as 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 7–Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures and IAS 39–Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, in 
which loan loss was measured at amortised cost value. Although amortised cost is 
still a historical cost model, it is more forward-looking than the traditional approach 
applied earlier. This improvement is discussed in detail in the literature review in 
Chapter 2. In 2011, IAS 39 was then replaced by IFRS 9–Financial Instruments that 
requires loan loss to be estimated under the fair value approach rather than historical 
cost model so that loan loss can be recognised earlier. In addition, the global banking 
industry has moved on from Basel I–International Convergence of Capital 
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Measurement and Capital to Basel II–International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, which provides 
recommendations on a higher level of bank capital adequacy as a reserve for 
covering expected and unexpected credit loss. These rules are believed to address the 
financial crisis issues that occurred over the past 20 years as the result of the delay in 
loan loss recognition. 
Although those rules have not been explicitly mentioned in Vietnamese regulations, 
they have been adopted gradually. The adoption of Basel I and II was observed in the 
stipulation of minimum CAR for commercial banks (Section 5.2.2) and the SBV’s 
request of an increase in that ratio over time as analysed in Chapter 5. The estimation 
of loan loss based on both quantitative and qualitative data rather than mainly based 
on quantitative data under Decision 493 stipulated in 2005 was another reflection of 
loan loss measurement under IAS 39 and the internal ratings-based approach under 
Basel II (see Chapter 5). IFRS 9 had not been applied in Vietnam until 2015 when 
the 2015 Accounting Law stipulated that fair value should be applied in measuring 
financial (Luật kế toán [Accounting Law] No. 03/2003/QH11, Article 28). Those 
adoptions of international accords and standards have provided guidance on 
accounting for financial instruments including bank loans in Vietnam. 
However, in 2012, surprisingly, loan loss recognition and NPL measurement became 
a critical social concern in Vietnam with the confusion of bank regulators in 
regulating loan loss provision. It raises the questions ‘Is Vietnam experiencing the 
same issue that has occurred in other countries?’ and ‘Has Vietnam learned from 
history given that it is equipped with Basel Accords I, II, IFRS 7 and IAS 39?’ 
The review of current literature shows that loan loss recognition and communication 
has been a common debatable topic worldwide because it has a significant impact on 
various aspects, such as accounting (Beatty & Liao 2014; Bouvatier & Lepetit 2012b; 
Cortavarria-Checkley et al. 2000; Laurin & Majnoni 2003; Laux & Leuz 2010; Ryan 
SG 2008), bank regulation (Balla & McKenna 2009; Beatty & Liao 2011; Bouvatier 
& Lepetit 2008, 2012a, 2012b; Bushman 2014; Bushman & Williams 2012; Clerc, 
Drumetz & Jaudoin 2001; Cortavarria-Checkley et al. 2000; Crockett 2003; Fujii & 
Kawai 2010; Gaston & Song 2014; Glormann 2007; Harris et al. 2013; Herz 2010; 
Iannotta & Kwan 2014; Karacadag & Taylor 2000; Laurin & Majnoni 2003; Laux & 
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Leuz 2009; Nicoletti 2015; Young 1995), tax and other macro links (e.g., 
procyclicality or politics; Beatty & Liao 2011; Bouvatier & Lepetit 2008, 2012a, 
2012b; Bushman 2014; Bushman & Williams 2012; Chahed 2014; Cortavarria-
Checkley et al. 2000; Greenawalt & Sinkey 1988; Karimiyana, Alifiah & Nasserinia 
2014; Ozili & Outa 2017; Saurina 2009). 
Its wide influence causes different treatments in loan loss accounting from different 
perspectives, such as accounting practices or bank regulatory. This specific 
phenomenon is consistent with a general conclusion in accounting by Young (1995) 
and Chahed (2014) that the meaning of ‘right’ accounting shifted in various ways 
that are the results of the interaction between the actors in the accounting 
environment. Few studies explore the ‘right’ meaning of accounting in different 
contexts (Chahed 2014; Walker 2016), especially in relation to countries other than 
the developed ones that have established most of the current international regulations 
in accounting. 
Therefore, studying the meaning of loan loss accounting in a different context may 
assist in understanding it from an alternative perspective. In particular, the present 
study aims to examine the confusion in loan loss recognition and communication in 
Vietnam in light of its economic, social and political contexts rather than simply 
from the technical view as common in the current literature (Ezzamel & Xiao 2011). 
The context of Vietnam is chosen for the study because it has distinctive features that 
may affect loan loss recognition. Vietnam is a developing country that is different 
from developed countries such as Japan and the United States. Vietnam is also 
different from other developing countries because it has a quasi-market that 
comprises both control and capital factors. It is building a free market towards strong 
global integration for a high economic growth rate (Hoang, N. H. 2016). Conversely, 
Vietnam tries to maintain and protect the monopoly control of a single-party state 
using the sizable presence of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) even though those 
enterprises are inefficient with high leverage (Ministry of Information and 
Communication 2016). In addition, developing a free market while maintaining 
monopoly leads to a conflict in which Vietnam has to balance between the economic 
growth objective and social and political stability that still is a priority for the 
monopoly control by a one-party state (Suiwah 2009). 
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In terms of the Vietnamese banking industry, the existence of multiple specific 
conflict objectives in regulating loan loss recognition is a critical challenge for bank 
regulators in Vietnam where the SBV is not only responsible for controlling the 
nation’s monetary policy but also for implementing the Government’s economic, 
political and social policy. Regarding the tensions SBV faces with multiple 
inconsistent objectives, Victoria Kawakawa, the World Bank’s Vice President for the 
East Asia and Pacific Region, asserted that ‘Some of the factors that limit the 
effective operation of the central bank is that it has too many objectives and less 
independence’ (Baomoi 2016). 
The struggle of regulators with those conflicts was supposed to lead the 
communication in regulating loan loss recognition, a controversial issue in Vietnam, 
based on Katz and Kahn (1996), Lait and Wallace (2002) and Putnam’s (1986) claim 
that ‘unclear and incongruent messages are organizationally and personally 
problematic’ (Tracy 2004, p. 120). Those conflicts were believed to be actually the 
‘stuff of organizing’ (Trethewey 1999, p. 142) that makes it ‘messier, less logical, 
and more inconsistent unfolding practices of the moment’ (Baxter & Montgomery 
1996, p. 46). 
Considering that consequence, this thesis addressed the research question by 
examining the conflicts in regulating loan loss recognition in Vietnam and the related 
responses to explain the contentious issues in loan loss communication. Much of the 
discussion is concerned with the role of the SBV as the principal regulator in the 
Vietnamese banking sector (SBV 2013c). 
Since conflicts were spread over and occurred regularly in the Vietnamese context as 
well as in the ongoing process of regulating loan loss recognition, the dialectical 
theory is adopted to understand loan loss communication in Vietnam in terms of 
regulation activities. Dialectical theory emphasises the ongoing dynamic interplay of 
oppositional forces in contradictions that act on social relationships (Baxter 1990; 
Baxter & Montgomery 1996). 
Within a dialectical contradiction, two oppositional forces are interdependent and 
negate each other simultaneously (Baxter & Erbert 1999). In their ongoing dynamic 
interplay, two oppositional forces push–pull on each other like a rubber band as they 
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implicate each other (Putnam, Fairhurst & Banghart 2016). For example, our 
understanding of information closeness in social situations is partly defined by how 
we come to understand information openness. The dialectical theory conceptual 
framework is discussed in Chapter 3. 
This research is a dialectical analysis to explore the ongoing contradictions that 
constitute the process by which the Government/bank regulators attempt to shape the 
regulation on loan loss recognition by fixing ‘meanings in ways that resist and/or 
reproduce extant relations of power’ (Mumby 2005, p. 22). Specifically, the goal of 
this study is to understand how the Government/bank regulators in Vietnam ‘engage 
with, resist, accommodate, reproduce and transform the interpretive possibilities and 
meaning systems’ (Mumby 2005, p. 22) that constitute day-to-day loan loss 
recognition and communication among related partners (e.g., bank management, 
investors and foreign institutions) 
While the current literature presents a fairly good understanding of the multiple 
conflicts in accounting regulation (Nguyen Loc, Hooper & Sinclair 2013; Phuong 
NC & Richard 2011; Piotroski & Wong 2012) and loan loss communication (Kane 
2000), we know less about how the Government/bank regulators communicated in 
the ongoing processes of managing those conflicts. Further, little empirical data are 
available on the ways in which the Government/bank regulators react to conflicts. It 
suggests that a dialectical framework is fruitful for analysing conflict experiences and 
understanding ongoing tensions in the regulation on loan loss recognition. 
1.3 Research Contribution 
The investigation of the contentious issue in loan loss communication is justified in 
terms of both its contribution to theory and its practical benefit to organisations, 
banks and investors. 
1.3.1 Theoretical contribution 
Research on conflicts in the organisational environment (Putnam, Fairhurst & 
Banghart 2016) has become dominant, but the dialectical theory has been adopted 
infrequently in the empirical investigation of organisational conflicts (Erbert 2014). 
In terms of regulation and loan loss recognition, organisational conflict has been 
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addressed from various theoretical orientations, such as public interest theory, 
economic interest group theory, capture theory, institutional theories and political 
economic theories. Each theory may provide ‘accurate predictive statements about 
some aspects of organisational structure and process within delimited time periods 
and institutional locations’ (Benson 1977, p. 17), but formed ‘isolated lines of 
research’ with ‘compartmentalization of perspectives that do not enrich each other’ 
(Van de Ven & Poole 1995, p. 510). 
Adopting a dialectical theory to address organisational conflicts bridges that 
literature gap by going beyond such formulations to inquire into the relationships of 
theories in loan loss recognition regulation and organisational realities—considering 
the ‘reality-defining’ potential of a theory (Benson 1977, p. 17). From this approach, 
the research investigates the process of regulators’ knowledge-creating activities, not 
just the outcomes. A series of ‘relative truth’ can be created via that process and the 
absolute truth may never be found or exist (Nonaka & Toyama 2002). Therefore ‘it is 
this process that is important, rather than whether one can reach the absolute truth or 
not’ (Nonaka & Toyama 2002, p. 1006). It is a way to approach a reality to come 
close to ‘the elusive “absolute truth” through the process of examining and denying 
the series of ‘relative truth”’ (Nonaka & Toyama 2002). By adopting the dialectical 
framework, the thesis is expected to approach the true meaning of loan loss 
communication in the specific context of Vietnam. 
In that way, the thesis provides strong empirical evidence in the dynamics of the 
change process in accounting and banking regulation in a quasi-market country. 
Hence, it is expected to partly bridge the gap in the current literature that needs ‘a 
more detailed examination of the dynamics in the process of change’ taking into 
consideration specific factors, such as political factors, ideological factors or the 
poorly trained accounting personnel in Vietnam (Ezzamel & Xiao 2011). Ezzamel 
and Xiao (2011) expected this story of the accounting change in Vietnam to be 
‘interesting and insightful’ (p. 634) and have significant practical implications for the 
country because the banking area has a high impact on capital utilisation in Vietnam, 
where banks, rather than the financial market, play a leading role in allocating capital 
via lending activities and overseeing the utilisation of such capital. 
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By adopting the dialectical theory as the theoretical framework in this study, the 
research aims to study the analytical power of this theory in explaining the confusion 
in communication of loan loss in the Vietnamese-specific context. It is hoped that 
this research would lead to the door open for further dissertations that explain the 
confusion in other economic areas in Vietnam using the dialectical theory because 
there have been more and fiercer conflicts when Vietnam attempts to build a market 
economy with socialism orientation and enhance its global integration. According to 
Peng and Nisbett (1999), those conflicts are more likely to be framed as dialectical 
contradictions in the Eastern culture in which both contradictory oppositions are 
moderately accepted rather than polarised as in the Western culture. As Vietnam has 
a strong Eastern culture, dialectical theory is believed to be a useful framework to 
understand the Vietnamese method of thinking and acting in facing conflicts. 
1.3.2 Practical implications 
Bank stimulus has been a key factor behind economic expansion in emerging 
economies, but it could soon become a reason for its downfall if bank loan loss is not 
recognised in time for bank regulators and the market to monitor the bank lending 
activities as occurring in Vietnam since 2011. Considering this aspect, this research 
examines the contentious issues in loan loss recognition and communication in 
Vietnam to offer assistance in policymaking. In particular, this study would 
contribute rich data around the conflicts in regulating loan loss recognition. This 
knowledge is expected to be valuable for the policymaking of bank regulators, 
accounting standards setters, bankers and investors because regulating loan loss 
recognition is critical from the perspectives of accounting practices as well as bank 
regulations. 
This research also aims to offer direction for bank regulators towards a theoretical 
basis for responding to conflicts in regulating loan loss recognition. It is expected to 
improve their knowledge and necessary skills to understand loan loss recognition 
from different perspectives in the context of emerging economies and devise a better 
response to such conflicts. 
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1.4 Research Method 
This study adopts an interpretive paradigm to gain more in-depth information and 
new perspectives in the area of communication in regulating loan loss recognition. 
Since bank regulation in Vietnam is supposed to be significantly determined by 
multiple conflicts, the dialectical theory is utilised as a theoretical framework 
adopted to guide the analysis. 
According to Baxter and Montgomery (1996), a dialectical approach is not searching 
for the ‘happy mediums of compromise and balance, but instead focuses on the 
messier, less logical, and more inconsistent unfolding practices of the moment.’ (p. 
46). Thus, the adoption of a dialectical approach in examining regulation on loan loss 
recognition is expected to explain partly why loan loss communication is a 
contentious issue in the Vietnamese context. 
In the existing literature, dialectical theory is used more frequently in communication 
of various life contexts, such as dating, marriages, relationships and friendships 
(Baxter 1993; Baxter & Montgomery 1996; Hampsten 2012; Koschmann & Laster 
2011; Rawlins 1992; Werner & Baxter 1994). Few studies have analysed 
organisational conflicts from a dialectical framework (Erbert 2000, 2014) although 
Van de Ven and Poole (1995) and Nonaka and Toyama (2002) considered dialectical 
theory framework valuable for explaining changes or knowledge creation of an 
organisation. In the current organisational literature, the dialectical theory has been 
adopted to study the conflicts within an organisation (Erbert 2014; Tracy 2004) 
rather than the conflicts between an organisation and its environment, whereas Van 
de Ven and Poole (1995) and Nonaka and Toyama (2002) emphasised that the 
dialectical framework was useful for studying both internal and external conflicts. 
In particular, according to Van de Ven and Poole (1995), the dialectical theory 
explains that changes in organisations occur when those opposing values, forces or 
events mobilise sufficient power to confront and engage the status quo of 
organisation. These oppositions can be internal or external to the organisation (Van 
de Ven & Poole 1995). Internal conflicts arise when an organisation has ‘several 
conflicting goals or interesting groups competing for priority’ (Van de Ven & Poole 
1995, p. 517). External conflicts occur in case one organisation ‘pursues directions 
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that collide with the direction of other organizations’ (Van de Ven & Poole 1995). In 
addition, Nonaka and Toyama (2002) claimed that knowledge was created in 
dynamic interactions among not only individuals within an organisation but also an 
organisation and its environment ‘including competitors, customers, suppliers, 
related firms, local communities, the Government and so on’ (p. 1001). 
In line with views of these studies, this research attempted to extend the adoption of 
dialectical theory in communication to examine the conflicts in communication 
between an organisation and its environment. Specifically, within the area of 
regulating loan loss recognition, the thesis focuses on the communication between 
bank regulators from the SBV and its environment, including the Government, 
international institutions (e.g., World Bank and IMF), investors, bankers, depositors 
and financial specialists. 
Regarding the research data, the research uses a large source of published records 
about loan loss communication and other related topics. The content analysis of those 
published records is used to draw inferences. The data are manually coded and 
grouped taking into consideration developing themes or emerging patterns and 
meanings. Diagrams are prepared to link the various themes for searching emerging 
patterns, following Ryan B’s (2002) guidance. The focus of the data analysis in this 
study is to understand and explain the specific aspects to develop patterns rather than 
to produce statistical generalisations (Ryan B 2002). 
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 reviews the literature related to loan loss 
communication. It is recognized that loan loss recognition is a complicated topic with 
different approaches in international practice and how their adoption in developing 
countries can be problematic. Within the specific context of Vietnam, multiple 
conflicts are identified in regulating loan loss recognition towards international 
practices adoption that is supposed to make its communication a controversial issue. 
Chapter 3 discusses the dialectical theory and ways in which it can be applied to 
understand how bank regulators communicate with their environment (e.g., the 
Government, international institutions, investors, bankers, depositors and financial 
specialists) in resolving multiple organisational conflicts. This chapter aims to 
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present a comprehensive theoretical framework for analysing the communication of 
regulation on loan loss recognition in Vietnam from a dialectical view. 
Chapter 4 outlines the major aspects of the research methodology applied during the 
study. It includes the rationale for the interpretive paradigm, the research setting and 
research site. The method of content analysis is also presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 adopts the theoretical framework built in Chapter 3 to identify the specific 
contradictions related to regulating loan loss recognition and the manner in which the 
Government/bank regulators responded to those contradictions in communication 
with its environment. 
Chapter 6 provides the findings and their discussion, adopting the dialectical theory 
to address the research question. 
The thesis ends with Chapter 7, which presents the conclusions and a discussion on 
directions for further research. 
1.6 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter explained the foundation for the thesis. It introduced the research 
background and justified the need of research implementation. The research 
questions, research aim, research contribution, research method and the structure of 
the thesis were outlined to set the foundation to proceed the research through detailed 
descriptions. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
To understand the contentious phenomena of loan loss recognition and 
communication, Section 2.2 reviews how developments in accounting practice and 
bank regulations in terms of loan loss recognition affected loan loss recognition and 
communication. Section 2.3 examines the current literature on what is the right 
accounting for loan loss recognition. The Vietnamese-specific context is examined in 
Section 2.4 to determine how the country learned from others’ lessons by adopting 
revised regulations on loan loss recognition for improving loan loss communication. 
Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Development of Loan Loss Recognition Regulation 
This section provides a detailed discussion about the conflicts in regulating loan loss 
recognition highlighted in the current literature, which can make the recognition and 
its communication a contentious issue. Regulating loan loss recognition is a complex 
topic that plays an important role in the literature on accounting practice (Section 
2.2.1) and bank regulation (Section 2.2.2) within the two areas of asset impairment 
testing and capital adequacy process for prudentiality, respectively. Section 2.2.3 
represents how the conflict has been reconciled thus far in the current literature. 
2.2.1 Accounting practice: Asset impairment 
Within accounting practice in a bank, loan loss provision is the largest accrual that 
represents loan asset impairment loss or loan loss (Beatty & Liao 2014). Loan loss 
can differ depending on whether the backward-looking criterion (historical cost 
approach) or forward-looking criterion (fair value, often called the market value 
approach) is applied in loan classification for valuation purpose. 
In many countries, bank loans are usually classified into several groups with various 
categories of performance, such as standard (sound fundamentals), special mention 
(performing but have potential weaknesses), substandard (well-defined weaknesses), 
doubtful (collection in full is highly questionable and improbable) and loss 
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(uncollectible) (Laurin & Majnoni 2003). Traditionally, such loan classification 
worldwide is driven by NPLs (Bouvatier & Lepetit 2012b; Laurin & Majnoni 2003). 
Standard loans are those that are not yet due. The loans are commonly classified as 
special mention, substandard and doubtful if they are overdue for less than three 
months, six months and one year, respectively, and as loss if overdue for above one 
year. Although this classification solely based on the quantitative information of past 
due days, which is termed the quantitative method, is preferred owing to its simple 
implementation, it has been criticised as being backward-looking, thus being late in 
recognising loan loss and hence overvaluing loan assets (Laurin & Majnoni 2003). 
To overcome that weakness, other than past due dates, multiple qualitative criteria 
that are more forward-looking, which is commonly termed the qualitative method, 
are applied to determine the appropriate classification. According to Laurin and 
Majnoni (2003), the improvement is conducted in two different ways. Banks in 
developed countries are usually allowed to conduct loan classification themselves 
based on their complex internal models. In contrast, in many developing countries, 
bank regulators set a standard loan classification for all banks owing to the lack of 
capability to build their own internal credit rating system. 
Although adopting different criteria in bank classification, many banks converge to 
the classification of the five groups, namely, standard, special mention, substandard, 
uncollectible and loss, following the guidance in 2006 by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS). Different provision rates are applied for those groups 
and vary according to country (Laurin & Majnoni 2003). BCBS (2006a) does not 
guide the provision rate for each group. The rates of 20%, 50% and 100% are found 
commonly applied for the three groups of special mention, substandard and loss, 
respectively (Cortavarria-Checkley et al. 2000). 
Seeking to standardise loan loss recognition globally towards the fair value approach 
for earlier loan loss recognition, the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) issued IAS 39–Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (IASB 
2004) in which economic volatility was reflected in loan loss provision levels. 
Different from the traditional historical cost approach, which is driven by NPLs, loan 
loss provision under IAS 39 is determined based on a loan impairment test that 
applies the value-in-use approach. Value-in-use (or amortised cost) is the net present 
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value of a cash flow or other benefits that an asset generates for a specific owner 
under a specific use. The impairment loss on loans is determined as the difference 
between the loan’s book value and the discounted cash flow or amortised cost (IASB 
2004, para. 63). Thus, value-in-use is more forward-looking than the traditional 
historical cost approach because it focuses on future cash flows. In particular, the 
evidence of loan loss event under IAS 39 is extended to various economy volatilities 
rather than being confined to past due or default as under the traditional historical 
cost approach. IASB (2004) states that, ‘An adverse change in national or local 
economic conditions [economic volatility] … should be used as a basis for 
determining that there is a measurable decrease in their estimated cash flows’ (para. 
59). In other words, not only past due but also various economic triggers are allowed 
as an indicator that impairment loss may be present. Thus, loan loss recognition 
under IAS 39 is earlier than under the traditional historical cost approach that 
recognises impairment loss based on NPLs only (Bouvatier & Lepetit 2012b). 
In addition, impairment loss under IAS 39 comprises not only individual loan 
impairment but also group loans impairment. The recognition of group impairment 
loss is another piece of evidence supporting the earlier loan loss recognition approach 
under IAS 39 compared with traditional historical cost. When individual impairment 
cannot be identified yet, group loans impairment is required to recognise, for 
example, ‘when national or local economic conditions that correlate with defaults on 
the assets in the group’ (IASB 2004, para. 59). 
Although IAS 39, issued by IASB (2004), allowed recording loan loss earlier 
compared with the historical approach, it has two significant weaknesses. First, IAS 
39 requires the use of management judgement that is difficult to implement or verify. 
For example, a ‘loss event’ is defined as being presented by vague evidence that 
‘significant financial difficulty of the issues or obligor’ is detected (IASB 2004, para. 
59). The definition of the financial difficulty concept and the significant level of 
financial difficulty are left for banks to determine themselves. It provides bank 
management a high degree of discretion in loan loss provisioning, especially with 
debt restructuring that is not specified as a ‘loss event’ under IAS 39. Hence, it is a 
challenge for a developing country such as Vietnam to apply because its accounting 
practitioners are not experienced in accounting judgement (Phuong NC & Richard 
2011). 
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Second, while IAS 39 may appear to be forward-looking with earlier recognition of 
loans impairment, it is still based on historical cost or a variation of historical cost 
(Ryan SG 2008) because the future cash flow is estimated based on evidence of loan 
loss events that have occurred rather than future evidence (IASB 2004, para. 59) to 
ensure the reliability of asset measurement. As guided by that principle, loan loss is 
recognised in the income statements when it is probable rather than temporary (Laux 
& Leuz 2010). 
In addition, because of the same reason, the estimated cash flow is discounted using 
risk-adjusted discount rates from the time when debts are originated rather than 
current discount rates (IASB 2004, para. 63). IASB (2004) emphasises that ‘losses 
expected as a result of future events, no matter how likely, are not recognized’ (para. 
59). As a result, IAS 39 still applies the incurred model that is based on past events 
and the current condition rather than risks and losses that have not yet occurred at the 
balance sheet date even if these have a high degree of probability of occurrence. 
Thus, the issuance of IAS 39 does not satisfy the proponents of fair value, who argue 
in favour of timeliness and transparency by representing asset value at the current 
market conditions, which is reflected in fair value, for prompt corrective action (Laux 
& Leuz 2009). In addition, the proponents believe that historical cost does not inform 
the fundamental value of an asset (Laux & Leuz 2009) and fair value accounting is 
more ‘real’, and hence reduces the gap between accounting figures and economic 
measures (Young 1995). In addition to highlighting the implementation problem of 
the fair value approach, the supporters of historical cost say that the historical 
approach is suitable for loans because these are likely held until maturity rather than 
sold in the market (Laux & Leuz 2009). However, the proponents of fair value may 
counter that even when banks tend to hold loans, they may still be concerned about 
the current value of loans for taking action (Laux & Leuz 2009). The focus on the 
incurred loss model rather than expected loss of IAS 39 within accounting practices 
is also criticised by bank regulators who favour a forward-looking approach. This 
issue is discussed in the next section. 
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2.2.2 Bank regulation: Prudenciality and macro links 
Accounting standard setters and bank regulators both spend considerable time 
evaluating loan loss provision with different focuses driven by their different 
objectives (Balla & McKenna 2009; Gaston & Song 2014; Glormann 2007; Herz 
2010). While accounting standard setters focus on faithfully representing loan asset 
value up to a point of time and fairly stating impairment loss for a period (Gaston & 
Song 2014), bank regulators are responsible for ensuring financial system stability. 
These differences casue the variations in loan loss measurement. 
Accounting standard setters focus on loan loss provision as a dominant indicator in 
asset impairment, which is probably incurred rather than temporary, for the 
measurement period as aforementioned in section 2.2.1. In contrast, bank regulators 
have to align banks’ risk-taking with bank capital provision reserves, in which loan 
loss provision is a part, to ensure banks are operating in a safe and sound manner 
(Gaston & Song 2014; Glormann 2007), regardless of whether the risk has been 
incurred or not. For that purpose, the effects of future expected losses are permitted 
to be considered in an ongoing risk assessment, which may require earlier 
recognition of credit losses (Fujii & Kawai 2010). 
Further, from the bank regulation perspective, loan classification is not only the base 
for measuring loan loss provision, but also provides information on NPLs, which is a 
critical implication of bank lending quality and systematic risk (Beatty & Liao 2011; 
Bushman & Williams 2012; Iannotta & Kwan 2014). Although the notion of NPLs is 
widely used in many countries to assess bank asset quality and bank system 
prudentiality, that term is defined in different ways. NPLs can be considered 
impaired loans in some countries, while these mean past due loans in others (Laurin 
& Majnoni 2003). Nevertheless, NPLs are rather widely mentioned as more than 90 
days past due and include three groups of substandard, uncollectible and loss loans, 
which is a critical indicator for bank regulators worldwide to assess bank asset 
quality and bank system prudentiality (Cortavarria-Checkley et al. 2000; Laurin & 
Majnoni 2003). 
From this viewpoint, a more forward-looking or fair value approach is favoured for 
loan classification and loan loss recognition to ensure bank regulators have timely 
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information to monitor the current market condition before it deteriorates 
irretrievably (Laux & Leuz 2009; Young 1995). This suggests a potential conflict 
between bank regulators and accounting standard setters in the timing of loan loss 
recognition (Nicoletti 2015). Bank regulators focus on expected loss, and are thus 
forward-looking in credit risk assessment, while accounting standard setters strictly 
implement the backward-looking provisioning rules based on the incurred loss model 
required even by IAS 39. The incurred loss model under the accounting approach has 
been challenged from the bank regulation perspective by stating that it identified 
‘problem loans’ with loss already incurred rather than expected loss (Bouvatier & 
Lepetit 2012b). Specifically, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012b) argued that under the 
incurred loss model, loans are not recognised as problematic until it can document 
that a loss is probable and reasonably estimated or already incurred. From this view, 
the incurred loss model is based more on quantitative criteria of the quantitative 
method, which are likely past due dates, than on qualitative information for credit 
risk assessment, which is commonly considered a qualitative method, as also 
mentioned in Section 2.2.1. The provision of credit loss under an incurred loss model 
is a poor predictor of expected credit losses (Bouvatier & Lepetit 2012b; Harris 
2013) that are a major concern of bank regulators. 
2.2.3 Reconciliation of accounting and regulation approaches 
To reconcile the different approaches, bank regulators step in to impose additional 
provisions. For this purpose, general provision is required in many countries to 
complement the provision specifically related to each loan group as described earlier 
(specific provision) (Cortavarria-Checkley et al. 2000). While specific provision is 
made for possible loan loss that can be identified via objective evidence of past 
events and current conditions, general provision is set for possible or latent losses 
that have not yet identified but have been determined based on past loss experience 
(Cortavarria-Checkley et al. 2000). In that method of setting, general provision may 
cover a grey area between incurred loss under historical cost approach and expected 
loss under fair value approach. With that purpose, general provision is more common 
for provisioning under the historical approach and quantitative method in which 
incurred loss is measured mainly based on past due dates, thus leading to the 
omission of other losses that are more difficult to identify. The expected loss model 
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and qualitative method can identify losses more fully by assessing both quantitative 
and qualitative information related to debts via a credit rating system. 
In addition, bank regulators stipulate capital adequacy requirement, which is known 
as Basel Accords. Those regulations require commercial banks to maintain sufficient 
capital reserves to not only absorb the expected loan losses not covered by loan loss 
provision reserve under the backward-looking provisioning system, but also 
unexpected loss (Bouvatier & Lepetit 2012b). Capital adequacy requirement is 
critical for bank regulators to lower the risk of bank insolvency that can lead to 
banking system risk. In this respect, regulatory capital regulation is a bank 
specification (Beatty & Liao 2014). 
For the purpose of prudentiality, provision and capital can be used interchangeably 
(Gaston & Song 2014). To deal with the risk of lacking coverage for loan loss, bank 
regulators will consider increasing either provision or equity. Provision is preferred 
to equity because it is believed to improve loan quality transparency. As provision 
for loan loss is likely estimated inaccurately, there are banks with large equity that 
are actually weak because of the hidden underlying weakness in their loan portfolio 
(Gaston & Song 2014). If these banks make higher provision for their loan portfolio, 
it would reduce their equity. Consequently, the overstatement of capital as the result 
of insufficient provision may lead to ‘higher dividends, taxes, and a higher risk of 
insolvency later’ (Gaston & Song 2014, p. 18). 
According to Gaston and Song (2014), the option to raise capital has the advantage of 
being easier to understand for investors than increase of provision with complicated 
estimates. In addition, raising provision will have an adverse effect on credit ratings. 
The more the provision made, the lower the credit rating of the borrower, which 
increases banks’ concerns about their continued lending. 
Capital adequacy requirement is usually expressed as a CAR of equity that a bank 
must hold as a percentage of risk-weighted assets (RWA) to ensure it does not take 
on excess leverage and become insolvent (BCBS 2006a). Generally, banks are 
required to hold total capital equivalent to at least 8% of their RWA. The numerator 
of CAR comprises the primary equity capital (Tier I: equity capital, disclosed 
reserves and retained earnings) and the complementary equity capital (Tier II: 
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undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, hybrid debt or equity capital instruments 
and subordinated term debt instruments) (BCBS 2006a). A part of general provision 
can be considered Tier II capital because of its hybrid nature of incurred and 
expected loss as discussed earlier. Given the importance of retained earnings in 
determining the recorded value of equity, loan loss provision has a significant impact 
on regulatory CAR calculation. 
RWA, the dominator, is a bank’s assets net of provision (BCBS 2004, para. 52) and 
off-balance-sheet exposures, weighted according to risk. From the bank regulation 
approach, capital buffer for expected loss is based more on credit risk assessment and 
a better understanding of loan portfolio in which the higher the risk assets are, the 
higher the fraction of those assets that has to be funded with capital. 
CAR was first stipulated in Basel I (BCBS 1988) issued by the BCBS, in Basel, 
Switzerland. Under Basel I, RWA is determined principally based on the generic 
nature of the borrowers that already incorporates some limited degree of risk 
sensitivity. Specifically, Basel I is based on simplistic categories of assets (100%: 
Corporates; 20%: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development banks; 
and 0%: Sovereigns). Thus, all loans to sovereigns are risk weighted at no more than 
50% under Basel I regardless of whether the countries are in financial distress owing 
to high public debts. Alternatively, all loans to banks with a residual maturity of up to 
one year are risk weighted at 20% regardless of their low credit rating. Therefore, 
Crockett (2003) criticised Basel I, stating that it does not take account of the 
differentiation of risk for capital weighting purposes between loans with higher or 
lower credit rating. 
Basel II was introduced in 2004 (BCBS 2004) and presents a fundamental shift in 
adopting more of a risk-based approach. In addition, unlike Basel I, Basel II deals 
with not only credit risk but also operational risk and market risk (BCBS 2004, para. 
4). Basel II suggests two methods for determining capital requirements for credit 
risk: the standardised approach and internal ratings-based approach. 
Credit risk in the standardised approach is measured by external credit assessments 
set in a standardised manner (BCBS 2004, para. 50). Under this approach, capital 
requirement is differentiated based on loan credit ratings. Thus, the standardised 
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approach is expected to ‘promote the adoption of stronger risk management practices 
by banking industry’ (BCBS 2004, para. 4) to reduce the required capital level for 
lowering the cost of capital. To reduce the capital requirement, banks can require 
their customers to lower their credit risk or can restructure the lending portfolio into 
safer loans. It is advantageous in comparison to the simplistic categories of assets 
without differentiation of credit rating under Basel I. 
The alternative approach allows banks to assess credit risk by using their internal 
rating systems that are approved by bank supervisors. This method is a significant 
innovation of Basel II in its encouragement of banks to improve their credit risk 
management by developing their own internal credit rating. It is stated clearly that 
the risk weight for an asset will be 100% if it is not assessed by the internal credit 
rating system (BCBS 2004, para. 214). Thus, banks can lower their RWA by 
applying their internal credit rating system for all of their loans. Therefore, the 
internal ratings-based approach is expected to offer banks a strong motivation for 
improving their risk management (BCBS 2004, para. 4). 
Different from Basel I and the standardised approach of Basel II, expected loss can 
be measured under the internal ratings-based approach using data from the bank 
internal credit rating system. This system is expected to provide sufficient data to 
determine probability of default and the related loss given default of a loan for its 
expected loss measurement (BCBS 2006a, Section iii). Expected loss will then be 
reconciled with total eligible loan loss provision, including specific and general 
provisions (BCBS 2006a, para. 374). The difference will be deducted from Tier I and 
II capital, in case expected loss is higher, or can be recognised as Tier II capital, in 
case expected loss is lower. Hence, if the loan loss provision system under incurred 
loss model has not yet made provision for the expected loss, the capital buffer will 
cover it. 
Although it adopts more of a risk-based approach, Basel II was criticised as only 
being interested in the issue of capital adequacy, and not paying attention to the 
problem of banking system liquidity that caused many banks to become bankrupt 
during the 2008 financial crisis (Kolb 2010; Ren-Raw et al. 2013). Hence, Basel III 
was presented in 2011 to improve financial system stability by requiring commercial 
banks to meet the regulations on both liquidity and capital adequacy (BCBS 2011). 
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Capital adequacy reserve creates capital cushions for banks to survive in the long 
term, while liquidity reserve is to survive in the short term. 
Later, Basel III was also criticised for not having addressed the issue of ‘too big to 
fail’ (Lall 2012; Williams & Conley 2014). In addition, Basel III is believed to 
merely build on and further expand Basel II, thus inheriting the weaknesses of 
assessing credit risk by internal or external credit rating systems (Lall 2012). 
Particularly, the internal credit rating approach was criticised as inconsistent, because 
it may vary according to banks’ characteristics (e.g., management and quality of 
assets), and inaccurate, because banks appear to have generally limited data and 
techniques available for expected loss estimation (Beatty & Liao 2011; Bouvatier & 
Lepetit 2008, 2012a, 2012b; Bushman 2014; Bushman & Williams 2012; Clerc, 
Drumetz & Jaudoin 2001; Karacadag & Taylor 2000). 
Hence, Basel IV, as it is called by the financial industry, was proposed as a standard 
following Basel III (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
[ICAEW] 2014). The former standard is expected to require more stringent capital 
requirements and greater financial disclosure than the latter so that information users 
have more information about how bank managements are managing the environment 
volatility and uncertainty (A World Leader of the Accountancy and Finance 
Profession 2014). 
Although Basel Accords have weaknesses that need to be overcome, the combination 
of a backward-looking provisioning approach and capital buffer system under the 
internal ratings-based approach partly eliminates the difference between backward-
looking provisioning approach and capital buffer approach by reconciling expected 
loss to incurred loss. Therefore, the internal ratings-based approach is believed to 
represent a major step forward in loan loss recognition (BCBS 2006a, para. 12) since 
it meets objectives of accounting standard setters as well as bank regulators. 
However, the backward-looking provision system with capital buffer was criticised 
for having procyclicality effect. The misevaluation of expected credit risk in the 
upswing period motivates banks to grant new loans with insufficient loan loss 
provision. Hence, greater loan loss amount is recognised in the downward period, 
reducing bank earnings and capital that is intrinsically low under adverse economic 
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conditions. A low capital level potentially causes a bank to reduce its lending to 
avoid violating the minimum capital requirement regulation, thus amplifying the 
downturn owing to credit shrinking. Certain studies have observed that the 
procyclicality effect was common in the U.S. and Japanese financial crises (Beatty & 
Liao 2011; Bouvatier & Lepetit 2008, 2012a, 2012b; Bushman 2014; Bushman & 
Williams 2012). From this view in those studies, loan loss is likely not recorded in 
time under the backward loan loss provisioning system. 
To solve the procyclicality problem, a few countries (e.g., Spain, Peru, Colombia and 
Chile) have developed a dynamic provisioning system that is driven more by credit 
risk considerations (Ozili & Outa 2017; Saurina 2009). Under the dynamic system, 
loan loss provision is set higher in the boom period with low credit risk and lower in 
the burst period with high credit risk. Thus, loan loss provision is expected to be a 
countercyclical tool to mitigate the procyclicality. 
While it remains unclear whether the dynamic system reaches its desired aim in 
practice, its feasibility is questioned in several aspects, such as the difficulties in 
foreseeing business cycle development, sufficient provision buffers for a stressed 
period taking account of its variability depending on the severity and time lag of the 
recession (Ozili & Outa 2017). In addition, this approach is against the accounting 
goal of financial statement transparency in which loan loss provision reflects the 
incurred loss, under historical cost model, or expected loss, which is probable loss 
under fair value model, rather than abnormal or remote loss in a future period, which 
is difficult to foresee (Ozili & Outa 2017). The distinguishing features of incurred 
loss, expected loss and remote loss are outlined in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: Loan loss recognition 
As shown in Figure 2.1, loan loss can be classified as incurred loss, expected loss and 
remote loss based on the probability of default. Incurred loss is loss that has 
occurred, whereas expected loss is yet to occur but has a high degree of probability 
of occurring. Remote loss is the variation of expected loss with low degree of 
probability. 
The difference in loan loss provisioning between the historical cost model, fair value 
model and the dynamic model is characterised by whether all those three types of 
loss are recognised. As discussed above, in general, only incurred loss is recorded 
under historical model because that loss can be measured with reliability. That 
selection towards reliability makes this model late in loan loss recognition. Both 
incurred loss and expected loss are recognised under fair value model to reflect the 
current fundamental value of loans. Provision is made for all three losses under 
dynamic model for the purpose of counter-cyclicality. 
On comparison of the three approaches in Figure 2.1, fair value model, which is in 
between historical cost model and dynamic model, is considered a harmonisation that 
is not as extreme as the others. Consequently, many studies called for the 
implementation of a forward-looking provisioning system in which provision is made 
for expected loss, allowing banks to better absorb it, compared with the historical 
approach previously adopted, thus reducing the escalation in loan loss reserves that is 
costly in the downturn. IFRS 9–Financial Instruments was introduced to address this 
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call (IASB 2014). Under IFRS 9, loan loss provision is determined mainly using the 
forward-looking approach that recognises expected credit loss for future events 
(IASB 2014). 
In addition, the fair value model adopted in IFRS 9 is modified to moderate the 
multiple approaches of historical cost, fair value and prudenciality. The forward-
looking approach applied in IFRS 9 originated from fair value and prudenciality 
approaches. Conversely, it is limited to a certain time in future (12-month expected 
credit loss) rather than the whole asset life for low credit risk loans to ensure the 
reliability of the recognised loss as a requirement of incurred loss model under 
historical cost. 
With the introduction of IFRS 9, recognition of loan loss is now more of an art than a 
science with significant judgement for estimating expected credit loss. Loan loss 
recognition can become more debatable than ever because of its more subjective 
nature. This characteristic could be witnessed significantly even before the 
introduction of IFRS 9 in that loan loss provision is widely considered an optimal 
managerial tool for accounting manipulation (Greenawalt & Sinkey 1988; 
Karimiyana, Alifiah & Nasserinia2014). This issue was solved by the introduction of 
IFRS 7–Financial Instruments: Disclosures, with several amendments until 2011 
(IASB 2011) to enhance the disclosure of financial instruments in which bank loan 
loss recognition is a part. 
On adopting IFRS 7 in terms of loan loss recognition, banks are required to disclose 
the information that enables users to evaluate ‘the effect of credit risk on the amount, 
timing and uncertainty of future cash flows’ (IASB 2011, para. 35B). Together with 
IFRS 9, which is more forward-looking, IFRS 7 required disclosure of information 
related to expected credit losses to mitigate the uncertainty of the forward-looking 
approach in loan loss recognition. In particular, a bank needs to disclose its credit 
risk management practices and their impact on expected loss recognition and 
measurement (IASB 2011, para. 32B(a)). The disclosed information is both 
quantitative and qualitative to evaluate expected credit losses (IASB 2011, para. 
32B(b)). 
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However, all of these efforts are still questionable in many respects. From the 
accounting perspective, since fair value measurement requires a significant extent of 
judgement that can be utilised to justify manipulation, it is uncertain whether fair 
value accounting is ‘indeed providing transparency’ (Laux & Leuz 2009, p. 5). 
Regulators wonder whether the disclosure of fair value or market value in a distress 
period can lead banks and firms to undesirable actions that worsen the situation 
(Laux & Leuz 2009, p. 5). In terms of bank loans, receiving a concerning signal from 
such disclosure, bank managers rationally tend to be more pessimistic in loan review 
and classification. Thus, they would increase loan loss provision and reduce lending, 
thus lowering bank profit (Laux & Leuz 2009). If the depression is prolonged, bank 
capital will deteriorate, leading to bankruptcy. 
Therefore, it is debatable whether not only historical accounting contributes to 
procyclicality as described above but also fair value approach. In short, the cause and 
effect of historical and fair value approaches in terms of procyclicality remain 
indeterminate. The forward-looking approach applied in IFRS is limited to 12 
months, as aforementioned, considering the procyclicality effect of fair value 
approach. 
In addition to the procyclicality effect, loan classification, valuation and provision 
can be direct or indirectly linked to the Government’s concern on macro effects 
(Chahed 2014; Cortavarria-Checkley et al. 2000) that makes these the subjects of 
macro debates. The NPL amount and ratio are increasingly considered an indicator of 
national financial security (Cortavarria-Checkley et al. 2000). Regarding national 
monetary policy, the credit volume of the economy is determined based on loan 
classification and provisioning, which reflect the quality of the country’s credit 
growth (Cortavarria-Checkley et al. 2000). On the fiscal side, a supportive or 
restrictive tax treatment of provisions can increase or weaken banks’ incentives to 
make adequate provisions (Cortavarria-Checkley et al. 2000). The Government is 
concerned about loan loss recognition not only in the local country, but also as a 
challenge of global competition (Chahed 2014). 
In general, it is likely that accounting is not the only element in the universe of loan 
loss recognition. In addition to banks, accounting professionals, bank supervisors and 
other government agencies (e.g., finance department and tax officers) are also 
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concerned, from their own perspectives, about how bank loans are classified and 
valued and provisions made. Hence, what is the ‘right’ accounting for loan loss 
recognition considering all its relationships to other elements as described above? 
The next section reviews the current literature on this aspect. 
2.3 ‘Right’ Accounting for Loan Loss 
It is obvious that loan loss recognition has implications not only for banks but also 
for the entire society. Its meaning lies in the accounting role that creates ways in 
which an organisation or individual ‘may be thought about, controlled and directed, 
and acted upon’ (Potter 2005, p. 266). Hence, multiple actors, such as accountants, 
bank regulators and other government agencies, determine the selection activity of a 
loan loss accounting treatment. A regulatory space is formed (Young 1995) in which 
those actors alter the way loan loss is recognised for their own variable purposes. 
Young (1995) defines the regulatory space as follows: 
An abstract conceptual space constructed by people, organizations and events that 
act upon accounting and accounting practices. Within this space, various actors 
discuss, analyze and contest accounting practices and methods. These actors 
produce the accounting standards, regulations and conventions that govern 
accounting measurement and classification. (p. 57) 
By examining how accounting was changed during the savings and loan crisis, 
Young (1995) argued that accounting cannot be made right but can be constructed 
within a particular regulatory space. Specifically, Young (1995) found that the 
change process occurred during four stages of a crisis. Before the crisis, accounting 
was designed to ‘reveal’ the financial health of savings and loans organisations and 
to provide useful information for regulatory decision-making. During the first part of 
the crisis, accounting was revised to ‘conceal’ the financial condition of the entities 
and justify regulatory inaction to purchase time for the organisations to work through 
their problem. Despite those efforts, the situation did not improve and time was 
running out. In the second part of crisis, accounting was altered again to reveal 
organisational solvency. After the crisis, accounting was set to show not only the 
organisational financial condition but also to discipline the regulator rather than 
being a regulatory tool. The function of disciplining the regulators is formed by 
implementing market value accounting, which removes some regulatory discretion. 
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With these findings, Young (1995) concluded that during the financial crisis, the 
meaning of ‘right’ accounting shifted in various ways depending on how the power 
was allocated to the actors in the space. Prominent among the actors in the regulatory 
space of the savings and loan crisis were regulators. It is because as bank supervisors, 
bank regulators have the authority to establish accounting regulations for the banking 
industry (Braithwaite, Baxter & Harper 1998, Young 1995). 
Particularly, according to Young (1995), during the first part of the crisis, the bank 
regulators impeded free market control by allowing weak banks to continue 
operating. Their accounting figures were concealed for this purpose. When the crisis 
was becoming severe, more and more individuals and entities (e.g., Congress, 
academics, accountant and business press) entered the regulatory space to form 
another change process of loan loss recognition. Then, market control was enforced 
once again to discipline those weak banks that could not recover. That desire led to 
the change in accounting to reveal those banks’ weak performance. The revealed 
figures can be used to justify regulatory intervention in bank operations. In addition, 
those numbers may be used in the policy process to obtain the support of the 
industry, Congress or public. 
Further, it is believed that bank regulators must improve their performance to prevent 
crises and further bailouts in the future (Young 1995). For that purpose, bank 
regulators must be ‘subject to the discipline of the market’ (Young 1995, p. 75). 
Accounting moving towards market value in loss recognition is a response to this 
issue. Market value is more objective and is thus expected to remove the subjectivity 
of bank regulators in the loss judgement process. ‘The call to the market is also a call 
to reinject discipline into the regulatory process’ (Young 1995, p. 74). 
That change pattern is consistent with Young’s (1994) argument that an accounting 
change results from a social issue when it is constructed as an accounting problem. 
During that process, the actors ‘construct or defend their own version of a right 
accounting and criticize the efforts of others’ (Young 1995, p. 57). ‘Right’ 
accounting can be that which conceals or reveals the organisational financial 
condition. In addition, it can be a tool to discipline either organisations or regulators. 
Thus, accounting has travelled from solving issues (e.g., revealing financial health) to 
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addressing other aspects (e.g., disciplining regulators) rather than being improved to 
reach a right accounting that is ‘out there’. 
In short, by studying the accounting changes in the savings and loan crisis, Young 
(1995) has highlighted the regulatory space in which accounting change, particularly 
bank accounting regulation, is the outcome of the interaction among actors there. 
However, he has not yet identified clearly how such accounting issues originate in a 
specific context (Potter 2005). 
Chahed (2014) partly bridged that gap by investigating ‘the conditions of possibility 
for innovation in regulatory space’ (p. 1) through assessing the narrative reporting of 
the British Accounting Standards Board. By raising questions about the ‘emergence 
of new agenda issues in the first place’ (p. 8), Chahed (2014) described the 
accounting standard-setting progression as a multidirectional procedure of translating 
a particular issue into an accounting problem. 
Particularly, Chahed (2014) claimed that accounting can be changed in one direction 
such that a new accounting technique emerges to reflect the change of its social and 
historical foundations. In another direction, accounting can be revised to support the 
administration of the government in implementing its policy targets, such as 
economic efficiency, economic growth or modernisation. Third, accounting change 
can occur as the result of translating the normalisation of accounting practices across 
organisations or national boundaries in institutional environments. Finally, the 
regulation of accounting practices is a combination of all these three directional 
processes of translation. 
Accounting regulation reform occurs in ‘an area in which accounting and the sphere 
of government are brought together’ (Chahed 2014). Chahed (2014) described the 
reform process as follows: 
A combination of ‘push’ and ‘pull’—push from powerful actors exercising 
pressure on standard setters to advance their own interests; pull from standard 
setters seeking to maintain their legitimacy in politically or economically difficult 
environments. (p. 25) 
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Within that pattern, accounting is believed to not change incrementally on the 
assumption of linearity but more haphazardly as a tinkering, that is, patching with no 
quick-fix process (Chahed 2014). 
By reviewing the literature on the interconnections between accounting and the social 
control, Walker (2016) called for further research about these interactions. Consistent 
with Chahed (2014), Walker (2016) emphasised that ‘accounting was to be 
understood in the context of the distribution of power in society and sets of social 
relations characterised by class conflict’ (p. 43). 
Bischof, Daske and Sextroh (2017) partly addressed this gap by examining how fair 
value accounting was constructed by the political incentives of regulators and the 
special interests of related firms during the 2008 financial crisis. Consistent with 
Young’s (1995) findings, Bischof, Daske and Sextroh (2017) argued that a strong 
ideological view of the government might spill over to the loan loss recognition 
debate and orient its accounting treatment. According to Bischof, Daske and Sextroh 
(2017), in the 2008 financial crisis, politicians who gave prominence to increasing 
the role of government wished to stop bank bankruptcy by a bailout. The 
conservatives, who support the free market process and are against government 
intervention, opposed that solution. 
However, in fall 2008, it was commonly believed that a wealth transfer to the 
troubled banks was clearly unavoidable to obtain financial stability. To overcome the 
ideological conflict, the conservatives relaxed the fair value accounting rules to offer 
financial institutions a way to reduce the risk of breaching regulatory capital 
requirement and avoid a governmental bailout. Hence, the weakness of financial 
health was concealed temporarily to avoid a bailout. Given such changes in 
accounting, financial institutions could maintain their regulatory capital at a low cost, 
which is similar to receiving a wealth transfer but ‘less visible to the general public’ 
(Bischof, Daske & Sextroh 2017, p. 6). Hence, Bischof, Daske and Sextroh (2017) 
asserted that a political ideology, especially the belief about the role of government 
and market, could establish an accounting treatment. 
This understanding partly explains why the regulation space is more crowded by 
regulators in a financial crisis and why bank regulators have the power to influence 
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the patterns of accounting change. However, further research is still needed to 
understand how the variety of actors in the regulatory space arrive at an agreement 
on an accounting change (Chahed 2014, p. 13) that reveals or informs some elements 
and conceals or disinforms others. 
Kane (2000) studied the transparency conflict of information and disinformation in 
loan loss communication on the U.S. savings and loans by linking the four ideas of 
banking crises, misregulation, disinformation and dialectical change. The study 
described the dialectical change through the struggle between the warring forces of 
information and disinformation about banking system income and net worth. 
According to Kane (2000), that change determined ‘the timing and depth of 
individual banking crises’ (p. 286). 
Kane (2000) defined disinformation as efforts to ‘convince news media to publish’ 
‘false or half-true information’ (p. 286) to ‘trick less-informed individuals into 
drawing false conclusion’ (p. 287). That disinformation distorted the efficacy of 
banking regulation, thus inducing a troubled bank into insolvency rather than solving 
the banking crisis (Kane 2000). 
According to Kane (2000), the disinformation started from banks to cover their 
financial weaknesses. Classification and making provisions mainly based on the 
schedule of payments was blamed for facilitating the delay in loan loss 
communication to the public (Kane 2000). Specifically, under this accounting 
system, a loan was identified as an NPL when it was commonly overdue 90 days or 
more (Kane 2000). At that time, banks had bad loans whereas the regulators tolerated 
these loans owing to many reasons, such as inadequate information, defective 
analysis and competitive pressure (Kane 2000). 
Later, when financial stress increased to the extent that it started to expose banking 
financial weaknesses, the Government or regulators deliberately disinformed or 
communicated half-true information about the loss because they were sensitive to 
public criticism about their weak supervision performance (Kane 2000). The 
disinformation of loss was possible by influencing bank managers to make numerous 
loans at inappropriately low interest rates to revive NPLs. Those politically directed 
loans were booked at par as a good loan whereas they were actually bad loans. 
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By that lending and disinformation mechanism, the loss was compounded over time 
until it was too large, thus creating doubt whether the Government could provide 
financial aid to absorb the banks’ losses fully. At that time, a silent run was triggered 
by the withdrawal of financially aware large depositors. When a silent run spreads 
over the banking system, ‘the information it produces challenges bank and regulatory 
disinformation’ (Kane 2000, p. 299). The benefit of disinformation was then reversed 
by an increase in credibility gap that amplified the severity of the banking crisis. 
Although Kane (2000) analysed the accounting change specifically in loan loss 
recognition and communication, his findings have not yet explained clearly why loan 
loss recognition and communication become a contentious issue. Kane (2000) has 
not yet investigated the conflicts among bank regulators and other actors in the 
regulation space and the ways in which the conflicts are settled so that they arrive at 
an agreement regarding the information or disinformation. Focusing on the conflicts 
and their conciliation can reveal the contention in several ways; for example: Who 
are the actors? What are their interests? How do those interests conflict with each 
other? Who are the actors with the power to influence the response? What are the 
types of responses to the conflicts? This knowledge is necessary to understand the 
contention and find the way to solve it. 
Although the answers to these questions can vary in different contexts, the shared 
experiences and lessons can be suggestions for responding to contradictions in a 
specific context. From this point of view, the study of the controversial issue in loan 
loss recognition and communication in Vietnam partly bridges the current literature 
gap. For this purpose, the next section discusses how the current literature studies 
loan loss recognition and communication in Vietnam, particularly the transparency 
conflict of information and disinformation. 
2.4 The Specific Context of Vietnam 
In the context of Vietnam, the current literature mainly focuses on the impact of the 
culture factor on the degree to which IFRS standards are adopted. Chu (2004) sought 
to explore in detail the determinants of the accounting change process in the 
Vietnamese transition economy focusing on Vietnamese culture, the role of 
Government and socialist ideology. The data were collected using the ethnography 
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method, participant observation and in-depth interviews. The investigation found that 
socialist ideology and Vietnamese culture have had a critical impact on the 
accounting change in Vietnam. 
However, adopting a political economy approach to analyse the concepts and related 
literature, Phuong NC and Richard (2011) argued that scholars paid too much 
attention to the differences between Anglo-Saxon private accounting and socialist 
accounting. In fact, overall, socialist accounting was similar to its Western Anglo-
Saxon counterpart: capitalist accounting at the service of bureaucrats seeking to 
maximise their wealth within the framework of state capitalism. 
From this view, the transformation of the accounting system generated some 
difficulties owing to the adaption of a private capitalist accounting system to function 
in a state-capitalism accounting system. According to Phuong NC and Richard 
(2011), the difficulties in transformation stemmed from the contradictions between 
the internationalisation of Vietnamese accounting and the socialist stance. They can 
be summarised into three conflicting issues related to politics, globalisation and 
transformation that characterise the specific context of Vietnam. It is proposed that 
these three conflicts underlie the transparency conflict of information and 
disinformation (or reveal and conceal) in loan loss recognition and communication in 
Vietnam. The struggles related to these conflicts in accounting transformation can be 
expected to explain why loan loss recognition and communication has been a 
contentious issue in the Vietnamese-specific context. 
2.4.1 Political conflicts: Government vs. market control 
The political conflict identified was that the Government ‘continues to affirm its 
commitment to state control over the economy’ while developing a Western market 
economy model that considered the Government just a ‘market facilitator’ (Phuong 
NC & Richard 2011, p. 708). That difference created a conflict in designing the 
Vietnamese accounting system because an accounting system emphasises ‘the needs 
of the state’ since the Government’s desire ‘must be significantly different from a 
system that focuses on the needs of investors in equity’ as in a Western model 
(Phuong NC & Richard 2011, p. 719). 
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Specifically, the Government would like to maintain the particularities of the current 
accounting system to serve its tight control over the economy. While developing a 
new accounting system towards market control, the regulators have always sought 
ways to maintain the accounting function in helping the Government to ‘control 
wealth distribution, calculate tax, and implement rewards and punishments’ (Phuong 
NC & Richard 2011, p. 719). The maintaining of those objectives concurrently in 
designing the Vietnamese accounting system ‘can harm operational management and 
the quality of accounting information’ (Phuong NC & Richard 2011, p. 720). 
The most significant challenge in adopting the new accounting system was found in 
the Vietnamese SOE sector because it differs substantially from SOEs in ‘pure 
capitalist countries’ (Phuong NC & Richard 2011, p. 718). Specifically, the 
Vietnamese SOEs were imposed by the state to provide public services apart from 
their commercial function as other enterprises. It created difficulties in applying the 
same accounting system for all of the Vietnamese SOEs with different operational 
objectives. 
2.4.2 Globalisation conflict: Separation vs. integration 
The globalisation conflict in accounting has become a major issue since 1998 when 
Vietnam was forced by foreign institutions (e.g., World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank) to adopt IAS as a critical requisite for receiving financial aid and 
participating in the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Phuong NC & Richard 2011). 
Nguyen Loc, Hooper and Sinclair (2013) also emphasised that foreign institutions are 
new players arriving in the accounting field. These are the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and WTO, which are representatives of overseas investors and 
resources, and thus ‘possess much of the capital both symbolic and economic’ 
(Nguyen Loc, Hooper & Sinclair 2013). Foreign institutions were considered a 
powerful party confronting the Government, and their power emerged from 
Vietnam’s internalisation need of international assistance in capital and technology 
for its Doi Moi policy. The adoption of international accounting practices is a critical 
requisite to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). 
In particular, the conflict was presented in two aspects of local needs that confronted 
the global integration requirements. First, the Government needs to maintain the 
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particularities of Vietnam’s current accounting system for multiple objectives rather 
than just the accounting function as aforementioned. 
Second, Vietnam lacks competent personnel to implement the globalisation in 
accounting. According to Phuong NC and Richard (2011), for a long time, 
Vietnamese accountants have been accustomed to complying with a unified 
accounting system that ‘makes statements clear to state agencies and results in more 
efficient state management’ (p. 717). As a result, they ‘have weak professional 
judgement, have a technical mindset and would like to minimise fluctuations in 
accounting practices’ (p. 718). That lack of qualified accounting professional trained 
in the context of a market economy was an obstacle for adopting international 
standards, including concepts and principles that require a high degree of 
professional judgement to apply in practice. 
2.4.3 Transformation conflict: Stability vs. change 
Change versus stability was another conflict in the accounting transformation in 
Vietnam. According to Phuong NC and Richard (2011), ‘this process has been 
shaped by the tensions and power relationship between moderate and radical 
reformers and the interaction of their reform strategies’ (p. 694). The moderate 
reformers preferred to reform at a gradual and steady speed to ensure stability, 
whereas the radical called for significant change with more radical or speedy reforms 
(Phuong NC & Richard 2011). Thus, by considering reform stability and quality, 
both groups struggled over ‘the direction, extent, pace and depth of reforms’ rather 
than whether the reform should be implemented (Phuong NC & Richard 2011, p. 
707). 
In addition, for making the change, the reformers had to approach not only the 
conservatives in the Party but also the Vietnamese accountants who ‘would like to 
minimise fluctuations in accounting practices’ (Phuong NC & Richard 2011, p. 718). 
Nguyen Loc, Hooper and Sinclair (2013) studied whether Vietnamese accounting 
practitioners resisted or changed towards IFRS adoption from Bourdieu’s perspective 
of the ‘habitus’ in which ‘the push by these Anglo-Saxon institutions into Vietnam is 
not so much about progress as about power and domination’ (p. 5). 
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Nguyen Loc, Hooper and Sinclair (2013) claimed that the Communist Party 
dominated the Vietnamese accounting field, which thus enabled the party to establish 
the rules of the game. Vietnamese accountants and bookkeepers were dominated, 
thus being familiar with accepting ‘uniformity systems and procedures’ (p. 9) with 
‘greater emphasis placed on compliance as against disclosure’ (p. 9) that formed 
their ‘habitus’ of compliance. Considering that ‘habitus’, Nguyen Loc, Hooper and 
Sinclair (2013) conducted 44 semi-structured interviews in which bookkeepers and 
others, including accountants and academics, were asked about their ‘feelings and 
thoughts on the possibility of change’ (p. 2) towards IFRS adoption. The study found 
that Vietnamese bookkeepers tended to resist the change. The ‘habitus’ of 
compliance formed under the domination of the Communist Party can explain that 
behaviour (Nguyen Loc, Hooper & Sinclair 2013) 
According to Nguyen Loc, Hooper and Sinclair (2013), the accounting field in 
Vietnam is an arena of conflict between the dominant and the dominated. The 
Government agencies are the dominant because they hold the majority part of ‘the 
capital both symbolic and economic’ (p. 5). Bourdieu (cited in Nguyen Loc, Hooper 
& Sinclair 2013, p. 14) defined symbolic capital as ‘credit founded on credence or 
belief or recognition’. That credit ‘enables forms of domination which imply 
dependence on those who can be dominated by it’ (Nguyen Loc, Hooper & Sinclair 
2013, p. 15). Nguyen Loc, Hooper and Sinclair (2013) asserted that the Vietnamese 
Government can ‘maintain tight control on every aspect of life because it enjoys the 
recognition, belief, esteem and confidence of the people’ (p. 15) in addition to its 
control of large economic capital via SOEs. 
The dominated are the accountants and bookkeepers in the country because they do 
not ‘belong to an independent profession’ (Nguyen Loc, Hooper & Sinclair 2013, p. 
14). Nguyen Loc, Hooper and Sinclair (2013) believed that the dominant–dominated 
relationship created the habitus of compliance in which the accountants and 
bookkeepers would like to just focus on complying with the state regulations rather 
than actively provide quality information to public by following international 
standards. 
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2.4.4 Relationship between conflict issues 
Piotroski and Wong’s (2012) study of behaviours of listed firms in China can be 
considered a complement to Nguyen Loc, Hooper and Sinclair’s (2013) claim since 
the former described in more detail the causal link between government control and 
the quality of accounting information. Specifically, Piotroski and Wong (2012) 
provided evidence and discussed several effects of how the domination of 
Government harmed the quality of information disclosed to public, and thus reduced 
market control in China. They revealed the effects as ranging from the reduction in 
the demand of both state and creditors to the quality of external financial reports 
from firms. Another effect is the decrease in firms’ motivation to disclose that 
information to public. 
In detail, from the perspective of the state, the state’s control of the majority of 
Chinese firms gave the state a private channel for information reporting, thus 
reducing the state’s demand of quality public information from firms. In addition, 
using only public financial information was insufficient for the Government’s need. 
The state, as the majority owner, had the incentive to manage the firms directly, with 
multiple economic, social and political objectives. Therefore, the state did not rely 
solely on public financial information on firm-level profit for monitoring and 
assessing the firm’s performance. It reduced the demand for high-quality external 
financial reports. Further, even the state could suppress the incentives of firms to 
provide information to the public market because the state-controlled firms are a part 
of the state asset management bureau. The bad news disclosed from those firms 
could ruin the state’s prestige as regards its management ability. 
In the view of creditors, the state-controlled firms were rarely in bankruptcy because 
the state would bail them out in financial distress. This implicit insurance from the 
state directed the depositors and creditors to pay more attention on the firm’s political 
background apart from the firm’s financial condition, and thus reduced the need of 
high-quality public information from the firms. In addition, the state, rather than 
other creditors, provided firms the prevalence of debt with its private information 
channel for monitoring the firms’ financial condition. 
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In addition to the low demand for high-quality public information from both state and 
creditors, the firms also had low incentives to supply that information owing to the 
state’s strong control of capital markets, relying on simple accounting targets. In a 
weak legal environment, firms intended to manage accounting realisation to reach 
regulation targets. Because just some areas of Piotroski and Wong (2012) 
propositions were tested in China, it reveals a need of more testing in Vietnam with a 
similar political environment. 
Despite the study of Piotroski and Wong (2012) being conducted on the Chinese 
market, it can be a complement to not only the study of Nguyen Loc, Hooper and 
Sinclair (2013) but also that of Phuong NC and Richard (2011). In particular, it 
enlightens how the Government control over accounting regulation restrained the 
adoption of international standards, thus challenging the transformation. Hence, it 
implies from those studies that three issues, politics, globalisation and 
transformation, are closely related. 
Several proposals can be made about their complicated relationship in the 
Vietnamese context by combining those three studies. The transformation was 
problematic because of both politics and globalisation issues. Simultaneously, both 
transformation and globalisation were political determinations. Concurrently, the 
transformation was necessary for globalisation. Moreover, the political issue was a 
challenge for globalisation. Therefore, their related conflicts of Government control–
market control, separation–integration and stability–change were proposed to be 
closely related. 
In addition, all of those three conflicts can be related to the transparency conflict of 
information and disinformation in accounting that was found in both the U.S. 1980s 
savings and loan crisis and the 2008 international financial crisis, as discussed in 
Section 2.3. For example, according to Kane (2000), the Government can disinform 
loan loss to hide the low performance of the state policy. The separation of 
accounting regulation in Vietnam can disinform loan loss from the world. The 
information of loan loss to the public can trigger a bank run and then a banking crisis 
(Kane 2000), thus threatening the stability in Vietnam. 
46 
Hence, the complicated relationships among the four issues and their conflicts are 
expected to explain the contention in the communication for solving those conflicts 
in Vietnam as mentioned in the summarised Table 2.1. 
The Government or regulators in the Vietnamese context were believed to struggle 
with four conflicts—market control, separation–integration, stability–change and 
information–disinformation—in regulating loan loss recognition to transform for 
globalisation while at the same time preserving the tight control of the Government 
over the economy. The disinformation of loan loss to public can be both a result of, 
and a means to, react to those conflicts. It was proposed that the contention in loan 
loss recognition and communication in the Vietnamese context resulted from the 
dynamic interplay between the opposing forces of those four conflicts. 
Table 2.1 Proposed conflicts in loan loss communication of regulators 
Issues Conflicts Communication among 
Politics 
Government vs. Market 
control: Accounting 
regulation serves Government 
or market control 
Government/regulators and public 
(e.g., management, investors, 
depositors and international 
institutions) 
Globalisation 
Separation vs. Integration: 
Accounting regulation serves 
local needs or adopts 
international standards 
Government/regulators and 
international institutions 
Transformation 
Stability vs. Change: 
Moderation for stability or 
acceleration in accounting 
regulation change process 
Radical reformers and moderate 
reformers (among Government 
officers/regulators) 
Transparency 
Information vs. 
Disinformation: Bank 
accounting regulations are 
changed for information or 
disinformation 
Government/regulators and public 
(e.g., investors, depositors and 
international institutions) 
Particularly, the conflict of Government control–market control underlines the issue 
with Vietnamese politics. Banks in Vietnam exist in a world of two colliding forces, 
government control and market control, which is called the market economy with 
socialism orientation. The mixture of Government control and market control, which 
are opposites, serves the need of free market development while maintaining the 
monopoly control of the Communist Party in capital allocation. For that purpose, the 
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Government or regulators have to communicate with the public, especially bank 
management, to seek ways to maintain this specificity in designing and implementing 
the new regulations on loan loss recognition. 
The conflict of separation–integration arose from the global integration issue in 
which the Government/regulators desires to integrate the local regulation with that 
worldwide to attract foreign capital investment and trade with international markets 
to fulfil the local market economy development objective. Meanwhile, bank 
regulators tend to resist the adoption of international standards to protect domestic 
entities of which the maintenance of Government control is critical. These colliding 
forces are external to the Vietnamese economy in the situation that the domestic 
drivers compete with the international drivers for dominating the economy. The 
Government/regulators interacted with foreign institutions for responding to this 
conflict. 
The conflict of stability–change is related to the transformation issue. The 
Government/regulators debated with each other to consider the speed and scope of 
the transformation process for increasing the change while considering the economic, 
social and political stability. 
The conflict of information–disinformation arises from the transparency issue. The 
Government/regulators struggle between information and disinformation on loan loss 
in communicating with the public in regulating loan loss recognition to reach its 
different desires. 
Those issues and their related conflicts are yet to be examined jointly in the current 
literature to understand the whole picture of loan loss recognition and communication 
and the roots of the contentious issue in the specific context of Vietnam. For 
example, Phuong NC and Richard (2011) and Nguyen Loc, Hooper and Sinclair 
(2013) focused only on how Government control limited market control in 
accounting practices. The other directions, namely, that the limitation of market 
control can harm Government control, is not yet examined to provide a rich story 
about the conflict between Government control and market control in which both 
poles can be interdependent. 
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In addition, Phuong NC and Richard (2011) claimed that the transformation in 
Vietnam was a relative success with ‘a very cautious and clever accounting policy’ 
(p. 720) by adopting a compromise response to the conflicts above. Yet, they were 
concerned that a compromise response could harm operational management and the 
quality of accounting information without discussion or examination of how the 
compromise response could cause the destruction. On consideration of that possible 
detrimental effect, Phuong NC and Richard (2011) emphasised that the future of the 
accounting situation in Vietnam was less certain, although it seemed to be under 
control until that time despite the contradictions. This proposition needs to be tested 
as well. 
In short, bridging the aforementioned gaps in the literature on loan loss recognition 
and communication about its related conflicts is expected to aid in understanding 
why it is a contentious issue in Vietnam with various participants of Congress, bank 
regulators, bankers, foreign organisations and business press as described in Chapter 
1. That feature is prominent in Vietnam where banking is one of the most sensitive 
areas in which economic and political changes are closely related (Vo Van Thanh 
2006). This is because the banking industry accounts for the majority of lending 
activities in the market economy while it is predominantly state-controlled. These 
characteristics are discussed in detail in Section 4.4. 
Studying the accounting regulation change from this political economy perspective is 
interesting and insightful (Ezzamel & Xiao 2011). According to Ezzamel and Xiao 
(2011), ‘Many studies have examined accounting changes from a technical 
perspective while neglecting political, ideological and social changes that are part, or 
determinants, of accounting change’ (p. 635). 
Considering the unique aspects of Vietnam and its banking industry, an examination 
of the loan loss communication requires a theoretical lens that captures the conflicts 
in contextual complexities and recognises how those conflicts are responded to by 
examining their related communication. For that purpose, Nonaka and Toyama 
(2002) suggested a dialectical perspective that stresses the importance of the 
interplay between the conflicting forces to an organisation in its environment. To the 
author’s knowledge, the present study is the first attempt to apply dialectical theory 
in investigating the change process of loan loss recognition. It is expected to partly 
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answer the call of Walker (2016) for broadening the theoretical apparatus to interpret 
accounting change in relation to society. The dialectical theory is discussed in the 
next chapter to build the theoretical framework for studying the communication 
related to regulating loan loss recognition in the specific context of Vietnam. 
That approach partly answers the call of Ezzamel and Xiao (2011) for ‘a more 
detailed examination of the dynamics in the process of change’ on how ‘the political 
and ideological factors’ affected the choices of accounting change and how ‘the new 
capitalist concepts and techniques’ were interpreted and customised to respond to the 
conflicts in a specific context (p. 635). In doing so, ‘the accounting change process 
would be portrayed as non-linear, dynamic and problematic rather than necessarily 
smooth’ (Ezzamel & Xiao 2011, p. 635). 
2.5 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the current literature related to loan loss recognition and 
communication. In general, loan loss recognition and communication can be 
contentious because of two reasons. First, loan loss recognition has become 
increasingly complicated in practice with different approaches within accounting 
practice and bank regulation. To reconcile the differences, more discretion in loan 
loss recognition and disclosures has been allowed, which can cause loan loss 
communication to become a contentious issue in the Vietnamese context in which 
accountants are more familiar with rule-based accounting rather than using 
professional judgement. 
Second, no ‘right’ accounting has been identified for loan loss recognition in practice 
so far. Indeed, accounting has been changed following interactions among multiple 
actors for their own interests in a regulatory space. Generally, it makes an accounting 
change continuously debatable. The debate can be fiercer with more actors entering 
the regulatory space when a crisis becomes more severe. It can be more problematic 
in Vietnam as a transitional country that adopts the international standards from 
developed countries within its specific context. Specifically, the Vietnamese 
accounting field is characterised by forces and struggles between the 
Government/regulators with the public, including business management, creditors, 
depositors, foreign institutions and specialists. Within that field, loan loss 
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communication can become contentious when the Government/regulators struggle to 
respond to multiple conflicts at the same time. 
Therefore, it was suggested that loan loss communication in Vietnam should be 
studied deeply in its specific context to understand its specific context outcomes. The 
organisation behaviours in responding to those conflicts on an ongoing basis can be 
examined from the lens of dialectical perspective. This content is discussed in the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
This section reviews prior studies to set the theoretical framework applying 
dialectical theory for understanding how the Vietnamese Government/bank 
regulators communicated with other parties in its environment in regulating loan loss 
recognition. The dialectical theory is applied in this research to understand regulating 
loan loss recognition as a dynamic process of dialectical contradictions and thus is 
expected to provide a better complete picture of loan loss communication in 
Vietnam. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 provide an overview of the dialectical theory in the 
existing literature as the background for the theory application. Section 3.4 proposes 
the theoretical framework for understanding loan loss communication in the specific 
context of Vietnam. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Organisational Change: A Dialectical View 
According to Benson (1977), organisations continue to change as a part of the social 
world with changes in their major features, such as goals, structure arrangements, 
technology and relations. Those organisational arrangements are continuously 
maintained or reproduced in the process of social construction beset by 
contradictions that cause divergent and incompatible production. That phenomenon 
is also found in Vietnam through the continuous change of regulation on loan loss 
recognition. That seemingly nonstop transformation process has resulted in 
substantial controversy, which the present study suggests is underlined by multiple 
contradictions as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Dialectical theory calls attention to the search for underlying principles of the 
emergence and dissolution of organisational arrangements process by 
dereifying established social patterns and structures—points out their arbitrary 
character, undermines their sense of inevitability, uncovers the contradictions and 
limits of the present order, and reveals the mechanisms of transformation. (Benson 
1977, p. 6) 
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In terms of the transformation process of regulation on loan loss recognition, 
dialectical theory, therefore, is expected to assist in uncovering the contradiction and 
searching for the change patterns and change process, and then offering explanations 
for the present controversy on loan loss recognition. 
In that way, studying an organisation from a dialectical approach is different from 
using a conventional approach. From the conventional view, organisational 
arrangements are examined through scientific categories and theories that have been 
accepted by participants (Benson 1977). Instead, the dialectical theory studies the 
entanglement of those categories and theories in those organisational arrangements 
(Benson 1977). Within this research, the dialectical view is applicable to understand 
the entanglement of regulation on loan loss recognition. Particularly, the study 
examined how accounting theories were interpreted and regulated in a specific 
context rather than assessing how loan loss was recognised in a country from the 
view of commonly accepted theories (e.g., IFRS). The dialectical theory can examine 
the continuous reconstruction of loan loss-related concepts rather than the application 
of commonly accepted concepts. These pieces of knowledge are expected to equip 
bank regulators with the understanding of separate, dynamic environments and the 
suggestions to respond actively to changes. 
As stated by Benson (1977), a dialectical view of study is driven by an application of 
four basic principles: social construction, totality, contradiction and praxis. Human 
beings continuously reconstruct the social world when they interact with each other, 
and then establish various social patterns and arrangements (social construction). 
However, the human creation of social structure is conducted within a social context, 
thus being influenced and constrained by the context. That dialectical relationship 
makes social construction a complex process with the intertwinement of its 
components. From this feature of dialectical theory, social construction is expected to 
explain the interconnection between accounting and its environment that constituted 
the complicated change process in regulating loan loss recognition in Vietnam. 
Considering the social construction of organisational change, Benson (1977) 
suggested studying the transformation of social structures with ‘attention to their 
multiple interconnections’ and ‘any particular structure is always seen as part of a 
larger, concrete whole rather than as an isolated, abstract phenomenon’ (p. 3). It is 
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the principle of totality (Benson 1977). In accordance with this principle, the change 
process of accounting in Vietnam should be viewed as being interrelated wholes with 
other organisational arrangements (Benson 1977). 
Contradiction created in social construction is the third principle that explains 
powerful forces leading to organisational transformation according to Benson (1977). 
He said, ‘The organization is seen as a concrete, multi-level phenomenon beset by 
contradictions which continuously undermine its existing features’ (p.1). According 
to Benson (1977), the most prominent contradiction is ‘the interests of particular 
groups of people and their power to defend their interests within and established 
order’ (p. 3). Within the context of Vietnam, there can be contradictions in defending 
the interests of a particular group of people in terms of the political, globalisation and 
transformation conflicts related to loan loss recognition as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Benson (1977) asserted that the struggle of people to go beyond the 
constraints of current social context to sustain and enhance their interests ‘bring them 
eventually into conflict with the established arrangements and lead to social change’ 
(p. 3). 
Benson (1997) believed that social change is an ongoing process. The construction 
process occurs in various social contexts resulting in different and incompatible 
social structures with little coordination that generates further underlying 
contradictions following social transformations (Benson 1977). Therefore, the social 
transformation is a partially autonomous process in which ‘even powerful actors may 
be unable to maintain an orderly, rationalized system of social relations’ (Benson 
1977, p. 4). Simultaneously, according to Benson (1977), the ongoing social 
construction is a creative process that is directed depending upon human action or 
praxis with various alternatives to produce and maintain a social structure. People 
can construct their own social relationships actively or passively. Considering that 
praxis, Benson (1997) suggested that social science should offer guidance to the 
process of human social formations. This proposition yields the foundation for this 
study to contribute in preparing bank regulators to be more active in responding to 
their related contradiction in regulating loan loss recognition. 
Regarding the meaning of specific concepts created through organisational change, 
Deetz (1982) claimed that ‘the meanings of organizational events are produced and 
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sustained through communication’ (p. 132) because ‘communication and social 
interaction become merely the means by which consensus is reached and meaning is 
shared’ (p. 133). This statement gives the rationale for considering loan loss 
communication and social interaction a means to understand the right meaning of 
loan loss recognition in a specific context. 
According to Deetz (1982), the creation of those specific concepts via 
communication and social interaction is human knowledge creation. It is a dialectic 
process in which the meaning of the whole is reflected only through the meaning of 
the parts, and the meaning of the parts is understood only in terms of that of the 
whole (Deetz 1982). In such a way, the new created concepts are intelligible to the 
current organisational members within their own interrelationships, not from the 
interpretation of application of a priori theoretical concepts to make them relevant 
(Deetz 1982). Within this research, searching for various meanings of loan loss 
recognition related concepts is expected to increase the understanding of 
organisational life in terms of loan loss recognition. That knowledge allows for 
undistorted discourse or brings out the meaning of loan loss recognition and the 
related confusion in Vietnam. It is also expected to equip bank regulators with ‘a 
knowledge of how to act appropriately in a variety of situations’ or ‘practical 
wisdom’ as suggested by Deetz (1982, p. 141) rather than theoretical knowledge. 
Van de Ven and Poole (1995) developed Benson’s (1977) study to explain the root of 
organisational change. They believed that ‘The organizational entity exists in a 
pluralistic world of colliding events, forces, or contradictory values that compete 
with each other for domination and control’ (p. 517). They classified contradictions 
into two types: internal and external. Contradictions may be internal to an 
organisation when several conflicting goals or interest groups are competing for 
priority within it. In addition, contradictions may be external to it because an 
organisation pursues directions that collide with those of other organisations (Van de 
Ven & Poole 1995). The dialectical theory explains that changes in organisations 
occur when those opposing values, forces or events mobilise sufficient power to 
confront and engage the status quo in the organisation (Van de Ven & Poole 1995). 
Nonaka and Toyama (2003) studied the dynamic interactions among individuals, the 
organisation and the environment. According to them, knowledge creation can be 
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conceptualised as a dialectical process of synthesising various contradictions. This 
view is consistent with that of Deetz (1982) as discussed above. Nonaka and Toyama 
(2003) called for a re-examination of an organisation’s strategy as ‘the synthesizing 
and self-transcending process instead of a logical analysis of structure or action’ (p. 
9). 
Particularly, humans or agents and their environment do not exist independently. 
Instead, they define and reproduce each other in the way that ‘the environment 
influences agents’ and then ‘the agents are continuously recreating their environment 
through social interaction’ (Nonaka & Toyama 2003, p. 4). Within those interactions, 
knowledge is created in a process to transcend and synthesise antithetical concepts or 
contradictions such as ‘order and chaos, micro and macro, part and whole’ (Nonaka 
& Toyama 2003, p. 2). The process is ongoing with creative spirals rather than 
repeated circles. The next spiral is the innovation that is the reflection of the 
synthesis in the previous spiral. 
Therefore, Nonaka and Toyama (2003) criticised that current organisation studies are 
based on the static, passive view that considers an organisation ‘an information-
processing machine that takes and processes information from the environment to 
solve a problem and adapts to the environment based on a given goal’ (p. 3). This 
approach cannot describe the dynamic process through which ‘the organization 
interacts with the organizational members and the environment’ (Nonaka & Toyama 
2003, p. 3). 
The problem is more significant in the accounting area when accounting has come to 
be regarded a social practice rather than a mere technical one (Miller 1994; Walker 
2016). That transformation requires a greater understanding of the interaction 
between accounting regulators and the social. However, Burchell, Clubb and 
Hopwood (1985) believed there is a ‘very significant gap’ in understanding ‘the 
intertwining of accounting and the social’ (p. 382). In particular, accounting research 
commonly declares and presumes the interdependence between accounting and the 
social to be a paradigm rather than demonstrates it (Burchell, Clubb & Hopwood 
1985; Potter 2005). Considering the interrelationship between accounting and the 
social, Burchell, Clubb and Hopwood (1985) called for a dialectic view of 
accounting with a focus on change to identify how the social passes through 
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accounting and how accounting constructs the social. The interplay of accounting 
and the social is expected to be visible by understanding the mechanism of 
accounting change (Burchell, Clubb & Hopwood 1985). 
Aware of that urgent need, sociologists have frequently posited the relationship 
between accounting and society and are showing interest in understanding that area 
(Burchell, Clubb & Hopwood 1985; Hopwood 1983; Walker 2016). Yet, there is 
little systematic analysis on the mechanism of accounting change (Walker 2016). 
Among such studies, Burchell, Clubb and Hopwood (1985) and Kane (2000) are the 
only two empirical studies from a dialectical view on accounting. Burchell, Clubb 
and Hopwood (1985) contribute an outline of dialectical analysis in value added 
accounting. However, it is just an initial attempt of connecting accounting changes 
with social events on the surface that needs further in-depth analysis to conceptualise 
the change mechanism (e.g., identifying the conflicts and the types of responses to 
these). Kane (2000) analysed the conflict of information and disinformation of loan 
loss, but that conflict represents the outcomes of accounting change rather than the 
conflicts that determine those changes. Therefore, Walker (2016) continued to raise 
the question ‘How can historians explore the roles of accounting in society?’ In 
consideration of this literature gap, the present research attempts to address this need 
by illustrating how to adopt the dialectical theory as a theoretical framework in 
understanding the interplay of accounting and society. 
Communication is key to organisational formation because as Deetz asserted (1982), 
the meanings of organisational events are reached and shared through 
communication. Therefore, it is necessary to review how dialectical theory is 
developed in communication for adopting it to understand organisational changes 
through communication. 
3.3 Dialectical Theory in Communication 
Dialectical theory is commonly used in studies on communication, which focus on 
dialectical contradictions (Baxter & Montgomery 1996). Dialectical contradictions 
are defined as ‘the dynamic interplay between unified oppositions’ (Baxter & 
Montgomery 1996, p. 8). Unified oppositions are ‘two or more themes or forces that 
are interdependent with one another at the same time that they function to negate and 
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oppose one another’ (Baxter & Montgomery 1996, p. 548). This simultaneous ‘both–
and’ dynamic produces an ongoing dialectical tension or interplay between opposites. 
To dialectical theorists, dialectical tensions keep the relating process vibrant and 
alive as parties navigate the unity of opposites in an ongoing manner. Therefore, 
contradictions are not a sign of trouble for a relationship, but are inherent in the 
process of relating. 
According to Erbert (2000) and Putnam, Fairhurst and Banghart (2016), a conflict 
can be a dialectical or nondialectical contradiction. To consider a contradiction 
dialectical, a conflict needs to be based on a constant push–pull between its 
oppositions because it does not have a clear-cut boundary between oppositions such 
that they can be compatible with each other (Putnam, Fairhurst & Banghart 2016). 
That dynamic interplay of oppositions becomes a source of energy (Bakhtin 1981) 
for an ongoing change process in which oppositions are mutually implicative and 
coproductive (Mumby 2005). 
A nondialectical conflict in organisations can have two opposite poles, such as 
micro–macro or action–structure (Janssens & Steyaert 1999), but their relationships 
are not necessarily incompatible if they have clear-cut boundaries so that they are not 
mutually exclusive or opposite (Putnam, Fairhurst & Banghart 2016). A dilemma in 
making a choice over scare resources is another example of nondialectical conflict 
because it is typically a one-shot encounter rather than an ongoing contradiction 
(Putnam, Fairhurst & Banghart 2016). The encounter will end when the actor weighs 
pros and cons and makes trade-offs (Erbert 2000; Putnam, Fairhurst & Banghart 
2016). 
In the current literature, dialectical theory is commonly used in communication to 
help explain how people manage oppositions in various life contexts (Erbert 2014). 
Three major types of contradictions in interpersonal relationships have been found. 
They are the dialectic of integration–separation, of expression–no expression and of 
stability–change prevalent in most studies (Baxter 1993; Baxter & Montgomery 
1996; Lusk 2008; Werner & Baxter 1994). 
The dialectic of integration–separation represents the union of two distinct 
individuals, such as marriages. Both oppositions of integration and separation are 
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required to maintain the relationship. Without integration, there is no relationship. 
Simultaneously, without separate individuals, there is nothing to integrate. The 
dialectic of expression–nonexpression refers to the ongoing negotiation of revelation 
and concealment between two partners in their relationship. Openness is necessary to 
maintain the relationship while it can hurt each party, thus leading to their 
concealment to protect the relationship. The dialectic of stability and change 
represents the parties’ need of certainty and consistency in opposition to wanting 
excitement and surprises. The stability opposition is required for their relationship 
constancy whereas the change keeps the relationship alive with creativity. The 
dialectic of integration–separation is a contradiction that represents the simultaneous 
needs to be independent and dependent. Stability and change involves the 
simultaneous needs for certainty and order versus novelty and change (Conville 
1991). 
According to (Baxter 1990), there are four basic types of partners’ responses to a 
dialectical contradiction in their relationship. They are selection, separation, 
neutralisation and reframing. Within a selection response, the parties in the 
relationship are aware of the co-existence of both oppositions but select one 
opposition which then dominates the other (Baxter 1990). 
Under the separation style, each opposition is separated to be dominant temporarily 
for topicality. Temporary separation is a cyclic alternation between two oppositions 
in autonomy from one point in time to another, and topical separation is the 
separation of domains into those for which one opposition is dominant and those for 
which the other is dominant (Baxter 1990). Therefore, the separation response is not 
as extreme as the selection style in which the dominance of one opposition is 
determined once or for the whole domain of activities. However, the division of two 
oppositions under the separation response denies the interdependence between the 
two. 
In the neutralisation response, a portion of each opposition is sacrificed to 
compromise their contradiction (Baxter 1990). Hence, each opposition is enacted in 
its full intensity at some time or in some domain under the separation response, while 
the intensity of both oppositions is diluted under the neutralisation response. 
However, the neutralisation response is similar to the separation response in 
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perceiving the presence of both oppositions but denying their interdependence. 
Baxter (1990) found two types of neutralisation responses—moderation and 
disqualification. Whereas the moderation neutralisation is undertaken with explicit 
evidence (e.g., a small talk), the disqualification neutralisation is handled indirectly, 
ambiguously or ‘off the record’ (Baxter 1990, p. 73). 
Reframing a response is completely different from the first three types in the way 
that appreciates the interdependence between two oppositions. It is undertaken by 
transforming the perception of both oppositions along different dimensions of 
meaning such that the two oppositions are no longer contrasts (Baxter 1990). 
Whereas those studies contributed to the classification of responses, they have not yet 
identified the factors determining the choice of response to a dialectical 
contradiction. Peng and Nisbett (1999) partly bridged that gap by studying the impact 
of culture factor on dealing with contradiction. Five empirical studies were 
conducted with both White American and Chinese participants. They were asked to 
classify proverbs as dialectical or nondialectical and offer solutions for contradictions 
in various topics. Peng and Nisbett (1999) found that Westerners and Easterners 
differed in terms of their responses to a conflict. When two apparently contradictory 
propositions were presented, Westerners polarised their views and Easterners were 
moderately accepting of both propositions (Peng & Nisbett 1999). 
A dialectical approach may enable Eastern people to tolerate and even appreciate 
contradiction, consequently maintaining a view of the big picture (Peng & Nisbett 
1999). It is also known as the holistic approach in which people would not ‘regard a 
social conflict as a contradiction’, and thus would be ‘less likely to take sides in a 
conflict’ (Peng & Nisbett 1999, p. 746). 
However, Peng and Nisbett (1999) believed that Easterners with a dialectical 
approach may accept both contradictional viewpoints even though there is evidence 
supporting that one of these views is inferior. This trend is named naïve dialecticism 
that was suspected of being more common than a holistic approach among the 
Chinese (Peng & Nisbett 1999, p. 746). Several reasons can explain the claim. 
Chinese philosophy is more likely to assume that ‘there can be some truth to both of 
two opposing propositions and hence implies that no side should win in a debate’ 
60 
(Peng & Nisbett 1999, p. 747). Chinese culture emphasises harmony rather than 
debate, which is represented by the lack of proper forums or institutions for debate 
(Peng & Nisbett 1999). 
Although conflicts are mentioned pervasively in the organisational research (Putnam, 
Fairhurst & Banghart 2016), few studies in dialectical contradictions have examined 
organisational conflicts (Erbert 2000, 2014). Tracy (2004) believed that the 
dialectical theory designed to explain contradictions in interpersonal relationships 
could be helpful to apply as a conceptual framework to enlighten reactions to 
contradictions in organisational interaction. Developing the studies of Baxter, a 
leading scholar of dialectical theory in personal relationship, Tracy (2004) analysed 
and theorised employee reactions to organisational contradictions in two correctional 
institutions. According to her, employees can react to contradictions in various ways 
depending on how they can frame the contradictions. Adopting the literature of 
dialectical theory in communication, Tracy (2004) identified three different ways of 
framing a contradiction. In particular, a contradiction can be framed as simple 
contradictions, complementary dialectics and pragmatic paradoxes or double binds 
(Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 Different responses to a contradiction 
Frame Response Strength/weakness/consequence 
Simple 
contradiction 
Selection Ignore half of responsibilities 
Target, temporal or topic 
vacillation 
Inconsistent or haphazard 
Source splitting Usually impossible and pressure 
Complementary 
dialectics 
Creative rule-following 
techniques 
Attending to multiple 
organisational expectation 
Layering and balancing of 
goals 
Pragmatic 
paradoxes or 
double binds 
Withdrawal Avoid the confrontation 
Source: Tracy (2004) 
She explored the different responses corresponding with each frame of contradiction. 
Organisational members frame a contradiction as a simple contradiction based on the 
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assumption that they cannot perform two actions at once, but can alternate or choose 
one. Hence, they can respond to the contradiction by selecting one opposition 
dominant over the other. Selection is problematic because they ignore half of their 
responsibilities by just attending to one opposition of organisational contradiction, 
and essentially do not perform their job. 
Alternatively, organisation members can also respond to the contradiction by 
separating the two oppositions of the contradiction and flexibly switching between 
opposing organisational norms depending on the time, person with whom they are 
working or the topic/context. Those responses are named target, temporal and topic 
vacillation. The target or topic vacillation is the reaction in which members topically 
segment varying activities to correspond with the two different poles. The temporal 
vacillation is the reaction in which the organisational members move back and forth 
between two oppositions, simply alternating the attention paid to them. According to 
Tracy (2004), all types of vacillation have problematic repercussions because it can 
cause inconsistent or haphazard behaviours by the organisational member. 
Source splitting can be the other type of response by organisational members when 
they frame it as a simple contradiction. The source-splitting response in Tracy’s 
(2004) study is the reactions by different officers in which they consistently play 
‘good cop’ or ‘bad cop’ in different domains. Although this reaction presents 
consistency in the organisational member’s behaviour, it is more likely impossible 
because officers usually work independently. 
To avoid that weakness, the employees can frame a contradiction as a 
complementary dialectic by reframing the elements of the contradiction so that the 
two contrasts are no longer regarded as opposites. In that way, organisational 
members understand a contradiction as interrelated and nonmutually exclusive, 
viewing one pole of an organisational contradiction as a means for achieving the 
other pole. As the result, multiple organisational expectations can be attended by 
creative rule-following techniques or layering and balancing of goals. Framing a 
contradiction as complementary dialectic, therefore, has been found to be correlated 
with higher satisfaction than other ways of managing contradictions. 
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Some contradictions may be more difficult to reframe than others, such as a situation 
wherein a primary and a secondary injunction are present, as found by Tracy (2004). 
In that situation, the officers also cannot exit the contradiction by any reaction of 
selection, vacillation or source splitting. Hence, the contradiction is considered a 
pragmatic paradox or double bind in which two oppositions countermand each other 
or conflict directly with one another. Tracy (2004) found that organisational 
members reacted to that contradiction by withdrawing (e.g., ignoring the rules) to 
avoid confrontation. 
In summary, Tracy (2004) provides a model with a wide range of different responses 
to these contradictions of organisational members. Most of these responses were 
developed from the research on communication by Baxter and colleagues to help 
explain how people manage opposition and contradictions in various life contexts. 
According to Baxter (1990), selection, separation, neutralisation and reframing are 
four common techniques to manage dialectical contradictions. Three of them were 
found by Tracy (2004), excluding neutralisation. This is evidence that the dialectical 
theory in communication can be applied in understanding communication within the 
organisational context. This belief is strengthened by Erbert (2014). 
Erbert (2014) conducted research to decide whether the dialectical theory is a 
feasible framework for understanding organisational conflict within an organisation. 
Adopting the propositions in communication developed by Baxter and her 
colleagues, Erbert (2014) first examined the perceived importance of five dialectical 
contradictions in organisations: independence versus separation, stability and change, 
openness and closeness, judgement versus acceptance and ideal versus real. The first 
three are similar to the dialectic of integration–separation, of expression–
nonexpression and of stability–change, which were common in dialectical 
communication as aforementioned. Judgement versus acceptance represents the 
contradiction about the acceptance of work experience and being evaluated or judged 
(Erbert 2014, p. 142). Ideal versus real refer to the concurrent desires of ‘doing it 
right’ versus ‘just getting by’ (Erbert 2014, p. 142). Within those contradictions, the 
social actors struggle with ‘if, when and how to communicate in organizational life’ 
(Erbert 2014, p. 142). 
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The study asked 40 organisational employees in-depth questions for over one year to 
rate the importance of those five contradictions for each conflict episode. The 
participants were also asked to determine whether those contradictions are dialectical 
in each conflict episode. Erbert (2014) found that all the five contradictions were 
perceived moderately important to organisations. In addition, 49% of the conflicts in 
the test were considered dialectical. 
Thus, Erbert (2014) and Tracy (2004) together have implied that the dialectical 
theory is a viable framework for understanding the ongoing contradictions within 
organisations. However, the research does not mention how the dialectical theory is 
applied for understanding the way in which an organisation acts in communication 
within its society, although firms are considered dialectical beings within their 
environment as discussed in Section 3.2. The next section discusses communication 
between organisations from a dialectical view, in terms of loan loss recognition. 
3.4 Adoption of Dialectical Theory in Loan Loss Recognition 
The dialectical theory adopted in this research answers the call for a dialectical view 
on the organisational process (Benson 1977; Deetz 1982; Nonaka & Toyama 2002, 
2003; Van de Ven & Poole 1995) and on the intertwinement of accounting and its 
environment (Burchell, Clubb & Hopwood 1985; Kane 2000; Walker 2016). 
In addition, to the present researcher’s knowledge, this is also the first study 
attempting to adopt the dialectical theory in the communication between 
organisations rather than individuals. Both Tracy (2004) and Erbert (2014) adopted 
the dialectical theory to investigate organisational communication at the micro level 
in which the theory was applied to understand the contradictions confronted by each 
employee in their organisation and their responses. Different from them, this research 
attempts to develop the view (Benson 1977; Deetz 1982; Nonaka & Toyama 2002, 
2003; Van de Ven & Poole 1995) that considers an organisation a dialectical being 
confronted with its social. 
The adoption is conducted based on the belief that organisations are also represented 
by individuals; therefore, the communication between organisations is expected to be 
similar to that between individuals. Specifically, this research examines the 
interaction between the Vietnamese Government/SBV, commonly represented by 
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bank regulators, and its social context represented by various agents (bank 
management, depositors, heads of foreign institutions, etc.) in regulating loan loss 
recognition. The contradictions and various types of responses found in 
communication between individuals as discussed above are expected to be found in 
the communication between organisations. 
However, several differences need to be considered in that adoption. First, there is 
more than one person representing an organisation. Therefore, the contradictions in 
communication of an organisation derive not only from its external environment but 
also from its internal members; in this regard, Ven de Ven and Poole (1995) asserted 
that contradictions can be internal or external to an organisation. In consideration of 
this difference, the data are collected not only from the debates between 
organisations but also between members in an organisation. 
In addition, when examining the communication between organisations, the concept 
of ‘totality’ or ‘the whole’, stated by Benson (1977) (p. 3) as discussed, might cover 
a broader scope compared with communication between individuals. An individual’s 
relationships are often confined to a narrow range of families, colleagues, friends and 
some organisations. Conversely, an organisation has a much broader connection that 
includes the relationships between individuals inside and outside the organisation, 
between organisations in a system and outside it and local and international entities, 
among others. Owing to this broad connection, the impact of a reaction on the whole 
can be more widespread, and thus, there is a longer lag time from the action time to 
the time of full output. 
Hence, a wider range of data should be collected for a longer period to thoroughly 
understand the communication between organisations. The necessary period for data 
collection can even be extended because an organisation might take more time than 
an individual would to decide on a response to a contradiction. The reason is that an 
organisation is more likely based on consensus to conceptualise and share meaning 
for decision-making as suggested by Deetz (1982). The extensive influence on 
society of a response in communication between organisations lends the study on 
how to respond appropriately to contradictions in this field substantial importance. 
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Developing the literature review in Chapter 2, it is proposed that the Vietnamese 
Government was confronted with the contradiction of Government control–market 
control, integration–separation, stability–change and information–disinformation 
corresponding with the four conflict issues of politics, globalisation, transformation 
and transparency. These conflicts are expected to be dialectical contradictions 
because their relationships have been constantly pushed and pulled since 1986 when 
the state decided to develop a market economy with socialism orientation as found by 
Phuong NC and Richard (2011) and Nguyen Loc, Hooper and Sinclair (2013) and as 
a heritage from Kane’s (2000) study. The four contradictions are supposed to be 
underlying the accounting reform in Vietnam until date. The ongoing interplay of 
those contradictions is proposed as being the source of energy for the change in 
Vietnamese accounting regulations in terms of loan loss recognition. 
In line with Benson (1977), Deetz (1982), Ven de Ven and Pool (1995) and Nonaka 
and Toyama (2002, 2003), the Government/regulators can be considered agents that 
interplay with the environment that is represented by the multiple forces from bank 
managements, foreign institutions, investors and depositors, among others, in terms 
of political power, globalisation, transformation and transparency. The 
Government/regulators as an agent and other parties in its environment have different 
perceptions on regulating loan loss recognition. Both the Government and its 
environment continuously interplay in defining and reproducing the perception of 
each other. Therefore, the regulation on loan loss recognition is supposed as an 
ongoing change process in which the regulation knowledge is created in a spiral as 
Nonaka and Toyama (2002, 2003) suggested. 
Specifically, external forces, as stated by Ven de Ven and Pool (1995), from the 
public created by environment changes, such as the economic and politic instability 
and the globalisation trend, influence the Government perception of transparency in 
loan loss. Then, the Government takes actions to change the environment as a 
reflection of its perceptual transformation. By doing so, the Government is 
continuously recreating its environment through social interaction with the external 
forces from other organisations or individuals in the environment. The transformation 
spiral is supposed to include three phases as described in Section 3.4.2. How the 
Government responds to the related contradictions is predicted in Section 3.4.1 as the 
foundation for the proposition of the spiral in Section 3.4.2. 
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3.4.1 Naïve response style 
Since Peng and Nisbett (1999) studied contradictions in various topics rather than the 
interpersonal area only, their findings can be adopted to propose how the 
Government/bank regulators respond to the contradictions in regulating loan loss 
recognition in Vietnam. The present study proposes that being in the East, the 
Vietnamese tend to respond to contradictions from the naïve dialecticism approach 
similar to the Chinese. The reason is that there are many similarities in culture and 
philosophy between Vietnam and China. More related evidences are discussed in the 
next chapter. 
This proposition made for the majority of the Vietnamese can also be made for the 
behaviour of Government/bank regulators in Vietnam because they are more likely 
making decisions based on consensus rather than based on the views of an arbitrary 
ruler (Tran Dinh Thien & Luu Bich Ho 2015c). Hence, since it is the general 
character of the majority of the Vietnamese, the naïve dialecticism is also supposed 
to be applied in decision-making by the Vietnamese Government/bank regulators. 
The policy of market economy with socialism orientation can be considered a typical 
example of the Government’s decision-making using naïve dialecticism. Thus far, no 
study has investigated that model thoroughly. The decision was made simply owing 
to the Government’s concern: ‘The Government was afraid people would suffer if it 
gave up its control to the market’ (Tran Dinh Thien & Luu Bich Ho 2015a, translated 
by the author). Specifically, the Government worried that private enterprises under 
the market economy would exploit labour (Tran Dinh Thien & Luu Bich Ho 2015a). 
Because of those concerns and its naïve dialectic thinking, the Government proposed 
to seek a compromise approach of developing the market economy while retaining 
socialism to repair the weakness of the market. This issue is discussed in detail in the 
next chapter. 
Instead of conducting proper scientific research, the Government’s decision was 
made based on the belief from reasonable thinking that a combination of two 
oppositions could fix the weaknesses of the market economy. That decision-making 
style can be similar to the Eastern naïve dialecticism found by Peng and Nisbett 
(1999). It is the tendency that ‘accepts too much as face value, failing to generate 
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counterarguments for a statement and trying to reconcile opposing views’ (p. 751) 
even when one opposition, socialism, is inferior, in terms of the evidence supporting 
it (Kornai 2000)4. Thus, the decision is made based on reasonable thinking rather 
than a ‘logically correct, or true, or effective’ proposal or solution (Peng & Nisbett 
1999, p. 746). The reasonable thinking is reflected in the naïve thinking that accepts 
what the Communists like (the beauty of socialism idea) and rejects what the 
Communist dislike (the dark side of the free market). That response style is proposed 
to cause confusion in communication related to regulating loan loss recognition 
because the decision was made with less experience or a lack of complex thinking. 
This response style was similar to the separation (or vacillation) and neutralisation 
found by Baxter (1990) and Tracy (2004) in interpersonal communication. Adopting 
those styles, people are aware of both oppositions and try to reconcile them simply 
by responding separately to each pole (separation or vacillation) or respond to both 
opposition simultaneously but by half (neutralisation). These are naïve responses 
because these ignored the interdependence between both oppositions (Baxter 1990; 
Tracy 2004). That consequence can be considered a result of a decision made based 
on an easy reasonable thinking rather than a thorough assessment, which is termed 
naïve thinking by Peng and Nisbett (1999). 
Responding to the Government control–market control can be exceptional in the way 
that Government control would be superior to the market control in case it is unable 
to respond to both at the same time even in part. It is because the 
Government/regulators as representative of the Communist Party could not 
voluntarily surrender control. This response style is similar to the selection response 
in interpersonal communication in that selection is the simplest way to respond to the 
contradiction by ‘making one condition or pole dominant to the exclusion of the 
other condition’ (Baxter 1990, p. 72) or ‘selecting one norm to uphold in favour of 
another’ (Tracy 2004, p. 129). 
                                                          
4 It is evident that the socialist system has collapsed in many countries with the change of system from 
socialism to capitalism 
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3.4.2 Dialectical spiral 
The studies of Phuong NC and Richard (2011) and Nguyen Loc, Hooper and Sinclair 
(2013) can be adopted to suggest propositions for the first two phases of renovating 
regulation. Phase 3 is the period when the regulation was revealed to be problematic. 
The studies of Kane (2000) and Piotroski and Wong (2012) can be applied to suggest 
propositions for the contradictions and responses in phase 3. 
Phase 1 represents the period when accounting regulation was mainly a heritage of 
the plan economy (Nguyen 2013a). Particularly, the Government had full control of 
the regulation on loan loss recognition because it was almost the only owner of the 
banking industry. At that time, the accounting regulation mainly served the multiple 
objectives of the state, such as tax accounting and management (Phuong NC & 
Richard 2011). 
Phase 2 is the period when the transformation became clear. Phuong NC and Richard 
(2011) claimed that the transformation is clever at first glance. The environment 
changed with the strong growth of the market control force that mainly emerged from 
foreign institutions. That change influenced the Government to reform the accounting 
regulation in loan loss recognition towards international practices, similar to the 
general trend found by Phuong NC and Richard (2011). In addition to serving the 
state, the regulation is expected to be modified to satisfy the need of emerging 
economic groups of investors and depositors. However, it may still be more rule 
based than principles based to suit the ‘habitus’ of compliance but can be overridden 
by practitioners as claimed by Nguyen (2013a). 
In addition, the adoption of naïve dialecticism thinking (Peng & Nisbett 1999) in 
responding to the conflict between Government and market control can deny the 
interdependence between the two oppositions. For example, the state control can 
cause a reduction in supply and demand of high-quality external reports as asserted 
by Piotroski and Wong (2012), thus limiting the market control owing to lack of 
transparency and disclosure. Thus, by taking those actions to respond to the change 
of environment during phase 2, the Government is proposed to continuously recreate 
its environment as suggested by (Nonaka & Toyama 2003). The new environment is 
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proposed to be formed in which the market control was restrained by the rule-based 
regulations and the lack of disclosure. 
According to Piotroski and Wong (2012), ‘the widespread availability of information 
is a key determinant of the efficiency of resource allocation decisions and growth in 
an economy’ (p. 202). Therefore, the lack of quality information disclosed to the 
market in phase 2 is supposed to distort the capital allocation leading to the 
acceleration of NPLs in phase 3, leading to a loss of both economic and symbolic 
capital to the Government, thus threatening the Government control. It is similar to 
the dialectical phenomenon stated by Benson (1977): ‘People produce a social world 
which stands over them, constraining their actions’ (p. 3). In phase 2, the 
Government is supposed to cause that loss [of both economic and symbolic capital], 
thus constraining the Government’s control. 
In phase 3, responding to that environment change, the Government is supposed to 
hide NPLs to save its symbolic capital. It is similar to the Government’s suppression 
of bad news stated by Piotroski and Wong (2012) and Kane (2000). Simultaneously, 
the market control can be stronger because the foreign institutions can have more 
power when the Government needs financial aid from them to recover the economy. 
For this reason, the conflict can be fiercer in phase 3 for the Government to maintain 
its control. With naïve dialecticism thinking, the Government may not know how to 
respond to the conflict in this phase, thus causing its embarrassment and delay in 
problem solving. 
3.5 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the understanding of organisational change from a dialectical 
view. It is found that organisational transformation is a complex ongoing process of 
social construction in which people continuously interact with each other in 
responding to various contradictions underlying differentiated contexts. The change 
process is partly autonomous because of contextual constraints and reactions and 
partly human creative (praxis) since people can actively select their responses. 
Threfore, the change process offers bank regulators a chance to determine 
appropriate actions to respond to related contradictions in regulating loan loss 
recognition’ 
70 
The transformation process constantly creates new concepts that are understandable 
for organisational members in their specific interrelationships rather than a priori 
theoretical concepts. In that way, the dialectical view is appropriate for the current 
research to examine the specific meaning of loan loss recognition in the Vietnamese 
context with several contradictions that can significantly affect how loan loss is 
recognised. That understanding is expected to inform the Vietnamese bank regulators 
and other related parties about the current confusion in loan loss recognition. 
Specifically, they are the specific meanings of different loan loss figures, of the 
concerns and debates on those figures and their differences and of the frequent 
changes in regulations on loan loss recognition. Loan loss communication is 
considered a critical means to understand the knowledge created and shared through 
accounting change in loan loss recognition in Vietnam. 
Based on that understanding, this chapter provided a theoretical framework for 
understanding the specific context of Vietnam and analysing the behaviour of the 
Vietnamese Government/bank regulators in the following chapters. The contradiction 
themes of Government/market control, stability/change, separation/integration and 
information/disinformation can be used to code the contradictions in loan loss 
communication in Vietnam. The model of responses to the contradiction was 
demarcated into three phases in line with Peng and Nisbett (1999), Kane (2000), 
Nonaka and Toyama (2002, 2003), Phuong NC and Richard (2011), Piotroski and 
Wong (2012) and Nguyen Loc, Hooper and Sinclair (2013). The next chapter 
presents the research design following the theoretical framework proposed in this 
chapter. 
71 
Chapter 4: Research Design 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in this study, the communication of regulation 
on loan loss recognition is viewed as a dialectical contradiction process of a social 
and institutional practice, instead of merely a static and technical practice. From that 
dialectical view, organisations do not merely solve problems but create and define 
problems through actions and interactions (Nonaka & Toyama 2002; Nonaka, 
Toyama & Nagata 2000). This approach requires an interpretive worldview that 
combines a quite different set of beliefs about the nature of society. ‘In this case, 
subjectivism and relativism together with the view that social order is negotiated 
through social interaction lead to the use of qualitative, naturalistic research methods’ 
(Ryan B 2002, p. 87). Hence, the paradigm that this research will fit into is the 
interpretive paradigm. The next section discusses how the interpretive paradigm is 
designed. The research setting, research site, data collection and content analysis are 
discussed in the remainder of this chapter. 
4.2 Interpretive Paradigm 
Burrell (2001) suggested that the interpretive paradigm attempts to understand and 
explain the social world primarily from the viewpoint of the actors directly involved 
in the social process. The ultimate reality of the universe lies in ‘spirit’ or ‘idea’ 
rather than in the data of sense perception. Burrell (2001) asserted that the 
interpretive paradigm is informed by a concern to understand the world as it is, to 
understand the fundamental nature of the social world at the level of subjective 
experience. Those various perspectives from a particular orientation are ‘confusing 
and senseless’ (Deetz 1982, p. 134) when individuals work together in an 
organisation or among organisations. Deetz (1982) described as follows that the 
confusion can be severe in an organisation with contradictions: 
Organizations can be filled with contradictions and formed in such a way as to 
alienate the individual. Decisions are manipulated, data are distorted, and power is 
inevitably distributed unequally. Organizational members approach their tasks 
with special interests, and their perceptions are interested perceptions. Political, 
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economic, and community forces and individual interests are inscribed in 
organizational arrangements, social relations, and in every perception… these 
inscribed interests result in blockages, repressions, and distorted communication. 
Meaning structures are filled with privileged interests. (p. 139) 
He emphasised that such confusion could distort communication leading to false 
consensus: 
Systematically distorted communication leads to false consensus, a consensus 
reached by the power of definition rather than by open discussion by all interested 
parties of the practical situation at hand. (Deetz 1982, p. 140) 
Therefore, interpretive research in organisational communication not only considered 
interpretation a subjective process in which each individual or organisation forms its 
own perception from an orientation, but ‘communication and social interaction 
become merely the means by which consensus is reached and meaning is shared’ and 
‘the role of all interpretive research is the undermining of the conditions leading to 
false consensus’ (Deetz 1982, p. 133). 
Considering Deetz’s (1982) claim, the interpretive paradigm would be the best tool 
for the present research to not only reveal the contentious issue in loan loss 
communication in the specific context of Vietnam but also ‘to provide appropriate 
action to overcome’ (p. 140) that problem as suggested by Deetz (1982). In this 
sense, the culture that consists of a member’s knowledge or belief ‘describes the 
systems of meaning inscribed’, thus being ‘a necessary foundation for doing 
interpretive research in organizations’ (Deetz 1982, p. 131, 134). The next two 
sections present that culture setting within which the study is conducted. 
4.3 Research Setting 
This research, on the period after the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, acts as a 
continuation of Chu’s (2004) research on accounting changes in Vietnam as a 
transition economy from 1945. A long period from 1991 to the present offers a 
suitable opportunity to observe the consequences of the different responses to 
contradictions in loan loss communication and check the existence frequency and 
importance level of the dialectical contradictions within this area. 
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This period is also critical for the study of loan loss recognition in banks since it 
accounts for the several facts that have significant impact on loan loss recognition. 
First, learning from the Asian financial crisis, between 2005 and 2007, international 
banking regulations changed from Basel I (BCBS 1988) to Basel II (BCBS 2006a) 
with an increase of convergence in accounting for credit loss (e.g., IAS39; World 
Bank 2002) that increased the gap between Vietnamese and international standards in 
loan loss recognition. This leads to a concern regarding communicating loan loss in 
Vietnam to foreign investors because of that increasing gap. 
In addition, by joining the WTO in 2007, Vietnam faced increased pressure to adopt 
international standards in loan loss recognition after the financial market was opened 
fully as part of its commitment to liberalise its banking industry made upon its entry 
to the WTO (Vietnamese Diplomatic Missions 2014). Responding to that 
commitment (Phung 2005), Vietnam moved from the quantitative method under 
Basel I to the qualitative method under Basel II from 2005 following Decision No. 
493/2005/QD-NHNN on the issuance of regulation on the debts classification, 
provisioning and use of provisions against credit risks in the banking activity of 
credit institutions, issued by SBV. 
Further, the regulation on loan loss recognition has been more significant to study 
owing to the sudden increase in loan loss since 2008 because of the global financial 
crisis. Many stakeholders questioned the transparency and representational 
faithfulness of banks’ balance sheets as well as whether commercial banks had 
adequate provisions for future loan losses. Hence, major changes have been made in 
the context for regulating loan loss recognition since the Asian financial crisis of the 
late 1990s not only in Vietnam but also worldwide. The next section discusses the 
context in detail as the research site for data collection. 
4.4 Research Site 
In the context of Vietnam, Chu (2004) revealed that the socialist ideology and 
Vietnamese culture played very influential roles in accounting change in the current 
transition economy. The study found that the ideological paradox between the 
socialist economic system and the market system caused numerous serious problems 
because of Vietnam’s move to incorporate market accounting concepts and standards 
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into its current accounting system. These problems included Vietnamising or 
customising the process of market accounting to adapt to the new environment as 
well as the need to align regulatory structure, professional development and the 
education system. Phuong NC and Richard (2011) also found that the accounting 
system transformation generated some difficulties owing to adapting a private 
capitalist accounting system to function in a state-dominated market economy. 
Bearing this in mind, this section provides a systematic review of the Vietnamese 
context to identify the critical factors that influence regulating loan loss recognition 
in Vietnam and the reason that Vietnam is a specific context for the examination of 
such regulation. 
4.4.1 Culture and political environment 
Vietnam’s culture and politics have significant effects on its economy. Historically, 
China ruled Vietnam for more than 1,000 years, and it finally became independent in 
938 (Le Thi Lan 2012). This fact explains why Vietnam was deeply influenced by 
Chinese culture (Le Thi Lan 2012) of which the Chinese behaviours of dialectical 
tendency asserted by Peng and Nisbett (1999) can be found in Vietnam. The 
influence continues until now because China is a large neighbouring country sharing 
borders with Vietnam. Le Thi Lan (2012) stated that the Vietnamese have the 
harmonisation culture in which they accept different thoughts and try to reconcile 
them. Vietnam is known as a nation of many religions and ethnic cultures (Le Thi 
Lan 2012) but has not experienced a holy war because the Vietnamese accept and 
tolerate different beliefs (Hoang Huong 2014). Hoang Huong (2014) said, ‘In 
Vietnam, different beliefs dive in, mingle, are not exclusive and do not conflict 
(translated by the author).’ This culture is very close to the Eastern behaviour in 
responding to a dialectic by accepting both oppositions rather than polarising them, 
as stated by Peng and Nisbett (1999). 
After ending the war with France and the United States in 1975 (Nghiencuuquocte 
2015), Vietnam was led by the Communist Party (Vietnamplus 2015). The ‘market’ 
or ‘capital factor’ towards global integration has replaced the monopolistic state 
providers with competitive independent ones in Vietnam since 1986 (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2014). It has resulted in a quasi-market that comprises both control 
and capital factors with many SOEs. The market is ‘quasi’ because it differs from 
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conventional markets with the existence of many SOEs and banks that operate partly 
under state control and compete against private banks for users (Le Grand & Bartlett 
1993). 
Within the quasi-market in Vietnam, the leading role of the Communist Party is still 
assured in the Government, politics and society (Institute for State Organization 
Sciences 2014). Below the Communist Party are the National Assembly and then the 
Government (Figure 4.1). SBV is a ministerial organisation, under the direct control 
of the Government (Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 2013). Under that political structure, 
SBV is not only subject to political interference of the Communist Party but also 
operates relying on the Government’s guidance (International Business Publications 
2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Political structure of Vietnam 
Source: The outline is drafted based on Sacombank Securities Company (2008), Tran B. (2008), 
International Business Publications (2009), Nguyen T. (2011), Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. (2013) and 
Institute for State Organization Sciences (2014) 
Through SBV, the Government can direct how banks allocate capital resources by 
various regulations and restrictions (Sacombank Securities Company 2008; Tran Bao 
Toan 2008). Within this political structure, SBV is not only responsible for 
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implementing its primary function of controlling the country’s monetary policy, as in 
developed countries, but also the objective of economic growth that is the primary 
function of the Government. The first objective is usually found in developed 
countries whereas the second is the distinctive characteristic of Vietnam. 
Specifically, SBV is responsible for the target of credit growth and credit structures 
that facilitates the objective of the Government of economic growth (Nguyen Thi 
Kinh Thanh 2011). 
Further, the banking industry is mainly under the direct management of SBV in 
finance and accounting as delegated by the Ministry of Finance (Figure 4.1). The 
Ministry of Finance is more focused on corporations rather than the banking industry. 
Within loan loss recognition accounting, it is evident that SBV rather than the 
Ministry of Finance (Appendix 1) directly issued all related accounting regulations. 
Therefore, SBV has undertaken the task of promulgating the accounting framework 
for market control. At the same time, SBV represented the party and the Government 
to exercise the right to control and implement their political, economic and social 
policies. Holding the two roles of market control and Government control 
concurrently is supposed to create the contradiction and confusion for bank 
regulators in SBV in regulating loan loss recognition. It is challenging for bank 
regulators in Vietnam to understand, adopt, customise and monitor the capitalist 
accounting and banking regulation system to work in a quasi-market economy. For 
example, bank regulators are supposed to consider whether improving accounting 
regulations, which serves market discipline on loan loss recognition, affects the 
targeted lending growth rate and credit structure of the Government. It represents the 
contradiction between Government control and market control. The next section 
examines the economic environment of Vietnam to set the background for the data 
analysis. 
Finally, the bank regulators face contradictions when the SBV, a government agency, 
is the state shareholder of several commercial banks (Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 2013). 
That organisational structure makes the bank regulators the owner of commercial 
banks whereas they are the Government representatives and regulators of the 
financial system. The interest conflict is severe in that authorisation relationship. 
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4.4.2 Economic environment 
The contradiction of Government control and market control arising from the 
political environment as discussed above has caused confusion and contradiction in 
the Vietnamese economic environment. The following sections discuss the confusion 
and contradiction and the manner in which the Government responded to the 
contradiction in the general economy and the banking industry. The analysis of the 
general economy is expected to provide the background for understanding the 
confusion, contradictions and responses within the banking industry of Vietnam. 
4.4.2.1 Confusion 
Traditionally, Vietnam was an agricultural economy based on wet rice cultivating. 
The Vietnam War destroyed much of the country’s resources. After acquiring power, 
the Government created a planned economy with full monopoly control of the 
Communists via a system of 100% SOEs (Dang Phong 2016). The private economic 
sector was abolished. The state set a plan for all enterprises’ activities. Vietnam faced 
many troubles in recovering and developing the economy because of its political 
system. The planned economy failed to mobilise the economic potential for 
development (Dang Phong 2016; Huynh Buu Son 2016). 
As a result, learning from China, the Vietnam Communist Party officially introduced 
economic reforms in 1986 that considered the free market economy elements the 
cornerstone of strategy for a developing economy and for bolstering the masses’ 
confidence in the Government control (Dang Phong 2016; Huynh Buu Son 2016). 
This was called the Doi Moi policy for developing an economic socialist-oriented 
market economy. Despite some minor changes, the Congress documents from 1986 
and 2015 generally explain the concept of economic socialist-oriented market 
economy: 
The economic socialist-oriented market economy is operating following the 
market mechanism with the management of the state under ‘the leadership of the 
Communist Party’ and is ‘striving for the goal of prosperous people, a strong 
country and an equitable, democratic and civilised society’. The economic 
socialist-oriented market economy has many forms of ownership and many 
economic sectors in which the state economy plays a key role. The nature of the 
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socialist-oriented economy is reflected in the way that the state economic sector 
plays the role of leading and actively orienting the economy. (Central Economic 
Committee 2016; translated by the author) 
This policy has been controversial to many theoretical, ideological leaders of the 
Vietnamese Communist Party in that ‘What is socialism orientation?’ The leading 
economic experts in Vietnam admitted that this question had not been answered 
clearly over nearly 30 years of Doi Moi in 1986 (Vietnamnet 2015). Although 
Vietnam has declared its entry to a transition period towards socialism from 1960 
(Government 2010), in 2013, the general secretary of the Communist Party Nguyen 
Phu Trong told the Parliament, ‘To the end of the century, it could not be known 
when there was complete socialism in Vietnam’ (Thanhnien 2013; translated by the 
author). Nobody, not even the seniormost political leader knows when the goal can 
be reached in building the national development plan. People are oblivious of the 
direction in which the economy is headed. 
The director of Vietnam Institute of Economics, Tran Dinh Thien, and the former 
director of Development Strategy Institute, Luu Bich Ho, stated: 
Every five years, one or more state research programmes are conducted, and in 
them, there are several addressing the question of defining the market economy 
with socialism orientation. By assuming that at least five sessions of research 
programmes were conducted in 25 years, it is possible to estimate the number of 
research projects that have attempted to answer that question. Further, many other 
topics that do not have the same title are also being researched to answer that 
question. It means we have tried hard to find a definition that can make us 
confident and satisfied. However, the fact is that until now, we have not been clear 
and still have to find the answer. (Tran D. and Luu, 2015a; translated by the 
author) 
Through these comments, one can imagine how the Vietnamese society has suffered 
much of the costs related to defining the direction of development over 20 years. Not 
only the theoretical and ideological leaders, but also the public staff in charge of 
leadership, and management and administration practitioners have struggled to find 
ways to explain how the concept of socialism orientation is compatible with the 
practices. 
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At the end of 2013, Minister of Planning and Investment, Bui Quang Vinh, was 
invited to talk about economic issues at the National Political Institute in Ho Chi 
Minh City (Saigontimes 2014). He frankly stated, ‘We keep studying that model and 
have not yet found it. That model does not exist for seeking’ (Saigontimes 2014, 
translated by the author). He said he also questioned the scientific community, nearly 
30 years ago, what the model was but was yet to receive a reply (Saigontimes 2014). 
Many other government officers and consultants (e.g., Luu 2012, 2014; Nguyen Viet 
Thong 2014; Truong 2015; Vu Van Phuc 2014a) tried to explain the concept of 
socialism orientation   but their explanations were not specific enough for practice. 
Those studies just restated or repeated information on the policy and Marxism 
without a new study and regardless of the changes in the world and in Vietnam (Tran 
Van Tho 2015). No definitions of the key concepts, such as ‘orientation’, ‘socialism 
orientation ’ or ‘the leading role of state economy’, were offered. The term 
‘orientation’ is also controversial. China identifies its economy directly as a socialist 
market economy while Vietnam states ambiguously that its economy is a socialist-
oriented market economy (Tran Dinh Thien & Luu Bich Ho 2015a). It is confusing 
how ‘a socialist-oriented market economy’ is different from ‘a socialist market 
economy’. Therefore, the definition of ‘socialist-oriented market economy’ stated in 
the Congress documents is just a statement. It needs to be interpreted into specific 
mechanisms and institutions for specific actions (Tran Dinh Thien & Luu Bich Ho 
2015a). 
Because of that confusion, many readers argued against those studies. For example, a 
reader, named Minh Toan, responded to Truong’s (2015) analysis about the market 
economy with socialism orientation: 
Many thanks for your analysis. However, for our businesses, what we need most is 
the specific statement for our long-term business orientation. … The country’s 
way to develop needs to be stated clearly for the public to understand. Why was it 
wavering so that even the general secretary of the Communist Party [Nguyen Phu 
Trong, as aforementioned] did not know when socialism would be completely 
built in Vietnam? (Translated by the author) 
The voice of practicians became much more powerful when the Prime Minister made 
a suggestion at the regular meeting of the Government in February 2015: ‘What the 
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market economy is, and what socialism orientation   is about? They need to be 
specific rather than saying generally all the time’ (Ha Chinh 2015). He made this 
statement when referring to the major directions to create breakthroughs, promoting 
social and economic development in 2015 and the following years (Ha Chinh 2015). 
The Prime Minister is the chief executive who enforces and implements policies. 
Therefore, his suggestion implied that the current principles of socialist-oriented 
market economy were not specific enough for operating. This is the first time this 
confusion was raised by the leader of the Government, which shows the severity of 
the problem. 
The analysis of the confusion raises several questions such as why socialism is 
necessary in Vietnamese development policy that has been maintained 
simultaneously with a market economy, leading to the current confusion. Further, 
why should the state business sector play a leading role in the market that conflicts 
with the fair competition principle of market economy? These questions are 
examined in the next section to investigate the contradiction hidden inside the 
confusion. 
4.4.2.2 Politic conflict: Contradiction of Government control–market control 
After the war, the Communist Party claimed that socialism continues to be necessary 
for the Vietnamese development policy because the Communist Party was successful 
in its leading role in the wartime by upholding the banner of national independence 
and socialism as an ideology (Luu 2014). Therefore, the Communist Party said that 
socialism under its leadership is ‘a historical choice’ or ‘the only best option’ that 
should be continued in the peacetime for the Vietnamese development policy 
(Communist Party 2015; Le Nhi Hoa 2016; Luu 2014; Nguyen Thanh Vinh 2015). 
The Communist Party emphasised its leadership is the prerequisite for obtaining the 
goal of socialism because it was proven in the wartime (Communist Party 2015; Le 
Nhi Hoa 2016; Luu 2014; Nguyen Thanh Vinh 2015). This claim implied that the 
Communist Party would like to rely on not only its historical victory but also the 
socialism goal to affirm the orthodoxy of its leadership role in Vietnam in the 
peacetime. 
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The determination of the Communist Party to defend its right to be the sole 
leadership, which is justified by the socialism objective, is clearly revealed through 
its declaration that: 
To continue the implementation of the socialist objective, it is inevitable to 
maintain the leadership role of the Communist Party, and to reject political 
pluralism and multiparty opposition, because the leadership of the Communist 
Party is the prerequisite to achieve the socialism objective. (Luu 2014; translated 
by the author) 
The single-party system, instead of a multiparty political system, is often justified by 
the stability and high focus on the socialism objective (Luu 2014; Truong 2015). For 
example, Truong (2015), the former Minister of Commerce explained the necessity 
of a single-party system in Vietnam: 
Under multiparty political systems, Government policies are not stable and not 
highly targeted because they depend on each party’s policies. When the ruling 
party changes, the above policies also change (e.g., the regulatory changes...). 
(Truong 2015; translated by the author) 
Hence, history and the socialism ideology was utilised to create ‘recognition, belief, 
esteem and confidence of the people’ (Nguyen Loc, Hooper & Sinclair 2013, p. 15), 
and thus enhance the symbolic capital of the Communist Party that facilitates its 
monopoly control in Vietnam. As claimed by Nguyen (2013), the Government holds 
the dominant role in Vietnam because it possesses a significant part of symbolic and 
economic capital. 
Following that direction, the Communist Party conducted nationalisation of assets 
and implemented a centralised planning mechanism to control the economy in all 
aspects following the model of socialist countries (Dang 2016). That management 
style, named socialist solutions, was then recognised as being unsuitable to stimulate 
economic development as summarised by Dang (2016a): ‘Thus, there is a 
disagreement between the socialist solutions and the real life. The more 
implementation of socialist solutions, the more negative reactions of life’ (p. 14, 
translated by the author). 
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Facing that problem, the Communist Party changed its direction by recognising the 
necessity to implement a market economy rather than a planned economy. Since 
then, the Communist Party has combined the concepts of both market economy and 
socialism as a solution for economic renovation. Hence, the market economy 
emerged as a force conflicting with the Communist Party control because socialism 
is represented by the monopoly control of the Communist Party as affirmed by the 
Government whereas the market economy is characterised by free competition (Tran 
Van Tho 2015). Dang Phong (2016) described the negation of the Government 
control following socialism orientation and market control as follows: 
In order to have goods for society, it is necessary to return the freedom for private 
economy. In order to buy or sell, must accept the market economy. But with that 
acceptance, what is the socialist regime, what is the central planning mechanism, 
and what is the socialist goal? (p. 15, translated by the author) 
According to Dang Phong (2016), that contradiction is a severe struggle for the 
policymakers in Vietnam without theoretical guidance for solving it. In particular, 
these two forces oppose one another in the way that the Communist Party would like 
to activate its control over the country, including the economy, whereas a market 
economy operates following market principles rather than Government control. 
Within the market economy, private enterprises are free to operate and compete in 
production and sales, and then, the distribution of resources is determined efficiently 
by market supply and demand based on the win–win solution for both buyers and 
sellers rather than being directly controlled by the Government (Tran Van Tho 2015). 
Under the market economy, transparency is the prerequisite for free competition and 
efficient resources allocation (Tran Van Tho 2015). By contrast, transparency 
regarding bad performance threatens the Government control as found by Piotroski 
and Wong (2012). 
Conversely, these two forces are unified or interdependent. The Communist Party 
needs to build a market economy operating under the market mechanism for 
economic development, rather than the backward planned economy under the full 
control of the Government, to maintain public confidence in its control as mentioned 
in the Doi Moi policy. 
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A market economy also needs the Government as a market facilitator (Phuong NC & 
Richard 2011), rather than the market dominant, to ensure free competition in the 
market. These unified oppositions together form a dynamic interplay between 
Government control and market control. 
In general, the contradiction of Government control and market control was found 
hidden inside the confusion in the economy policy of Vietnam, of which banking 
industry and its regulation on loan loss recognition is a part. Those two forces meet 
Baxter and Montgomery’s (1996) definition that oppositions are ‘two or more themes 
or forces that are interdependent with one another at the same time that they function 
to negate and oppose one another’. The contradiction of Government control–market 
control is ‘generated in the larger society’ but can ‘impose upon the organization’ as 
claimed by Benson (1977). 
4.4.2.3 The link among contradictions 
While Government control–market control is the contradiction that penetrates the 
Vietnamese economic context under the Communist Party’s leadership, as described 
above, other contradictions appeared in the debate on loan loss recognition during 
different economic periods. They link together around the Government control–
market control contradiction. 
4.4.2.3.1 Phase 1: Closeness and poverty 
Before 1986, by adopting a planned economy Vietnam was undergoing many 
difficulties: The economy was in decline, the gap between import and export was 
narrowing and inflation had accelerated to over 700%, leading to the country having 
more than 7 million people facing the threat of starvation 
 (VnExpress 2015). Economic aid from the socialism group was reduced following 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Luong Ninh 2015). Vietnam faced embargoes 
not only from countries in the region but also from the rest of the world when 
Vietnam sent troops to Cambodia from 1979 to 1991 to keep peace in Cambodia 
(Nguyen Thi Ai Huong 2012). Then, the country fell into an economic crisis that 
decreased the confidence of the masses in the leadership of the Communist Party and 
the state (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam 2015). That situation led to an 
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urgent need of renovation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam 2015) or change 
rather than maintaining the current status of a planned economy. 
To escape from those challenges, the market force was used as a relief for the 
existence of the economy, which is the base for leading the opposition to the 
Communist Party in the Government. The general secretary, Nguyen Van Linh, said 
‘Without renovation [the country] is dead’ (VnExpress 2015; translated by the 
author) implying renovation is vital to maintain the Government control (Luong Ninh 
2015). This strong belief is the rationale for the promulgation of the Doi Moi policy 
to save Vietnam from its isolation from the world and revive the economy, thus 
restoring people’s confidence in the leadership of the Communist Party. assert 
renovation. He explained about the Doi Moi policy for renovation purposes, stating 
that: 
No other way, apart from resolutely abolishing the mechanism of centralisation, 
bureaucracy and subsidies; implementing the decentralisation of management; 
adopting the principles of democracy; properly using economic leverages; 
promoting the role of science and technology; improving efficiency; and 
expanding foreign economic relationships. (VnExpress 2015; translated by the 
author) 
With that statement, he argued that the economy must be managed by market 
discipline, ‘the principles of democracy … economic leverages’, rather than 
Government direction, ‘the mechanism of centralization, bureaucracy and subsidies’ 
(Nguyen Trong Phuc 2015; translated by the author). It can be seen that the general 
secretary acted in response to market control instead of the Government’s direct 
control on the economy. He strongly insisted on ‘returning the economy to its 
economic rules’ (Luong Ninh 2015; translated by the author). 
The Communist leaders acknowledged the interdependence of two oppositions, 
stability and change. This is reflected in the slogans mentioned above that ‘without 
renovation, [the country] is dead’ (VnExpress 2015; translated by the author), 
‘Renovation is a vital issue’, or ‘Renovation is prerequisite’ (Luong Ninh 2015; 
translated by the author). The establishment of market control (change) was 
perceived as saving the stability or existence of the country that would be under 
threat of ‘Death’ without change. 
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Since 1986, the change has been made by developing the multisectorial ownership 
structure policy, establishing market institutions and a legal framework for market 
operation. Thanks to that policy, the number of private and foreign businesses has 
increased sharply representing the growth of free market force (Lan 2003). In 
contrast, the number of SOEs that represents the monopoly control force has steadily 
declined. Between 1989 and 2006, thousands of small, loss-making and inefficient 
SOEs were closed or merged, reducing their numbers from 12,000 to 2,600 (Vo Van 
Thanh 2006). This evidence proves that the direct intervention of the Government in 
the economy was reduced, giving way to a self-regulating market with the 
development of the multisectorial ownership structure policy that encourages the 
development of the private sector rather than the state sector only. 
In addition, the market institution was first established for market operation (Nguyen 
Van Dang 2015). In terms of banking industry, the separation between the SBV and 
commercial banks marked the withdrawal of Government control for self-regulating 
free market in banking businesses. Prior to 1990, there was no separation between 
commercial and state banking in Vietnam (SBV 2014). The Government controlled 
both commercial and state banking activities under the SBV (SBV 2014). 
In renovation, the Vietnamese banking system was now separated into two tiers as 
commonly found in a traditional market economy (Dang Duc Thanh 2015). The first 
tier is the SBV. It plays the role of the central bank that is responsible for conducting 
monetary policy, supervision and regulation of the banking system. The lending 
activities were transferred from the SBV to the second tier, including commercial 
banks, financial companies, credit co-operatives, people’s credit funds and insurance 
companies (Le Minh Tam 2001). The Vietnam Agriculture Bank (Agribank), the 
Bank for Investment and Development (BIDV), the Foreign Trade Bank of Vietnam 
(Vietcombank), and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam (Vietinbank) 
were the first four commercial banks detached from SBV in 1992 (Stiftung 2014). 
Along with the construction of the legal system for market operation, the 
Government also passed the Ordinance on the SBV State Council, 38-LCT/HĐNN8 
(State Council 1990), which provided the first legal framework for the banking 
industry to operate in the market economy (Stiftung 2014). 
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The globalisation was initiated in phase 1 and became vigorous in phase 2. From the 
outset of the Doi Moi policy, it was asserted in Resolution 11 of the periodic 
government meeting in the 09 January 1999 session that ‘Integration is an objective 
trend of the global development, being the unavoidable requirement for each country 
in the world today’ (Resolution No. 11/1999/NQ-CP; translated by the author). 
The Government was aware that ‘how to harmonize inside [local] with outside 
[global]’ is a matter of delicateness and cleverness…’ (Duy Huu 2015; translated by 
the author) in responding to the separation–integration contradiction as the result of 
the internalisation policy. In spite of the challenges in globalisation, the Government 
asserted that without global integration, Vietnam could not exist because it was 
‘isolated and embargoed’ (Duy Huu 2015; translated by the author). Then, the 
Government framed global integration by setting the relationship with other countries 
as a means for the local renovation or ‘our reform’: 
We adjusted our diplomatic global integration policy to reduce tension in the 
region, especially with the neighbouring countries, to create a peaceful space for 
the benefit of our reform. (Hoang 2017; translated by the author) 
Under Decision No. 136/2001/QD-TTg dated 17 September 2001 by the Prime 
Minister, the programme implementation of globalisation was divided into two 
stages: 2001–2005 and 2006–2010. This decision required building the capital and 
monetary market institution in the first stage. The institution was required to be 
improved towards market in the next stage of 2006–2010, that is in phase 2. 
Following the Doi Moi policy, the trade and technology barriers of the closed and 
voluntarily controlled economy were removed to help Vietnam use both internal and 
external resources effectively for its economy’s development (Nguyen Duy Quy 
2016). This facility has unleashed agriculture, leading Vietnam from a country that 
imports food to a country that exports rice and gradually becoming one of the leading 
countries in the world in exporting rice. In 1988, Vietnam continued to import 199.5 
thousand tons of food. Suddenly, in 1989, the country exported 1.4 million tonnes of 
rice and constantly boosted exports in the coming years. Ten years later, in 1999, the 
country exported 4.5 million tonnes of rice, becoming the world’s second largest rice 
exporter (VietBao 2006). Hence, Vietnam achieved around 8% annual GDP growth 
from 1990 to 1997. The rise and mobilisation of free market forces with the transition 
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to a market economy and the strengthening global integration and reduction of 
government control force have successfully changed the overall economy of 
Vietnam, thus restoring confidence in the government control. 
In short, the contradictions of stability–change and separation–integration emerged in 
phase 1 as a solution to the Government control–market control contradiction in 
which the Government control was threatened by the poverty and isolation from the 
world. The Renovation policy was implemented from 1986 as the first response to 
the dialectic of government control and market control. The significant economic 
development in phase 1 shows that the Communist Party was successful in framing 
the tension as a complementary contradiction. The free market opposition was 
utilised to consolidate the Government control apposition. Economic achievements 
help the Communist Party repeatedly assert that ‘We have made great achievements, 
which have historical significance’ because of ‘the right leadership of Communist 
Party’ (Nguyen Thanh Vinh 2015; Pham Ngoc Quang 2006; Thai 2016, translated by 
the author), restoring the people’s trust in the Party and maintaining its leadership. 
The fact represents two contradictions of stability–change and separation–integration 
rooted in the contradiction of Government control–market control. 
4.4.2.3.2 Phase 2: Openness and growth 
Phase 2 was characterised by the separation–integration contradiction emerging when 
Vietnam opened its economy. Generally, it is the conflict between the high speed of 
international cooperation development versus the Vietnamese low qualification for 
implementing those agreements as well as the local need versus global demand. 
High speed of international cooperation 
Specifically, following the Doi Moi policy, the trade and technology barriers from 
the closed and voluntarily controlled economy were removed to help Vietnam use 
both internal and external resources effectively for its economy’s development 
(Huynh Buu Son 2016; Nguyen Thanh Tuan 2016). The economic reform in Vietnam 
towards developing a market economy to integrate with the world is evident through 
the expansion of international relationships. As summarised in Table 4.1, this process 
has been marked by the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo (1994) and Vietnam’s 
ASEAN membership (1995). As a member of ASEAN, Vietnam became a member 
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of the ASEAN Free Trade Zone (AFTA), leading to sharp reductions in tariffs on 
imports from Southeast Asian states. Then, its APEC membership was registered in 
1998. The signing of the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) in 2000 between the 
United States and Vietnam was a significant milestone for Vietnam’s economy that 
provided for Normal Trade Relations status of Vietnamese goods in the U.S. market 
as the treatment for the most favoured-nations (Donor Working Group 2012). The 
access to the U.S. market allowed Vietnam to hasten its transformation into 
a manufacturing-based, export-oriented economy. It also concomitantly attracted FDI 
to Vietnam, not only from the United States, but also from Europe, Asia and other 
regions (Stiftung 2014). 
Table 4.1: Global integration process in Vietnam 
Time Events 
1994 
1995 
1998 
2000 
2007 
2008 
2010 
Lifting of the U.S. trade embargo 
ASEAN; AFTA 
APEC 
BTA—Bilateral Trade Agreement (United States) 
WTO 
FTA—Free Trade Agreement (Japan) 
ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA, ASEAN–China FTA (ACFTA) 
Source: The table summarises the events listed in the various sources of Donor Working Group 
(2012), Huynh (2016), Nguyen H. (2014), Nguyen T. (2016) and Stiftung (2014) 
The access to the WTO in 2007 provided an important boost to Vietnam’s economy 
and helped to ensure the continuation of liberalising reforms and creating options for 
trade expansion. In 2008, Vietnam signed a free trade agreement (FTA) with Japan 
(Stiftung 2014). In January 2010, both the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA and 
the ASEAN–China FTA (ACFTA), of which Vietnam is a member, came into effect 
(Stiftung 2014). 
The global integration process by those events gave Vietnam favourable conditions 
to access the global trading market and attract foreign capital investments. In 
addition, Vietnam had a huge foreign capital inflow as the positive result of the 
international agreements. Vietnam has been Southeast Asia’s leading recipient of 
Western and Japanese overseas development assistance (ODA) in absolute terms. 
Over the past two decades, the amount of ODA funding has increased almost 
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annually (Figure 4.2). Especially, the access to the WTO event in 2007 strongly 
boosted the capital inflows into Vietnam from that time (Nguyen H. 2014). By 2011, 
there were 51 donors (28 bilateral and 23 multilateral) operating regularly in 
Vietnam, with the World Bank, Japan and the United States as the largest providers 
of ODA (Stiftung 2014). 
 
Source: Tapchicongthuong (2008), Minh Ngoc (2010), Nguyen Hoai (2012), VnExpress (2012) and 
Thuy Hien (2014) 
Figure 4.2: Overseas development assistance signed and disbursed amount 
The increasingly deeper global integration supported the thriving tendency of the 
market economy. The trade and technology barriers from the closed and voluntarily 
controlled economy were removed to help Vietnam use both internal and external 
resources effectively for its economy’s development. As the result, Vietnam 
continuously increased its imports and exports volume (Figure 4.3). Especially, it 
doubled in 2008 after Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007, putting it into the top 50 
countries with exports and imports as the 50th largest exporter and the 41st largest 
importer, respectively (Ha 2013). 
The expansion of the world market and a strong increase in foreign capital flows 
facilitated all economic sectors, which were unleashed thanks to the Doi Moi policy, 
to develop strongly. The Vietnamese economy has not only come out of poverty, but 
has also continuously developed with a high GDP growth rate (Huynh Buu Son 
2016). The size of GDP in 2006, after 20 years of Renovation, had increased 3.7 
times compared with that of 1985 (International Monetary Fund 2009). Vietnam 
achieved around 8% annual GDP growth from 1990 to 1997 and continued at around 
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7% from 2000 to 2011, becoming one of the world’s fastest growing economies 
(Donor Working Group 2012). There were many optimistic assessments that 
Vietnam was ‘about to become a dragon or tiger’ because Vietnam’s economic 
growth rate was less than only that of China (State Audit Office of Vietnam 2016). 
Vietnam was considered a success story among the transitional economies (Huynh 
Buu Son 2016; Nguyen Minh Trang 2015; World Bank 2015). 
 
 
Source: Vietnam Customs Statistics 
Figure 4.3: Imports and exports in Vietnam 
Those external commitments were also helpful in shaping domestic reforms towards 
international market practices rather than the Government voluntary control as 
before. The passing of the Foreign Direct Investment Law (1987) and the Enterprise 
Law (2000) was regarded as the first concrete step towards economic renovation 
(World Bank 2008, p. 6). The Vietnam Accounting Law was issued in 2003 to 
govern the principles, objects and definitions of accounting, conduct, organisational 
structure, profession and the state control of accounting (Luật kế toán [Accounting 
Law] No. 03/2003/QH11). The convergence with IAS started when the Ministry of 
Finance gradually issued, in five phases since 2001, 26 Vietnamese accounting 
standards (VAS) that are mainly built based on IAS (Vo Van Nhi & Le Hoang Phuc 
2011); these standards must be followed by all enterprises, except family and small 
business, in preparing their financial statements. 
Challenges to Government and bank regulators 
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Those changes create three major challenges for the Government and bank 
regulators. They are the difficulties in renovating the regulation system, of which 
banking and accounting regulation is a part, privatisation and resources allocation. 
Regulation system 
First, the Business Law and Foreign Investment Law have changed frequently every 
4 to 5 years with many amendments of terms (Tran Dinh Thien & Luu Bich Ho 
2015b). Such temporal vacillation reflected the indecisive attitude towards the 
contradiction of separation–integration. It led to the loss of much time in building a 
legal framework and made the investment climate continuously unstable (Tran Dinh 
Thien & Luu Bich Ho 2015b). The inconsistency caused by the temporal vacillation 
resulted in a weak institutional foundation that was not well prepared for global 
integration. This tension can explained for the claim that ‘do not see State where it 
should be’ (Tran Dinh Thien & Luu Bich Ho 2015a; translated by the author) which 
means the state did not fulfil its responsibilities in defining a framework of law for 
market operation. 
In addition, both of private and state sectors in Vietnam are not strong enough to 
compete with the FDI sector (FDI enterprises) and to learn from them (Tran Dinh 
Thien & Luu Bich Ho 2015b). It is evident that technology and business knowledge 
of FDI enterprises does not spread to the whole economy although the FDI 
enterprises have been in Vietnam for a long time and accounted for a large 
proportion of Vietnam’s economy with high industrial production ratio (50% in 
2014) and high exports ratio (70% in 2014) (Tran Dinh Thien & Luu Bich Ho 
2015b). Therefore, Vietnam could not achieve its target of becoming a country with 
the ‘basic industrialization towards modernisation’ as set by the Sixth Congress of 
the Party in 1986 (Thoibaonganhang 2014). This fact shows Vietnam took limited 
advantage from global integration for developing the local economy. It can be seen 
that the Government could not frame integration opposition as a complement to 
respond to separation opposition. 
In terms of accounting, it is the requirement to divert the accounting system from a 
‘socialist’ model to a private capitalist accounting one. Whereas the current system 
mainly serves state management, the new system is required to serve the new players 
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arriving in the accounting field, who are represented by several foreign institutions, 
such as the World Bank, IMF, WTO and Asian Development Bank. This 
transformation process generated difficulties in changing accounting principles and 
preparing a competent human resource as discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.2). 
A unique feature of Vietnamese banking is the state’s strong control of banking 
activities, especially as it pertains to state-controlled commercial banks. For example, 
rather than leaving decisions to the market or the bank’s managers, the Government 
retains the ultimate power in setting the lending growth rate, NPL ratio, CAR and 
equity growth. For global integration, the SBV struggled with regulation on CAR and 
NPL ratio. Bank regulators recognised that a CAR ratio above 8% represents safety 
(as per Basel I and II mentioned in Chapter 2), which is critical to obtain the global 
integration objective. However, maintaining the CAR ratio above 8% would limit the 
lending growth for the economy development objective because the bank capital was 
currently very low. 
To manage that conflict, the bank regulators decided to stop trying to regulate the 
ratio only, which might have negative effects on the target of lending growth and 
inflation owing to the current low capital level in banks, and instead decided to focus 
on managing the denominator and numerator separately to reach multiple objectives 
simultaneously. 
In that way, the denominator of the ratio was managed towards inflation and lending 
growth that was usually maintained at a high level of 20% on average. Then, the 
numerator was managed to rise following the increase of denominator to meet the 
minimum requirement of CAR. This problem-solving approach explains the rationale 
for the equity growth requirement stipulated by the Government since 2006 when all 
joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) were required to have their legal equity capital 
at not less than 3,000 dong billion by 31 December 2010 (Nguyen Tan Dung 2006). 
In addition, the equity growth requirement is another response to the global 
integration need in which Vietnamese banks must have a higher equity capital level 
to compete in international trading (Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 2013). 
It is seen from this fact that the bank management reframed the meaning of CAR 
regulation to manage the contradiction of separation–integration in which the local 
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identity (low capital but high credit need) conflicted with the international 
requirement of CAR ratio and the need for equity growth for international 
competition. 
That resolution created strong pressure on many start-up JSCBs with a small size and 
lack of business experience. Following the policy of multisector business economy 
development under Doi Moi, this period witnessed the strong growth of the number 
of commercial banks. There were 12 JSCBs formed during 2005–2008 by converting 
small rural banks as subjectively requested by the bank regulators to develop the free 
market for economic development in Vietnam (Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 2013). Since 
many banks were small rural banks with limited capital and rudimentary banking 
technology, these could not raise enough capital or were not eager to raise more 
capital because a larger size would exceed their management capacity. Hence, JSCBs 
did not meet the equity growth requirement deadline of 31 December 2010. Then, on 
26 January 2011, the bank regulators delayed the implementation of capital 
requirement for one year and firmly required banks to increase their capital equity to 
3,000 billion dong as at 31 December 2011. 
In addition to the requirements of equity growth, the requirement of NPL ratio below 
3% was also stipulated to improve the competitiveness of the Vietnamese banking 
industry for implementing the global integration policy of the Government. The NPL 
ratio below 3% is critical for the Vietnamese Government to maintain its 
international credit rating related to its large global borrowings (Vov.vn 2012; 
Zing.vn 2015). It explains why the bank regulators have required commercial banks 
to manage this ratio since 2005. This ratio has been more important for commercial 
banks to manage of late, since bank regulators use it as a criterion to limit activities 
of commercial banks. 
The pressure from the requirement of equity growth and NPL ratio became fiercer in 
2011. The Vietnam economy began to fall into a depression period when the stimulus 
package ended leading to the burst of the securities and real estate markets. Many 
banks faced the challenge that their NPL ratio went over 3% with the acceleration of 
NPLs and credit freeze during this time. In addition, it was a big challenge for 
commercial banks to cope with the requirement of equity growth from SBV within 
just one year of 2011. At that time, the depression began to spread and the securities 
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market declined since 2008 making it difficult for banks to raise more capital from 
investors. The efforts to solve that problem can critically affect how bank loan loss is 
recognised in the commercial banks under severe pressure. 
Equitisation 
Second, the equitisation was conducted as a response to the global integration need. 
Particularly, Vietnam had to quickly implement the equitisation programme since it 
was perceived as the ‘golden key’ to be accepted as a member of the WTO (Sai Gon 
Giai Phong (SGGP) 2006; translated by the author). According to Pham Chi Lan, the 
former Vice President of Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry: 
Although there are many challenges, Vietnam still has ‘the golden opportunity’ to 
participate in the WTO. The important thing is that we must expend great efforts to 
take advantage of the opportunity … We need to restructure businesses, including 
drastically reforming SOEs, rapidly implementing equitisation and reducing the 
percentage of shares in SOEs equitisation of state, and soon transfer all SOEs to 
operate under the Enterprise Law. This is a vital element for SOEs to improve 
themselves and improve competitiveness. (SGGP 2006; translated by the author) 
According to Pham Chi Lan, equitisation helps Vietnam to meet the globalisation 
requirement of developing private business sectors. The equitisation of SOEs sector 
was expected to mobilise all resources (e.g., capital and human) for the economy’s 
growth because it offered the chance for other business sectors rather than state only 
to participate in the current SOEs (Hanoingannam 2014). Equitisation was also 
believed to create business incentives for the state-owned sector’s management 
(Hanoingannam 2014) to improve its current low efficiency that threatened the 
national financial safety and Government control (VnEconomy 2014). 
However, through equitisation, the Government control would be reduced to make 
room for market control with the growth of other sectors (e.g., private or foreign 
sectors) taking part in business. The fear of losing the Government control because of 
‘privatization’ in SOEs limited the depth of equitisation, which is a response to 
enhance market forces. 
Specifically, the equitisation process was very slow. The reason is that the 
Communist Party still wanted to maintain its control over the equitised enterprises to 
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continue engaging in the economy’s operations via the leading role of the SOE sector 
(United Nations Development Programme 2006). That wish was reinforced in the 
resolution of the Ninth Party Congress, session 3, dated 24 September 2001: 
State-owned enterprises play a dominant role in the economy... and being the core 
force of state economic sector to ensure its leading role in the market economy 
under socialism orientation. (United Nations Development Programme 2006; 
translated by the author) 
The leading role of the state economic sector policy was also repeated in the 
resolution of the Ten Party Congress: 
The state economic sector plays a key role, being an important material force for 
the state to orient and adjust the economy, setting the environment and conditions 
for developing all economic sectors. (Vien Nghien Cuu Phat Trien [HIDS] 2016; 
translated by the author) 
With that desire, the Government responded to both oppositions of Government and 
market control by interpreting the concept of equitisation as ‘equitisation but not 
privatization’ (Hanoingannam 2014; translated by the author). That slogan revealed 
the permanent fear of the rise of private sector that could overwhelm the control of 
the Government (Tran Vinh Du 2015). To prevent that risk, the state applied a 
specific equitisation strategy that was affirmed by the Deputy Head of Central 
Innovation and Enterprise Development Committee, Ho Xuan Hung: 
I can confirm that under the Vietnamese approach, equitisation of state-owned 
enterprises is absolutely not privatisation. Since the state now holds over 50% 
stake after the equitisation, these are still state-owned enterprises under the 
Enterprise Law. So, do not worry about whether it is private or state. (Vo Van 
Thanh 2006; translated by the author) 
The contradiction under the policy of ‘equitisation but not privatization’ was raised 
by the Deputy Director of Business Innovation in Government Office, Nguyen Trong 
Dung: 
The Party and State have advocated the development of a multisector economy, 
including private sector development. Thus, we are encouraging the development 
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of the private economy and why do we have to worry about privatisation (Vo Van 
Thanh 2007; translated by the author) 
The fear of ‘privatization’ can be observed more clearly in examining the 
equitisation in Vietcombank, Vietinbank and BIDV, which are three of big four state-
owned commercial banks5. Those three banks are running the ongoing transformation 
of the banking ownership structure by equitisation aiming to introduce a strong 
commercial orientation to the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) (VnEconomy 
2012). The equitisation of SOCBs was significant for Vietnam to integrate with the 
world as asserted by Ho Xuan Hung, the Deputy Head of Central Innovation and 
Enterprise Development Committee. He claimed: 
The banking sector must be one of the earliest to open next year. Equitisation plans 
for all state commercial banks were outlined, beginning with Vietcombank and 
finally the Agribank. (Vo Van Thanh 2006; translated by the author) 
Conversely, the Government hesitated to equitise SOCBs since it was considered a 
‘sensitive area’ (Vo Van Thanh 2006) with their significant role in implementing 
Government policy. It created a conflict between international pressure and local 
needs within the equitisation of SOCBs. The Government has to respond to the 
global requirement for integration while it would like to maintain the national, 
separate need of direct control on commercial banks’ operation. 
In consideration of that concern, Vietcombank, with the most progress in 
equitisation, was almost entirely owned by the Government with 92.5% of ownership 
in late 2007 (Rosengard & Huynh 2012). This state-owned percentage dropped until 
the end of 2011 but remained highly significant at 77% (Rosengard & Huynh 2012). 
Vietinbank was the second SOCB for equitisation. Its equitisation had not been 
conducted until 2009. Similar to Vietcombank, the ownership structure of Vietinbank 
still was state-owned at 89.23% at the end of 2009 (Thuy Linh 2009). This rate was 
lowered to 80.31% in 2012 (Nguyen Son 2012) and has been still significant at 
64.46% since 2013 (Vietibank 2017). 
                                                          
5 They are Vietcombank, Vietinbank, BIDV and Agribank. 
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As the result of the ‘equitisation but not privatization’ policy, the process of 
equitisation in Vietnam is largely a closed process. The state still has a majority 
stake, holding at least 51% (Hanoingannam 2014). There was no significant change 
in the ownership structure. In this way, the equitisation had been made by halves. 
Under that ownership structure, the state has been the major shareholder of SOEs in 
substance so far. 
It represents a neutralisation response in which both oppositions were diluted to 
compromise their contradiction. In particular, whereas the Government still 
maintained its control as a major shareholder, its control switched from business 
management into investment management that gave SOEs more independence in 
market competition. The development of market was improved to a limited extent, 
with other business sectors participating in SOEs via purchasing small portions of 
their stocks. As the result of that partial response, the capital and human resources 
raised from the other business sectors were limited since the Government still holds a 
significant amount of shares (Hanoingannam 2014). 
Similarly, being a part of SOEs, the shareholder structure of SOCBs shows that SBV, 
representing the Government, still controls those banks. Therefore, SBV is both the 
governing body of the banking sector and the representative of the state capital at 
SOCBs as well. This organisation structure facilitates the use of SOCBs as a tool for 
bank regulators in SBV with multiple objectives. It is evident that the SBV Governor, 
Nguyen Van Binh, asserted, ‘Vietcombank is a tool of the state to implement and 
enforce monetary policy besides its mission of running a good business’ 
(Vietcombank 2015; translated by the author). 
As the majority owner of SOCBs, SBV appointed the key officers, such as the chair, 
CEO and the board members. Most of leaders of SOCBs remain ‘Government 
officials’, and SOCBs are closely managed by the Government, and especially by the 
Communist Party. For example, in Vietcombank, both its board chairperson and 
CEO are Communist Party members and Government officials, and hence, these 
executives can be rotated fully to work at SBV, which is the governing body of the 
banking sector. For example, Mr Thanh, a former CEO of Vietcombank, has been 
currently appointed the Deputy Bank Governor in SBV. With this organisation model 
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of personnel, the ownership is concentrated in the hand of Government with no clear 
separation of ownership and control in the organisation. 
The state control over SOCBs has not only remained but was also partly extended to 
JSCBs via cross-shareholding (Dang Duc Thanh 2015, Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 
2013). According to The Banking Review (2013), cross-shareholding between 
SOCBs and JSCBs was the Government policy: 
Since the years before the establishment of joint-stock commercial banks, the 
Government has planted its agents in each bank and large state-owned commercial 
banks have been instructed to contribute capital to joint-stock commercial banks to 
become state shareholders in those joint-stock banks. The presence of the state-
owned commercial banks is for limiting the activities beyond the legal framework 
if there are weaknesses originating from the new joint-stock banks that were 
established. (Banking Review 2013; translated by the author) 
Under that pyramid ownership structure, the state also indirectly owns JSCBs 
through the SOCBs. When the ownership of SOCBs in JSCBs is significant, the 
problem of state direct control arises in JSCBs as in SOCBs. The JSCBs are also 
influenced to participate in the funding of projects designated by the Government 
(Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 2013). In such a way, the banking system is intertwined 
directly or indirectly with the majority of commercial banks in Vietnam being 
‘relatives’ of SBV, the Government and the SOEs (Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 2013). 
According to Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. (2013), that cross-shareholding makes those 
entities consider being in the same interest group. With that thought, banks lack the 
responsibility to carefully appraise and monitor lending to SOEs. In addition, SOEs 
have less prudence in borrowing and tend to rely on the Government policy of 
interest freeze, credit extension or NPL write-off. In addition, bank managers are 
often forced to give credit priority, with preferential or permissive terms, to 
businesses or projects under the control of the final owner, which is the Government 
whereas it is also the regulator of the economy. Therefore, regulations on financial 
security for bank operations are often overlooked or not fully complied with. 
Resource allocation 
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Third, the Government’s intervention in capital allocation and the related invalidation 
of regulation is more severe when the Government focuses on how to strengthen the 
local economic entities so that they, especially the state business sector, can compete 
with foreign investors and the state business sector still maintains its leading role for 
maintaining the Government control in Vietnam. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Government supported the leading role of 
SOEs by giving SOEs privileges in the resource allocation of capital, real estate and 
training (Huong Duong 2014; Tran Van Tho 2013). It has resulted in the formation of 
simple, large, capital-intensive state corporations rather than corporations with high 
technology and modern management. Specifically, keen to emulate the experience of 
Japan’s keiretsus and the Republic of Korea’s chaebols, in 2005, the Government 
accelerated the process of creating State Economic Groups (SEGs) or General 
Corporations by consolidating SOEs with similar business interests. 
Vinashin is a typical example. It is a large state-owned shipping corporation founded 
in 2006 following the response mentioned by Nguyen Tran Bat, a financial specialist 
and CEO of Invest Consult Company: 
There are slightly different motives in this story. There are those who want to 
establish the leading role for the state economy, but also those who want our 
economy to be developed quickly in size; there are those who want us to have 
economic representatives for international talks. Because ultimately a prime 
minister or a president cannot negotiate a specific economic problem, cannot be 
the representative of the economy. The corporations are considered the 
representatives of the economy. (Viet Lam & Khanh Linh 2010; translated by the 
author) 
According to the statement, such SEGs were expected to serve both objectives of 
enhancing Government control over the economy and the national competition in 
global integration process. By doing so, the Government defined its control by the 
leading role of the state economy sector. The key role of the state economy is 
described by the Congress (2006) of the Communist Party of Vietnam that 
The dominant role of the state economy is not reflected in the number of 
enterprises more or less, in the proportion of high or low contribution to GDP that 
in place, but it is an important material force for the state to navigate and regulate 
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the economy, providing the environment and conditions for promoting the 
development of all business sectors. (Nguyen Quang 2010; translated by the 
author) 
According to the definition above, the leading role of the state economy was not 
reflected in ‘the number of enterprises’ or in ‘the proportion of contribution to GDP’ 
anymore because it needs to share the market for the development of other business 
sectors for developing the market economy and for globalisation. The leading role of 
the state economy is redefined as the ‘important material force’ for ‘the State to 
navigate and regulate the economy’. This redefinition has two implications in terms 
of regulation. The state economy sector is designed to be used as a complement for 
regulations on controlling the economy. Conversely, the support from the 
Government for the development of this sector is important because the sector is 
considered an ‘important material force’ for the Government to maintain its control. 
This role is emphasised in Luu’s (2014) argument that the Communist Party must 
take control of both the economic and military force as follows: 
Common theory of political science had shown: for a caste, a social force or an 
individual, to be able to win, hold and exercise its power, it must have the power 
of violence, physical or intellectual; in other words, it must have ‘gun’ and 
‘money’ or knowledge and culture. In spite of knowledge and culture playing an 
increasingly important role, violence and physical and financial power are still 
indispensable in today’s conditions. (Luu 2014; translated by the author) 
This substantive role of the state economy sector was also legitimated by the 
socialism objective. Particularly, the Communist Party argued that the state business 
sector should play a leading role in the market economy because it is a precursor to 
public ownership, which is the goal of socialism orientation (Vu Van Phuc 2014b, 
2015). 
With that redefinition of the leading role of the state business sector for responding to 
the Government control pole, the Government stepped up favour lending to SEGs 
and SOEs through the pyramid cross-shareholding banking system as mentioned 
above and also via the separate state lending channel that is the Vietnam 
Development Bank (VDB). VDB is established under Decision No. 108/2006/QD-
TTg dated 19 May 2006 by the Prime Minister. According to this decision, VDB is a 
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wholly state-owned bank that has mobilisation functions, receiving capital from 
domestic and foreign institutions (e.g., ODA) to execute the state development 
investment and export credit policies as regulated by the Government and guarantees 
for business loans in commercial sector. 
According to Dang (2015), as the result of that preferential credit policy: 
The majority of SOEs are lent mainly without securities, even under ‘orders’ or 
‘indications’ [from the Government agencies, politicians, regulators, etc.] with 
huge amounts and being processed very fast, not as tightly as when banks lend to 
small and medium businesses. Examples are huge government-mandated loans, 
such as for Vinashin, Vinaline, Electricity Corporation, Coal Group and Petroleum 
Group. (Dang 2015, p. 24, translated by the author) 
The easy lending policy gives SOEs the chance to borrow large amounts from banks, 
which is more than 40% of total banking sector loans (Dang 2015). That capital 
support undermined the market principles that encourage fair competition among 
business sectors based on real economic efficiency rather than such biased capital 
allocation. Consequently, huge loans could not be recovered because those SOEs lost 
their payment capability or deliberately delayed, waiting for the Government’s rescue 
(Dang 2015). The causal relationships of this phenomenon are examined further 
through the analysis of loan loss recognition in the next chapter. 
From a dialectical view, two contradictions of separation–integration and 
Government control–market control were found in this phase. By framing the 
socialism orientation as the public ownership and the leading role of the state 
economy, the Government supported the state economy sector with many privileges 
while underplaying the role of the private economy regardless of the low efficiency 
of the former sector. Because of the unequal competition with SOEs in accessing 
economic resources, the private enterprise sector lacks the conditions for healthy 
development (Tran Dinh Thien & Luu Bich Ho 2015a; Tran Van Tho 2015) while 
that sector is commonly the most dynamic area in a traditional market economy 
(Tran Van Tho 2015). 
By doing so, the Government ignored its responsibility to respond to the market 
control in which the market should play the role of resource allocation rather than the 
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Government. This is problematic given that resource allocation under Government 
direction is not as efficient as under market control. The topic vacillation also causes 
haphazard government policy of which it is usually said, ‘do not see market where it 
should be’ and ‘do not see state where it should be’ (Tran Dinh Thien & Luu Bich 
Ho 2015a; translated by the author). In Vietnam, the first statement means ‘do not 
see the market role in resources allocation’. The second statement means ‘do not see 
the state role in setting and enforcing institutions for the market’, which is 
represented by examining the temporal vacillation response as discussed above. By 
playing the market role, the Government was believed to confuse the market (Tran 
Dinh Thien & Luu Bich Ho 2015a). Tran Dinh Thien and Luu Bich Ho (2015a) 
commented about the state’s actions as follows: 
The problem is that the state has not traditionally performed its correct role. 
Investment is not the state’s job, but it still rushes forward into investing. 
Developing a competitive market but jumping into setting price. Consequently, the 
more the state does, the more confusion it causes. (Tran Dinh Thien & Luu Bich 
Ho 2015a; translated by the author) 
4.4.2.3.3 Phase 3: Depression 
As the result of inefficient resource allocation in the previous phase and the 2008 
global financial crisis, from 2012, the Vietnamese banking industry’s growth 
declined with the acceleration of NPLs resulting in economic depression. The 
Deposit Insurance of Vietnam has never been used for the resolution of NPLs or for 
troubled banks because it has a weak financial position. According to the World 
Bank (2014), its financial position is inadequate to assist even in the liquidation of 
two medium-sized institutions. 
In addition, the Government could not bail out the troubled banks because Vietnam’s 
total public debt increased significantly over the past 10 years (Figure 4.4). In 2014, 
it was over 80 billion USD, accounting for 48% of GDP. However, it would reach 
approximately 98.2% of GDP, far exceeding the safety threshold of 65% of GDP that 
was recommended by World Bank for the Euro area (Tapchitaichinh 2014) if SOEs’ 
debts were counted. 
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Source: Data are collected from Zing.vn (2014) 
Figure 4.4: Vietnam’s public debt in 10 years 
Although the Government does not guarantee a part of SOEs’ debts, it cannot avoid 
that liability in case some large SOEs fall into loss and cannot pay their debts 
because the Government cannot allow them to become bankrupt given their strategic 
importance for the Government. Therefore, the impact of poor performance by these 
large SOEs is better seen as a contingent liability for the Government budget, rather 
than a direct risk for the banking system. The problem was considered severe when 
the SOE sector accounted for 70% of NPLs as at 30 September 2012 (Dang Duc 
Thanh 2015; The Saigon Times 2012; Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 2013); thus, the 
majority of bank losses in case of bankruptcy would be charged to the state budget 
rather than any other group. 
However, the Government could not allow bank bankruptcy since it feared instability 
for society and politics that might lead to the loss of its control. According to Nguyen 
Phuoc Thanh, SBV Deputy Governor, SBV tried not to let banks be declared 
bankrupt because if many depositors were to lose money owing to bank bankruptcy, 
it would have large effect on politics and society (Thuy Lien 2015, transalted by the 
author). He stressed: 
We would rather lose money for state bailout to have stability in the society. It 
would be better than the case that people lose money leading to loss of confidence, 
stability and other problems that cost more.  
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The Politburo and the Government also agreed with this policy that did not apply the 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act to bankrupt banks in the current period to ensure 
the stability of macroeconomic, political security and social order and safety 
(Nhandanonline 2015). Following this policy, the SOCBs, such as BIDV and 
Vietcombank, were directed by the SBV to support the liquidity for the banking 
system in restructuring (Dang Duc Thanh 2015; VnEconomy 2011; Vu Thanh Tu 
Anh et al. 2013). Mr Tran Bac Ha, the Chairman of BIDV, representing for the 
Government’s share in BIDV, asserted that ‘In any case, the rights of legitimate 
depositors will be ensured. Under the political regime of Vietnam, there would be no 
story that depositors lose money!’ (VnEconomy 2011; translated by the author). Bac 
Ha desired to communicate the ideological view in which the Government’s 
guarantee was a preeminent of the market socialism regime. 
The dilemma is that the depositors could not lose money if banks went bankrupt 
while there was no source for compensating the depositors. Hence, the dilemma 
comprises all four conflicts of Government control–market control, stability–change, 
separation–integration and information–disinformation. The Government had to 
maintain stability to ensure its control. The revealing of NPLs to the public would 
cause bankruptcy without other sources for paying depositors, leading to instability. 
Concealing NPLs would negate the attempt at global integration and prevent market 
discipline. In addition, the Government’s assurance of deposits would neutralise the 
market penalty for the depositors. The data analysis in Chapter 5 examines how the 
stability concern and ideological view of the Government spilled over to the debate 
and oriented loan loss recognition in this period. 
4.5 Data Collection 
According to Deetz (1982), interpretive studies in organisational communication not 
only searched for ‘what organizational members think is real or how they think and 
feel’ but ‘the understanding of the system of meanings from which this situation is 
composed and connected to the larger sociocultural context’ (p. 135, 138). Regarding 
the regulation on loan loss, the collected communication data in this research 
included not merely regulation documents but their related discussions and actions to 
obtain ‘more talk and actions’ (Deetz 1982, p. 138) for understanding how the 
perception was manifested in communication and social interaction. 
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Since the regulations, regulation promulgation process and the general practices of 
loan loss recognition are publicly available, the study was able to make use of 
published records as the basis for its data collection. Detailed data related to the 
practice of loan loss recognition are not published officially, other than bank external 
reports, but can be obtained abundantly through the speeches and debates on public 
media about loan loss recognition, which is a current ‘hot topic’. 
Since the research focuses on the ongoing interplay between the 
Government/regulators with its environment, the collected data include not only the 
data related to loan loss recognition but also the background data in which the loan 
loss communication data occurred. They are the data related to the substantial 
conflict between government and market control in the economic and political 
environment that was expected to have critical influence on regulation on loan loss 
recognition. 
Most data were sourced from the internet and included archived documents and 
speeches (including videos, and newspaper and rating agency reports) from various 
users of accounting information, such as investors, bankers, politicians, 
professionals, auditors, rating agencies and related organisations. The selected 
websites are official websites that represent these agencies. Since this research 
examined and criticised the Government policy relating to accounting change, the 
websites that are often considered hostile and reactionary are not chosen to avoid the 
bias against the Government. Negative criticisms of the Government are collected 
from Government official websites, formal press releases, key people and specialists 
acknowledged by the Vietnamese Government. 
The remaining data were sourced from hardcopies of newspapers, books, industry 
journals and regulations. All of those sources are within the public domain; no data 
used in this study were obtained from banks, except bank external reports, or from 
any interview with bank officers. 
Considering the aforementioned data setting, online searches were performed for the 
data using several key words not only about NPLs (e.g., ‘bad debts’, ‘non-performing 
loans’, ‘debts classification’, ‘loan loss provision’ and ‘VAMC’) but also about 
related social interests (e.g., ‘Nguyen Van Binh Governor’, ‘bank supervision’, 
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‘bankruptcy’, ‘bank merger’, ‘SOEs sector’, ‘implementation of Basel Accords’, 
‘credit freeze’, ‘cross shareholding’, ‘capital adequacy ratio’, ‘public debts’, ‘global 
integration’, ‘rescue real estate market’, ‘bank training’ and ‘credit rating’). 
Moreover, searches were performed using the key words of ideologies and power 
structure (e.g., ‘socialism orientation’, ‘market economy’ and ‘renovation’). 
In Vietnam, the term ‘bad debt’ is commonly used interchangeably with NPLs. In 
fact, bad debts are only debts that are not expected to be collected, whereas NPL 
includes bad debts and other debts that might turn into bad debts. In Vietnam, NPLs 
are classified into five groups as mentioned in Section 1.1 of which bad debts are 
group 5 ‘potentially irrecoverable debt’. Considering the unique characteristic of 
communication in Vietnam, the term ‘bad debts’ in the collected communication data 
was often translated into NPLs during the translation process when the author 
believed the speakers referred to NPLs rather than bad debts in their statements. 
The research design utilised the interpretive paradigm and focused on qualitative 
data. The data collection included three groups. First, background data were collected 
from sources such as the World Bank, Bank for International Settlements, IFRS, 
international credit rating agencies, Ministry of Finance and SBV as well as speeches 
and press releases. Second, the data on Vietnamese regulation in loan loss 
recognition were collected from the Vietnamese Ministry of Finance, Vietnamese 
banking regulations, Vietnam Department of Accounting and Auditing Regulations, 
SBV, Vietnam Banks’ Association and Vietnam Association of Accountants and 
Auditors. Third, external reports from commercial banks in Vietnam were collected. 
All of these data were created in the communication between the 
Government/regulators and other related parties in its environment, such as bank 
management, foreign institutions, investors, depositors and specialists. Therefore, 
they are called communication data in general. 
4.6 Content Analysis 
A content analysis of multiple documentary sources in accounting and banking 
regulation is used in this study to identify the change process and its underlying 
conflicts in regulating loan loss recognition in Vietnam. This accepted method 
enables the researcher to include large amounts of textual information (Silverman 
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2011, p. 64) and systematically identify its properties. This section discusses how the 
method of content analysis was applied in this study and how to eliminate the textual 
bias that may occur using that method of data analysis. 
4.6.1 Method of content analysis 
The purpose of the present interpretive study is to uncover insights on 
communication of loan loss recognition. From a dialectical view, as guided by Deetz 
(1982), the formation of the searching knowledge is also a dialectical process of the 
tension between the whole and the part, in which ‘the part has meaning only in terms 
of the whole, and the meaning of the whole is understood only from the meaning of 
the parts’ (p. 145). Considering this feature, the analysis is organised into three 
stages. The first is understanding the context [the whole] for examining the part [loan 
loss recognition and communication] in the next step. The second step is to 
understand loan loss recognition and communication [the part] within the context 
[the whole]. In turn, the acquired knowledge aids in clarify the context [the whole] 
meaning. Finally, the knowledge acquired in the previous two steps are summarised 
and synthesised to search for the emerged patterns of change. These three stages are 
conducted in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4), Section 5 and Section 6, respectively. 
Specifically, Section 4.4 analyses the data related to the cultural, political and 
economic context that have multiple interconnections with loan loss recognition. 
From the dialectical view, the change in loan loss recognition is believed to be a part 
of a larger, concrete whole of the Vietnamese harmonisation culture in responding to 
contradiction, the leading role of the Communist Party and the quasi-market 
environment. The communication data and the related events, related to those issues, 
are connected to set the context for understanding the change of loan loss recognition 
in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 assesses the data directly related to loan loss recognition. Those data are 
analysed in connection with the findings from the context analysis in Section 4.4. 
Specifically, the context analysis found three distinct stages in the Vietnamese 
economy development: (1) closeness and poverty (2) open and growth and (3) 
depression. That change pattern can be an indicator of the spiral of change from a 
dialectical view. Therefore, the data of loan loss recognition is also grouped into 
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three phases following the economic change pattern that emerged in the context 
analysis to understand the corresponding intertwinement between the whole, context, 
and the part, loan loss recognition. 
In both Section 4.4 and Chapter 5, the data are analysed through three steps. First, the 
data are arranged in topic and time order. Second, the data are combined to make a 
coherent story that is logical, appropriate, comprehensive and consistent with ‘the 
values, beliefs, and types of actions possible in the organization’ for revealing the 
very meaning of data in their specific context (Deetz 1982, p. 144). The 
understanding of one part (e.g., a change in a regulation on loan loss recognition) or 
one phase is utilised for clarifying the meanings of other parts (e.g., the next change 
of regulation or the following phase). 
In particular, Section 4.4 is the story about the Vietnamese cultural, political and 
economic environment and its changes. Chapter 5 tells the story of changes in loan 
loss recognition in Vietnam. The two stories are reproduced in coherence with the 
values, belief and types of actions derived from the current literature such as the 
types of contradictions, the types of responses to contradictions or the characteristics 
of the Vietnamese cultural, political and economic environment. The understanding 
of phases 1 and 2 explain the confusion of loan loss recognition in phase 3. 
Third, the contradictions underlying the various conflicts in the stories as well as how 
the contradictions are responded to are searched. This step is conducted based on the 
conceptual framework built on the dialectical theory in Chapter 3. This step gives a 
richer and deeper understanding of the changes in loan loss recognition. It also 
reveals the misunderstandings of loan loss and the forces of contradictions that 
sustain them. 
The data analysed in Appendix 2 were rearranged following the loan loss recognition 
story sequence for convenience in keeping track of both Appendix 2 and Chapter 5 at 
the same time. The arranged data were skimmed to determine the primary conflict 
issue rather than focusing on multiple conflict issues embedded within each 
document. Then, they were highlighted and coded into four types of contradictions, 
namely, stability–change, separation–integration, information–disinformation and 
Government control–market control, with six response styles of selection, vacillation, 
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source splitting, creative or complementary, layering and balancing, and withdrawal. 
They are the contradictions and response styles as proposed in the literature review 
(Section 2.4) and the conceptual framework (Section 3.3–Table 3.1). Those four 
dialectical contradictions were used as themes to code the entire collected data 
manually. 
In Chapter 6, the dialectical view was applied to identify the emerged patterns of 
contradictions and responses from the data analysis in Appendix 2 and Chapter 5, 
comparing with the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3. The emerged 
responses were compared with the responses styles in interpersonal communication 
to search for similarities. The emerged contradictions and responses were 
summarised in Table 6.1 to view the whole picture of loan loss communication over 
three phases from a dialectical view. 
In addition, the relationship among contradictions was examined to understand the 
depth of the contentious issue in loan loss communication. Their relationship was 
reflected in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2. Figure 6.1 shows the relationship in a static 
state, whereas Figure 6.2 displays the relationship in a change process over three 
phases. 
Finally, because it was found that Government control determines market control and 
vice versa, the transformation process of loan loss communication was analysed as 
the result of the dialectical interplaying between the two oppositions of Government 
and market controls. It is described in Figure 6.3 as a line graph in three dimensions, 
resulting from the ways of response to the Government control–market control 
contradiction to explain why loan loss communication is a contentious issue in 
Vietnam. 
4.6.2 Textual bias 
Loan loss recognition is a sensitive issue because of its close relationship with the 
country’s economic and political situation. Being aware of that, the study prefers to 
use the primary data, which are considered to consist of all the official documents 
issued by the Government agencies and bank financial reports, because these are 
created at about the same time as the event. Because of their special creation time, 
the primary data are free of the opinions and fictions imposed by later generations. 
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Although priority is given to the use of official information (data, policy and law), it 
is necessary to carefully consider other published sources of information in the mass 
media for understanding from different perspectives the conflicts and contradictions 
in the communication related to loan loss recognition. They are the secondary 
resources that include reviews and commentary on publications from the 
Government, banks, accounting, other regulatory bodies and the wider media. These 
secondary sources have a major advantage in that the authors were not involved in 
the event. This allows the authors to analyse the events dispassionately. 
Both primary and secondary data have disadvantages. The primary data reflect the 
authors’ prejudices (e.g., containing propaganda designed to pacify the conquered 
country) or their author might be unaware of relevant facts (e.g., omitting politically 
inconvenient facts). The disadvantage of using secondary data is that the authors 
write about what other people said occurred, when they do not have their own 
experiences to help them understand such events clearly. Thus, the authors might 
unconsciously emphasise one thing while overlooking the others through their own 
cultural lens. 
To overcome that bias, the communication data were analysed concurrently with the 
analysis of background data to create a coherent story for understanding the right 
meaning of communication data in their original context. The knowledge of the 
context is essential for appropriate content analysis since language is not neutral 
(Krippendorff 2013). In addition, multiple reviews and commentaries related to one 
publication were examined at the same time to examine the event from different 
views to obtain a rich picture of the event. For this purpose, the thesis made extensive 
use of quotations. 
Further, understanding an event from different views as described above is also the 
property of the dialectical method that ‘tries to approach the elusive absolute truth 
through the process of examining and denying the series of relative truth’ (Nonaka & 
Toyama 2003, p. 9). Nonaka and Toyama (2003) even emphasised the understanding 
of the different perceptions as a target of dialectical view, saying that ‘it is this 
process that is important, rather than whether one can reach the absolute truth or not’ 
(p. 9). 
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The dialectical approach applied in this research limited the researcher’s subjective 
meanings by focusing on the view of the big picture, and in this respect, the 
researcher maintains a reflexive stance to interpret the text meaning. Further, data 
collected from the multiples sources of primary and secondary resources were 
verified to ensure data validity or to obtain clarification on any unclear issues. In 
addition, the contradictions and response patterns found in background analysis are 
not only the basis of guidelines for analysing the communication on regulating loan 
loss recognition but confirm the contradiction patterns and responses of bank 
regulators. 
In the first phase of Doi Moi, there were few public arguments on behalf of bank 
regulators for the fear of capturing the wrong direction of the Communist Party. Most 
of the debates quoted from this phase are individual speeches (Section 4.4.2.1 and 
Section 5.2). However, their opinions can represent bank regulators’ conflicts 
because many of these quotes are from the banking journals belonging to the SBV, 
which is a government agency. The authors of those quotes can be bank regulators or 
others who have a close relationship to bank regulators, such as researchers, 
consultants and university lecturers. Because of that close relationship and their 
academic background, their opinions are believed to have significant impact on bank 
regulators in decision-making. In that way, the conflicts in the quoted debate are 
believed to represent the conflict faced by bank regulators. 
The auditor’s perspective is beyond the scope of this research because of the lack of 
sufficient public data in this area. Nevertheless, some related data were also found 
and analysed (e.g., in paragraph 2 and 3 of page 126). How internal credit risk 
assessment is performed in banks for loan loss recognition is beyond the scope of this 
research because data related to this topic are not sufficient. The lack of these two 
areas is believed to not significantly affect the research findings because auditors in 
Vietnam do not have a strong voice in the accounting regulation setting process 
(Phan DHT 2014). In addition, only two commercial banks have been applying 
internal credit risk assessment; the others adopt the standard method stipulated by the 
Government. 
Finally, although most of the data are in Vietnamese and are translated by the author, 
most of them can be accessed online for evaluating and limiting the translator’s bias. 
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The easy access to data online also helps to verify their validity. In addition, the 
Vietnamese quotes used in the data analysis are presented in Appendix 4 for 
accessing the accuracy of author’s translation. 
4.7 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter provided the rationale for the research process and design of this study. 
The research decision to use an interpretive paradigm is justified since it provides the 
right framework and approach for understanding the contentious issue in loan loss 
communication in terms of regulation. The data were collected based on the period 
from the launch of the Doi Moi policy in 1986. This study acts as a continuation of 
Chu’s (2004) research on accounting changes in Vietnam as a transition economy 
from 1945. Most of data were sourced from the internet, including newspapers, 
reports, speeches and videos. A content analysis of multiple documentary sources in 
accounting and banking regulation is used to understand the regulation on loan loss 
recognition in Vietnam from a dialectical view. Data collected from multiple sources 
were verified and textually analysed to ensure data validity or to obtain clarification 
on any issues that were unclear. In the following chapter, the thesis provides and 
discusses the background data analysis. 
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Chapter 5: Data Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analysed and linked the communication data on regulating loan loss 
recognition to create a story related to how loan loss recognition was regulated in the 
specific context of Vietnam. The analysis in this chapter was conducted concurrently 
with the data analysis presented in Appendix 2 to identify the contradictions in the 
communication related to regulating loan loss recognition and the related responses. 
The data were analysed following three phases of the dialectical spiral as proposed in 
the conceptual framework in Chapter 3. Each phase was presented in Section 5.2, 5.3 
and 5.4 respectively. Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 Phase 1: 1986–2004 
Before actually moving to a market economy as described in Section 4.4.2, the 
accounting systems of credit institutions in Vietnam were designed to serve the 
Government control with multiple objectives of macro and micro management. The 
public or investors were not mentioned as accounting information users as in a 
market economy because all credit institutions were owned by the state even when 
they had been separated into two tiers to form a market economy structure, as 
mentioned in Section 4.4.2. Under this new formation, the state still fully owned and 
controlled the credit institutions. Under this model, the Government managed 
commercial banks both at the macro level (economic policy management) and at the 
micro level as business operators (Phan Le 1998). Therefore, the Government 
preferred to design an accounting system to serve multiple objectives. They were 
implementing monetary policy, tax collection and national and operation 
management (Phan Le 1998). For that purpose, Phan Le (1998) suggested that 
Accounting must meet the requirements of economic management at both macro 
and micro levels. That is, it must meet the requirements of state management and 
administration of a business, even in a department of a business. Accounting 
implements economic management in terms of not only monetary values but also 
nonmonetary ones, including quantity and quality. (p. 18; translated by the author) 
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This characteristic was reflected in Article 47 of the Law on the SBV of Vietnam that 
‘SBV runs accounting operations under the chart of accounts and the documentary-
based system in accordance with legal regulations on accounting and statistics’ 
(Luật Ngân hàng Nhà nước Việt Nam [Law on the SBV] No. 06/1997/QH10 1997b; 
translated by the author) and Article 86 of the Law on Credit Institutions that ‘Credit 
institutions shall perform accounting based on the system of accounts and financial 
documents in accordance with the laws on accounting and statistics’ (Luật các tổ 
chức tín dụng [Law on Credit Institutions] 1997a; translated by the author). Both of 
the laws stipulated that the accounting system was designed for accounting and 
statistics objectives. For serving simultaneously many different objectives, the 
Government represented by the Ministry of Finance holds the function of issuance of 
the accounting system for enterprises, including credit institutions (Phan Le 1998). 
Commenting on the accounting system of the banking industry, Ha Cuc (1998) said: 
We easily see that the accounting system for financial institutions is designed very 
specifically for both financial and management accounting purposes … both 
serving the state management of monetary policy and maintaining consistency 
with the sector’s business activities (p. 16; translated by the author) 
In terms of loan loss recognition, the accounting transformation process from serving 
government control into market control is discussed in the following paragraphs. The 
analysis is conducted through the regulation change and the discussions and debates 
on those changes. 
5.2.1 Decision 106 (1992) 
Loan loss provision had not been made until 1990 when the Law on the SBV (State 
Council 1990) was framed, marking the renewal of the organisation and activities of 
the banking sector, from a one-tier to a two-tier banking system. Under Decision 106, 
Regulation on Setting Up and Use of Reserves in Credit Institutions, commercial 
banks were allowed to deduct 10% of net profit to establish a reserve for credit loss 
until the reserve reaches 100% of charter capital: 
10% on net profits is established as ‘special reserves’ for risk prevention. This 
fund was established until reaching 100% of the actual charter capital at the time 
of provisioning. (SBV 1992, article 1.1; translated by the author) 
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Commenting on that stipulation, some worried that reserve funds set aside under the 
provisions above would be insufficient to offset credit risk that arises because, ‘If risk 
reserve fund is appropriated from the net profit, the bank with no gain or loss will 
have no risk reserve fund’ (To 1996, p.11; translated by the author). 
Since commercial banks must be accounted as an independent business unit when 
they were separated from the SBV (State Council 1990), To (1996) was concerned 
the commercial banks would collapse because they did not have sufficient reserves 
for loan loss. That is the view of a banking regulator responsible for bank safety 
rather than from the accounting perspective, which focuses on the bank financial 
health at a point of time. 
Consequently, at that time commercial banks commonly did not have enough reserve 
to cover increasing credit loss, while bank loans accounted for 95% of their total 
assets (To 1996, p.11). To solve that problem, To (1996) suggested ‘the creation of a 
reserve fund risks need to be counted as an expense’ and ‘the risk reserve should be 
seen as a factor for calculating lending interest rate’ (p. 12; translated by the author). 
With this suggestion, To (1996) aimed to ensure that commercial banks had 
sufficient sources of loan interest revenue for making loan loss provision rather than 
the limited source of profit. Thus, his recommendation was also from the bank 
regulation perspective of ensuring bank safety. The accounting approach to represent 
bank financial situation was not yet a focus. 
From the tax accounting perspective, Ba Thanh and Moc Mien (1998) considered 
‘treating loan loss provision as an expense affects tax revenues’ (p. 18; translated by 
the author) because it reduced tax payment owing to an increase in expense and 
‘banks can use provision to evade taxation’ (p. 18; translated by the author). 
However, Ba Thanh and Moc Mien (1998) also suggested treating loan loss provision 
as an expense because ‘it [treating loan loss provision as an expense] is common in 
many countries’ (p. 18; translated by the author). 
The analysis above shows two conflicts of bank regulators in loan loss recognition. 
First, it is the conflict between the bank regulation approach and tax accounting 
approach. In this regard, To (1996) worried about the bank safety and thus preferred 
loan loss provision to be increased by allowing banks to treat it as an expense rather 
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than a reserve. Conversely, Ba Thanh and Moc Mien (1998) were concerned about 
the decrease of tax collection and the increase of tax fraud that is a part of bank 
regulators’ duty on supporting the implementation of the Government policy. 
Second, the need to integrate with the global environment appeared to signal the 
conflict between global integration demand and the desire for separation for 
maintaining the country’s distinct institutions. Specifically, the transformation of the 
banking sector into two tiers operating under the market mechanism raised the 
difference between the accounting perspective and tax laws in the definition of 
revenue, expense and profit (Pham Quy Hoa 2002). 
From accounting perspective, Ba Thanh and Moc Mien (1998) said "The objective of 
setting up a reserve fund for loan loss is also to ensure a bank’s profit reflects its 
business result" (p. 18; translated by the author). He means without loan loss 
provision, bank earning is distorted from accounting perspective. By citing the nature 
and characteristics of loan loss recognition in many countries when compared with 
that of Vietnam, Ba Thanh and Moc Mien (1998) argued: 
In our country, it was claimed that on making provisions, some currently profitable 
banks would turn into loss-making ones. If people say so, it means that they were 
aware of the risk related to the loans that banks issued. If a loan was actually 
believed to be doubtful, then making provision for it is necessary; there is no need 
to wait until the real loss is incurred and deducted from interest, affecting business 
results. Without provisioning, business results shown on the balance sheet reflect 
incorrectly the financial position of the bank. (p. 18; translated by the author) 
Their argument shows the concern on the reliability of bank financial statements on 
consideration of loan loss provision. This interest stemmed from the need to follow 
international practices for global integration that was fierce in phase 2 as discussed in 
the previous chapter (Section 4.4.2). 
5.2.2 Decision 48 (1999) 
The response above set the foundation for the issuance of Decision 48, Regulations 
on Classifying Assets, Establishing and Using Reserved Funds for Covering Losses 
Suffered by Credit Institutions (SBV 1999). It is the first regulation that treated loan 
loss provision as an expense following international practices. 
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Learning from international practices, loan loss provision was measured based on 
loan loss classification. Decision 48 (SBV 1999) classifies bank loans based on their 
past due with fixed levels of credit risk stipulated for each loan group. Specifically, 
loans are divided into four groups under the term timescales, including current and 
restructured debts, debts overdue less than 181 days, debts overdue less than 361 
days and debts overdue more than 360 days (SBV 1999, article 5) with the 
corresponding provision rate fixed at 0%, 20%, 50% and 100% (SBV 1999, article 
6). 
That Renovation towards global integration caused many debates since bank 
accounting needs to serve the need for Government control with a variety of 
objectives as discussed above. Specifically, Vu Minh (1999) estimated ‘the figure of 
[current credit loss] was about 300 billion dong, which was at least double or triple 
compared to profit of the whole state banking sector’ (p. 25; translated by the 
author). Therefore, he worried that commercial banks would have no profit 
remaining after provision under Decision 48: 
If all profit is used for provision making, where is the profit to pay tax to finance 
the state budget, to modernise banking technology to catch up with the world that 
is changing hourly and daily and to cover many daily bank expenses for ensuring 
its normal operation? (Vu Minh 1999, p. 25; translated by the author) 
Vu Minh (1999) commented from the perspective of macro management in which 
the increase in loan loss provision could influence macro policy. Commenting on the 
issue that bank profit was not sufficient for provision making under Decision 48, 
Dieu (1999) raised another concern: ‘If provision is made exceeding the profit of the 
current fiscal year, it means financial institutions make provision from nothing’ 
(Dieu 1999, p. 10; translated by the author). His comment was from the perspective 
of bank regulators who expect commercial banks to maintain sufficient reserve to 
cover credit loss when it is incurred. 
Under international practices, BCBS issued regulations on minimum capital, which 
are usually called Basel Accords I, II and III. Those regulations required banks to 
either add more equity capital or restrict their lending scale to ensure they have 
sufficient reserve to cover loan loss (Bank for International Settlements 2006; BCBS 
1988, 2011). At the time when Decision 48 was issued, Vietnam did not have such 
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minimum capital requirement. The SBV had stipulated Decree 82 since 1998 on the 
minimum capital requirement but the commercial banks were not required to meet it 
until 3 years after the effective date (Phan Van Khai 1998). The postponement of 
minimum capital requirement shows the insufficiency of bank equity not only for its 
normal operation according to Basel Accords but also for covering loan loss 
provision at that time. 
Facing those challenges that were specific to the context of Vietnam, the bank 
regulators had to limit the provision requirement, although treating provision as 
expense is required for prudence and globalisation purposes from the regulation 
perspective by experts such as To (1996), Ba Thanh and Moc Mien (1998) and Pham 
(2002) as discussed above. Particularly, provision as an expense is restricted only for 
credit risk caused by irresistible reasons such as ‘natural disasters, fires, epidemics 
or state policy changes’ (SBV 1999, article 7; translated by the author). 
The restriction helped banks avoid a significant reduction in their profit and, in turn, 
their equity when loan loss provision commenced being treated as an expense under 
Decision 48. In addition, the tax collection amount was not affected much owing to a 
limited loan loss provision expense. In other words, the limitation of loan loss 
provision can be explained by the desire of the Government to alleviate the decline in 
bank profit and, in turn, the tax collection amount owing to the increase in loan loss 
provision. 
Another explanation is that being the major, or the only, shareholder in banks, the 
state was very careful in protecting its stake in commercial banks by not easily 
recognising the loss incurred subjectively by individual customers or bank 
management. By limiting the provision to be made to credit risk owing to irresistible 
reasons only, the state preferred to prevent the loss of bank assets through the 
irresponsibility of bank management and staff. In the cases other than natural 
disasters, fires, epidemics or state policy changes, the bank management and staff 
have to do their best to collect the loans rather than writing them off via loan loss 
provision. This inference is indirectly inferred from similar requirements that aim to 
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assist the Government in protecting its large stake in commercial banks by such 
administrative rules6. 
Hence, although the accounting change, in which loan loss provision began to be 
considered an expense, was made towards international practices, its substance was 
altered to serve Government control. For this reason, Pham Phu Quoc (2000) 
criticised that making provisions for irresistible reasons alone did not provide the 
market sufficient information for enforcing discipline in the business relationship 
between banks and their customers in lending activities. 
Pham Phu Quoc (2000) argued against that stipulation: 
In bank lending activities, credit risk owing to subjective reasons, such as 
customers deliberately not repaying, has the same opportunity to occur as credit 
risk owing to irresistible reasons, such as customers lacking the ability to repay. 
Therefore, we think that even when clients deliberately do not fulfil their 
obligations, banks should reserve the right to cover that risk by loan loss provision. 
(p. 32; translated by the author) 
Pham Phu Quoc’s (2000) suggestion relies on the market economy’s perspective in 
which accounting information serves bank management and investors to evaluate the 
efficiency in lending activities to customers. For that purpose, any loan loss incurred 
because customers do not pay, for whatever reason, should be recorded as an expense 
for evaluating bank credit risk management and bank performance. In addition to the 
restriction above, loan loss provision was required to be reversed at the end of the 
financial year as follows: 
The remaining balance of loan loss provision, after deducting the actual loss 
incurred as at 31 December each year, must be reversed to reduce loan loss 
                                                          
6 For example, under Decision 493, SOCBs have to obtain approval from the Government for writing 
off NPLs via loan loss provision (Decision No. 493/2005/QD-NHNN in 2005, article 11, para 4). 
Another example is requirement under Decision 488 for banks to not inform customers when their 
debt are written off (Decision No. 488/2000/QD-NHNN5 in 2000). Quy định về việc phân loại tài sản 
‘có’, trích lập và sử dụng dự phòng để xử lý rủi ro trong hoạt động ngân hàng của tổ chức tín dụng 
‘Regulation on the assets classification and use of provisions to deal with risks in the banking 
activities of credit institutions’. In: VIETNAM, S. B. O. (ed.) 488/2000/QD-NHNN5. Hanoi, Vietnam: 
State Bank of Vietnam, to prevent customers from refusing to pay their debts as discussed in the next 
section. 
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provision expense made during the year. (SBV 1999, article 7; translated by the 
author) 
Adopting this stipulation, the loan loss provision account had no balance at the end of 
fiscal year, which may help to easily verify loan loss expenses for tax deduction 
because loan loss provision was determined based on actual loss rather than bank’s 
judgement from the tax perspective. In addition, according to Le Thi Thanh Nhan 
(2000), ‘Tax authorities are afraid that the stipulation of provision heavily relying on 
subjectiveness will facilitate banks in overstating expenses for tax reduction’ (p. 14; 
translated by the author). 
Commenting on this specification, Dieu (1999) said: 
It is just as if banks are allowed to establish a reserve for covering credit risk but 
are not permitted to store the reserve. This paradox makes provisioning 
meaningless; if there is no difference between having and not having a reserve, the 
outcome will be the same. (Dieu 1999, p. 10; translated by the author) 
The stipulation and Dieu’s (1999) comment shows that loan loss provision was 
considered a loan loss reserve rather than an impairment loss in asset impairment test 
from the accounting approach. Under Decision 48, a new balance of loan loss 
provision was made at the beginning of the year to absorb credit loss actually 
incurred during the year and refunded at the end of year in case that fund was not 
used up. The refund to close the provision account balance at the end of the year hid 
the asset impairment loss on the balance sheet because the loan asset was disclosed at 
the original historical cost. Therefore, Le Thi Thanh Nhan (2000) claimed: 
Provisions under Decision 48, although termed ‘provision of assets’ in form, have, 
in substance, absolutely no meaning of ‘provision for impairment loss’ for 
representing faithfully the fair value of assets in the financial statement. (p. 13; 
translated by the author) 
In addition, that way of making provision is a direct write-off method rather than 
accrual accounting, and thus can help the Government monitor tax collection easily 
based on actual loss. However, its disadvantage is that loan loss was recorded late. 
Considering that weakness, Dieu commented: 
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Such income is likely taking the current financial year profit to make provision for 
credit risk from the previous year. Paradoxically, this will increase the financial 
burden for the operations of the current year. (1999, p. 9; translated by the author) 
From the accounting perspective, that late loan loss recognition distorted bank 
earnings. Therefore, Le Thi Thanh Nhan (2000) insisted, ‘In our opinion, this 
[provision under Decision 48] is a very big blank in the regulation of the SBV. This 
issue should be urgently considered’ (p. 13; translated by the author) for two reasons. 
First, it is ‘the trend of economic integration with the region and the world that 
raises the need to integrate with the international generally accepted accounting 
practices’ (Le Thi Thanh Nhan 2000, p. 14; translated by the author). Second, it is 
‘the upcoming birth of the stock market in which the users of financial statements, 
including local and foreign investors, have the right to ask for accounting 
information that reflects faithfully business operations’ (Le Thi Thanh Nhan 2000, p. 
14; translated by the author). 
Le Thi Thanh Nhan’s (2000) statements expressed the need for change in regulation 
on loan loss recognition as an action in response to the pressure of global integration 
and the development of a market economy leading to the emergence of market force. 
Investors should be provided information on loan loss from the accounting 
perspective as a requisition for supporting the growth of market discipline. This was 
the prerequisite for the introduction of Decision 488 (Decision No. 488/2000/QD-
NHNN5) in 2000 one year after Decision 48. The issuance of Decision 488 was a 
part of the Government’s Institutional Reform Program under Decision No. 
136/2001/QD-TTg dated 17 September 2001 by the Prime Minister as described in 
Section 4.4.2.3.1. 
5.2.3 Decision 488 (2000) 
Decision 488 responded to the demand to include the accounting perspective in loan 
loss recognition by removing the requirement of reimbursing loan loss provision so 
that such provision could reflect better bank earnings on the income statement and 
the carrying value of bank loans on the balance sheet. The restriction on loan loss 
provision for irresistible reasons only was also eliminated from Decision 488. 
Instead, some other specifications were added in Decision 488 to protect the state’s 
shareholding in banks, such as ‘Credit institutions shall not be entitled to inform their 
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customers of the risks that have been dealt with, except for debts that are written off 
with Government’s permission’ (Decision No. 488/2000/QD-NHNN5 in 2000, article 
4). This requirement was made to reduce the risk that customers might not repay 
overdue loans if aware that their debts have been already written off. Another 
example is the following stipulation: 
In the event that a state-owned credit institution experiences business loss in a year 
owing to the provisions made in accordance with this regulation, that credit 
institution must work out a solution plan to submit to the Ministry of Finance and 
the SBV for consideration. (Decision No. 488/2000/QD-NHNN5 in 2000, article 
10) 
This requirement can be made to reduce the risk that bank managements are careless 
in credit risk management thus causing too high loan loss provision. That type of 
requirements helps the Government to monitor directly commercial banks in making 
loan loss provision rather than to provide information for market discipline. 
The provision under Decision 488 was made primarily based on the classification of 
loans into four groups according to overdue date and a fixed rate was specified 
(Decision No. 488/2000/QD-NHNN5 in 2000, article 9). That fixed rate system was 
criticised as inflexible, and thus, did not represent properly the credit risk level 
related to each loan. Pham Phu Quoc (2000) believed that the criteria system, 
although more complicated, was not sufficient for determining credit risk level. 
Specifically, regarding the rate of 0% applied for group 1, including all loans that 
have not yet fallen overdue, Pham Phu Quoc (2000) criticised: 
When a loan is not yet due, loss has not yet been incurred, but it does not mean 
that the loss will not be incurred. For example, if a loan is current but the borrower 
has completely lost the ability to pay, and the bank does not have any way to 
recover the debt, it can be observed that the loan will never be paid despite not 
being due. (p. 31; translated by the author) 
The maintenance of defined criteria with a fixed rate of credit risk can be viewed as 
facilitating the tax accounting supervision purpose as claimed by Le Thi Thanh Nhan 
(2000) as aforementioned. Such inflexible classification results in excluding 
potentially value-relevant information from financial statements (Carlin, Finch & 
Ford 2009), such as signals that a borrower is making losses or can go bankrupt. 
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Under that classification system, a loan made for a company whose operating results 
decreased, which reduced its probability to pay back its loan, would be listed in 
group 1 with 0% credit risk, and thus no provision would be made for it. This case is 
treated differently under IAS 39 as discussed in Chapter 2. The loans impairment had 
already occurred in this case because there is objective evidence that the company’s 
probability of payment had declined compared with the lending originating date 
(IASB 2004, para. 58). As the result, impairment should be recognised through loan 
loss provisioning for this case. Thus, the past due method under Decision 488 
provided insufficient warning of this reduction in asset impairment compared with 
international practices (IASB 2004, para. 58). 
5.2.4 Summary of data analysis in phase 1 
By analysing the communication related to the change in loss recognition in phase 1, 
the accounting change was examined associated with the actual condition to 
understand how the accounting change reflected the change in the Vietnamese social 
interests. A comprehensive story emerged that phase 1 marked the first movement 
towards international practices in loan loss recognition in Vietnam. 
Specifically, banks were allowed to establish loan loss provisions first in Decision 
106 in 1992 arising from bank regulators’ perspective and macro aspect rather than 
the accounting perspective. From that view, loan loss provision was considered a 
reserve rather than an expense. It was stipulated for ensuring that banks had reserves 
to cover loan loss when incurred. Loan loss provision was made from profit after tax 
to avoid a reduction in the tax amount paid to the Government. 
This accounting treatment was then criticised considering that the provision was not 
sufficient for covering loan loss because the reserve was made only when banks 
earned profits whereas credit risk presented in all banks. For this reason, loan loss 
provision was required to be considered an expense that matched interest revenue to 
ensure that all banks had interest revenue to make such provision. This argument was 
the rationale for the stipulation of Decision 48 in 1999 that recognised loan loss 
provision as an expense. However, the total expense was limited to that owing to 
irresistible reasons to avoid two consequences of recording loan loss provision 
expense in full. They were the significant reduction in tax and the strong decrease in 
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bank equity. Insufficient equity would put banks in the situation of violating the 
minimum capital requirement stipulated in 1998. 
The limit in loan loss provision expense attracted criticism from the accounting 
perspective because it did not reflect faithfully bank financial health while Vietnam 
was preparing for global integration. Consequently, Decision 488 removed the limit 
on loan loss provision expense to improve loan loss accounting towards international 
practices. 
5.3 Phase 2: 2005–2011 
Phase 2 was highlighted by the trend of globalisation leading to the stipulations of 
Decision 493 and Decision 18 (Section 5.3.1), but then being invalidated through 
cross-shareholding structure, a weak regulation system (Section 5.3.2), direct 
intervention by the Government (Section 5.3.3) and separate regulation established 
for state lending (Section 5.3.4). The consequences, which then are traced to the 
system failure, are discussed in Sections 5.3.5 and 5.3.6 respectively. Section 5.3.7 
concludes. 
5.3.1 Decision 493 and Decision 18 
In short, the global integration of Vietnam was vigorous during this phase with 
several international agreements signed, sharp increase in international trading and 
huge foreign capital inflows. Hence, there was a significant change in regulation with 
two decisions related to loan loss provisioning in this phase. As shown in Appendix 
1, Vietnam moved from Decision 488 to Decisions 493 (Decision No. 493/2005/QD-
NHNN) and Decision 18 (Decision No. 11/1999/NQ-CP in 2007) in 2005 to be 
closer to international best practice in terms of loan grading and provisioning 
(Cortavarria-Checkley et al. 2000; Laurin & Majnoni 2003). 
Particularly, adopting the simple loan categories suggested by BCBS (2006b), debts 
were reclassified into more groups under Decision 493 and Decision 18 than in the 
previous phase. There are five groups with different risk levels that lead to different 
loan loss provision rates (group 1: standard, 0%; group 2: special attention, 5%; 
group 3: substandard, 20%; group 4: doubtful, 50%; and group 5: loss, 100%) 
(Decision No. 493/2005/QD-NHNN, article 6). The addition of group 2 requires 
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banks to inform loan loss earlier than before. The provision determined for each 
group is named specific provision under Decision 493. 
In addition, the general provision that was first required under Decision 493 is 
another evidence of earlier loan loss provisioning compared with the previous phase. 
General provision was measured as 0.75% of the total value of debts from Group 1 to 
Group 4 (Decision No. 493/2005/QD-NHNN, article 9). It is defined as ‘an amount 
to be made available to provide against losses that have not yet been determinable 
during process of specific debts classification’, which is similar to group impairment 
loss under IAS 39 (Decision No. 493/2005/QD-NHNN, article 2). 
While the past due was still the critical criterion for loan loss classification for 
making specific provision, additional factors were included that help to signal loan 
loss more properly in terms of global practices. This change can be found in the 
definition of each group that is more general rather than particularly attached to the 
past due date as before. In detail, group 1–standard includes current debts that banks 
assess as fully recoverable when falling due. Group 2–special mention are debts that 
banks assess as fully recoverable, but there are signs that the customer’s payment 
capability is deteriorating; thus, this group of debts need special attention. Group 3–
substandard debts are debts that banks assess as not recoverable in due course; thus, a 
part of these debts are assessed to be likely impaired. Group 4–doubtful debts are 
debts that banks assess as highly impaired. Group 5–potentially irrecoverable are 
debts that banks assess as irrecoverable and lost (Decision No. 493/2005/QD-NHNN, 
article 6). 
The change in group definitions allows flexibility in loan loss classification by which 
banks can chose either the quantitative method (Decision No. 493/2005/QD-NHNN, 
article 6) or the qualitative method (Decision No. 493/2005/QD-NHNN, article 7) to 
classify debts for loan loss provisioning and communicating loan loss to the public. 
Under the quantitative method, these five groups are determined mainly based on 
past due (group 1: current debts; group 2: debts overdue less than 90 days; group 3: 
debts overdue between 90 and 180 days; group 4: debts overdue between 181 and 
360 days; and group 5: debts overdue more than 360 days). Although this 
classification is still based mainly on past due as in phase 1, a number of qualitative 
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factors were added to fix the weaknesses of the quantitative method under Decision 
488 as discussed above. These qualitative factors were bank assessment of 
customers’ ability to fulfil committed obligations, interest exemption or reduction, 
debt restructuring and multiple loans to a single customer (Decision No. 
493/2005/QD-NHNN, article 6). Under the quantitative method, Decision 493 and 18 
required banks to classify multiple debts to a borrower to a higher risk level group 
based on banks’ self-assessment of borrowers’ capability of full payment of current 
debts and restructured debts (Decision No. 493/2005/QD-NHNN, article 7). 
The classification of multiple loans to a single customer was first mentioned in 
Decision 493 and Decision 18. Provision for loan loss was made earlier for those 
loans because when a loan is classified as impaired, all other loans to the same 
customer should be classified in that same category. This was consistent with IAS 39 
that the reduction in relevant repayment capacity of a borrower was considered a loss 
event that affects the estimated future cash flows of all his/her loans. 
The restructuring event became the trigger to recognise loan impairment under 
Decision 483 and Decision 19, thus also resulting in making provision earlier than 
before (Decision 488). Classifying restructured debts as standard loans with no loss 
provision under Decision 488 was abrogated probably because it motivated the bank 
to roll over a past due loan to hide credit risk. It was evidence of an improvement in 
bank regulations on loan loss recognition towards international standards. 
Apart from the quantitative method as discussed above, Article 7 of Decision 493 
offered banks the option to use the qualitative method with multiple criteria (e.g., 
customers’ management ability, industry risk and business environment risk) based 
on the internal credit ranking system to determine appropriate classification. This 
method was designed to prepare for the application of Basel II under the internal 
ratings-based approach in the capital adequacy process. Although being more 
advanced than the quantitative method as regards global integration, the qualitative 
method is optional rather than compulsory under Decision 493. The reason that it is 
optional is the low ability of bank management and bank regulators to perform credit 
risk assessment (Stoxplus 2011). 
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In addition, bank regulators stipulated the requirement that the credit risk level under 
the qualitative method should not be lower than that under the quantitative method 
(Vietcombank annual report 2008, Circular 02/2013/TT-NHNN). This requirement 
was set to prevent cases of abuse in which banks reduced their loan loss provision 
(LLP) by taking advantage of the subjectiveness of qualitative criteria in loan loss 
classification. The introduction of that underlimit did not make sense in terms of 
improving the appropriateness of loan loss provision because the qualitative method 
is believed to be an advanced method under Basel II in comparison with the 
quantitative method. Therefore, it can be inferred that SBV is currently incapable of 
assessing the appropriateness of the implementation of the qualitative method, which 
is subjectively based on self-developing an internal credit rating system in each 
commercial bank. The result of the quantitative method is used as an underlimit that 
is a complementary to reduce that risk of understating loan loss recognition. 
Once again, a separate Vietnamese version of regulation on loan loss recognition 
resulted in the global integration process because of the low education level as 
regards credit risk assessment. In turn, the separation pole was responded to at the 
cost of negating the global integration pole. That is, the underlimit requirement 
demotivated bank management in building their internal credit rating systems for 
improvement of credit risk management, which is desired under international 
standards (e.g., Basel II). 
Specifically, most banks in Vietnam did not want to apply the qualitative method 
because it gave them no direct benefit in loan loss recognition but instead led to 
increased implementation cost. It is evident that five years after Decision 493 was 
issued, only two banks in Vietnam (BIDV and Vietcombank) established their 
internal rating system7 to apply the qualitative method in LLP for public disclosure 
(Stoxplus 2011). The quantitative method, which is based on the historical cost 
approach, is still being applied in most of the Vietnamese banks, leading to a 
significant deficiency in loan loss recognition in the Vietnamese banking industry. 
This inference is made based on the finding of Linsmeier (2011) that loan loss had 
                                                          
7 The internal credit rating is beyond the scope of this research because the related data are not 
sufficient for the public. The exclusion of this area is believed to not significantly affect the research 
findings because there are only two commercial banks applying the qualitative method and designing 
their internal credit ranking system for this purpose. 
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been consistently and dramatically underestimated during the crisis in the United 
States and Japan under the historical cost approach. 
In addition, the introduction of an underlimit for LLP represented a mix of 
accounting and banking regulations in which bank regulators encouraged bank 
managements to record more, rather than less, loan loss provision to ensure the safety 
of the banking system rather than the appropriateness of loan loss recognition from 
the accounting perspective. The organisation model in which SBV is responsible for 
banking regulation and accounting regulation for commercial banks simultaneously, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, can be an explanation for the mixing up of two 
approaches. The changes in loan loss accounting towards banking regulation and 
their mix in regulation on loan loss provisioning can be explained in terms of the 
tendency in which SBV utilised its accounting regulation function to obtain their 
banking regulation objectives of improving bank credit risk management and 
prudence. 
From a dialectical view, the above fact represents a neutralisation response between 
two oppositions of separation and integration. The application of the qualitative 
method responds to the desire for global integration (Basel II) but is modified to meet 
the national identity of lacking an internal credit rating system. The modification 
includes treating the qualitative method as optional and setting a floor for LLP to 
reduce the risk of understating loan loss because of the weakness in credit risk rating. 
In short, compared with phase 1, the bank regulators were more vigorous in 
responding to global integration because the market institution was established at just 
a rudimentary level in phase 1 whereas Vietnam increasingly integrated deeper into 
the world. As a result, the regulation on loan loss provisioning in phase 2 has a 
significant improvement by which loan loss provision is required to be recognised 
earlier. Nguyen Xuan Thanh (2012) highlighted that change as a renovation: 
Notably, in the 2006–2011 period, the regulatory framework and supervision of 
banking activities was constantly being modernised. Current regulations of 
Vietnam on ensuring safe operations of commercial banks cover all content of 
supervision on capital, credit limit, equity investment limit, solvency ratio, quality 
classification of debts and provision for risks. (translated by the author) 
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Specifically relating to loan loss provision, Duong (2009) commented: 
By adopting Decision 493, banks are gradually moving towards the assessment 
and classification of debts based on qualitative factors and prevention is divided 
into a general provision and specific provision under the framework of banking 
risk provisions of Basel 2. (p. 31; translated by the author) 
It is consistent with Le Hong Giang’s (2012) argument, which was against the views 
expressed in the press and by many other specialists in 2012, that: 
Decision 493 issued by SBV also applies those practices for measuring NPL, so 
one cannot say ‘standard of NPLs’ in Vietnam is poor compared with that of 
‘international standards’. (Le Hong Giang 2012; translated by the author) 
While Le Hong Giang’s (2012) comment is correct, the press and many other 
specialists are also right in terms of how Decision 493 was implemented in practice. 
The fact that the qualitative method, the most important advance of Decision 493, has 
been applied in two banks only is one evidence. In addition, Nguyen Xuan Thanh 
(2012) criticised that this innovation was likely a decoration. He said: 
Banks, but in fact, their investors and economic organisations that own banks, can 
easily disable all safety regulations, even if these are the rules under international 
standards. Moreover, that disablement would strictly follow current laws (but 
violate the spirit of the law). (Nguyen Xuan Thanh 2012; translated by the author) 
Next, the invalidation of regulation on loan loss recognition as the result of three 
issues in the Vietnamese economic context, as referred to in the previous chapter, is 
discussed. They are the weak legal system, the direct intervention on lending by the 
Government and the separate regulation set for state lending. 
5.3.2 Cross-shareholding structure and weak legal system 
The fierce pressure from the requirement of equity growth and NPL ratio as 
mentioned in the previous chapter motivated bank management to manipulate both 
equity growth and NPL ratio. Banks managed their capital and loan loss recognition 
by taking advantage of weak regulations (Bich Diep 2013; Dang Duc Thanh 2015; 
Tieu Phong 2015; Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 2013). The weakness of regulation system 
is discussed in the previous chapter (Section 4.4.4.3). 
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According to Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. (2013), the widespread cross-shareholding 
structure in the banking system allowed banks to easily find cross-funding sources to 
raise capital, making the estimated CAR incorrect. In addition, the cross-funding 
sources were also used to reverse NPLs, making it difficult to measure banks’ credit 
activities and NPL ratio. 
Many of the cross-lending transactions between related parties in a cross-
shareholding structure were not disclosed because of the weak regulation on related 
parties’ transactions (Dang Duc Thanh 2015; Nguyen Xuan Thanh 2012; Vu Thanh 
Tu Anh et al. 2013). Specifically, the legal definition of relatives8 does not cover all 
cases in which the relevant role arises (Law on Credit Institutions No. 47/2010/QH12 
in 2010). For example, organisations and individuals have a contractual relationship 
by which one person represents the other, or a group of people agree to coordinate in 
the acquisition of shares to control the targeted company or bank. 
In addition, the threshold of holding 5% of share capital or above to be considered a 
relative of a bank is no longer suitable. When the bank capital is at least 3,000 billion 
dong according to regulations according to Decree 141 (Nguyen Tan Dung 2006), the 
ownership ratio of 5% is equal to about 150 billion dong. This amount is too large 
compared with the amounts that many significant shareholders of banks hold. 
Therefore, the definition ignores many instances where organisations and individuals 
hold less than 5% but still significantly influence the bank, and thus should be 
considered bank relatives. 
                                                          
8 Law on Credit Institutions, article 4, par 28: Affiliated person means an organisation or individual 
having a direct or indirect relationship with another organisation or individual in any of the following 
cases: 
a/. Parent company with a subsidiary and vice versa; credit institution with a subsidiary and vice 
versa; among subsidiaries of a parent company or credit institution; manager or Control Board 
member of the parent company or credit institution, and individual or organisation competent to 
appoint these persons with a subsidiary and vice versa; 
b/. Company or credit institution with its manager or Control Board member, or with company or 
organisation competent to appoint these persons and vice versa; 
c/. Company or credit institution with organisation or individual owning 5% or more of the charter 
capital or voting share capital of that company or credit institution and vice versa; 
d/ Individual with his/her spouse, father, mother, child or sibling; 
e/ Company or credit institution with individual defined at Point d of this Clause of manager. Control 
Board member, capital contributor or shareholder owning 5% or more of the charter capital or voting 
share capital of that company or credit institution and vice versa; 
f/ Individual authorised to represent an organisation or individual specified at Points a, b, c. d and e of 
this Clause with authorising organisation or individual; among individuals authorised to represent the 
capital share of an institution. 
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Further, banks took advantage of weak regulation in recording investment in bonds to 
roll over overdue loans to avoid recording a loan as overdue (Dang Duc Thanh 2015; 
Tinmoi 2012). For example, Hoang Anh Gia Lai (HAG) had successfully issued 
bonds of 850 billion dong on 17 August 2012. The bond buyers were the banks 
where HAG currently had debts. Cash inflows from bonds issued was used to pay 
back these debts (Tinmoi 2012). 
Consequently, according to Mr Nguyen Huu Nghia, Acting Chief Inspector of SBV, 
several commercial banks violate regulations on loan classification and provisioning 
to reduce NPLs and loan loss to meet the regulation requirement and improve their 
performance (Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 2013). The Deputy Governor of SBV also 
admitted that banks hide a large amount of NPLs and LLP to achieve their profit 
targets. According to him, six weak banks were disciplined because they hid NPLs. 
Their disclosed NPLs was not higher than 2.5%, thus meeting the requirement of not 
exceeding 3%, but SBV inspectors found that their NPLs ranged from 30% to 60% 
(Thuy Mien 2013). 
Unsurprisingly, all banks met the requirement of equity growth rapidly, even in a 
gloomy security market, by manipulating capital to withdraw from confrontation 
when the bank management framed the tension as double bind (Nguyen Hoai 2011b; 
Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 2013). NCDT (2013) expressed surprise: 
At that time, there were many controversies that 9% is too high, and that banks are 
difficult to satisfy. However, most of the banks had a CAR much higher when 
compared with the minimum, except Agribank, according to the data for 2011. 
(Translated by the author) 
The capital increase based on cross-shareholding distorted the safety of banks that 
was commonly expected to be reflected in the CAR. Specifically, at the end of 2012, 
several weak JSCBs had very high CAR ratios (e.g., Bao Viet Bank: 42%, Tien 
Phong Bank: 40.15%) (NCDT 2013; Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 2013). It was so 
abnormal that the press said sarcastically, ‘A high capital adequacy ratio signals 
unsafety!’ (NCDT 2013; translated by the author). A financial specialist, Doctor 
Nguyen Tri Hieu, explained that situation, stating, ‘One of the reasons why banks 
pushed higher CAR is the trend of hiding debt. If provision were made fully and on 
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time, CAR would reduce immediately rather than increase’  (NCDT 2013; translated 
by the author). 
This phenomenon is consistent with Piotroski and Wong’s (2012) finding regarding 
the Chinese market that without ‘a strong market infrastructure to guard against 
manipulations’, ‘the use of accounting-based regulations’ motivated listed firms to 
manage accounting realisation to meet the regulation targets (p. 221). In the 
Vietnamese banking industry, loan loss management was accelerated under the 
pressure of managing the regulation target of CAR ratio, equity growth and NPL 
ratio. They were handled through cross-shareholding and regulation weaknesses that 
arose from the local demand of maintaining the Government control and the lack of 
competency in establishing a proper regulation system to match the development of 
business sectors other than the state business sector. 
Although the SBV asserted that ‘Many subjects [banks and others] use a number of 
different techniques for not complying with credit security regulations’ (Vu Thanh 
Tu Anh et al. 2013), they admitted ‘the auditing and inspection to detect and handle 
the problem is very difficult due to lack of judicial evidence’ (Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 
2013). Nguyen Xuan Thanh (2012) also recognised these difficulties: 
The current status is using cross-shareholding to dodge, but not violate, the 
regulation … Many loans over 1,000 billion, which have now become NPLs, were 
revealed by the supervision, but were not being highlighted because the law was 
not broken. (Nguyen Xuan Thanh 2012; translated by the author) 
Hence, a large gap existed between Vietnamese practices and international standards 
in loan loss recognition during phase 2 as commonly claimed by the public as 
mentioned in Chapter 1. That gap seems to derive from the accounting practices in 
the unique context and institutional setting of Vietnam rather than from Decision 493 
and Decision 18 that directly regulate loan loss recognition in the country. Banks 
shall be penalised by SBV on violating the regulations as described above but it was 
absolved from a disciplinay action by taking advantage of the weak regulation 
system. This behaviour was normally found in JSCBs rather than SOCBs because the 
state economic sector can overcome the requirements from regulation using its own 
ways (Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 2013). These are the Government’s direct intervention 
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in regulation (Section 5.3.3) and the separate regulation established for state lending 
(Section 5.3.4). 
5.3.3 Direct intervention by the Government 
The following two examples from collected data (Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2) are 
supporting evidence for the statement above. Figure 5.1 clearly indicates the delay in 
loan loss recognition under the Government’s direction for lending to Vinashin, a 
State Economic Group mentioned in Chapter 4. Figure 5.2 is a quote from Notice No. 
285/TB-VPCP dated 20 August 2015 from the Government Office (Nguyen Van Nen 
2015). With this document, the bank did not make provision for the loans to the state 
drainage project following directions from the Government. 
The banks in the two examples above did not violate the Vietnamese regulations with 
that accounting exception authorised by the Government. However, nondisclosure of 
the credit risk related to those loans did not reflect loan loss incurred in Vietnam in 
time, and thus distorted the efficiency of capital utilisation. The delay to recognise 
loss from the huge debts of over 80 billion dong from Vinashin certainly caused 
substantial misleading in loan loss information for market discipline. 
The passage of promulgated loan regulations to provide preferential credit to SOEs is 
criticised by Nguyen Xuan Thanh (2012): 
The first is that although the regulations to ensure safe operation were issued by 
the state, these are disabled by the state. That is because the Government is the 
owner of the State Corporations (SOEs) and, simultaneously, the controlling 
shareholder of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), thereby allowing lending 
activities between the two groups to escape from the regulations... Violation of the 
monitoring framework resulted in the bad loans that the bank had to suffer 
directly. That the lending of SOCBs to Vinashin, Vinalines and other major 
projects of SOEs exceeded safety regulations is obvious evidence. (Nguyen Xuan 
Thanh 2012; translated by the author) 
According to Nguyen Xuan Thanh (2012), the ownership structure in which the 
Government is the bank owner can explain such invalidation of regulation. Thus, it 
can be inferred the Government control framed as its direct ownership in commercial 
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banks invalidated the market discipline supported by Decision 493 and Decision 18 
in loan loss recognition, thus misleading about the efficiency of capital utilisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Vinashin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: State drainage project 
Many banks such as Habubank and Oceanbank did not make provision for the lending 
to Vinashin (Tinmoi 2012). This was supported by the Government documents. The 
audit opinion of Deloitte in the 2011 financial statements of Oceanbank stated:  
‘On 31.12.2011, the bank (i.e., Oceanbank) held deposits, loans and bond 
investments in Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry (Vinashin) and several companies 
owned by Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry, which were overdue. However, in 2011, 
based on the written direction of the State regulators about considering and 
restructuring the debts of the corporation, Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry, the bank 
has implemented the directive, maintaining the status quo and not making provision 
for the debts and receivables above. Currently, banks are continuing to work with 
Vinashin and the State management agencies to plan the treatment and recovery of 
the debts and receivables’. (Tinmoi 2012; translated by the author) 
 
 
To solve drainage problems, the Prime Minister instructed BIDV, one of the four 
biggest SOCBs, to finance the drainage project. The Prime Minister also directed the 
State Bank of Vietnam to allow BIDV to not comply with the current regulations of 
safety as mentioned on Notice No. 285/TB-VPCP: 
The State Bank of Vietnam processed specifically BIDV’s suggestion that the loans 
related to that project [the drainage project] would not be counted in complying with 
the ratios, the requirement of not lending over 15% of the equity capital, excluding 
from the annual credit growth limit, not classifying in credit risk groups as well as 
not making provision for risks related to the project. (Nguyen Van Nen 2015; 
translated by the author) 
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5.3.4 Separate regulation set for state lending 
In addition to the direct intervention of the Government that invalidated the 
regulation, the establishment of VDB with a separate operating mechanism, as briefly 
stated in the previous chapter, made this issue more serious. The financial 
mechanism of VDB is executed in accordance with Decision No 44/2007/QD-TTg 
dated 30th March 2007 by the Prime Minister and Circular No. 111/2007/TT-BTC 
dated 12nd September 2007 by the Ministry of Finance as follows. 
The Ministry of Finance implements the state management function in finance and 
guidance, supervision and inspection of the implementation of the financial regime 
of the Development Bank. (Decision No 44/2007/QD-TTg in 2007) 
and 
The Development Bank reports the audited annual financial statements to the 
Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance, the SBV, the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment. (Decision No 44/2007/QD-TTg in 2007, article 29; translated by the 
author) 
Under these stipulations, VDB’s financial mechanism is designed and supervised by 
the Ministry of Finance. At the same time, it is a bank of the Vietnamese banking 
industry under SBV’s supervision, thus having to report to the SBV. Cong Thuong 
(2013) criticised that this financial mechanism was a critical reason for the high 
NPLs amount in VDB9. He said, ‘There are many causes leading to the “very bad” 
situation in VDB. However, most importantly, it is that VDB is “bipolar”, being a 
bank and also not a bank at the same time’ (Cong Thuong 2013; translated by the 
author). 
Specifically, according to the financial mechanism issued by the Ministry of Finance, 
loan loss in VDB is recognised at the maximum level of 0.5% of the lending balance, 
regardless of the risk level (Decision No 44/2007/QD-TTg in 2007, article 3), which 
is too low compared with the provision rates set by the SBV under Decision 493 and 
                                                          
9 According to the inspection results published recently, VDB bad debts had NPLs of 22,600 billion 
dong at the end of 2010, which accounted for 12.57% of total NPLs of the Vietnamese banking sector 
Cong Thuong. 2013. Pha The ‘Luong Cuc’ Cua VDB. ‘Eliminating the “Bipolar” of VDB’ [Online]. 
Cong Thuong. Available: http://vietbao.vn/Kinh-te/Pha-the-luong-cuc-cua-VDB/2131640423/90/ 
[Accessed 05/03/ 2016].  
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Decision 18 (i.e., 0%, 5%, 20%, 50% and 100%). Nguyen Hoai questioned that too-
low rate, stating, ‘This makes many people think 100% of investment loans and 
export loans to the State through VDB were almost no risk!’ (Nguyen Hoai 2011a; 
translated by the author). 
Explaining that low rate of provision, Mr Nguyen Quang Dung, the CEO of VDB, 
said many times: 
The bank is a complete nonprofit organisation, which mainly carries out lending 
for investment and export activities under the direction of the Government. The 
problem is that, since it operates without profits, VDB cannot have funds for 
making provisions. (Nguyen Hoai 2011a; translated by the author) 
The CEO’s explanation can prove that bank regulators and VDB management were 
not sufficiently aware of the role of loan loss recognition as a part of the alarm 
system on lending safety and efficiency. From this perspective, financial 
professionals have criticised the CEO’s explanation as follows: 
Operating lending must have risk, and thus must have risk provisioning. When 
provision is made, it must be recorded as an expense. If the bank lacks funds to 
cover that expense, the state must grant it. Without that, where is the reserve to 
absorb credit loss when incurred? … Especially, reserve for loan loss from DBV 
has never been mentioned in both short- and long-term financial budgets of the 
Government. (Phuong NC & Richard 2011; translated by the author) 
The specialists made that comment from the bank regulation perspective in which 
loan loss recognition is necessary to provide information on expected loss for 
requiring banks to set sufficient capital reserves for credit loss to ensure the safety for 
the banking industry. Another specialist emphasised: 
One Basel principle for capital adequacy requirement is to make provision 
corresponding with the level of risk, rather than waiting until the risks incur and 
record the loss without reserve to cover that loss. (Nguyen Hoai 2011a; translated 
by the author) 
According to Nguyen Hoai (2011a), this problem is serious because 40% of VDB’s 
fund for lending is from ODA capital that Vietnam has to repay in future. Thus she 
concluded, ‘VDB is similar to a time bomb’ (2011a; translated by the author) that 
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could be triggered when the ODA fund falls due, since no provision has been made 
for credit risk and the amount of NPLs is high. 
According to Cong Thuong (2013), the Ministry of Finance might not be adequately 
aware of that risk because its officials are not specialised in banking unlike those of 
the SBV: 
The Ministry of Finance acknowledged that, with the current regulations, it is 
difficult to force the mechanism of autonomy and self-responsibility of VDB 
leaders because the Finance Ministry cannot supervise the activities of the central 
bank better than the SBV, but the SBV also could not fully implement this duty. 
(Cong Thuong 2013; translated by the author) 
Since VDB’s financial mechanism is not under the supervision of the SBV, it could 
not access the lending data in VDB for supervision duty. Nguyen Hoai (2011a) 
offered an explanation for this issue: 
Since the capital fund and operation mechanism of VDB are under the Ministry of 
Finance ‘management’, when asking SBV about VDB’s funds, how it operates, 
how much it has disbursed and for which project and how it sets provision for loan 
loss, all SBV staff, even the highest leaders, all answered ‘We do not know’! 
(Translated by the author) 
The disclosure of lending activities and the related risks was insufficient even at the 
minimum level, as claimed by Nguyen Hoai: 
One other remarkable issue, Decision 44/2007/QD-TTg regulates: ‘Within 120 
days after the fiscal year end date, VDB shall disclose financial statements in 
accordance with the provisions of the law’. However, although having already 
operated for 5 years, the ‘Annual Report’ on its portal is still blank. (Nguyen Hoai 
2011a; translated by the author) 
It led to the situation that no sufficient information related to state lending activities 
was disclosed to the SBV or public. From the accounting perspective, loan loss 
recognition provides information of assets impairment for lending decision-making 
based on economic efficiency. Thus, the lack of timely information of loan loss led to 
the allocation of capital into inefficient businesses that caused NPLs later. 
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In addition to direct lending with many preferential treatments as directed by the 
Government without supervision of the public or other parties, VDB and the Ministry 
of Finance, on behalf of the Government, offered guarantees for SOEs to borrow 
from commercial banks. Arguing for that policy, the chairman—Minister of the 
Government Office, Nguyen Van Nen—explained: 
The Government guarantee for the loan business is to create favourable conditions 
for businesses to raise large funds, for which, sometimes, credit institutions require 
a Government guarantee as security … Moreover, the cost of the loan guaranteed 
by the Government will be lower than a normal commercial loan … The issuance 
of Government guarantees for foreign loans serves urgent investment projects, 
especially in periods when domestic capital is insufficient to meet the demand for 
investment and development needs. (Bao Bao 2015; translated by the author) 
The transfer of capital resources to SOEs under the guarantee of VDB was 
potentially a high credit risk because of the ease in evaluating the efficiency of 
investment projects without informing the public or the SBV. The consequence of the 
insufficient information on loss is discussed in the following paragraphs. 
5.3.5 Consequences 
As also mentioned in Chapter 5, the Government supported the leading role of SOEs 
by giving them privileges in resources allocation, especially bank capital lending 
without sufficient information for market and government control. Taking advantage 
of that favour and weakness of control, SOEs invested in non-core businesses, such 
as banking, insurance, securities and real estate, which is one of the major reasons 
leading to the bankruptcy of Vinashin with large NPLs of 86 trillion dong 
(approximately 4.6 billion USD at that time; Dang Duc Thanh 2015; Huyen Thu 
2013; Vietcombank 2009; Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 2013). The loss is substantial 
compared with the total assets of the Vietnamese Government, which is about 1,000 
trillion dong (Vuong Le 2017). 
Other SEGs formed joint-stock banks as subsidiaries and raised deposits directly 
from the public without convincing investors that the project was suitable (World 
Bank 2008). A large part of the raised money was then invested in real estate during 
the asset price bubble of late 2007 and early 2008 (Dang Duc Thanh 2015; Vu Thanh 
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Tu Anh et al. 2013; World Bank 2008). It caused a high level of NPLs in the SOE 
sector when the real estate bubble shattered in 2011. Figure 5.3 shows a snapshot of 
the situation one year after the economic downturn started in Vietnam. Because of 
their careless investment, as at 30 September 2012, although SOEs only accounted 
for 17% of total outstanding loans, they accounted for 70% of NPLs. Clearly, the 
expansion of SOEs without the establishment of systems of corporate governance 
and effective regulations has resulted in the wasteful use of resources. 
 
Source: SBV website 
Figure 5.3: Percentage of NPLs per bank group at 30 September 2012 
That mechanism of resource allocation caused the inefficiency in capital allocation. 
According to Duy Phuong (2011), compared with other enterprises, SOEs are 
holding more resources but their economic output is much lower. In 2009, SOEs held 
37.2% business capital and 44.8% of fixed assets and long-term investments of the 
entire national economy, but only generated 25% of revenues, 37% of profit before 
tax and 20% of industrial production (Duy Phuong 2011). Similarly, in 2010, SOEs 
held approximately 70% of total fixed assets of the national economy and dominated 
30% of the total national investment capital, 60% of commercial bank credit, 50% of 
invested capital from state budget and 70% of ODA (Duy Phuong 2011). With such 
substantial resources, SOEs only contributed 38% of GDP and only created jobs for 
about 4.4% of the labour force. The labour productivity of SOEs was lower than that 
of the private sector by 10% to 14% (Duy Phuong 2011).Tran Dinh Thien and Luu 
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Bich Ho (2015b) claimed that ‘Consequently, it is clear that economic efficiency is 
very low [by investing in SOEs] … This is a huge expense’ (translated by the author). 
Some commented that ‘Debts of SOEs that were guaranteed by the Government 
could threaten the national financial security’ (Bao Bao 2015; translated by the 
author). It is because public debts guaranteed by the Government increased strongly 
via VDB. According to Bao Bao (2015), at the end of 2014, ‘for every $5, the public 
debt has $1 loan guarantee contract for state-owned enterprises or corporations’ 
(translated by the author). 
5.3.6 System failure 
Analysing the reason that system failure occurred, especially the case of Vinashin, 
professional Nguyen Tran Bat, CEO of Invest Consult, said it was owing to lack of 
sufficient information for controlling. He said: 
Assuming that we have a good control system, losses or disasters up to the first 
few trillion might be incurred undetected. However, allowing the loss to extend to 
80,000 billion means that the system has problems. We do not have in the 
Government administration system an alarm mechanism sensitive enough to be 
able to prevent a disaster at the beginning. So, we definitely have to acknowledge 
that not only individual faults resulted in this failure, but that it also was a failure 
of system quality, and that system failure is the lack of an alarm system for the 
financial risk. The Vinashin phenomenon revealed to the Party, the Government 
and Parliament that if there were more intelligent thieves, they might make off 
with all national assets, because we do not have such an alarm system. (Viet Lam 
& Khanh Linh 2010; translated by the author) 
The failure to provide adequate information for controlling the financial risk of SOE 
lending is so common in Vietnam and so widely influenced by the inefficiency of 
lending activities and capital allocation that it is considered ‘a system failure’ that is 
‘the lack of an alarm system for the financial risk’. 
The lack of motivation to publish information for the market related to VDB’s 
activities can be explained by considering that the availability of the capital fund 
from the state budget to VDB minimised its need to publish financial reports for 
raising funds. This explanation is consistent with the study of Piotroski and Wong 
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(2012) on China that the prevalence of state debt limited the need of state-controlled 
listing firms for external reports to accomplish a debt-contracting role. 
Similar to VDB, other SOCBs and even JSCBs did not have sufficient motivation to 
offer information to the market following the revised regulations of Decision 493 and 
Decision 18. Particularly, because of its multiple and frequently conflicting 
objectives, as discussed in more detail for phase 1, the Government did not evaluate 
bank performance by solely using bank financial statements, thus reducing the 
demand for strictly forcing SOCBs to follow Decision 493 and Decision 18 in terms 
of loan loss recognition regardless of those regulations being revised in line with 
international practices. 
This inference was made based on Piotroski and Wong’s (2012) assertion that the 
reliance on other measures, rather than profit, when assessing the performance of 
state-controlled listing firms in China reduces the demand for high-quality external 
financial reports. The Government’s permission for commercial banks to not make 
provision or classify for credit risk management the debts related to Vinashin 
(Tinmoi 2012) or the drainage project (Nguyen Thanh Vinh 2015) as discussed 
above are obvious examples for this claim. 
In addition, the state control of SOCBs not only continued but also partly extended to 
JSCBs via cross-shareholding. Hence, the state concentrated ownership arrangement 
and the contracting role of accounting in Vietnamese commercial banks, especially 
SOCBs, are different from that of a commercial bank in a developed market with 
dispersed ownership. 
With that cross-shareholding structure, ownership is concentrated in the hands of the 
Government with no clear separation of ownership and control in the organisation. 
Therefore, the banks do not face a serious agency problem that requires the public 
transparency of accounting information. A similar finding of Piotroski and Wong 
(2012) for China was that the dominance of the Government in the ownership 
structure can significantly reduce the demand for, and supply of, transparent 
information. 
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Specifically, Piotroski and Wong (2012) found: 
The Government owner of listed state firms can use private channels and their 
political networks, instead of public accounting and information reported to the 
markets, to measure and assess managerial performance, thereby reducing the 
demand for high-quality external information. (p. 219) 
That finding is applicable to the banking industry in Vietnam as well. The 
Government can collect information directly from commercial banks by employing 
its private channel, as explained by a banking specialist, Le Xuan Nghia: 
SBV builds software for remotely monitoring NPLs independently and 
objectively. The result is always different from reports of commercial banks. For 
example, in 2006, commercial banks reported NPLs of 3.7% whereas SBV’s 
figure was 7%. (Le Ha 2015; translated by the author) 
That fact can explain the two different figures from credit institutions and SBV—as 
discussed in Chapter 1, the Governor indicated that this has been the case for more 
than 30 years (Vietnamnet 2012). The difference was not SBV’s concern because it, 
being the major owner of commercial banks, can collect its own information via its 
private software for control purposes. The difference was not of significant interest to 
the public (e.g., bank depositors) either. Vietnamese depositors are less likely to rely 
on the financial information supplied by the banks when making their depositing 
decisions, which was also found for China where the major control is with the state 
(Piotroski & Wong 2012). Instead, the public focuses on the bank’s political 
background. 
For example, Agribank is a 100% state-owned enterprise with a key role in 
implementing Government policy (Agribank 2016). However, it had a bad reputation 
in risk management owing to a huge NPL amount that accounted for a quarter of the 
entire banking industry’s NPLs at the end of 2012 (Info.net 2014). In particular, the 
debts in group 5, potentially irrecoverable, accounted for nearly 90% of the bank’s 
charter capital (Info.net 2014). In spite of this fact, its deposits from customers have 
continued to increase sharply since 2012, making it the leading bank in raising 
deposits in Vietnam although it offers the same interest rate as the other banks 
(Nguyen Loc, Hooper & Sinclair 2013; Quan 2017). The local depositors expected 
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the Government to bail the bank, in case it experienced financial distress, because of 
its critical importance to the Government. As such, the local depositors did not create 
a demand to the bank for high-quality external reports. 
Recognising that the lack of transparency in loan loss recognition amplified the 
economic inefficiency in capital allocation to SOEs, one expert suggested: 
Should the state disburse credit through the commercial banking system because 
the risk management structure of commercial banks is safer than that of VDB? 
Commercial banks have their internal risk management system because they are 
inspected by the SBV and have to publish their annual financial statements 
through an independent audit. (Nguyen Hoai 2011b; translated by the author) 
That suggestion represented the struggle between the Government control and market 
control in which more information related to state lending was required to be 
disclosed for market discipline (public) and for the other party (SBV) to improve its 
lending efficiency. 
In addition to the transparency problem, the framing of public ownership as 
representing a socialist orientation was considered the root cause for the failure of 
SOEs, such as Vinashin, in leading the economy. Related to the huge loss of 
Vinashin and other SOEs, the policy to maintain the leading role of state economy in 
the market was also re-examined. The former president of the National Assembly, 
Nguyen Van An, said: 
I believe that Vinashin was the consequence of the global economic crisis but the 
system error was the root of that phenomenon, the error from the superstructure, 
from the policy of the Central Executive Committee of the Political Bureau, 
stemming from the point of view that socialist society must be based on ‘... the 
public ownership regime of main production means’. This model derives from the 
radical theory that private ownership of the production means is the source of 
exploitation. This extreme theory resulted in an economic model that lacks 
motivation, and thus was denied in reality. The Government had implemented this 
policy following the ideology of the Communist Party. (Vietnamnet 2010; 
translated by the author) 
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More specifically, VDB’s favour lending mechanism to the state business sector was 
criticised as a manipulation of market discipline. Cong Thuong (2013) claimed that 
VDB’s preferential loans distort market or are ‘nonmarket’: 
Here, capital fund (from the state budget) is abundant, interest rates are low (owing 
to the mechanism of subsidised interest rates) and the repayment period and other 
loan conditions are easier than in commercial banks.... It is time to reconsider the 
policy of ‘special deals’ that VDB made because that policy is for a nonmarket 
economy. (Cong Thuong 2013; translated by the author) 
Learning from this lesson, Resolution 01/NQ-CP of the Government, on major tasks 
and solutions on directing and managing the implementation of the socioeconomic 
development plan and the state budget plan in 2016, has suggested for the first time, 
‘It is necessary to study how to transfer gradually the lending guarantees to 
commercial banks’ (Resolution No. 01/NQ-CP in 2016, article 2; translated by the 
author). It can be inferred from this statement that the bank regulators have 
recognised the large risk for the economy when turning commercial debt obligations 
into national debt obligations through the Government guarantees for lending. Their 
suggestion is a response to have market control instead of Government control in 
lending guarantees for SOEs to improve the lending efficiency. 
Generally, the regulation on loan loss recognition in phase 2 was neutralised by two 
channels. First, they were overtaken by the commercial banks, taking advantage of 
cross-shareholding and regulation weaknesses as discussed in Section 5.3.2. Second, 
the Government invalidated the regulation as analysed in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. 
The insufficiency of loan loss recognition was undetected until the present when the 
loss was exposed. For example, according to the Government inspector, in 2009, 
Vinashin actually lost nearly 5,000 billion dong, which is 3,300 billion dong more 
compared with its published financial statements audited by KPMG (Tran Nam 
2018)10. The leader of the Inspection Agency in SBV has now confessed about the 
difference in NPL ratios in 2012, as mentioned in Chapter 1: 
                                                          
10 Auditing in loan loss recognition is beyond the scope of this research owing to the lack of sufficient 
public data in this area. 
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The difference between two figures is owing to computational and statistical data 
obtained from two different sources. Specifically, the NPL ratio of 4.9%, 
equivalent to 133,060 billion, was reported by the credit institution. The figure of 
17.4% was from the inspection authorities after auditing all NPLs hidden in 
corporate bonds, credit trusts and restructured debts, including two ‘shipwrecks’, 
Vinashin and Vinalines. Therefore, the total bad debt [NPL] actually amounted to 
465,000 billion. (Tieu Phong 2015; translated by the author) 
This announcement is a late answer for the question raised in a press conference 
about the large difference between the two figures: 4.94% (reported by credit 
institutions) and 17.4% (reported by SBV) as at 9 May 2012. The disclosure was not 
made until the end of 2015 when it seemed likely that the increase of NPLs had been 
under the control of SBV with the NPL ratio already pulled down to the safety 
threshold of 3%, as described in phase 3. 
5.3.7 Summary of data analysis in phase 2 
In brief, loan loss accounting in phase 2 was intertwined closely with social practices 
in which the market force grew strongly with the equitisation of SOCBs and the 
launch of many JSCBs following the implementation of the multisector business 
sector policy. It resulted in the need for external accounting information to serve 
investors other than the Government because the state was no longer the only owner 
of the commercial banks, as in phase 1. The international commitments under the 
global integration policy were found the major cause of the renovation in regulating 
loan loss recognition as also claimed by Phuong NC and Richard (2011) and Nguyen 
Loc, Hooper and Sinclair (2013). 
In particular, Decision 493 and Decision 18 classified debts and made provision 
based on both quantitative and qualitative criteria following international practices. 
The maintaining both methods of quantitative and qualitative showed the 
‘cleverness’ of bank regulators in customisation of international standards for 
adopting in the specific context of Vietnam. In detail, the quantitative method that 
was based mainly on the overdue date suited the Vietnamese practicians’ ‘habitus’ of 
compliance, thus sustaining the dominant–dominated relationship between the 
Government and the practicians as claimed by Nguyen Loc, Hooper and Sinclair 
(2013). That habitus helped to enhance the Government control. 
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The permission for banks to select the qualitative method, which was based on the 
internal credit rating system, responded well to the need of global integration. By 
responding in that way, the bank regulators seem to meet both oppositions of 
Government and market controls simultaneously, consistent with Phuong NC and 
Richard’s (2011) comment that the accounting transformation was a success at the 
first glance and the modification was a clever compromise. It also explained why 
there were few criticisms related to Decision 493 and Decision 18. This is another 
piece of evidence to prove that the current definition of Government control is 
similar to the ‘reframe’ response in interpersonal communication in which 
‘Dialectical theorists have found reframing to be correlated with higher satisfaction 
than other ways of managing contradictions’ (Tracy 2004, p. 137). 
However, later, there were many claims that the Vietnamese standard in loan loss 
recognition was quite different from international standards, thus understating bank 
loan loss disclosed, and then distorting the capital allocation. The analysis of 
communication in phase 2 revealed that the difference in loan loss disclosure in 
Vietnam compared with the international standard was caused by the invalidation of 
regulation on loan loss recognition (Decision 493 and Decision 18). Both the 
Government and commercial banks took that action. 
The Government directly intervened in loan loss recognition in commercial banks or 
created a separate set of regulations on loan loss recognition for lending to SOEs or 
state projects. This finding is complementary in another way to Piotroski and Wong’s 
(2012) discussion about the different ways that reduced the supply of high-quality 
external reports in Chinese listed firms. 
The system error was found to be at the bottom of such behaviour. Specifically, 
although establishing the multisector economy, the Government would like to 
develop the state economy sector into the market leader to maintain the 
Government’s direct control over the market economy. This policy was reflected in 
different ways. It was reflected in the halfway equitisation of SOEs, including 
SOCBs, in which the firms or banks were still state controlled after equitisation. It is 
also reflected in the privileges offered to SOEs in resource allocations, especially, 
lending in spite of their low efficiency. 
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In terms of loan loss recognition, the privileges were waiving debts classification 
requirements for a commercial bank and/or provision making related to lending to 
SOEs. Other privileges included setting a minimal provision for lending to SOEs via 
VDB under another regulation instead of under Decision 493 and Decision 18, thus 
making them inefficient and distorting the external disclosure of loan loss. 
Whereas that deficiency misled the market discipline, the Government accepted it 
because the state has low need of external qualitative information that is consistent 
with Piotroski and Wong’s (2012) explanation that the state has its private channel of 
information collection. In the Vietnamese banking industry, SBV collected 
information via the direct reports from the commercial banks that were not published. 
Its Credit Information Centre is another private channel of SBV for collecting 
information related to credit risk management. 
In addition, the Government can obtain the necessary information using its private 
channel under the state control ownership structure in SOCBs as the result of the 
halfway equitisation. Being state-controlled, SOCBs work for multiple objectives, 
other than profit seeking, to implement the Government policy. It promoted the state 
to establish its private channel of information rather than utilising the firm external 
financial reports. Similarly, Piotroski and Wong (2012) claimed that the only 
financial information published by the Chinese listed firms was insufficient for the 
Government to measure and assess the firms’ performance with multiple objectives 
rather than profit seeking only. Therefore, the external disclosure of loan loss 
recognition under Decision 493 and Decision 18 would not be necessary to the state. 
It added to the reduction in the demand of quality information from external sources 
from the perspective of the government as one of the information users. 
The behaviour of the commercial banks in the invalidation of Decision 493 and 
Decision 18 resulted from three major reasons. These are the low motivation to 
publish quality information, the high pressure to reach the regulation targets that are 
simple accounting-based ones and the weak legal environment represented by the 
prevalence of cross-shareholding and relative transactions. The privileges to SOEs 
for political purposes led to the situation that depositors cared more about a bank’s 
political background than its published financial information. It reduced the bank’s 
motivation to publish high-quality information of loan loss. 
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The setting of unaffordable regulation targets, which caused a large burden to small 
commercial banks, reflected the inexperience of the bank regulators in adopting the 
international practices related to the capital adequacy process. It was found that 
commercial banks managed their loan loss recognition to meet regulation targets of 
NPL ratio and equity growth that were simply determined based on accounting 
figures without the elimination of cross-transactions among relatives. It is similar to 
Piotroski and Wong’s (2012) assertion that regulation targets based on simple 
accounting targets, without strong discipline to guard against manipulation, 
motivated the Chinese listed firms to distort their external accounting reports for 
reaching regulation targets. This finding is also consistent with Nguyen Loc, Hooper 
and Sinclair’s (2013) claim that the dominated practitioners (commercial banks) tend 
to override the regulations imposed by the state as the dominant. 
Commercial banks took advantage of cross-shareholding and relative transactions to 
hide NPLs to reach the regulation targets. The cross-shareholding was caused by the 
half-equitisation in which SOCBs were required to become a shareholder in JSCBs 
and SOEs purchased stocks of each other to maintain the Government control. 
5.4 Phase 3: 2012–present 
Phase 3 witnesses the frequent change in regulation related to loan loss recognition as 
the result of the ongoing negotiation of revelation and concealment in the interaction 
between the regulators and public. That process is presented in the following sections 
in relation to the four decisions on loan loss recognition stipulated during this phase. 
They are Decision 780 that delayed loan loss recognition (Section 5.4.1); Circular 02 
that was supposed to properly recognise loan loss (Section 5.4.2); Circular 12 to 
postpone the implementation of Circular 02 (Section 5.4.3); and Circular 09 to 
amend Circular 02 (Section 5.4.4) and Circular 19 to help banks clean NPLs on their 
balance sheets using VAMC special bonds (Section 5.4.5).  
5.4.1 Decision 780 (04/2012): the delay of loan loss recognition 
By the announcement assuring the safety of depositors’ money in troubled banks as 
described in Section 4.4.2.3, Government insurance for bank deposit was dominant 
over the market discipline in which depositors can lose money if they are wrong in 
evaluating bank financial health. Responding in that way reduced the demand for, 
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and supply of, information to the market on commercial banks because the depositors 
expect the Government to ensure repayment of their deposits. Hence, the power of 
market control is weakened under that Government intervention. This phenomenon 
was also found in Chinese market under Government control (He, Wong & Young 
2012; Piotroski & Zhang 2014). 
In spite of its announcement, the Government had no money to meet its commitment 
to the depositors in case the banks failed because of the high increasing public debt 
as mentioned in Section 4.4.2.3. Therefore, the Vietnamese regulations were 
downgraded by delaying loan loss recognition to avoid bank bankruptcy that would 
be costly for the state following its commitment to insure bank deposits. Specifically, 
bank regulators issued Decision 780 dated 23/04/2012, officially allowing banks to 
keep rescheduled loans in their pre-rescheduled classification groups, resulting in no 
additional loan loss being recognised that could lead to bank bankruptcy. 
In brief, the response was conducted in the way that stability was the priority over 
change (bankruptcy) to ensure the existence of the Government control. The delay of 
loan loss recognition was decided for this reason, whereas it is in fact a failure to 
maintain and develop the market economy mechanism of free competition based on 
information transparency (market control). Hence, the bank regulators decided to 
respond to the pole of disinformation in which loan loss recognition was delayed 
under Decision 780 to maintain stability even if temporarily. That selection response 
ignores the responsibility of the market in controlling the efficiency of capital 
allocation. It reduces the market control power in the way that investors and 
depositors do not pay sufficient attention to bank loan loss recognition since they 
expect a Government bailout in bankruptcy. Attending to just one opposition 
(Government control) of the contradiction explains why loan loss recognition in 
Vietnam is a regulation rather than a market target, consistent with He, Wong and 
Young’s (2012) finding. 
5.4.2 Circular 02 (01/2013): the intention to improve transparency 
The attention was switched to the free market pole after one year of delaying loan 
loss recognition because it was criticised by several experts and journalists in the 
media that delaying loan loss recognition could lead Vietnam to a decade of loss, as 
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in Japan (Communist Party 2012; Nguyen Duc Thanh et al. 2013; Nishimura & 
Asahi 2014; Phan Hoai Hiep 2012). As the result of that argument, following the 
evolutionary trend before 2012, Circular 02 was issued on 21 January 2013, 
replacing Decision 493 (also see Appendix 1) with more improvement towards 
international practices than Decisions 493 and 18. This phenomenon can be 
summarised as the responsiveness to the disinformation pole then creating pressure to 
attend to the other pole of information. Specifically, the disinformation of loan loss 
under Decision 780 encountered the community reactions of fear of adversely 
affecting economic development [a decade of loss like in Japan]. This reaction led to 
the state support to the information of loan loss by stipulating Circular 02. 
The scope of assets for credit loss provision under Circular 02 is wider than under 
Decisions 493 and 18. This is an improvement in Circular 02 in comparison to the 
previous regulations. The assets added to the list of objects of provision under 
Circular 02 include credit extensions under form of credit card issuance, investment 
or risk-bearing entrustment in unlisted bonds, credit extension entrustment, deposits 
(excluding deposit for payment) at domestic credit institutions and foreign banks’ 
branches in Vietnam. The addition of these assets to the list of debts for loss 
provision stems from the fact that these assets have the same credit risk as loans and 
their outstanding balance was larger in Vietnam. In addition, Circular 02 requires 
establishing provision for interbank lending and investment or deposits in other 
financial institutions since they are or can be debts in substance when those financial 
institutions utilise them to solve their liquidity risk, manage equity growth 
requirement or lending to related parties. 
Further, the risk extent of banks’ self-classification group is required to be not less 
than the classification result supplied by the Credit Information Centre (CIC). CIC is 
a state nonprofit organisation under the SBV, which functions in acquisition, storage, 
analysis, processing and forecasting credit information as required by SBV under 
Circular 02. Bank regulators would like to monitor banks’ loans classification by 
reconciling bank results to those of CIC to reduce the risk of insufficient loan loss 
recognition. 
The reconciliation requirement shows the state is not confident because of the low 
quality of information it receives from the commercial banks on loan loss 
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recognition, which is the consequence of invalidating regulation in phase 2 and the 
delay of loan loss recognition under Decision 780 at the beginning of phase 3. Hence, 
the CIC reconciliation mechanism under Circular 02 tightened the Government 
control on loan loss recognition. It also served the market need of improvement in 
loan loss transparency when commercial banks were suspected to hide loan losses. 
However, that benefit is limited because CIC is a state organisation directly 
controlled by SBV, rather than an independent organisation in the market. From that 
view, the requirement to use CIC data as the base for loans classification serves the 
control objective of the Government, but reduces the market’s role in monitoring and 
evaluating credit risk. Under that design, the effectiveness of CIC data was criticised 
to be restricted because of insufficient communication with the market to update the 
credit rating (Tran Thuy 2013; World Bank 2014). 
In particular, although CIC classifies loans into the highest risk groups that are 
suggested by financial institutions, as stipulated in Circular 02, article 8, there is no 
effective enforcement mechanism to ensure the data quality and timely update from 
financial institutions. The credit information from nonbank sectors was not included 
because customer data were collected mainly from financial institutions only. In 
addition, credit institutions cannot disclose to the borrowers the reason when their 
loans are refused basing on adverse credit data from CIC (World Bank 2014). The 
doubts about the reliability of the rating system can be explained for this restriction 
in disclosing information to borrowers. Moreover, Tran Thuy (2013) claimed that the 
enforcement of asset classification based on CIC data conflicted with bank 
regulators’ effort to motivate commercial banks in building and developing their 
internal credit rating system. 
Therefore, the World Bank (2014), which can be considered an international market 
representative, believed this enforcement is a positive step to reduce discrepancy in 
loan classification standards across the Vietnamese banks (World Bank 2014). 
However, the understated loan loss issues remained partly unsolved because of the 
data insufficiency and the bias towards Government control as discussed above 
(World Bank 2014). 
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5.4.3 Circular 12 (05/2013): the postponement of Circular 02 
The response was found to have switched towards the Government control pole one 
more time in responding to the tension between domestic and international drivers. 
The Government is inconsistent in requiring banks to implement the change under 
Circular 02. As the economic depression intensified, causing loss to banks, bank 
regulators issued Circular 12 on 27/05/2013 to delay the implementation of Circular 
02 from 01/6/2013 to 01/6/2014 (Appendix 1). The implementation of Circular 02 
was suspended until June 2014 (SBV 2013b, VnEconomy 2013b) by the extension of 
Decision 780 to help the banks delay NPLs disclosures, thus distorting loan loss 
recognition. 
Explaining that delay, at a recent banking conference, many bank managers claimed 
that if Circular 02 were to be applied, then ‘bank NPLs may rise to 10%, 20% or even 
higher’ (VnEconomy 2013a) because banks have to receive information from the 
CIC of SBV as a basis for loan classification instead of using their own information. 
More significantly, a downgrade of debts in just one bank could cause all remaining 
loans at other banks to become NPLs according to Circular 02. Some people feared 
that this could increase the NPLs in the banking system, resulting in credit being 
frozen because borrowers could not borrow more when their credit were 
downgraded11, thus making economic recovery even more difficult (VnEconomy 
2013a). 
Different from bank management in the domestic banks, foreign investors were 
disappointed with the delay of Circular 02 (Bich Diep 2013). Alain Cany, Co-chair of 
the Vietnam Business Forum asserted, in a meeting of this Forum in June 2013, that 
the delay was not good news for foreign investors (Vietnamnet 2014). Tomoyuki 
Kimura, Vietnam Country Director of Asian Development Bank also expected the 
Circular would be applied earlier in 2014 instead of on 01 June 2014, as stated in 
Circular 12 (Vietnamnet 2014). In addition, Mr Tareq Waleed Muhmood, the CEO of 
ANZ Vietnam insisted that ‘We fully support the steps of the SBV in the 
implementation of Circular 02 to be closer to international standards in risk 
                                                          
11 In Vietnam, borrowers whose debts are classified into groups 3, 4 and 5 are more likely not 
extended borrowing limits and have to wait two to three years for applying for another loan from any 
bank TAICHINH.ONLINE 2016. CIC là gì? Những thông tin cần biết về CIC ‘What is CIC? Facts 
about CIC’. 2016 ed.: Taichinh.online. 
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provisioning’ in a press meeting with SBV in 16 December, 2013 (Vietnamplus 
2013; translated by the author). 
Holding the same opinion as the foreign investors, some press believed that Circular 
02 was a revolution in the banking industry (Xuan Than 2013) towards the adoption 
of international practices in loan loss recognition. Therefore, they were afraid that the 
delay of application would hinder the process of international integration of Vietnam 
(VnEconomy 2013a; VnExpress 2013). Specifically, the delay could negatively 
affect the belief in the Government’s operating policy and push back the progress of 
the restructuring of credit institutions as well as the access to the Basel II & III 
standards, which bank regulators were pursuing (Dan Viet 2014, Lam Thanh 2014). 
5.4.4 Circular 09 (03/2014): The amendment of Circular 02 
According to the roadmap, Circular 02 would be applied from June 2014 to eliminate 
the information users’ disappointment on transparency. However, financial markets 
remained difficult in 2014, leading to continuous increase in NPLs and loan loss 
provision. As mentioned above, if Decision 780 expired and loans were categorised 
under Circular 02, NPL ratio would be 14.55% rather than the current published ratio 
of 4.6% (VnEconomy 2013a). More seriously, NPLs of some credit institutions 
exceeded their equity capital (Vu Dinh Anh 2014) and thus made people worry that 
those banks might have lost all their equity to NPLs. Thus, many financial 
institutions proposed further delaying Circular 02 to 2015 (Vu Dinh Anh 2014) since 
the application of Circular 02 towards international practices was thought to be able 
to cause the banking system to crash. 
In this regard, the press was afraid that if the NPL recognition was to be delayed 
again, this could lead to the illusion that everything is going well, rather than 
accepting the reality (Hai Minh 2013). They supported the implementation of 
Circular 02 in 2014, as committed by the Government, to provide sufficient 
information for NPL problem solving and restructuring the entire banking system 
(Bao Tung 2013). They argued that bank regulators had not been aggressive enough 
to resolve NPLs. If Circular 02 were delayed again, the Government would miss a 
good opportunity to put a healthier banking system under the market discipline that 
helps to eliminate inefficient businesses (Nguyen Hang 2013). 
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These opinions show that it was critical for bank regulators to keep their commitment 
to implement Circular 02 to maintain the confidence of people, especially foreign 
investors, on the Government’s determination to support market discipline. For that 
purpose, SBV strongly confirmed that Circular 02 would not be delayed further. In a 
press meeting on 16 December 2013, Mr Dang Van Thao, Deputy Chief Inspector, 
was denominated by the SBV Deputy Governor to reply to the question about the 
possibility of delaying Circular 02. He explained, ‘One year postponement of 
Circular 02 has its historic role as creating favourable conditions for businesses, 
banks in difficult times …’ and he insisted that ‘… but also cannot be delayed too 
long. The view of our advisory bodies are still applying Circular 02 on 01 June 
2014’ (Vu Hanh 2013). According to the Deputy Chief Inspector, delaying Circular 
02 was necessary for saving businesses but should be stopped in 2014 to improve 
transparency of loan loss. 
Conversely, bankers, firms and the business press continually claimed that the 
application of the original version of Circular 02 from 01 June 2014 could cause 
difficulty for firms (Nguyen Hang 2013; Nguyen Hoai 2013; Nhue Man 2013; 
VnExpress 2014). They explained that firms were still in difficulty because the 
Vietnamese economy was still in the recovery period of 2014 and 2015 (Nguyen 
Hang 2013; Nhue Man 2013; VnExpress 2014). Once Circular 02 was implemented, 
banks would have to classify all multiple loans of a customer into one group with risk 
level not lower than the CIC’s classification, leading to double increase in NPLs. A 
higher risk classification would prevent customers from accessing bank lending 
because of their downgraded credit rating as explained in note 11 or, at least, would 
cause a higher financial cost to customers, which could drive them to bankruptcy. 
With the same thought, Vu Dinh Anh (2014) predicted that thousands of businesses, 
instead of the current few thousand, would cease operations in a year, if the Circular 
02 was applied. 
Finally, bank regulators decided to delay the recognition of NPLs once more to 
implement its political role in maintaining the economic, social and political stability. 
As the result, banks were allowed to restructure NPLs again for treating these as 
standard loans. For this purpose, bank regulators issued Circular 09 on 18March 
2014 (Appendix 1) stating, ‘Circular 02 will still be applied from the landmark date 
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01/06/2014, but several criteria and contents are expected to be amended for gradual 
implementation’ (VnEconomy 2013b; translated by the author). 
That modified version of Circular 02, Circular 09, provided a compromise solution 
by which Circular 02 was still applied as announced previously but that 
implementation would not affect the economy’s stability too negatively. The SBV 
Governor justified such compromise stating, ‘It was made in accordance with the 
actual conditions of the market and the economy of our country’ (SBV 2013d; 
translated by the author). Specifically, the Governor explained, ‘By restructuring, the 
enterprises were supported by not having to pay penalty rates for overdue loans and 
by ensuring they could continue borrowing from banks for running their businesses, 
thus reducing the escalation of NPLs’ (SBV 2013d; translated by the author). 
Although Circular 09 delayed the disclosure of loan loss to the market by extending 
the debt restructuring for lowering the published NPLs and loan loss provision, it 
required commercial banks to report the debts structuring in detail to SBV for 
Government control as stated in Annex 01 ‘Report on situations of time restructuring 
for debt payment’ (Circular No. 09/2014/TT-NHNN dated March 18, 2014, p. 7). 
Thus, the Government required banks to report NPLs to the Government, whereas it 
helped them to hide a part of it from the market. 
From a dialectical view, all four contradictions of Government control–market 
control, stability–change, separate-integration and information–disinformation were 
found to co-exist in the above facts. That is, the Government could not ignore its 
responsibility to disclose loan loss to the market (information) following its 
international commitments (integration). However, the Government did not want to 
disclose loan loss (disinformation) because a sharp increase in loan loss recognition, 
which was a separate feature of Vietnam (separation), could activate market 
discipline (market control), leading to a series of bankruptcies (change) thus 
threatening political stability (stability), causing the loss of Government control 
(Government control). Market discipline had been easier to activate than in the 
previous phases because the confidence in the Government bailout dropped 
significantly owing to a large deficit in the state budget. In addition, the SBV 
Governor had repeatedly affirmed that ‘will not use the state budget for bad debts 
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[NPLs] solving’ (Quang Vu 2014; Vietnamnet 2013; VnEconomy 2013d) because of 
insufficient funds, which was another distinction of Vietnam (separation). 
In addition, a substantial increase in NPL ratio would make it more difficult for 
Vietnam to borrow abroad (e.g., IMF, World Bank) (integration) for covering its 
budget deficits. It is evident that the Government always targets to control NPL ratio 
and retain it below 3%, which is considered normal according to international 
practices (Vov.vn 2012; Zing.vn 2015). This pressure gave the Government a 
stronger motivation to delay loan loss recognition. 
Finally, bank regulators neutralised the contradiction by revealing the partial, not the 
full, truth of loan loss to the public. The government continuously confirmed it would 
not delay Circular 02 to keep its commitment to the market; however, it prepared for 
revising Circular 02 (Vietstock 2014, VnExpress 2014). That is, banks were allowed 
to delay loan loss recognition one more time via Circular 09. Under this Circular, 
loan loss recognition was also postponed but the conditions were stricter than the 
ones under Circular 12 that had first postponed loan loss recognition as mentioned in 
Section 5.4.3. 
Specifically, under Circular 09, restructuring was allowed only once for each debt, 
except the lending under the Government’s direction for restructuring the banking 
system. Such a compromise of loan loss recognition would be neither full revelation 
(information) nor full concealment (disinformation) but somewhere in the middle. 
Thus, there was no absolute improvement in loan loss recognition towards 
international standards as was the original expectation, in spite of the implementation 
of Circular 02. That insufficient transparency distorted the market discipline and thus 
continued to hide the inefficiency in capital allocation in Vietnam, which hindered 
the country’s growth. 
5.4.5 Circular 19 (09/2013): the creation of VAMC mechanism 
Concurrently with the postponement of loan loss recognition, the SBV Governor 
issued Circular 19/2013/TT-NHNN on 06/09/2013 regarding the establishment, 
organisation and operation of the VAMC. VAMC was assigned, as the central bank-
run NPL-solving firm, the function of acquiring NPLs from Vietnamese banks. 
VAMC is a 100% state-owned limited liability, nonprofit company that issues special 
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bonds to buy a credit institution’s NPLs. According to Circular 19, banks can sell 
their NPLs to VAMC at market price or convert their NPLs at book value into 
VAMC special bonds. 
Up to 2017, VAMC has almost always purchased NPLs using the second method of 
converting NPLs to VAMC bonds (Mai Trinh 2017). This method is absolutely new 
in Vietnam. In particular, VAMC pays for NPLs by issuing special bonds to the 
selling banks. The bonds are special in some ways. They have a term of five years 
and the interest rate is 0%. Banks use special bonds only to take financing loans from 
the SBV or to buy back the NPLs sold to VAMC. The amount collected from the 
borrower of the debt sold will be used as a source to pay for the discounted amount. 
If the collected amount from the sold debt’s borrower is insufficient for the payment 
to SBV, the banks have the responsibility to pay the deficit. 
Banks cannot ask VAMC to redeem the bonds upon maturity. VAMC will transfer 
money to banks if it can collect the NPLs from the borrowers. Meanwhile, banks 
have to record provision of 20% each year and up to 100% after a five-year term for 
the special bonds, unless NPLs are recovered during that time. By converting NPLs 
into special bonds under Circular 19, banks are allowed to classify their NPLs as 
special bonds on their balance sheet (SBV 2013a), while they continue to bear the 
credit risk related to the NPLs sold. 
Therefore, under this mechanism, VAMC does not share the credit risk related to the 
NPLs sold although it issues the special bonds to purchase them. Banks, rather than 
VAMC, still bear all risks related to sold NPLs. Thus, in substance, banks cannot 
exclude sold debts from their balance sheet because it is a factoring transaction with 
full recourse. By converting NPLs into VAMC special bonds, banks benefit from 
hiding their NPLs on their balance sheet so that they can lower their NPL ratio. In 
addition, the selling banks can extend their loan loss provisioning over five years 
instead of provisioning immediately, thus improving the bank earnings in form rather 
than in substance. 
Hence, taking NPLs sold to VAMC out of the bank’s balance sheet can be interpreted 
as a violation of international accounting principles with regard to the recognition of 
assets and liabilities under IAS 01–Presentation of Financial Statements 
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(International Accounting Standards Committee 2007) because it is not a real trading 
or disposing of NPLs to VAMC. This organisation can be interpreted more as a 
‘warehouse’ to help banks temporarily clean their NPLs from their balance sheet 
(Dang Duc Thanh 2015; Hai Minh 2014), thus distorting credit loss disclosure. 
Bank regulators justified the establishment of VAMC by the argument that it is 
specific to Vietnam and hoped that it will not only help to improve the financial 
position of the banks with regarding to raising funds, but also force banks to disclose 
information on NPLs when selling NPLs to VAMC (Saigondautu 2014). The SBV 
Governor affirmed it was the most viable solution to lift the NPLs ‘clot’ out of the 
economy’s ‘body’ (Cong Ly 2015; translated by the author). He explained: 
Now, we want money flowing into production. So just lift ‘blood clot’, and new 
blood will flow back into circulation. The picture is very clear. Taking out the 
‘blood clot’ based on the market principle is very easy; just sell bad debts [NPLs] 
and it is completed. However, there is no market buyer currently, so we just need 
the state for the last purchase of bad debts [NPLs] sold via the VAMC 
organisation.… (Cong Ly 2015; translated by the author) 
Selling NPLs to the market is a common practice in many countries worldwide, (e.g., 
the United States, China, East Asian countries and Eastern Europe) by which NPLs 
were solved by cash outlay at the market price under the Government’s management 
(Dang Duc Thanh 2015; Huynh The Du 2004; Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al. 2013). 
However, the Governor recalled, ‘But we do not have money for bad debts [NPLs] 
purchase’ (Cong Ly 2015; translated by the author). Therefore, the Governor 
asserted, ‘Vietnam cannot handle bad debts [NPLs] by the state budget as in many 
other countries’ (VnEconomy 2013c; translated by the author), and hence, ‘solving 
bad debts [NPLs] via VAMC mechanism in Vietnam is much different from [the 
practice in] other countries because Vietnam does not use the state budget to 
purchase bad debts [NPLs]’ (Quang Canh 2014; translated by the author). 
Specifically, under the VAMC mechanism, selling NPLs is a sale in form rather than 
in substance because the state had no money to purchase NPLs. The Governor made 
it clear that: 
I [VAMC] bought your bad debts [NPLs], but actually, you [banks] mortgaged 
your bad debts [NPLs] for borrowing from me … You have five years to solve 
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your bad debts [NPLs]. I hope that in five years, your business would be better and 
you have money to pay your borrowings [from VAMC] … That solution can 
removed the ‘blood clot’ [NPLs] and the state will not lose money. (Cong Ly 
2015; translated by the author) 
The purchase of NPLs via VAMC was expected to not only provide commercial 
banks more funds for their lending activities as mentioned above by the Governor, 
but also motivate banks to continue lending to the firms holding NPLs. Banks used to 
be afraid to offer a new loan to those firms because current regulations stipulated a 
high loan loss provision rate for these firms (Saigondautu 2014). For example, if a 
firm had an NPL in group 5, a provision of 100% was applied for a new loan to that 
firm. By selling those NPLs to VAMC, banks can lend more to that firm without loan 
loss provisioning. Therefore, both banks and firms can unfreeze credit flows. In 
addition, the sale of debts to VAMC would make NPLs more transparent because 
banks had to present to VAMC the full records and collaterals related to the debts 
sold (Saigondautu 2014). 
In brief, by establishing VAMC, the bank regulators expected that it would improve 
the transparency in loan loss to provide sufficient data for the Government control, 
via banks reports to VAMC. In addition, it partly met the market expectation with 
more disclosed loan loss recognition, which was 20% of sold debts each year. At the 
same time, it did not cause a negative impact on bank performance, lending growth, 
NPL ratio and the in-deficit state budgets. 
In practice, by mainly using the VAMC mechanism, SBV informed that it was 
successful in solving 90% of NPLs and reduced the NPL ratio to below 3% as at 
2015 as targeted (Hai Minh 2014; Khanh Nhi 2015). The Governor stressed, ‘The 
international organizations have agreed the VAMC mechanism is acceptable in this 
difficult situation’ (Quang Canh 2014; translated by the author). His excuse implied 
that the VAMC mechanism was just a temporary solution in the short term before 
solving the NPLs issue. In reality, four years have passed since the issuance of the 
VAMC mechanism in 2013 and the economy has gradually recovered. In spite of 
that, thus far, the Government has just finished collecting NPLs into the VAMC store 
and is unclear about how to handle them (Mai Trinh 2017), whereas NPLs solving 
was defined as an urgent task: 
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Currently, NPLs not only seriously affect the credit system, but also adversely 
affect the whole economy. Therefore, fast and complete solving of this problem is 
not only the desire of the banking sector but also the wish of the political system. 
This is an important, urgent mission to remove the bottlenecks in the economy, 
creating the conditions that promote economic development. (Tapchitaichinh 
2016; translated by the author) 
The lack of legal framework related to the NPLs problem solving was considered the 
major challenge, as concluded from the 10th session of the National Assembly XIII 
(Quynh Hoa 2016). According to a Member of Parliament, Nguyen Van Thang: 
The key problem is to have a mechanism to remove legal difficulties. 80% of the 
NPLs remaining at VAMC are mainly debts with difficulties in collection, most of 
which are related to legal procedures associated with the properties. (Hoang Yen 
2016; translated by the author) 
In addition to the legal issue, debates on the proposal to use the state budget for 
handling NPLs remained inconclusive, although many financial experts believed it 
was an essential work. For example, Dr Nguyen Tri Hieu, a banking and finance 
expert, argued: 
The bad debt [NPLs] will only worsen if not solved. In Vietnam, the number of 
bad debts [NPLs] is too large; thus, only the Government’s intervention can solve 
the ‘clot’ [NPLs problem] for the economy. (Bach Hop 2016; translated by the 
author) 
The specialists called for using the state budget because only that was large enough 
for purchasing NPLs from commercial banks. They believed that it was necessary to 
solve the problem as soon as possible ‘because the Vietnamese NPL rate is at an 
alarming level, causing ‘congestion’ in the market capital flows, which is the major 
reason that interest rates are unlikely to fall’ (Bach Hop 2016; translated by the 
author), thus ‘reducing the competitiveness of domestic enterprises in the 
international market’ (Tran Thuy 2016; translated by the author). 
However, although those financial experts argued for VMAC to use the state budget 
for buying NPLs from commercial banks, the state agent in VAMC, Mr Hung, the 
CEO of VAMC, asserted: 
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No need of additional money at this time. VAMC has even not yet used any penny 
of the amount of 2,000 billion dong already granted by the Government for NPLs 
solving because no agreement could have been made between VAMC and credit 
institutions for selling their NPLs to the market. (Bach Hop 2016; translated by the 
author) 
In addition to the lack of a legal framework for forcing the borrowers to repay or for 
distraining their property as mentioned above, the CEO explained the necessity of a 
legal framework for a different purpose: 
‘What VAMC needs now is a clear legal framework. Specifically, VAMC needs a 
debt trading market that it can operate. A legal framework to stipulate clearly the 
responsibility in case a debt is solved at loss [lower than its book value]. Is that 
loss sale problematic? Will that loss be allowed to be covered by provision in the 
credit institution? Will the credit institution be allowed to record the loss gradually 
over years to reduce financial pressure [as the provision rule currently applied for 
VAMC debts]?’ (Bach Hop 2016; translated by the author) 
It is understandable that commercial banks do not want VAMC selling their debts to 
the market in its NPLs solving process because banks must record all losses incurred 
immediately instead of making provisioning gradually over years as allowed 
currently by the Government. According to Ngan Giang (2016), it is likely that the 
loss would incur in the sale of NPLs stored in VAMC because the banks often pass 
unrecoverable debts rather than standard debts to VAMC. 
Similar to the VAMC CEO, a banking and financial expert, Doctor Can Van Luc, 
had a concern about ‘who would bear the loss incurred in the sale of NPLs’ (Ngan 
Giang 2016; translated by the author). However, Doctor Le, a financial specialist 
from TGM Fund in Australia, opposed that concern. He said: 
About VAMC, this organisation does not bear any risk related to the resale of 
debts purchased earlier. According to the current regulation, all gain or loss from 
the sale of bad debts [NPLs] would be transferred to the banks that sold those 
debts to VAMC earlier. (Ngan Giang 2016; translated by the author) 
Therefore, why is VAMC or others concerned about who bears the risk, thus being 
afraid of selling debts to the market? Ngan Giang’s (2016) statement can offer some 
clues: 
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Banks tend to hide bad debts [NPLs] because disclosing bad debts [NPLs] and 
making provision for them will truncate bank equity capital, leading to them being 
recapitalised by either the issuance of additional shares or no dividend payment. In 
case their financial health is too bad, leading to the risk of crisis, the Government 
has to recapitalise them using state budge t... Of course, recapitalisation by the 
state budget fund can incur a risk of loss that would be charged to taxpayers. That 
is the price we pay for the neglect of management/supervision by state 
management agencies giving rise to too risky loans in commercial banks. 
Therefore, instead of focusing on ‘bad debts [NPLs] solving’, [the authorities] 
should ‘convict’ the state agencies/individuals who did not fulfil their previous 
management responsibilities. (Translated by the author) 
An inference can be made from the statement above: The loss incurred in NPLs sold 
to the market should be charged to not only the related commercial banks but also to 
the state management agencies, who did not fulfil their regulation and supervision 
duties. The failure to complete the accountability of the Government was witnessed 
in phase 2 as discussed above. 
Such a way of sharing responsibility for the loss was also raised by several experts 
and obtained the consensus of participants in the seminar titled ‘Dealing with bad 
loans—The bottlenecks needed to be removed’ held by the SBV coordinating with 
the Office of the National Assembly, VAMC and People’s Deputies Newspaper in 
Hanoi on 26 October 2016 (Thanh Huyen 2016; translated by the author). For 
example, Doctor Le Xuan Nghia said: ‘The blame for the bad debts [NPLs] problem 
is not to be assigned only to firms, or banks, but it is also the fault of the 
Government, of the policy and of the market economy.’ (Thanh Huyen 2016; 
translated by the author) 
However, it is difficult to identify any specific individual or organisation in the 
Government who is responsible for that loss. It is often attributed to the whole group 
rather than any specific person or organisation. For example, in the Parliamentarians 
Conference on 11 April 2014 on the draft laws of public investment and the related 
problems (i.e., leakage and waste, spreading and corruption), the President of 
Congress, Nguyen Sinh Hung, said about the responsibility related to a wrong 
decision in regulation: 
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Parliament is a legislative body; if it makes a wrong decision or policy, it must 
also recognise the weaknesses, but we cannot discipline the whole Parliament, 
especially with the criminal discipline. Even the Chairman of the Parliament is not 
the head but the general coordinator, the chairperson to maintain contact among 
500 delegates. So, we cannot discipline 500 delegates or the chairman for their 
wrong voting … [He emphasised] Parliament is the people [Vietnamese citizens], 
and the people vote and hence must accept the wrong decision rather than seeking 
who to discipline. (Linh Thu 2014; translated by the author) 
Considering the President’s view, in case the Government shared the loss with 
commercial banks and firms, the state budget should be used to cover the loss rather 
than charging that loss to any specific individual or organisation. It is because a part 
of the loss stemmed from the system error, as mentioned in Section 5.3.3, which was 
voted for by the Parliament that represents Vietnamese citizens as asserted by the 
President. 
However, this solution was also strongly opposed. Thus far, the public, many experts 
and politicians have insisted that ‘NPLs are caused by banks and businesses; thus 
they have to bear’ (Thuy Lien 2016; translated by the author), or ‘State budget 
belongs to People [Vietnamese citizens], no matter from taxes or borrowings money; 
so we cannot force People to pay for what they do not owe. Using state budget to pay 
for that loss means taking money from the poor to pay for the rich’ (Hoang Long 
2016; translated by the author). 
In addition, a financial and banking expert, Pham Nam Kim, criticised that using the 
state budget to save commercial banks violated the market discipline. He said: 
The use of state budget, as well as public money, to ‘save’ the banks from their 
own mistake in management is paradoxical. Vietnam has confirmed it will 
implement the market mechanism; therefore, let the market solve its problems. 
(Lan Huong 2016; translated by the author) 
In fact, while the Government tried to build the market mechanism as committed, it 
partly invalidated that mechanism simultaneously as discussed in phase 2. Thus, it is 
obvious that the loss was partly caused by the Government’s fault, which is called a 
‘system error’ as discussed in phase 2. However, it is difficult to obtain political 
consensus for the solution of using the state budget to cover the loss because it faced 
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strong opposition from the public as described above. Using the state budget to cover 
the loss can greatly reduce people’s confidence in the Government control with the 
revelation of a huge loss caused by its wrong policies, thus damaging the leadership 
of the Communist Party. In addition, it can cause a large burden for the state budget 
that is currently in deficit with high public debt, and thus can threaten the national 
financial security and then the Government control. 
Because of that conflict, according to the lawyer Truong Thanh Duc, the 
nonacceptance of the responsibility sharing between the state budget, commercial 
banks and businesses is the critical reason hindering the NPL-solving process. He 
said: 
It [the Government] blames only banks for causing bad debts [NPLs], thus treating 
them as criminals, refusing to amend regulations, not using the state budget to 
solve bad debts [NPLs] …, [the Government] should not question why the process 
of bad debts [NPLs] is slow. (Ha Tam 2016; translated by the author) 
To avoid that conflict, Nguyen Minh (2016) suggested: 
We believe that the main treatment method is still using net operating income of 
commercial banks to process [to make provision] until when the book value of bad 
debts [NPLs] equals the market valuation. At that time, bad debts [NPLs] will be 
handled by selling/buying through market. (Nguyen Minh 2016; translated by the 
author) 
Accepting this suggestion means delaying the sale of NPLs to the market until bank 
earnings are sufficient to make full provision for the whole loss. At that time, the net 
book value of the debt after provision will not be higher than the market value, and 
thus, the sale of those debts will not cause loss. In this way, commercial banks and 
the Government can both avoid recognising the loss immediately to avoid incurring 
undesired responsibilities for both. 
Finally, the Government selected that solution by stipulating Circular 08, which came 
into effect from 1 August 2016 (Nguyen Phuoc Thanh 2016). Circular 08 amended a 
number of articles of the SBV Governor’s Circular No. 19/2013/TT-NHNN of 6 
September 2013, which provided the purchase, sale and handling of NPLs by 
VAMC. Under Circular 08, loan loss provision related to the NPLs sold to VAMC 
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was extended to 10 years instead of 5 years as stipulated in Circular No. 19/2013/TT-
NHNN in 2013 to give both commercial banks and the Government more time to 
delay loan loss recognition while waiting for economy recovery. 
In brief, after the Government failed several times to keep its word to improve the 
transparency of loan loss to the public, the VAMC mechanism was finally found as a 
‘creative and unique’ response that partly resolved the contradictions by responding 
to a small portion of the market control, integration and change oppositions rather 
than denying them in full. Specifically, the part of NPLs sold to VAMC was 
disclosed to the public by declaring VAMC special bonds under long-term 
investment securities items. The disclosure just partly improved the transparency in 
loan loss because NPLs were renamed as investment securities, which distorted the 
substance of that item. Moreover, the provision for their related loss has not been 
made in full, but is recorded gradually over 10 years as described above (under 
Circular 08 stipulated in 2016), thus overstating banks earnings and assets but giving 
banks more time while waiting for the economy to recover so that banks can obtain 
more resources to make provision. The NPLs were still stored in the VAMC 
organisation and were not yet settled adopting market discipline, thus freezing the 
related economic resources. Therefore, no significant change has occurred in loan 
loss communication in response to the opposition of market control, integration and 
change. 
5.4.6 Summary of data analysis in phase 3 
In phase 3, the information of loan loss recognised related to the acceleration of 
NPLs that threatened the stability of the Government control because it could 
damage both the economic and symbolic capital of the Government. The reason is 
that a significant part of NPLs was related to the state economy sector. Therefore, 
using the state budget to cover that loss would reveal the weaknesses of the 
Government in its administration because the loss was partly the Government’s fault 
in terms of its policy, which was described as the system error in phase 2. 
In addition, the recognition of that loss would place a substantial burden on the state 
budget while it was in deficit with a high public debt, thus threatening the 
Government’s financial security. In spite of that, the Government could not let the 
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state economy sector go bankrupt without a state bailout, in case loan loss was full 
recognised. The key economic and political role of the state economy sector 
determines the Government’s symbolic and economic capital; as claimed by Nguyen 
Loc, Hooper and Sinclair (2013), the Vietnamese Government was the dominant in 
Vietnam because it held the majority part of the economic and symbolic capital. 
Therefore, the recognition of loan loss would threaten the Government’s dominant 
role in the economy. 
Further, the Government could not let banks become bankrupt since many people 
would lose their deposits in banks, which would threaten the nation’s economic, 
social and political stability. In addition, the Government could not bail out the banks 
or the depositors owing to its current weak financial ability. 
Although all the facts above support the postponement of loan loss recognition, the 
Government faced pressure from the market force, represented by the public and 
foreign organisations, on the transparency of NPLs when they witnessed its 
acceleration. The public and foreign organisations paid more attention than 
previously to ensuring that the external quality information was according to 
international practices in response to the worry that the state budget with high public 
debt was insufficient for bank rescue in the period of financial distress in spite of the 
bank’s strong political background.  
It explained why the difference between the disclosure of SBV and that of 
commercial banks had been not a concern of the public until phase 3 when doubts 
arose about the Government’s economic capital for bailing out the banking system. 
Further, the transparency of information on NPLs of commercial banks was critical 
to the Government to take control over loan loss recognition in commercial banks. It 
was not under the Government’s control when the regulation was invalidated during 
phase 2 and relaxed during phase 3. The problem was increased in severity because 
the acceleration of NPLs was out of the Government’s control in phase 3. 
Facing those challenges, the Government frequently changed the regulations on loan 
loss recognition to extend the deadline for banks to make loan loss provision and 
disclose NPLs to public. The Government repeatedly stipulated new regulations as a 
promise to force banks to recognise loan loss by adopting international standards in 
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the near future. Those promises temporarily calmed down the public although they 
were denied by the next promise. Conversely, the Government sustained its control 
by intensifying its inspection over loan loss recognition in commercial banks and 
required these banks to report their restructured debts to the CIC as the Government’s 
private channel rather than via public financial reports for market discipline. 
Those actions aimed to delay the information of loan loss to the market but enhance 
the information to the Government, and were thus undertaken to favour the 
Government interest rather than that of others. That response is consistent with 
Benson’s (1977) claim on studying organisations from a dialectical view that ‘in 
crisis periods, when thoroughgoing change is possible, participants may see their 
interests more clearly and conform their ideas and actions closely to them’ (p. 7). 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter grouped the communication data into three phases and coded and linked 
them into a story to understand the meaning of data in their contexts from a 
dialectical view. Then, the found story of changes in loan loss recognition provides 
further understanding of the related context meaning. Such understanding over three 
phases forms the foundation for developing themes and emerging patterns in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 6: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided the story of regulating loan loss regulation in Vietnam 
from a dialectical view. This chapter analyses that story to summarise the findings 
and discusses them in comparison to the propositions developed in Chapter 3 from a 
dialectical view. The analysis above shows that over the three phases, the conflict 
between Government control and market control was at the bottom of the 
communication in regulating loan loss recognition in Vietnam. The results are 
presented in the order of the three phases as stated in the previous chapter. Then the 
emerged patterns are presented in the following sections. 
6.2 Phase 1: Contradictions and Responses 
As analysed in Chapter 5, most of the communications in phase 1 are related to the 
four contradictions of Government control–market control, stability–change, 
separation–integration and information–disinformation. At the beginning of phase 1, 
the communication discussed about how bank loan loss provision was regulated to 
serve different objectives of the Government rather than to disclose information for 
market control (information–disinformation contradiction). The multiple objectives 
of the Government included tax collection, statistics and direct management. 
The debate responded to the Government control opposition rather than the market 
control opposition because the whole banking industry was state-owned and under 
the direct control of the Government as the heritage of the planned economy model 
(Government control–market control contradiction). Therefore, the accounting 
system was designed to serve the Government as the dominant information user of 
accounting. This finding is consistent with that of Phuong NC and Richard (2011) 
that the accounting system in Vietnam was designed to work for multiple objectives 
of the state, such as tax accounting and management. 
The market control was formed when the Government defined the Renovation policy 
with market development following global integration as a political determination to 
maintain the Government control in Vietnam. Thus, the market control was originally 
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not considered an opposition to Government control but a means to accomplish the 
goal of maintaining the Government control. 
The relationship between stability and change was mentioned as complementary 
elements when the Government considered the change towards global integration and 
free market development a critical condition for stabilising the economy, politics and 
society, which is a requisite for maintaining the Government control. It is the 
metabolism through which bank regulators decided to change regulation towards 
global integration and free market to obtain the stability for government control. 
Setting regulation by adopting international practices to serve market control 
development was required for global integration towards internalisation policy 
(separation–integration contradiction) since it was defined as being a part of 
Government control enhancement. With that determination, the adoption of 
international practices in regulation was considered an advance step for improving 
the local regulation rather than a confrontation with separate need. 
In terms of regulating loan loss recognition, the market force started to appear 
obviously at the end of phase 1 when the banking industry was changed by 
separating it into two tiers, the SBV and the commercial banks, with an independent 
financial mechanism. That change was a result of the market development policy. 
Since the commercial banks have to operate relatively independently in the market 
rather than being subsidised by the state budget as before, it was necessary to 
establish loan loss provision first, from the banking regulation approach, as a reserve 
fund to absorb the risk of credit loss. 
Then, as the result of the global integration policy, the accounting approach was also 
mentioned in many suggestions to treat loan loss provision as an expense rather than 
a reserve to obtain a faithful financial statement under accrual basis accounting as per 
international practices. Loan loss classification was at first simply applied for 
measuring loan loss provision and risk management. With those changes in 
regulation, disclosure of loan loss information to the public commenced, establishing 
the initial step for providing information to serve market discipline. It is the result of 
the responses to the other three contradictions rather than a separate response to the 
contradiction of information–disinformation. 
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Several implications can be proposed from the findings above. First, the oppositions 
of the three contradictions of Government control–market control, stability–change 
and separation–integration were defined as complementary elements in political, 
renovation and internationalisation issues. The oppositions of market control, change 
and integration were the means for achieving the oppositions of Government control, 
stability and separation respectively. This definition was similar to the ‘reframe’ 
response found by Baxter (1990) and Tracy (2004) in interpersonal communication. 
Considering that response, the participants viewed one pole of an organisational 
tension as a means for achieving the other pole (Tracy 2004) and no longer regarded 
the two contrasts as opposites (Baxter 1990, p. 73). This pattern is summarised in 
Table 6.1 (page 172) about the contradictions and responses related to regulating loan 
loss recognition. 
Second, the two relationships of stability–change and separation–integration arose 
from the perceptual transformation of Government control, which increased the 
market development towards internalisation. The development of market control with 
the competition of multibusiness sectors is a critical change for the Government 
because it played the monopoly role owing to the fact that Vietnam had only the state 
economy sector at that time. The internationalisation is another substantial change 
when Vietnam was a closed economy under the monopoly control of the Government 
rather than relatively free market competition as commonly found in the developed 
countries. 
The perceptual transformation of Government control opposition defined responses 
to the two relationships of stability–change and separation–integration. In particular, 
the change and integration poles were selected as responses to the market 
development towards the internationalisation policy. That policy aimed to improve 
the national economy by taking advantage of global integration, and thus helping to 
re-establish political stability and then enhance the Government control. 
Thus, the Government control opposition, which used to be associated with the 
separation and stability oppositions as shown in Figure 6.1, was reframed as being 
complemented by the development of market control opposition, which was 
correlated with integration and change. Figure 6.1 shows the relationship between 
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Government control–market control and two other contradictions as it used to be at 
the beginning of phase 1 rather than after its unification at the end of phase 1. 
 
Figure 6.1 Relationship among four dialectics 
Third, by taking into consideration the two implications above, it can be inferred that 
the response to the contradiction of Government control–market control was at the 
bottom of regulation transformation in loan loss recognition in phase 1. The 
definition of Government control as market development with internationalisation 
caused the ‘change’ in accounting regulation towards global ‘integration’ that 
resulted in the improvement in loan loss ‘information’ to the market. That causal link 
can be summarised as Change → Integration → Information as shown in Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.2: Effects of framing Government-control opposition 
Before 1986:  Instability 
Phase 1:   Change → Integration → Information 
Phase 2:   Separation → Disinformation → 
Instability 
Phase 3:   Stability → Disinformation → Separation 
Phase 4 (proposed): Change → Integration → Information 
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Table 6.1 Summary of contradictions and responses in three phases 
 Politics Issue Transformation Issue Internationalisation Issue Transparency Issue 
Phase 
Government Control–Market 
Control 
Stability–Change  Separation–Integration Information–Disinformation 
1 
Considered the development of 
market operating under market 
discipline as a means to 
maintain the Government 
control (complementary). 
Change towards global 
integration and free market 
development for stabilising 
government control 
(complementary). 
Started to simply adopt 
international standard to build 
the first national regulation on 
loan loss recognition 
(complementary). 
Started to inform loan loss for 
market discipline. (It is the result 
of the responses for the other 
three contradictions rather than a 
separate response for this 
contradiction.) 
2 
Defined the Government control 
being the leading role of state 
economy sector, the state-
controlled ownership structure 
based on half-equitisation and 
the regulation targets based on 
simple accounting figures 
(neutralisation). 
 
Regulation was much closer to 
international practices in loan 
loss recognition but was 
invalidated directly or by 
establishing a separate 
regulation set for state-related 
lending activities (topic 
separation or vacillation). 
Loan loss was distorted in 
disclosing to both the market and 
the Government. (It is the result 
of the responses for the other 
two contradictions rather than a 
separate response for this 
contradiction.) 
3 
Government overrode the 
market discipline by ensuring 
bank deposits and avoiding 
bank bankruptcy by delaying 
loan loss recognition (selection). 
The Government has taken back 
the control of loan loss 
recognition but not disclosed 
significantly to serve market 
control (bias neutralisation). 
Change was made slowly and 
was insignificant in loan loss 
recognition (selection; bias 
neutralisation). 
Little adoption of international 
practices in regulations on loan 
loss recognition (selection; bias 
neutralisation). 
Loan loss was mainly closed to 
the public (selection; bias 
neutralisation). 
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Specifically, those responses to two relationships, stability–change and separation–
integration with market development towards integration, influenced the accounting 
regulation in the way that the accounting system designed under a plan economy was 
strongly criticised as being problematic because it merely attends to the opposition of 
Government control, which is separated from global integration and ignores the other 
half of its responsibility to serve market control. The debate led to the transformation 
of regulation on loan loss recognition at the end of phase 1 towards international 
practices that better inform loan loss to the market. This trend peaked at the end of 
phase 1 and the beginning of phase 2 with the stipulation of Decision 493 and 
Decision 18 as discussed in Chapter 5. This pattern is represented in Figure 6.3 
regarding the transformation process of loan loss recognition. 
 
Figure 6.3: Transformation process of loan loss recognition 
Finally, although the response to the Government control–market control 
contradiction determined how loan loss recognition was regulated in phase 1, 
significant time elapsed before that effect could be observed. It was found that the 
accounting regulation was not transformed much until the end of phase 1 despite the 
perceptual transformation of Government control that occurred at the beginning of 
phase 1 when the Renovation policy was initiated in 1986. The style of decision-
making by consensus and the naïve dialectical thinking can explain this long time 
gap. 
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6.3 Phase 2: Contradictions and Responses 
Several implications can be provided from the data analysis above. First, the 
communications in phase 2 were mainly about the two contradictions of Government 
control–market control and separation–integration. The features of those two 
contradictions were described in Table 6.1 based on the discussion that follows. 
Second, the change in the definition of Government control opposition led to the 
emergence of the separation–integration contradiction and determined the response to 
it. Particularly, to maintain the Government control in a market economy with 
multiple business sectors competing with other, the Government control was 
redefined as the leading role of the state economy sector, the state-controlled 
ownership structure based on half-equitisation and the regulation targets based on 
simple accounting figures. 
Through that response, the Government intended to fulfil both oppositions, but only 
partially. Particularly, the Government sacrificed a portion of its monopoly control to 
accept the existence of multiple business sectors competing with each other under 
market control. Yet, the market control was also diluted by the dominance of the 
state economy sector and by the Government’s close control via regulation targets or 
as the major shareholder. This response was made in a similar way as the 
neutralisation response found by Baxter (1990) in interpersonal communication. The 
neutralisation style is defined as follows: ‘a portion of each contrasting condition is 
perceived to be “sacrificed” to compromise the contradiction’ (Baxter 1990). 
That perceptual transformation triggered the contradiction of separation–integration 
in regulating loan loss recognition. It is the struggle between local needs and 
international requirements in loan loss recognition for global integration. While the 
Government desired to have its separate regulation to support the state economy 
sector to become the market leader, it needed to set regulation adopting international 
practices to serve market control development that was required for integration. 
Government responded to the contradiction of separation–integration by adopting 
international standards for building regulation on loan loss recognition (integration), 
yet invalidating or setting a separate regulation set for state-related lending activities 
(separation) so that the bank management could understate loan loss related to those 
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debts. The understatement of loan loss helped to hide the inefficiency in lending to 
state economy sector, thus facilitating the sector in accessing capital resources to 
become the leading sector for maintaining the Government control as per the 
Government’s expectation, although the sector grew just in size with low efficiency. 
Hence, it can be concluded that the type of response to the Government control–
market control determined the presence of the separation–integration contradiction 
and the type of reactions to it in phase 2. This relationship between the two 
contradictions was reflected in Figure 6.1. 
Then, the redefinition of Government control and its impact on the separation–
integration contradiction, in turn, determined the market control opposition in phase 
2. In particular, with the response above to the separation–integration contradiction, 
the Government took part in the market function in capital allocation related to the 
lending to the state economy sector. Hence, the lending activities were segmented 
into two separate areas for different treatments that separately meet the national 
needs and the global integration requirements. Through that response, the state 
selected to maintain its control over critical lending activities to SOEs and state 
projects and gave up its control over the others to the market. Therefore, the response 
was not as extreme as the response style at the beginning of phase 1 in which the 
Government control was dominant over the market control. Instead, both the 
Government and market directly participated in capital allocation in separate areas in 
phase 2. 
This reaction was similar to the topical separation or vacillation style found by 
Baxter (1990) and Tracy (2004) in interpersonal communication. According to 
Baxter (1990), through the separation response, people temporarily separated 
contrasting elements in different activity domains into ‘those for which one 
contrasting pole is appropriate and those for which the other contrasting pole is 
appropriate’ (p. 72). Tracy (2004) described that topical vacillation means that people 
switch between opposing organisational norms depending on the topic. The 
contradictions and their related responses in phase 2 were summarised in Table 6.1. 
Third, the responses above to both contradictions denied both oppositions of the 
contradictions. In detail, the responses above caused a reduction in demand and 
supply of external quality information. Specifically, although the Government was 
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the main investor, it had low demand for such information because the state-
controlled ownership structure gave the Government a private channel to collect 
necessary information for assessing the firm performance on multiple objectives 
rather than profit only as the main objective of external financial reports. In addition, 
the privileges offered to the state economy sector, in which the understatement of its 
loan loss is an example, caused the public to pay more attention to a company’s 
political background rather than its financial health. It caused a low motivation for 
commercial banks to supply high-quality information to public. The banks even 
invalidated regulation, taking advantage of the cross-shareholding created by half-
equitisation to meet the regulation targets based on simple accounting figures. 
As the result of the invalidation by both the Government and commercial banks, the 
regulations were disabled for market control in lending activities related to the state 
as well as nonstate sectors. It made loan loss communication in Vietnam completely 
different from international practices and out of market control. The Government 
also lost its control over loan loss communication related to the state economic sector 
when it allowed bank managements to understate the loan loss incurred in this sector 
as discussed in third inference. In short, loan loss communication moved far from 
market control when the regulation was invalidated. Despite the fact that the 
invalidation was made to enhance Government control, loan loss communication 
gradually went out of the control of both the Government and market at the end of 
phase 2. This progression was illustrated in the graph in Figure 6.3. 
The graph in phase 2 includes two segments. In the first part of phase 2, the 
communication was gradually being shifted to assist the Government control by 
invalidating the current regulations for understating the loss disclosed related to state 
lending activities. Therefore, the lending activities were separated into two areas for 
loan loss communication under the control of Government and market, respectively. 
That shift resulted from the new identification of Government control as the leading 
role of state economy, the half-equitisation and regulation targets based on simple 
accounting figures. 
In the second part of phase 2, that perceptual transformation of Government control 
not only limited the market control over the state-related debts as mentioned above 
but also misled the market control as regards the loss communication of other debts 
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by reducing demand and supply of external quality information from commercial 
banks. Hence, loan loss communication escaped from both Government and market 
control, reaching an uncontrolled state and causing such communication to be a 
controversial issue. The uncontrolled status reached the peak at the end of phase 2 
with the acceleration of NPLs. At this time, the loan loss communication was most 
contentious. 
This finding proves the existence of the interdependence between the Government 
and market control oppositions and that overlooking their interdependence by 
neutralising them in response to their dialectical contradiction can weaken both 
oppositions. The same result was also found for the contradiction between separation 
and integration oppositions when separating them in response. Finally, the local need 
of maintaining the Government control (separation) and the need to fulfill global 
integration requirements (integration) were both not met because of the regulation 
invalidation. 
That sequence is another evidence confirming the proposition that the 
Government/bank regulators can adopt the neutralisation and separation styles with 
the same weakness illustrated by Baxter (1990) that ‘the parties seek to deny the 
interdependence of the contrasting elements by “upcoupling” or separating them’ (p. 
129). Those neutralisation and separation responses, which ignored the 
interdependence between the two oppositions leading to the noncontrolling of loan 
loss recognition, were evidences for the naïve dialecticism as proposed. 
Fourth, it can be inferred from the sequence of the events above that the ‘separation’ 
in loan loss recognition in practices by invalidating the regulations (Decision 493 and 
Decision 18) led to the ‘disinformation’ in loan loss communication to not only the 
market but also the Government, thus distorting capital allocation. Finally, it led to 
the economy’s ‘instability’ with the acceleration of NPLs at the end of phase 2 
because the lending activities were out of control of both the market and 
Government. That progression was summarised in Figure 6.2 as the causal link of 
Separation → Disinformation → Instability. 
Finally, only the two contradictions of Government control–market control and 
separation–integration emerged in the loan loss communication in phase 2 as 
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summarised in Table 6.1. The reason can be that the transformation policy with the 
selection of change for obtaining economic stability was determined already in phase 
1. The change in phase 2 was an inheritance without debate from that determination. 
Similarly, transparency or not, as the result of that change determined in phase 1, was 
not a controversial issue in phase 2. The disinformation and confusion in loan loss 
communication at the end of phase 2 was the consequence of how the two 
contradictions of Government control–market control and separation–integration 
were responded to, rather than a response to the contradiction of information–
disinformation. 
6.4 Phase 3: Contradictions and Responses 
According to the analysis in Chapter 5, the communications in phase 3 were related 
to all the four contradictions, namely, Government control–market control, stability–
change, separation–integration and information–disinformation, which were 
underlying all the four issues, that is, politics, transformation, internationalisation and 
transparency. 
The information–disinformation of loan loss was found prevalent in the 
communication of loan loss in phase 3, but indeed, the contradiction of Government 
control–market control was at the bottom of that phenomenon. The Government 
control was threatened because of the NPLs information that might lead to instability. 
To maintain the Government control, the regulation on phase 3 was highlighted with 
its emphasis on the stability objective, leading to the disinformation of loan loss, and 
then placing the regulation in separation from the world as the result. This pattern 
was presented in Figure 6.2 as the causal link of Stability → Disinformation → 
Separation. The proposed pattern of phase 4 is discussed in the next chapter in 
Section 7.3.1. In that way, the process of Government control–market control 
contradiction was found underlying the emergence of the other three contradictions. 
This relationship was reflected in Figure 6.1. 
Facing that difficulty, the Government control was found being redefined as 
maintaining the economic and then political stability rather than improving the 
transparency of loan loss. Thus, loan loss recognition was allowed to be delayed by 
postponing the implementation of debts classification by following CIC standards. 
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By delaying loan loss recognition, the Government tried to resist that economic 
transformation to maintain temporal stability, which was considered necessary for 
ensuring the Government control. That effort triggered the contradictions in 
transformation, internationalisation and transparency of loan loss communication. 
That response is similar to the selection response style found by Tracy (2004), which 
is ‘selecting one norm to uphold in favour of another’ (p. 129). That style was 
defined by Baxter (1990) as ‘making one condition or pole dominant to the exclusion 
of the other condition’ (p. 72). Specifically, the stability–change contradiction was 
responded to by selecting stability opposition. For reaching that objective, the 
information–disinformation contradiction was reacted to by selecting the 
disinformation opposition. Therefore, the contradiction of stability–change was in the 
middle of the causal link between the Government control–market control 
contradiction and the information–disinformation contradiction because the 
Government considered the stability a survival means for ensuring its control 
temporarily in the economic depression in phase 3. Hence, the regulation on loan loss 
recognition implemented in this period moved further away from international 
standards. In other words, the separation–integration contradiction was responded to 
by selecting separation rather than integration for saving the Government control. 
These contradictions and the related responses were summarised in Table 6.1 based 
on the following discussions. 
That extreme response of selection was problematic, because the Government just 
attended to one set of the contradictions and ignored half of its responsibilities, 
especially when Vietnam had to show its will to adopt international standards in loan 
loss disclosure. Such adoption was essential to maintain the financial support and 
trading from the global market for saving the country from financial depression, 
which was essential for maintaining the Government control as well. In addition, the 
Government control on loan loss recognition could not be implemented when 
commercial banks still hid their loan loss from the Government. 
The VAMC response is similar to the neutralisation response found by Baxter (1990) 
in interpersonal communication in which a portion of each opposition was replied to. 
However, whereas both oppositions of the contradictions were responded to partly 
under the VAMC technique, the oppositions of Government control, stability, 
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disinformation and separation were responded to much more than the oppositions of 
market control, change, information and integration in several ways. 
First, it showed the public, especially the international institutions, the Government’s 
efforts to be more transparent in loan loss communication and significantly helped 
reduce the NPL ratio in Vietnam, although such reduction was only in the books. The 
government interpreted the adoption of international standards in loan loss 
communication as the disclosure of NPLs via the VAMC special bonds. By taking 
that action, the Government could improve its symbolic capital to call for financial 
aid and improve its trade with the world to recover from the financial depression. 
Second, with the VAMC mechanism, the loan loss provision for NPLs was 
continuously delayed with the extension of the deadline for making full provision, 
thus helping to avoid bankruptcies and reduce economic, social and political 
instability. Third, the extension implied that banks would delay the sale of NPLs so 
that they could record the loss gradually, rather than in full, if they were to sell NPLs 
to the market. Hence, the delay of loan loss recognition can help the Government 
temporarily avoid facing its responsibility related to the loss incurred in selling NPLs 
to the market. Finally, the Government now can control NPLs sold to VAMC with 
related information for value assessment; however, that information is yet to be 
transparently disclosed for market control. In general, the Government rather than the 
market has gradually controlled the loan loss recognition and communication more 
because this information was significantly closed to the market. This pattern was 
symbolised in Figure 6.3. The graph of phase 4 is discussed in the next chapter in 
Section 7.3.1. 
Therefore, the VAMC technique can also be considered bias neutralisation rather 
than fair neutralisation. The bias neutralisation is a response technique in which both 
oppositions are responded to but not at the same level. In VAMC technique, it was 
found that bias neutralisation was applied as a complement to a selection response to 
compromise the contradiction when it was too fierce to respond to by only selection. 
This classification was summarised in Table 6.1. 
The frequent changes of the timeline for loan loss disclosure can also be interpreted 
as evidence that the Government was passive and embarrassed in dealing with the 
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contradiction. The choice of selection response, which was problematic as discussed 
above, proved that the Government could not identify another, better solution, 
whereas maintaining the Government control was considered essential. 
6.5 Synthesis of Three Phases 
Over three phases, all four contradictions of Government control–market control, 
stability–change, separation–integration and information–disinformation were found 
underlying the four issues of politics, transformation, internationalisation and 
transparency, respectively. The Government control–market control contradiction 
was found prevalent over three phases. The other three contradictions were not 
equally prevalent across the phases of loan loss recognition and communication. The 
Government control–market control determined which contradictions were critical 
and how they were responded to in each phase. The remaining contradictions were 
the various components in the causal relationship. 
This finding is consistent with Stohl and Cheney’s (2001) claim when they examined 
organisations from a dialectical view that the organisation transformation is typically 
affected by multiple related contradictions. According to Benson (1977), some 
contradictions may be more decisive than others in determining the fundamental 
character of an organisation. Those critical contradictions ‘define limits which must 
be exceeded to transform an organization’ (Benson 1977, p. 16). 
In this study, the Government control–market control contradiction, being the key 
one, was found to determine the occurrence of the others. This unique feature of the 
Vietnamese context makes its issue different from the ones of the other countries and 
thus limits its learning from other countries. Specifically, it was found from the 
discussion over three phases above that the Government control opposition was often 
occurring concurrently with stability, disinformation and separation. The reason can 
be that Government control opposition was more likely sustained by an improvement 
of stability, disinformation and separation. The economic stability was found to be a 
requisite to maintain public confidence in the Government control ability. In 
addition, the disinformation to the public helped the Government hide the 
inefficiency in its control, which was thus the opposite of the requirements for global 
integration. 
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In addition, the market control opposition was found to be correlated with the 
oppositions of change, disinformation and integration. That explanation for that 
relationship is that the market control was more likely enhanced by an improvement 
in change, information and integration. This conclusion was confirmed over the three 
phases in which the market control was formed and developed when the Government 
changed its political and economic policy towards market economy following global 
integration for which sufficient public information of loan loss was a requirement. 
The classification of the two groups above merely shows the contrast between the 
two oppositions of government and market control rather than their unification. 
In their unification, it was also found that the Government/bank regulators could 
fluctuate between responsiveness to these opposing demands in the dynamic 
interplay of those oppositions depending on how the Government defined its control. 
In particular, change opposition was also found to be concurrent with the oppositions 
of Government control and stability in phase 1 because the Government considered 
change a must for maintaining economic stability and then ensuring the Government 
control. 
The facts above show that the dialectic of Government control–market control is the 
primary contradiction because it is likely that the dynamic interplay of the three 
others aimed to solve the Government control–market control dialectic. Hence, the 
right accounting for loan loss recognition in the Vietnamese context should be the 
one that can unify both oppositions of Government and market control. This 
conclusion is consistent with Dixon’s (2000) claim that ‘In Vietnam, the 
development of elements of the market economy and integration into the global 
system are taking place under the auspices of a single-party state that continues to 
affirm its commitment to state control over the economy’ (Cited in Phuong NC & 
Richard 2011, p. 708). It also confirmed Benson’s (1977) claim that ‘contradictions 
may be generated also in the larger society and imposed upon the organization’ (p. 
15). 
The conflict of Government and market control is a dialectical contradiction because 
it is based on the ongoing process of constant push–pull between the two 
contradictory elements of Government control-market control. The interplay of those 
two oppositions was continuous over three phases and the Government did not make 
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a choice in a one-shot encounter in which the Government would ‘weigh pros and 
cons and make trade-off’ (Erbert 2000). Over time, the very meaning of the 
Government control opposition is likely to shift depending on bank regulators’ 
perception. That perception transformation was found to be at the bottom of how 
loan loss recognition was regulated and communicated in Vietnam. 
Hence, overall, the perception of the Government/bank regulators had a critical role 
in determining the responses to contradictions in the regulation of loan loss 
recognition. This finding is an illustration of Benson’s (1977) assertion that ‘the 
construction of the organization depends upon the power of various participants, that 
is, their capacity to control the direction of events’ (p. 7). In the specific context of 
Vietnam, the Government was found to be in dominant positions (Nguyen Loc, 
Hooper & Sinclair 2013), thus ‘permitting the imposition and enforcement’ of its 
conceptions of reality (Benson 1977, p. 7). Others, especially local bank 
managements and creditors must act in conformity with the Government’s 
definitions, which is consistent with Nguyen Loc, Hooper and Sinclair’s (2013) claim 
about the habitus compliance of Vietnamese accountants and bookkeepers. With its 
dominant power, the Government can design the regulation on loan loss recognition 
as an instrument for serving its specific purposes. 
From the discussion of three phases, the Government’s responses to the 
contradictions in regulating loan loss recognition were found to occur in the similar 
way as different response styles stated in interpersonal communication by Baxter 
(1990) and Tracy (2004). Notably, the neutralisation was found in a bias form in 
phase 3. That type of neutralisation has not been mentioned in interpersonal 
communication. 
It was also found, as Nonaka and Toyama (2002) claimed, that human agents and 
their environment continuously define and reproduce each other. In the social context 
of instability and monopoly control at the beginning of phase 1, the 
Government/bank regulators adopted a response that produced the new context of 
global integration and market development that limited the Government control over 
capital allocation. As the result, within that produced social context, the Government 
redefined its control over capital allocation by allowing the understatement of loan 
loss in the state-related loans. By doing so, the Government reproduced the new 
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context with the segregation of control between state and nonstate-related debts, 
which then replaced the Government control of loan loss communication as an 
emergent of the accounting manipulation in loan loss recognition. It means that the 
segregation of control over loan loss recognition, which was accepted by the 
Government during phase 2, was then undermined by ongoing acts of the new social 
context in which the regulation was invalidated in both of state and nonstate sectors. 
The Government adopted that redefinition based on its peculiar priorities but then it 
generated another problem that the Government lost its control over loan loss 
communication as found in phase 2. Hence, ‘even powerful actors may be unable to 
maintain an orderly, rationalized system of social relations in the face of this ongoing 
process’ (p. 4) as claimed by Benson (1977). 
Thus, the transformation of loan loss communication was a semi-autonomous process 
rather than ‘a result of goal pursuit and/or need fulfillment’ (p. 2) as claimed by 
Benson (1977) about the production of organisational arrangements from a 
dialectical view. The process was found to be most autonomous in the second part of 
phase 2 as described in Figure 6.3. Because a transformation process is unplanned 
and not coherent at some points of time, Benson (1977) believed that social 
arrangements are ‘complex, interrelated wholes with partially autonomous parts’ (p. 
4). In this study, despite the efforts of the Government to drive the process, some 
elements emerged beyond its reach of rationalisation. It explained Ezzamel and 
Xiao’s (2011) claim that the accounting change process in transitional countries 
would not necessarily be smooth but be ‘non-linear, dynamic and problematic’ (p. 
635). Thus, it also clarifies why loan loss communication has been a controversial 
issue in Vietnam thus far. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the findings and used diagrams to link the various hypotheses 
for determining emerging patterns by adopting the dialectical theoretical framework 
developed in Chapter 2. It was found that to maintain its control, the Government 
desires to develop a free market and increase global integration, which both require 
transparency in loan loss recognition. Underlying those policies are four main 
contradictions: government control–market control, stability–change, separation–
integration and disinformation–information. The Government/regulators responded 
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to those contradictions mainly by adopting separation and neutralisation styles, thus 
being inconsistent and haphazard and denying the interdependence between the two 
oppositions. It led to the delay and contention in communication of loan loss. Next, 
all the chapters are combined and summarised in the Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
This archival study seeks to contribute to the existing literature on bank loan loss by 
examining why loan loss communication is a contentious issue in the specific context 
of Vietnam. For that purpose, the communication related to regulating loan loss 
recognition in the Vietnamese context of quasi-market towards global integration 
was examined from a dialectical view. The study adopted an interpretive paradigm 
and dialectical theory. The content analysis was conducted on the data collected from 
the public communication on regulating loan loss recognition in Vietnam. The next 
section presents the key findings of the study. Section 7.2 summarises and 
synthesises the key findings from the previous two chapters. Section 7.3 sets out the 
significance of the study in both the literature and practice. Section 7.4 states the 
limitation of the research. Section 7.5 offers suggestions for future research, while 
Section 7.6 provides a conclusion. 
7.2 Key Findings 
This study examines ongoing regulation on loan loss recognition in Vietnam to 
understand why loan loss recognition is a contentious issue in the Vietnamese 
context. The research found that the contention in loan loss recognition in the 
Vietnamese context resulted from the dynamic interplay between the oppositions of 
four related dialectics, namely, Government control–market control, stability–
change, separation–integration and disinformation–information. 
Particularly, the dialectic of Government control–market control underlines the 
Vietnamese politics issue. Banks in Vietnam exist in a world of two colliding 
forces—government control and market control—that is called the market economy 
with socialism orientation. The mixture of government control and market control 
opposites in Vietnam serves the need of free market development while maintaining 
the monopoly control of the Government in capital allocation. 
The dialectic of stability–change was found in the transformation issue. Bank 
regulators have to change regulation to respond to the Doi Moi policy towards the 
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development of market economy with socialism orientation. Yet, the stability of 
banking industry is one of the requisites for the existence of the Government control. 
The dialectic of separation–integration arose from the global integration issue in 
which bank regulators desire to integrate regulation with global standards to attract 
foreign capital investment or trade with international markets to achieve the local 
market economy development objective. Simultaneously, the bank regulators tend to 
resist the adoption of international standards to protect domestic identities of which 
the maintenance of government control is critical. These colliding forces are external 
to the Vietnamese economy in the situation in which the domestic drivers compete 
with the international drivers for dominating the economy. 
The dialectic of disinformation–information arose from the transparency issue. Bank 
regulators desire to delay loan loss recognition to hide the weak performance of their 
policy and maintain the economic and then political stability that is critical for the 
existence of Government control. Yet, transparency of loan loss recognition is a 
requisite for market development and global integration. 
In general, the dialectic of Government control–market control is the primary 
contradiction because it is likely that the dynamic interplay of the three others aimed 
to solve the Government control–market control dialectic. Government control is 
more likely sustained by an improvement of stability, separation and closeness. At 
the same time, the market control is often enhanced by an improvement in change, 
integration and information. 
The dialectical contradiction of government and market control was prevalent across 
three phases of regulating loan loss recognition. Over time, the very meaning of the 
regulations on loan loss recognition and the disclosed loan loss are likely to shift 
depending on how the Government/bank regulators respond to the contradiction of 
Government/market control. 
The research found that the contention in loan loss communication was mainly 
resulting from the separation and neutralisation responses to the contradiction of 
Government and market control. Those response styles ignored the interdependence 
between the two oppositions, leading to the loss of control of loan loss 
communication for both the Government and market. The insufficient knowledge of 
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international practices in loan loss recognition and naïve dialecticism thinking in 
responding to the related contradictions can explain the selection of separation and 
neutralisation responses. 
7.3 Contributions 
The research makes several theoretical practical and contributions. 
7.3.1 Theoretical contributions 
Thus far, the literature provides a fairly comprehensive understanding of how loan 
loss recognition is regulated in developed countries rather than developing countries. 
We know less about how the regulation, stemming from developed countries, was 
adopted in developing countries. Despite the difficulties in adopting a private 
capitalist accounting system in the specific context of Vietnam raised by Chu (2004) 
and Phuong NC and Richard (2011), no empirical research was conducted about this 
issue until date. Specifically, the current trends in the literature focused on a technical 
perspective while neglecting the political factor that can be the determinant of 
accounting change (Ezzamel & Xiao 2011). This study bridged this gap by providing 
empirical evidence to support the claim of Ezzamel & Xiao (2011). A careful search 
of the literature has indicated that this study represents the only research that 
provides rich information on how the Vietnamese banking system adopts a private 
capitalist accounting and banking system for recognising loan loss in the context of a 
state-dominated market. 
Adopting the dialectical theory in examining communication on regulating loan loss 
recognition, this study bridges the literature gap by showing that the transformation 
of loan loss recognition and communication is a partially autonomous process, rather 
than fixed and permanent, with arbitrary patterns being one among many possibilities 
depending on the perceptions of the Government and other parties in the economic 
and political environment (see Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3). That finding strengthens 
Benson’s (1977) assertion about the analytical power of the dialectical theory: 
Dialectical analysis contributes to this process in part by dereifying established 
social patterns and structures—points out their arbitrary character, undermines 
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their sense of inevitability, uncovers the contradictions and limits of the present 
order, and reveals the mechanisms of transformation. (p. 6) 
The Government control versus market control was the fundamental contradiction 
that fed into that social construction–production process over three phases by 
providing continuous conflicts, shaping the Government’s perception and actions to 
change the environment, defining the limit of the transformation and producing the 
crisis at the end of phase 2, which enhanced possibilities for reconstruction in phase 
3. 
From this view, the transformation of loan loss recognition and communication was 
the temporary outcome of not only the interpretation and customisation of 
international standards but also the social construction emergence of the semi-
autonomous ongoing interaction between the Government control and market control 
oppositions. Therefore, attempts to regulate tightly the transformation process of loan 
loss recognition and communication through authoritative direction towards 
international standards or ideological manipulation were only partly successful. 
The connection between the regulations produced by the Government’s acting within 
a limited context on the basis of its practical concerns and the social context created 
new concepts of regulation on loan loss recognition for the Government. Those new 
concepts reorganised the Government’s perception about regulation. Those 
interaction processes found in this study provided an illustration for knowledge-
creating activities as in Nonaka and Toyama’s study (2003), which claimed that 
humans or agents and their environment continuously define and reproduce each 
other, synthesising new knowledge. The transformation of regulation over three 
phases presented a series of ‘relative truths’ created via the intertwining in complex 
ways between the Government’s perception and action and its environment. That 
insight is important for policymakers by ‘giving choices that previously were hidden 
by the accepted knowledge, standard practices, and existing concepts’ as claimed by 
Deetz (1982). 
In addition to providing a rich story of loan loss accounting in a developing country 
from a dialectical view, this study is one of the few that have adopted dialectical 
theory for understanding communications between organisations. The study confirms 
that contradictions and responses found in communications between individuals are 
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also found between organisations. It gives the rationale for further adoption of studies 
in communication between individuals in organisations. In addition, a close and wide 
intertwinement exists between the whole (context) and the parts (loan loss 
recognition and communication) that constructed each other. Therefore, 
understanding organisational change from a dialectical view is meaningful for 
understanding the society in whole. 
7.3.2 Practical contributions 
This study provides an understanding of how loan loss was recognised and 
communicated in Vietnam that is valuable for analysing bank financial statements 
disclosed by the Vietnamese banking industry. Loan loss provision regulations and 
bank financial reports in Vietnam should be interpreted and analysed by considering 
the influence of contradictions in loan loss recognition and communication. 
Separation and neutralisation responses were identified as the root cause of the 
Government’s failure in loan loss recognition and communication in the past. It is 
because those response styles denied the interdependence between the two 
oppositions of contradiction. Responding partly or separately to each opposition not 
only missed the complementary between them but also destroyed the effects of each 
response. It led to the loss of control of both the Government and market over loan 
loss recognition and communication as found most obviously in phases 2 and 3. In 
turn, the insufficiency of regulating loan loss recognition and communicating loan 
loss drove capital to be allocated to inefficient and risky projects in Vietnam. This 
inference partly addressed the observation made by some experts from World Bank: 
The world includes developed countries, developing countries and undeveloped 
countries, but Vietnam is perhaps the most distinctive model. It’s the country that 
refuses to develop! So much, so much ODA has been invested in Vietnam, 
reaching nearly 90 billion USD over 20 years, but so far, it has not developed, it 
just might be... [it] refused to develop! (Hai Chau 2015; translated by the author) 
Vietnam ‘refused to develop’ because the Western neoliberal and democratic model 
that supports free market development has been a significant challenge to the reform 
and development in Vietnam where the Government would like to maintain a single-
party rule, high levels of state intervention and significant direct control of 
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production through SOEs. Hence, the change process of loan loss recognition and 
communication has been shaped by the tensions and power relationship between 
government control and market control. It can be under the control of, and serve, the 
Government or market, or even out of control depending on the type of response to 
the contradiction. Therefore, the regulation transformation in loan loss recognition 
was not only the policy choice of accounting but also the sequence of economic and 
political reforms. 
Although bank loan loss recognition is a significant part of bank accounting and 
regulation, it is difficult to regulate in Vietnam because it is full of contradictions in 
practice. The research leads the bank regulators to be aware of those contradictions 
and their influence in regulating loan loss recognition. Learning from the mistakes in 
responding to the Government control–market control contradiction over the three 
phases and their consequences as discussed above, a suggestion can be proposed for 
responding to that contradiction in the next phase (phase 4; see Figure 6.2). To avoid 
those mistakes, the contradiction should be reframed as a complementary dialectic as 
in phase 1 (Figure 6.2) in which both Government control and market control are no 
longer regarded as opposites but as mutually complementary. That change towards 
market control is expected to improve the global integration with more public 
information of loan loss as described in the causal link of Change → Integration → 
Information for phase 4 (Figure 6.2). 
Specifically, the proposed changes are classified into two groups. First, it is 
necessary to reframe the Government-control opposition as indirect control over the 
economy via an effective legal framework rather than direct control. In that model, 
the Government works as the market facilitator rather than a dominant sector in the 
market that distorts the market discipline as found in the previous three phases. For 
that purpose, regulation should be designed by the Government to direct loan loss 
recognition and communication to serve market discipline rather than to implement 
the Government policy as before. 
As the result, loan loss recognition and communication would gradually shift to the 
market control as illustrated by the dotted line in Figure 6.3. That model can be 
obtained by limiting the Government’s intervention in bank lending activities (e.g., 
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guarantees for SOEs to borrow from commercial banks), in the credit rating provided 
by CIC and in loan loss provisioning practices in commercial banks. 
The second group of changes aims to strengthen market control opposition that 
should be perceived as a tool to help the Government to control the economy rather 
than a force competing with the Government in dominating the economy. For that 
purpose, in the superstructure of socialism, market control should not be framed as a 
unique characteristic of capitalism, but an economic mechanism for operating an 
economy. In terms of bank lending activities, the separate regulation set for state 
lending should be eliminated so that the state-related lending activities can be 
monitored directly by the market for efficiency. The stipulation of Resolution 42 in 
June 2017 (Appendix 1) to implement a pilot settlement of NPLs via a market 
mechanism rather than storing these in the VAMC warehouse can be considered the 
first significant attempt towards the suggested direction in phase 4. An increase in 
privatisation of SOEs could also increase market control over the efficiency of SOEs 
because a higher percentage of shares issued to the public would break the current 
state-controlled ownership structure that limited the market demand and bank supply 
of information related to loan loss, thus restricting the market control as found in 
phase 2. 
Since those changes are in line with international practices, they would help Vietnam 
progress towards global integration and gain more international business 
opportunities. Overall, by improving economic efficiency, the Government control 
could be enhanced automatically, rather than forcing it by setting the SOE sector as a 
leading sector, which the former general secretary of the Communist Party 
considered a system error as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
A suggestion to provide a professional training course to bank regulators is made 
based on the finding that bank regulators have insufficient knowledge of international 
practices in loan loss recognition and lack the skills to respond appropriately to the 
related contradictions. The knowledge of international standards alone is not 
sufficient. It is necessary to acquire and teach knowledge of how to apply those 
standards appropriately in a context of specific contradictions to complement the 
understanding of international standards. 
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For that purpose, a proposed syllabus to improve the professional ability of bank 
regulators in loan loss recognition and communication is presented in Appendix 3. 
This course, ‘Bank loan loss recognition’, is different from a conventional accounting 
course in two ways. First, it approaches loan loss recognition from both accounting 
and regulation views, which are both used by bank regulators in Vietnam. Second, it 
directs the bank regulators to a critical thinking on the contradictions in practices and 
ways in which to respond to these. 
Specifically, within the two first contents (see Appendix 3), the trainees are guided to 
assess both the incurred loss for accounting recording, according to IAS 39 and IFRS 
9, and expected loss for bank regulation objectives, according to the Basel Accords. 
The syllabus integrates both approaches of accounting and regulation in loan loss 
recognition to highlight for bank regulators the differences between those different 
approaches and the need to reconcile them in regulating loan loss recognition and 
communicating loan loss. The literature review chapter provides the theoretical base 
for this training section. The quantitative ability in loan loss measurement is 
improved in the third content of credit risk assessment from both accounting and 
regulation approaches. 
The fourth content highlights the gap between the Vietnamese and international 
practices to present the rationale for examining the contradictions within loan loss 
recognition in the last content. In this content, the trainees are required to consider 
how to respond to the emerged contradictions to manage the gap issue. This 
requirement is made based on Tracy’s (2004) assertion that employees can react to 
contradiction in various ways that have various organisational effects. Therefore, this 
course is expected to help the trainees in being aware of the contradictions in loan 
loss recognition, and actively and creatively respond to them to improve their 
working performance. Several types of responses to a contradiction are also 
introduced in this content to put an idea into the trainees’ head for their 
brainstorming session about creative responses to a specific contradiction. Chapter 3 
of this research provides the necessary knowledge of dialectical contradictions and 
responses for this training section. 
Those contents will be delivered mainly through interactions between trainers and 
trainees in lectures and discussions that guide trainees to in-depth thinking on the 
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differences in how loan loss recognition is regulated and communicated in the 
specific context of Vietnam compared with international practices. Adopting a 
dialectical view, the trainers would lead trainees to recognise the contradictions 
underlying those differences and motivate them to brainstorm alternative responses 
to those contradictions and their consequences on adopting various types of 
responses discussed in this thesis. The analysis in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide 
suggestions for the application process from a dialectical view. 
This learning and teaching strategy would enable trainees to improve their 
knowledge of how to act appropriately in a variety of situations rather than simply 
apply the knowledge of international practices in loan loss recognition. From this 
approach, the international practices ‘must be brought to speak again’ (Deetz 1982, p. 
146) in relevance to a new context with a creation of new concepts rather than just a 
straightforward adoption. ‘Market economy with socialism orientation’ and ‘VAMC 
mechanism’ are typical examples of new concepts created in the Vietnamese-specific 
context. Therefore, that strategy is expected to help in developing the students’ 
problem-solving skills in facing multiple contradictions in regulating loan loss 
recognition and communicating loan loss in the specific context of Vietnam. 
In terms of learning outcomes following the learning and teaching strategy described 
above, upon completion of this course, the trainees are expected to not only 
understand the international standards related to loan loss recognition and how to 
assess credit risk from different perspectives, but also to compare and contrast to 
recognise the gap between the Vietnamese regulation and international practices. In a 
higher level, the trainees would be able to identify the contradictions underlying the 
gap and recommend how to respond to them. Finally, it is critical that the trainees 
comprehend how to recognise and communicate loan loss by considering its 
underlying contradictions to avoid contention. 
With that specialised knowledge in both accounting and quantitative finance, the 
trainees deserve a dual major certificate in accountancy and quantitative finance. For 
reaching those learning outcomes, the trainees are required to read a variety of 
learning resources, including not only the technical knowledge of international and 
Vietnamese standards in loan loss recognition, but also the literature related to bank 
loan loss and dialectical theory. 
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Since this is a specialist subject and a professional development issue, this course 
should be treated as an advance module in the major of accounting and finance that 
requires trainees to have knowledge of financial accounting and reporting as well as 
quantitative finance. The dual background is rather weak in Vietnamese universities, 
especially the education of quantitative finance (Tran Vu Duc 2014a). Currently, 
banks and companies in Vietnam have utilised finance personnel, who do not study 
mathematics, or mathematics personnel, who do not have knowledge of finance, to 
solve quantitative finance issues (Tran Vu Duc 2014b). Therefore, this syllabus 
should be taught at present as a short course for bank staff and bank regulators who 
have been trained further after university for both accounting and quantitative finance 
background rather than to current university students. 
The implementation of this syllabus can have a significant implication in Vietnam 
because the lack of people skilled in both finance and mathematics is problematic for 
a variety of bank activities, such as bank lending, risk analysis, balance sheet 
management and product development (Tran Vu Duc 2014b). This can lead to poor 
professionalism and low efficiency in operation because much of those analyses are 
both mathematical and finance based. The problem will be more serious when banks 
develop risk management strategies for implementing Basel II (VnEconomy 2016a) 
that needs labour with high-level skills in both mathematics and finance. All banks 
have indicated that the lack of human resources, especially in risk assessment, is one 
of the challenges (Nguyen Van Tho & Nguyen Ngoc Linh 2015). In addition, the 
international standards related to loan loss recognition (e.g., IAS 39, IFRS 9, Basel 
Accords) have not yet been commonly adopted in Vietnam probably because they are 
complex and require specialised knowledge of financial instruments. The limited 
competencies and the language barrier of Vietnamese experts and staff are major 
challenges for Vietnam in adopting international standards (Nguyen Loc 2009). 
Especially, in spite of receiving advice on numerous occasions from foreign 
consultants, the adoption of international standards has been challenging for 
Vietnamese experts and staff because foreign consultants do not understand the 
Vietnamese local context (Nguyen Loc 2009), whereas the underlying contradictions 
make Vietnam become a unique case with contingencies affecting its bank loan loss 
recognition. From this view, the syllabus can be not only necessary for local experts 
and staff but also benefit foreign consultants and foreign institutions (e.g., World 
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Bank and IMF) in understanding the limits of the Vietnamese social structure and 
purposely rearrange it, thus improving the feasibility of their advice for Vietnam. 
Benson (1977) believed that ‘consciousness of these limits may permit the ultimate 
of the limits’ (p. 5) or accept the limits at their basic or minimum level. Considering 
that suggestion, with the joining of external parties, this syllabus will be a call for 
more and wider participation and free speech not subject to the fear of reprisal’ 
(Deetz 1982, p. 140) that can prevent the Vietnamese Government from 
disinformation of bank loan loss to the market. 
For example, foreign institutions can temporarily accept the Government’s support to 
SOEs despite the fact that it can distort free market competition because it is 
currently considered the ultimate means for the Government to maintain its control, 
provided that the support is sufficiently disclosed to the market for improving 
transparency, which is the critical condition for healthy development of market 
disciplines. According to (Deetz 1982), Individual illusions cannot be overcome 
without removing conditions which make them necessary’ (p. 140). From this view, 
it can be impossible for the Vietnamese Government to publish its support to SOEs if 
that action is criticised by foreign institutions, such as World Bank or IMF, who 
currently provide financial and technical aid to Vietnam. 
As the Government and foreign institutions become conscious of contradictions and 
act to overcome them, they can rationally overcome the tensions in loan loss 
recognition and communication in Vietnam, thus being more transparent with earlier 
loan loss recognition, and then can avoid the unexpected acceleration of loan loss 
that amplified the credit crisis as found in phase 3. 
7.4 Limitations 
The research was conducted with several difficulties and challenges. The complexity 
of regulating bank loan loss recognition in nature is the most challenging feature. 
Acknowledging that feature, the researcher attempted to conduct the research with a 
certain focus on content. That is the study did not attempt to explain the cause–effect 
relationships in loan loss communication in Vietnam or test a hypothesis. Adopting a 
dialectical view, the valuable contribution of this research is a logical explanation of 
the changes in loan loss recognition and communication from the view of dialectic 
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interplay. The reliability of explanation was obtained by triangulating multiple data, 
and reinforcing these with information on the social and a study of the current 
literature to acquire useful knowledge in rendering relationships intelligible (Turner 
1986). 
It seems that the major limitation of the study is that the investigation is restricted to 
the case of banking industry in Vietnam. Therefore, the findings will not be 
representative for the wider population and cannot be generalised to all banking 
industries in emerging countries. However, this feature cannot be considered a 
limitation anymore from the dialectical view that believes, ‘The absolute truth may 
never be found. It may never exist’ (Nonaka & Toyama 2003, p. 10). The findings in 
this study show one of the series of ‘relative truths’ that helps to ‘approach the 
elusive “absolute truth”’ (Nonaka & Toyama 2003, p. 10). Specifically, the findings 
provide a rich understanding about the meaning of ‘right’ loan loss accounting in the 
specific context of Vietnam. Even in the same country, that meaning has shifted in 
various ways depending on the interactions between the Government/bank regulators 
and the others. That phenomenon has been also observed in other countries as 
discussed in Section 2.3. Therefore, although the various meanings of loan loss 
accounting found in Vietnam can be different from that in other countries, this study 
raises the awareness of the importance of the local context in the application of 
international standards in accounting and banking regulation as well as the need of 
dialectical theory application in understanding that context. 
7.5 Future Research 
The study can be extended by examining the ways in which commercial bank 
managements respond to the contradiction in loan loss recognition. Those studies 
would offer significant contributions to understanding loan loss recognition from the 
perspectives of bank regulators as well as bank managements. 
Since the contradiction of free market and Government control dominates the 
Vietnamese economy and banking industry, the dialectical theory can be adopted to 
understand the changes and communications within other areas of banking activities 
(e.g., building internal credit rating systems and lending policies). In particular, the 
heightened influence of global integration and free market factors when Vietnam 
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joins the Trans-Pacific Partnership commitment (TPP) in 2018 (VnEconomy 2016b) 
may create further struggles and efforts to cope with ongoing changes in accounting 
and banking regulation. TPP requires more transparency (e.g., publishing regulations 
in both Vietnamese and English) and no discrimination between business sectors, 
which would reduce the Government control factor, especially in favour of the SOE 
sector (Phan Minh Ngoc 2015). Therefore, research on this contradiction will be 
valuable for the policy makers and bankers to prepare for TPP in Vietnam. 
In addition, since the different responses styles to contradictions in interpersonal 
communication were also found in the communication between organisations in this 
research, it calls for further studies for verifying whether the responses to 
contradictions in interpersonal communication can be applied in organisational areas. 
If that proposition is true, it is promising that the abundance of dialectical research in 
the current literature on interpersonal communication can be extended to 
organisation. 
7.6 Conclusion of the Study 
The study investigates the communication in regulating loan loss recognition to 
answer the question why loan loss communication is a contentious issue in Vietnam. 
The research begins with an in-depth review of the literature on regulating loan loss 
recognition and contradictions in adopting the international standards within the 
specific context of developing countries. The theoretical framework is derived from 
the dialectical theory. Next, the research presents the results of a qualitative analysis 
of communication on regulating loan loss recognition in Vietnam, a transitional and 
emerging market economy, and the insights gained about the communication related 
to regulating loan loss recognition. 
The research finds that loan loss recognition is a contentious issue in Vietnam 
because the contradiction of Government control–market controls is underlying the 
regulation on loan loss recognition in the specific context of Vietnam. The 
Government/bank regulators were more likely to react to the contradictions with 
separation and neutralisation responses. That response style denied the 
interdependence of two oppositions in each contradiction, resulting in the contention 
and delay in communicating loan loss, thus misleading capital allocation in Vietnam. 
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This finding partly addresses the practical question raised by the World Bank experts, 
‘Why has Vietnam refused to develop?’ (Hai Chau 2015; translated by the author) in 
spite of massive capital inflows over 20 years. 
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Appendix 1: Evolution of Regulation in Loan Loss 
Recognition 
 
World Vietnam
Decision 106 09/06/1992 Loan loss provision was required for the first time
Decision 48 06/21/1999 Loan loss provision was treated as an expense
Debts are classified based on overdue status
Restructured debts are not required to reclassify to a 
higher risk level group.
Decision 493 22/04/2005
Bank can select either quantitative methods or qualitative 
method that is based on internal rating system.
The government issued Decision No. 
136/2001/QD-TTg on 17 September, 2001 
approving the overall program on state 
administrative reform, the 2001-2010 period 
Decision 18 25/04/2007
Restructured debts are classified to a higher risk level 
group.
Participated in WTO
Decision 780 23/04/2012
Banks are allowed to delay loan loss recognition, plan to be 
replaced by Circular 02 since 01/06/2014
Debts must be classified group with higher risk extent in 
comparison between quantitative and qualitative methods.
Banks must refer to the result of debts classification 
supplied by Credit Information Center
Circular 12 27/05/2013 Pending Circular 02 from 01/6/2013 to 01/6/2014
Circular 19 06/09/2013
Credit institutions with an NPL of 3% or more will be 
required by the SBV to sell the NPL to VAMC until the 
requirement is met, provision is spread over 5 years.
Circular 09 18/03/2014
Amending and supplementing a number of articles of 
Circular 02 dated 21/01/2013: allow to commercial banks to 
restructure time limit for debt payment and keep intact 
group of debt until 01/04/2015
Economy recovery , Plan to participate in TPP 
in 2014
Circular 08 16/06/2016
Extend the loan loss provision time for VAMC debts for 10 
years rather than 5 years
Resolution 42 21/06/2017
Implement a pilot settlement of bad debts of credit 
institutions
1986 to 
2004
The Renovation policy started since 1986. 
The government issued Decision No. 
136/2001/QD-TTg on 17 September, 2001 
approving the overall program on state 
administrative reform, the 2001-2010 periodDecision 488 27/11/2000
`The 
years of
Regulations* Date Remarks
Impact factors from macro environment
Decision 18 - The amendment, supplement of several articles of the Regulation on the debts classification, provisioning  and use of provisions against credit 
risks in the banking activity of Credit Institutions issued in conjunction with the Decision No. 493/2005/QD-NHNN dated 22 April 2005 of  the Governor of the 
State Bank
2005 to 
2011
The 
issuance 
of Basel II, 
IAS 39
2012 to 
present
Negatively 
impacted 
by Global 
financial 
crisis
Economic downturn, Banking depression, 
Plan to participate in TPP in 2014
Circular 02 21/01/2013
World 
economic 
recovery
Economy recovery
* All these regulations were issued by SBV except Resolution 42 which was issued by the Parliarment.
Decision 106 - Regulation on Setting Up and Use of Reserves in Credit Institutions
Decision 48 - Referring to the Issuance of Regulations on Classifying Assets, Establishing and Using Reserved Funds for Covering Losses Suffered by 
Credit Institutions
Decision 488 - Regulation on the debts classification, provisioning and use of provisions against credit risks in the banking activity of Credit institutions
Decision 493 - Regulation on the debts classification, provisioning and use of provisions against credit risks in the banking activity of Credit institutions
Resolution 42 - Regulation on pilot settlement of bad debts of credit institutions
Decision 780 - Classification of rescheduled loans
Circular 02 - Classification of assets, levels and method of setting up of risk provisions, and use of provisions against credit risks in the banking activity of 
credit institutions, foreign banks’ branches
Circular 12 - Mending a number of articles of the circular no. 02/2013/TT-NHNN dated 21/01/2013 of the governor of the state bank of Vietnam providing on 
classification of assets, levels and method of setting up of risk provisions, and use of provisions against credit risks in the banking activity of credit 
institutions, foreign banks’ branches
Circular 19 - Purchase sale settlement of bad debts Vietnam Asset Management Company
Circular 09 - Regulation on amending and supplementing a number of articles of Circular no. 02/2013/TT-NHNN dated 21/01/2013 of Governor of the State 
Bank providing on classification of assets, levels and method of setting up of risk provisions, and use of provisions against credit risks in the banking 
activity of credit institutions, foreign banks’ branches
Circular 08 - Amending a number of articles of the State Bank Governor’s Circular No. 19/2013/TT-NHNN of September 6, 2013, providing the purchase, sale 
and handling of non-performing loans by VAMC took effect as from 1 August 2016
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Appendix 2: Data Analysis 
(ST: stability, CH: change, SE: separation, IN: integration, DI: disinformation, IF: information, G: government, M: market) 
Speakers Source Statements ST CH SE IN DI IF G M 
PHASE 1 
Phan Le 
(1998a) 
Phan Le, 1998, p. 
18, translated by 
the author 
Accounting must meet the requirements of economic management at both 
macro and micro levels. That is, it must meet the requirements of state 
management and administration of a business, even in a department of a 
business. Accounting implements economic management in terms of not 
only monetary values but also nonmonetary ones, including quantity and 
quality.   Y         Y   
The National 
Assembly 
Article 47 of Law on 
the SBV (SBV) (The 
National Assembly, 
1997b, translated 
by the author)  
SBV runs accounting operations under the chart of accounts and the 
documentary-based system in accordance with legal regulations on 
accounting and statistics.     Y       Y   
The National 
Assembly 
Article 86 of the 
Law on Credit 
Institutions (The 
National Assembly, 
1997a, translated 
by the author )  
Credit institutions shall perform accounting based on the system of accounts 
and financial documents in accordance with the laws on accounting and 
statistics.     Y       Y   
Banker from Da 
Nang 
commercial 
bank 
Ha Cuc, 1998, p. 16, 
translated by the 
author 
We easily see that the accounting system for financial institutions is designed 
very specifically for both financial and management accounting purposes … 
both serving the state management of monetary policy and maintaining 
consistency with the sector’s business activities.      Y       Y   
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Speakers Source Statements ST CH SE IN DI IF G M 
SBV 
SBV, 1992 1407, 
article 1.1, 
translated by the 
author 
10% on net profits is established as ‘special reserves’ for risk prevention. This 
fund was established until reaching 100% of the actual charter capital at the 
time of provisioning.       Y       Y 
Staff of SBV 
 To, 1996, p.11, 
translated by the 
author 
If risk reserve fund is appropriated from the net profit, the bank with no gain 
or loss will have no risk reserve fund.       Y       Y 
Staff of SBV 
 To, 1996, p.12, 
translated by the 
author 
‘The creation of a reserve fund risks need to be counted as an expense’ and 
‘the risk reserve should be seen as a factor for calculating lending interest 
rate.       Y       Y 
Bank 
regulators of 
SBV 
Ba Thanh and Moc 
Mien, 1998, p. 18, 
translated by the 
author Treating loan loss provision as an expense affects tax revenues.     Y       Y   
Bank 
regulators of 
SBV 
Ba Thanh and Moc 
Mien, 1998, p. 18, 
translated by the 
author Banks can use provision to evade taxation. Y      G  
Bank 
regulators of 
SBV 
Ba Thanh and Moc 
Mien, 1998, p. 18, 
translated by the 
author It [treating loan loss provision as an expense] is common in many countries.       Y       Y 
Bank 
regulators of 
SBV 
Ba Thanh and Moc 
Mien, 1998, p. 18, 
translated by the 
author 
The objective of setting up a reserve fund for loan loss is also to ensure a 
bank’s profit reflects its business result.       Y       Y 
203 
Speakers Source Statements ST CH SE IN DI IF G M 
Bank 
regulators of 
SBV 
Ba Thanh and Moc 
Mien, 1998, p. 18, 
translated by the 
author 
In our country, it was claimed that on making provisions, some currently 
profitable banks would turn into loss-making ones. If people say so, it means 
that they were aware of the risk related to the loans that banks issued. If a 
loan was actually believed to be doubtful, then making provision for it is 
necessary; there is no need to wait until the real loss is incurred and 
deducted from interest, affecting business results. Without provisioning, 
business results shown on the balance sheet reflect incorrectly the financial 
position of the bank.       Y       Y 
Banker from 
Agribank 
Vu Minh, 1999, p. 
25, translated by 
the author 
The figure of [current credit loss] was about 300 billion dong, which was at 
least double or triple compared to profit of the whole state banking sector. Y   Y       Y   
Banker from 
Agribank 
Vu Minh, 1999, p. 
25, translated by 
the author 
If all profit is used for provision making, where is the profit to pay tax to 
finance the state budget, to modernise banking technology to catch up with 
the world that is changing hourly and daily and to cover many daily bank 
expenses for ensuring its normal operation?   Y    Y  
Staff of SBV 
Dieu, 1999, p. 9, 
translated by the 
author 
If provision is made exceeding the profit of the current fiscal year, it means 
financial institutions make provision from nothing.       Y  
SBV 
SBV, 1999, article 
10, translated by 
the author Natural disasters, fires, epidemics or state policy changes.   Y    Y  
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Speakers Source Statements ST CH SE IN DI IF G M 
Lecturer of 
Banking 
University  
Pham Phu Quoc, 
2000, p. 32, 
translated by the 
author 
In bank lending activities, credit risk owing to subjective reasons, such as 
customers deliberately not repaying, has the same opportunity to occur as 
credit risk owing to irresistible reasons, such as customers lacking the ability 
to repay. Therefore, we think that even when clients deliberately do not fulfil 
their obligations, banks should reserve the right to cover that risk by loan 
loss provision.       Y       Y 
SBV 
SBV, 1999, article 7, 
translated by the 
author 
The remaining balance of loan loss provision, after deducting the actual loss 
incurred as at 31 December each year, must be reversed to reduce loan loss 
provision expense made during the year.     Y       Y   
Le Thi Thanh 
Nhan 
Le Thi Thanh Nhan, 
2000, translated by 
the author 
Tax authorities are afraid that the stipulation of provision heavily relying on 
subjectiveness will facilitate banks in overstating expenses for tax reduction.   Y    Y  
Staff of SBV 
Dieu, 1999, p. 10, 
translated by the 
author 
It is just as if banks are allowed to establish a reserve for covering credit risk 
but are not permitted to store the reserve. This paradox makes provisioning 
meaningless; if there is no difference between having and not having a 
reserve, the outcome will be the same.       Y       Y 
Le Thi Thanh 
Nhan 
Le Thi Thanh Nhan, 
2000, p. 13, 
translated by the 
author 
Provisions under Decision 48, although termed ‘provision of assets’ in form, 
have, in substance, absolutely no meaning of ‘provision for impairment loss’ 
for representing faithfully the fair value of assets in the financial statement.        Y       Y 
Staff of SBV 
Dieu, 1999, p. 9, 
translated by the 
author 
Such income is likely taking the current financial year profit to make 
provision for credit risk from the previous year. Paradoxically, this will 
increase the financial burden for the operations of the current year.       Y       Y 
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Speakers Source Statements ST CH SE IN DI IF G M 
Le Thi Thanh 
Nhan 
Le Thi Thanh Nhan, 
2000 1402, p. 13, 
14, translated by 
the author 
In our opinion, this [provision under Decision 48] is a very big blank in the 
regulation of the SBV. This issue should be urgently considered... the trend of 
economic integration with the region and the world that raises the need to 
integrate with the international generally accepted accounting practices... 
the upcoming birth of the stock market in which the users of financial 
statements, including local and foreign investors, have the right to ask for 
accounting information that reflects faithfully business operations.       Y       Y 
Deputy 
Governor  
Deputy Governor, 
2000, article 4 
Credit institutions shall not be entitled to inform their customers of the risks 
that have been dealt with, except for debts that are written off with 
Government’s permission.     Y       Y   
Deputy 
Governor  
Deputy Governor, 
2000, article 10 
In the event that a state-owned credit institution experiences business loss 
in a year owing to the provisions made in accordance with this regulation, 
that credit institution must work out a solution plan to submit to the 
Ministry of Finance and the SBV for consideration.     Y       Y   
Lecturer of 
Banking 
University 
Pham Phu Quoc, 
2000, p. 31, 
translated by the 
author 
When a loan is not yet due, loss has not yet been incurred, but it does not 
mean that the loss will not be incurred. For example, if a loan is current but 
the borrower has completely lost the ability to pay, and the bank does not 
have any way to recover the debt, it can be observed that the loan will never 
be paid despite not being due.       Y       Y 
Fulbright 
financial 
specialist 
Nguyen Xuan 
Thanh (2012), 
translated by the 
author 
Notably, in the 2006–2011 period, the regulatory framework and supervision 
of banking activities was constantly being modernised. Current regulations of 
Vietnam on ensuring safe operations of commercial banks cover all content 
of supervision on capital, credit limit, equity investment limit, solvency ratio, 
quality classification of debts and provision for risks.       Y       Y 
PHASE 2 
Staff of SBV 
Duong, 2009, p. 31, 
translated by the 
author 
By adopting Decision 493, banks are gradually moving towards the 
assessment and classification of debts based on qualitative factors and 
prevention is divided into a general provision and specific provision under 
the framework of banking risk provisions of Basel 2.       Y       Y 
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Speakers Source Statements ST CH SE IN DI IF G M 
Financial 
specialist 
Le Hong Giang, 
2012a, translated 
by the author 
Decision 493 issued by SBV also applies those practices for measuring NPL, 
so one cannot say ‘standard of NPLs’ in Vietnam is poor compared with that 
of ‘international standards’       Y       Y 
Fulbright 
financial 
specialist 
Nguyen Xuan 
Thanh (2012), 
translated by the 
author 
Banks, but in fact, their investors and economic organisations that own 
banks, can easily disable all safety regulations, even if these are the rules 
under international standards. Moreover, that disablement would strictly 
follow current laws (but violate the spirit of the law).     Y           
Press 
Correspondent 
NCDT, 2013, 
translated by the 
author 
At that time, there were many controversies that 9% is too high, and that 
banks are difficult to satisfy. However, most of the banks had a CAR much 
higher when compared with the minimum, except Agribank, according to the 
data for 2011.   Y Y Y    
Press 
Correspondent 
NCDT, 2013, 
translated by the 
author 
One of the reasons why banks pushed higher CAR is the trend of hiding debt. 
If provision were made fully and on time, CAR would reduce immediately 
rather than increase.   Y  Y    
Fulbright 
Financial 
specialists 
Vu Thanh Tu Anh et 
al., 2013, translated 
by the author 
Many subjects [banks and others] use a number of different techniques for 
not complying with credit security regulations.   Y  Y    
Fulbright 
Financial 
specialists 
Vu Thanh Tu Anh et 
al., 2013, translated 
by the author 
The auditing and inspection to detect and handle the problem is very difficult 
due to lack of judicial evidence.   Y  Y    
Financial 
specialists 
Nguyen Xuan 
Thanh, 2012, 
translated by the 
author 
The current status is using cross-shareholding to dodge, but not violate, the 
regulation … Many loans over 1,000 billion, which have now become NPLs, 
were revealed by the supervision, but were not being highlighted because 
the law was not broken.   Y  Y    
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Fulbright 
financial 
specialist 
Nguyen Xuan 
Thanh (2012), 
translated by the 
author 
The first is that although the regulations to ensure safe operation were 
issued by the state, these are disabled by the state. That is because the 
Government is the owner of the State Corporations (SOEs) and, 
simultaneously, the controlling shareholder of state-owned commercial 
banks (SOCBs), thereby allowing lending activities between the two groups 
to escape from the regulations... Violation of the monitoring framework 
resulted in the bad loans that the bank had to suffer directly. That the 
lending of SOCBs to Vinashin, Vinalines and other major projects of SOEs 
exceeded safety regulations is obvious evidence.     Y       Y   
Deloitte 
auditor 
Tinmoi, 2012, 
translated by the 
author 
On 31.12.2011, the bank (i.e., Oceanbank) held deposits, loans and bond 
investments in Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry (Vinashin) and several 
companies owned by Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry, which were overdue. 
However, in 2011, based on the written direction of the State regulators 
about considering and restructuring the debts of the corporation, Vietnam 
Shipbuilding Industry, the bank has implemented the directive, maintaining 
the status quo and not making provision for the debts and receivables 
above. Currently, banks are continuing to work with Vinashin and the State 
management agencies to plan the treatment and recovery of the debts and 
receivables.     Y       Y   
Bank regulator, 
Nguyen Van 
Nen 
Nguyen Van Nen, 
2015, p. 4, 
translated by the 
author 
The SBV processed specifically BIDV’s suggestion that the loans related to 
that project [the drainage project] would not be counted in complying with 
the ratios, the requirement of not lending over 15% of the equity capital, 
excluding from the annual credit growth limit, not classifying in credit risk 
groups as well as not making provision for risks related to the project.     Y       Y   
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Prime Minister  
Prime Minister, 
2007, article 5, 29, 
translated by the 
author 
The Ministry of Finance implements the state management function in 
finance and guidance, supervision and inspection of the implementation of 
the financial regime of the Development Bank… The Development Bank 
reports the audited annual financial statements to the Prime Minister and 
the Ministry of Finance, the SBV, the Ministry of Planning and Investment.     Y       Y   
Press 
correspondent 
Cong Thuong, 2013, 
translated by the 
author 
There are many causes leading to the “very bad” situation in VDB. However, 
most importantly, it is that VDB is “bipolar”, being a bank and also not a bank 
at the same time.     Y       Y   
Press 
correspondent 
Nguyen Hoai, 
2011a, translated 
by the author 
This makes many people think 100% of investment loans and export loans to 
the State through VDB were almost no risk!     Y       Y   
Mr Nguyen 
Quang Dung, 
the CEO of VDB 
Nguyen Hoai, 
2011a, translated 
by the author 
The bank is a complete nonprofit organisation, which mainly carries out 
lending for investment and export activities under the direction of the 
Government. The problem is that, since it operates without profits, VDB 
cannot have funds for making provisions.     Y       Y   
Press 
correspondent 
Nguyen Hoai, 
2011a, translated 
by the author 
One Basel principle for capital adequacy requirement is to make provision 
corresponding with the level of risk, rather than waiting until the risks incur 
and record the loss without reserve to cover that loss.         
Press 
correspondent 
Nguyen Hoai, 
2011a, translated 
by the author VDB is similar to a time bomb.   Y  Y    
Press 
correspondent 
Cong Thuong, 2013, 
translated by the 
author 
The Ministry of Finance acknowledged that, with the current regulations, it is 
difficult to force the mechanism of autonomy and self-responsibility of VDB 
leaders because the Finance Ministry cannot supervise the activities of the 
central bank better than the SBV [SBV], but the SBV also could not fully 
implement this duty.   Y    Y  
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Press 
correspondent 
(Nguyen Hoai, 
2011a, 2011b, 
translated by the 
author 
Since the capital fund and operation mechanism of VDB are under the 
Ministry of Finance ‘management’, when asking SBV about VDB’s funds, how 
it operates, how much it has disbursed and for which project and how it sets 
provision for loan loss, all SBV staff, even the highest leaders, all answered 
‘We do not know’!   Y  Y  Y  
Press 
correspondent 
Nguyen Hoai, 
2011a, translated 
by the author 
One other remarkable issue, Decision 44/2007/QD-TTg regulates: ‘Within 
120 days after the fiscal year end date, VDB shall disclose financial 
statements in accordance with the provisions of the law’. However, although 
having already operated for 5 years, the ‘Annual Report’ on its portal is still 
blank.     Y       Y   
The Chairman - 
Minister of the 
Government 
Office 
Bao Bao, 2015, 
translated by the 
author 
The Government guarantee for the loan business is to create favourable 
conditions for businesses to raise large funds, for which, sometimes, credit 
institutions require a Government guarantee as security … Moreover, the 
cost of the loan guaranteed by the Government will be lower than a normal 
commercial loan … The issuance of Government guarantees for foreign loans 
serves urgent investment projects, especially in periods when domestic 
capital is insufficient to meet the demand for investment and development 
needs.     Y       Y   
Politics and 
Economics 
Specialists 
Tran Dinh Thien, 
Luu Bich Ho, 2015, 
translated by the 
author 
Consequently, it is clear that economic efficiency is very low [by investing in 
SOEs] … This is a huge expense.   Y    Y  
Press 
correspondent 
Bao Bao, 2015, 
translated by the 
author 
Debts of SOEs that were guaranteed by the Government could threaten the 
national financial security.   S    Y  
Press 
correspondent 
Bao Bao, 2015, 
translated by the 
author 
For every $5, the public debt has $1 loan guarantee contract for state-owned 
enterprises or corporations.   S    Y  
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Press 
correspondent 
Khanh Linh, 2010, 
translated by the 
author 
Assuming that we have a good control system, losses or disasters up to the 
first few trillion might be incurred undetected. However, allowing the loss to 
extend to 80,000 billion means that the system has problems. We do not 
have in the Government administration system an alarm mechanism 
sensitive enough to be able to prevent a disaster at the beginning. So, we 
definitely have to acknowledge that not only individual faults resulted in this 
failure, but that it also was a failure of system quality, and that system failure 
is the lack of an alarm system for the financial risk. The Vinashin 
phenomenon revealed to the Party, the Government and Parliament that if 
there were more intelligent thieves, they might make off with all national 
assets, because we do not have such an alarm system.   S    Y  
Press 
correspondent 
Le Ha, 2015, 
translated by the 
author 
SBV builds software for remotely monitoring NPLs independently and 
objectively. The result is always different from reports of commercial banks. 
For example, in 2006, commercial banks reported NPLs of 3.7% whereas 
SBV’s figure was 7%.   S    Y  
Press 
correspondent 
Nguyen Hoai, 
2011b, translated 
by the author 
Should the state disburse credit through the commercial banking system 
because the risk management structure of commercial banks is safer than 
that of VDB? Commercial banks have their internal risk management system 
because they are inspected by the SBV and have to publish their annual 
financial statements through an independent audit.     Y       Y   
The former 
president of 
the National 
Assembly, 
Nguyen Van An 
Vietnamnet, 2010, 
translated by the 
author 
I believe that Vinashin was the consequence of the global economic crisis but 
the system error was the root of that phenomenon, the error from the 
superstructure, from the policy of the Central Executive Committee of the 
Political Bureau, stemming from the point of view that socialist society must 
be based on ‘... the public ownership regime of main production means’. This 
model derives from the radical theory that private ownership of the 
production means is the source of exploitation. This extreme theory resulted 
in an economic model that lacks motivation, and thus was denied in reality. 
The Government had implemented this policy following the ideology of the 
Communist Party.   Y    Y  
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Press 
correspondent 
Cong Thuong, 2013, 
translated by the 
author 
Here, capital fund (from the state budget) is abundant, interest rates are low 
(owing to the mechanism of subsidised interest rates) and the repayment 
period and other loan conditions are easier than in commercial banks.... It is 
time to reconsider the policy of ‘special deals’ that VDB made because that 
policy is for a nonmarket economy.     Y       Y   
Prime Minister  
The Resolution 
01/NQ-CP of the 
Government, Prime 
Minister, 2016, 
article 2, translated 
by the author 
It is necessary to study how to transfer gradually the lending guarantees to 
commercial banks.               Y 
Press 
correspondent 
Tieu Phong, 2015, 
translated by the 
author 
The difference between two figures is owing to computational and statistical 
data obtained from two different sources. Specifically, the NPL ratio of 4.9%, 
equivalent to 133,060 billion, was reported by the credit institution. The 
figure of 17.4% was from the inspection authorities after auditing all NPLs 
hidden in corporate bonds, credit trusts and restructured debts, including 
two ‘shipwrecks’, Vinashin and Vinalines. Therefore, the total bad debt [NPL] 
actually amounted to 465,000 billion.   Y  Y    
PHASE 3 
Press 
correspondent 
VnEconomy, 2013a, 
translated by the 
author Bank NPLs may rise to 10%, 20% or even higher         
Press 
correspondent 
Vietnamplus, 2013, 
translated by the 
author 
We fully support the steps of the SBV in the implementation of Circular 02 to 
be closer to international standards in risk provisioning.  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Deputy Chief 
Inspector, SBV 
Vu Hanh 2013, 
translated by the 
author 
One year postponement of Circular 02 has its historic role as creating 
favourable conditions for businesses, banks in difficult times … but also 
cannot be delayed too long. The view of our advisory bodies are still applying 
Circular 02 on 01 June 2014. Y Y Y Y Y Y   
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Press 
correspondent 
VnEconomy, 2013b, 
translated by the 
author 
Circular 02 will still be applied from the landmark date 01/06/2014, but 
several criteria and contents are expected to be amended for gradual 
implementation. Y Y Y Y Y Y   
SBV Governor 
SBV, 2013d, 
translated by the 
author 
It was made in accordance with the actual conditions of the market and the 
economy of our country. Y  Y  Y  Y  
 SBV Governor 
SBV, 2013d, 
translated by the 
author 
By restructuring, the enterprises were supported by not having to pay 
penalty rates for overdue loans and by ensuring they could continue 
borrowing from banks for running their businesses, thus reducing the 
escalation of NPLs. Y   Y   Y   Y   
SBV Deputy 
Governor 
Circular No. 
09/2014/TT-NHNN 
dated March 18, 
2014, SBV, 2014, 
translated by the 
author Report on situations of time restructuring for debt payment     Y  Y  
 SBV Governor 
Quang Vu, 2014, 
VnEconomy, 2013c, 
Vietnamnet, 2013, 
translated by the 
author Will not use the state budget for bad debts [NPLs] solving Y   Y       Y   
 SBV Governor 
Cong Ly, 2015, 
translated by the 
author 
Now, we want money flowing into production. So just lift ‘blood clot’, and 
new blood will flow back into circulation. The picture is very clear. Taking out 
the ‘blood clot’ based on the market principle is very easy; just sell bad debts 
[NPLs] and it is completed. However, there is no market buyer currently, so 
we just need the state for the last purchase of bad debts [NPLs] sold via the 
VAMC organisation.… Y           Y   
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SBV Governor 
Cong Ly, 2015, 
translated by the 
author But we do not have money for bad debts [NPLs] purchase.   Y      
SBV Governor 
VnEconomy, 2013c, 
translated by the 
author 
Vietnam cannot handle bad debts [NPLs] by the state budget as in many 
other countries.         
SBV Governor 
Quang Canh, 2014, 
translated by the 
author 
Solving bad debts [NPLs] via VAMC mechanism in Vietnam is much different 
from [the practice in] other countries because Vietnam does not use the 
state budget to purchase bad debts [NPLs].   Y      
 SBV Governor 
Cong Ly, 2015, 
translated by the 
author 
I [VAMC] bought your bad debts [NPLs], but actually, you [banks] mortgaged 
your bad debts [NPLs] for borrowing from me … You have five years to solve 
your bad debts [NPLs]. I hope that in five years, your business would be 
better and you have money to pay your borrowings [from VAMC] … That 
solution can removed the ‘blood clot’ [NPLs] and the state will not lose 
money. Y   Y   Y   Y   
 SBV Governor 
Quang Canh, 2014, 
translated by the 
author 
The international organizations have agreed the VAMC mechanism is 
acceptable in this difficult situation.     Y   Y   Y   
Press 
correspondent 
Tapchitaichinh, 
2016, translated by 
the author 
Currently, NPLs not only seriously affect the credit system, but also adversely 
affect the whole economy. Therefore, fast and complete solving of this 
problem is not only the desire of the banking sector but also the wish of the 
political system. This is an important, urgent mission to remove the 
bottlenecks in the economy, creating the conditions that promote economic 
development.  Y    Y   
Member of the 
National 
Assembly 
Hoang Yen 2016, 
translated by the 
author 
The key problem is to have a mechanism to remove legal difficulties. 80% of 
the NPLs remaining at VAMC are mainly debts with difficulties in collection, 
most of which are related to legal procedures associated with the properties.       G  
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Press 
correspondent 
Bach Hop, 2016, 
translated by the 
author 
The bad debt [NPLs] will only worsen if not solved. In Vietnam, the number 
of bad debts [NPLs] is too large; thus, only the Government’s intervention 
can solve the ‘clot’ [NPLs problem] for the economy.       G  
Press 
correspondent 
Bach Hop, 2016, 
translated by the 
author 
Because the Vietnamese NPL rate is at an alarming level, causing 
‘congestion’ in the market capital flows, which is the major reason that 
interest rates are unlikely to fall.  Y      Y 
Deputy 
Chairman of 
the Economic 
Committee of 
the National 
Assembly 
Tran Thuy, 2016, 
translated by the 
author 
Reducing the competitiveness of domestic enterprises in the international 
market       Y       Y 
Press 
correspondent 
Bach Hop, 2016, 
translated by the 
author 
No need of additional money at this time. VAMC has even not yet used any 
penny of the amount of 2,000 billion dong already granted by the 
Government for NPLs solving because no agreement could have been made 
between VAMC and credit institutions for selling their NPLs to the market.   Y      
Press 
correspondent 
Bach Hop, 2016, 
translated by the 
author 
What VAMC needs now is a clear legal framework. Specifically, VAMC needs 
a debt trading market that it can operate. A legal framework to stipulate 
clearly the responsibility in case a debt is solved at loss [lower than its book 
value]. Is that loss sale problematic? Will that loss be allowed to be covered 
by provision in the credit institution? Will the credit institution be allowed to 
record the loss gradually over years to reduce financial pressure [as the 
provision rule currently applied for VAMC debts]?   Y    Y  
Press 
correspondent 
Ngan Giang, 2016, 
translated by the 
author Who would bear the loss incurred in the sale of NPLs.   Y    Y  
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Press 
correspondent 
Ngan Giang, 2016, 
translated by the 
author 
About VAMC, this organisation does not bear any risk related to the resale of 
debts purchased earlier. According to the current regulation, all gain or loss 
from the sale of bad debts [NPLs] would be transferred to the banks that 
sold those debts to VAMC earlier.   Y      
Press 
correspondent 
Ngan Giang, 2016, 
translated by the 
author 
Banks tend to hide bad debts [NPLs] because disclosing bad debts [NPLs] and 
making provision for them will truncate bank equity capital, leading to them 
being recapitalised by either the issuance of additional shares or no dividend 
payment. In case their financial health is too bad, leading to the risk of crisis, 
the Government has to recapitalise them using state budge t... Of course, 
recapitalisation by the state budget fund can incur a risk of loss that would 
be charged to taxpayers. That is the price we pay for the neglect of 
management/supervision by state management agencies giving rise to too 
risky loans in commercial banks. Therefore, instead of focusing on ‘bad debts 
[NPLs] solving’, [the authorities] should ‘convict’ the state 
agencies/individuals who did not fulfil their previous management 
responsibilities.           Y   Y 
Press 
correspondent 
Thanh Huyen, 
2016, translated by 
the author 
 
The blame for the bad debts [NPLs] problem is not to be assigned only to 
firms, or banks, but it is also the fault of the Government, of the policy and 
of the market economy.           Y   Y 
The President 
of Congress, 
Nguyen Sinh 
Hung 
Linh Thu, 2014, 
translated by the 
author 
Parliament is a legislative body; if it makes a wrong decision or policy, it must 
also recognise the weaknesses, but we cannot discipline the whole 
Parliament, especially with the criminal discipline. Even the Chairman of the 
Parliament is not the head but the general coordinator, the chairperson to 
maintain contact among 500 delegates. So, we cannot discipline 500 
delegates or the chairman for their wrong voting … [He emphasised] 
Parliament is the people [Vietnamese citizens], and the people vote and 
hence must accept the wrong decision rather than seeking who to discipline.     Y       Y   
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Director of 
Business 
Development 
Research 
Institute (BDI) 
Thuy Lien, 2016, 
translated by the 
author NPLs are caused by banks and businesses; thus they have to bear.        Y 
Financial 
specialist 
Nguyen Thoan, 
2016, translated by 
the author 
State budget belongs to People [Vietnamese citizens], no matter from taxes 
or borrowings money; so we cannot force People to pay for what they do not 
owe. Using state budget to pay for that loss means taking money from the 
poor to pay for the rich.        Y 
Financial 
specialist 
Lan Huong, 2016, 
translated by the 
author 
The use of state budget, as well as public money, to ‘save’ the banks from 
their own mistake in management is paradoxical. Vietnam has confirmed it 
will implement the market mechanism; therefore, let the market solve its 
problems.        Y 
CEO of VAMC, 
SBV 
Ha Tam 2016, 
translated by the 
author 
It [the Government] blames only banks for causing bad debts [NPLs], thus 
treating them as criminals, refusing to amend regulations, not using the state 
budget to solve bad debts [NPLs] …, [the Government] should not question 
why the process of bad debts [NPLs] is slow.   S      
Press 
correspondent 
Nguyen Minh, 
2016, translated by 
the author 
We believe that the main treatment method is still using net operating 
income of commercial banks to process [to make provision] until when the 
book value of bad debts [NPLs] equals the market valuation. At that time, 
bad debts [NPLs] will be handled by selling/buying through market.         Y   Y   
217 
Appendix 3: Certificates 
CERTIFICATE IN ACCOUNTANCY and QUANTITATVE FINANCE 
BANK LOAN LOSS RECOGNITION 
Pre-Requisites 
Financial Accounting and Reporting 
Quantitative Finance 
Module Outline 
This module provides an integrated accounting syllabus in which bank loan loss 
recognition is studied from different perspectives: accounting, bank regulation, quasi-
market and domestic and international drivers. The module aims to develop critical 
thinking in loan loss recognition in Vietnam from the view of international standards 
to equip trainees with a forward-looking approach to improve loan loss recognition 
practices in the country. On completion of this course, trainees will have gained the 
employability skills of adopting international standards, assessing credit risk and 
solving problems related to the contradictions in loan loss recognition, as well as the 
ability to interpret and communicate complex financial information related to loan 
loss in a form understandable to users of such information. 
Indicative Content 
Number Description 
1 
International standards in accounting for loan loss 
o IAS 39: Asset impairment test for bank loans (para. 63, 59) 
o IFRS 9: Asset impairment test for bank loans 
2 
International standards in capital adequacy process 
o Basel Accords I, II and III 
3 
Credit risk assessment 
o Accounting perspective 
o Bank regulation perspective 
4 
Comparison of Vietnamese accounting and bank regulations with IAS 
39/IFRS 9 and Basel Accords over different stages 
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o Before Doi Moi 
o First period of Doi Moi 
o Second period of Doi Moi 
o During financial distress to the present 
5 
a. The contradictions in loan loss recognition in Vietnam and how to react 
to the contradictions 
o Contradictions 
o Government control versus market control 
o International versus domestic drivers 
o Stability versus change objectives 
o Information versus disinformation on loan loss 
b. How to respond to a contradiction 
o Selection 
o Target, temporal, or topic vacillation 
o Source splitting 
o Creative rule-following techniques 
o Layering and balancing of goals 
o Withdrawal 
Learning and Teaching Strategy 
The content of the module will be delivered through a structured programme of tutor-
led lectures, followed by seminars that will enable trainees to develop problem-
solving skills in responding to contradictions in loan loss recognition in a specific 
context. For that purpose, trainees are required to discuss and write about four topics 
in the following sequence: 
1. comparing the Vietnamese and international standards in loan loss 
recognition in each period 
2. determining the reasons for the similarities and differences identified in step 1 
3. identifying the contradictions underlying the regulation on loan loss 
recognition in Vietnam 
4. suggesting alternative responses to the identified contradictions in each period 
and comparing and contrasting the consequences of those alternatives. 
Learning Outcomes 
On successful completion of this module, trainees will be expected to be able to: 
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 Description 
1 Understand international standards in loan loss recognition 
2 
Understand how to assess credit risk from different perspectives of accounting 
and bank regulation 
3 
Compare and contrast the Vietnamese regulations in loan loss recognition with 
international standards 
4 
Identify contradictions in loan loss recognition in Vietnam and recommend 
how to react to the contradictions 
5 
Use a variety of sources of information and communicate information in a 
comprehensible manner 
Learning Resources 
International standards 
IAS 39 
IASB, 2004. Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 
http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/Pages/Official-Unaccompanied-IFRS-Translations.aspx 
IFRS 9 
IASB, 2014. IFRS 9 Financial Instruments (replacement of IAS 39) 
http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/Pages/Official-Unaccompanied-IFRS-Translations.aspx 
Basel I 
BIS, B. F. I. S. 1988. International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards. BCBS. 
Basel II 
BIS, B. F. I. S. 2006. Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework–Comprehensive Version. BCBS. 
Vietnamese standards 
Accounting Law (2003) 
Vietnamese Accounting Standards (VAS) 
Decision 106: Regulation on setting up and use of reserves in credit institutions 
Decision 48: Referring to the issuance of regulations on classifying assets, 
establishing and using reserved funds for covering losses suffered by credit 
institutions 
Decision 488: Regulation on the debts classification, provisioning and use of 
provisions against credit risks in the banking activity of credit institutions 
Decision 493: Regulation on the debts classification, provisioning and use of 
provisions against credit risks in the banking activity of credit institutions 
Decision 18: The amendment, supplement of several articles of the Regulation on the 
debts classification, provisioning and use of provisions against credit risks in 
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the banking activity of credit institutions issued in conjunction with the 
Decision No. 493/2005/QD-NHNN dated 22 April 2005 of the Governor of 
the State Bank 
Decision 780: Classification of rescheduled loans 
Circular 02: Classification of assets, levels and method of setting up of risk 
provisions, and use of provisions against credit risks in the banking activity of 
credit institutions, foreign banks’ branches 
Circular 12: Amending a number of articles of the Circular No. 02/2013/TT-NHNN 
dated 21/01/2013 of the Governor of the SBV providing on classification of 
assets, levels and method of setting up of risk provisions, and use of 
provisions against credit risks in the banking activity of credit institutions, 
foreign banks’ branches 
Circular 09: Amending and supplementing a number of articles of Circular no. 
02/2013/TT-NHNN dated 21/01/2013 of Governor of the State Bank 
providing on classification of assets, levels and method of setting up of risk 
provisions, and use of provisions against credit risks in the banking activity of 
credit institutions, foreign banks’ branches 
Circular 19: Purchase sale settlement of NPLs Vietnam Asset Management Company 
Circular 08: Amending a number of articles of the State Bank Governor’s Circular 
No. 19/2013/TT-NHNN of September 6, 2013, providing the purchase, sale 
and handling of non-performing loans by VAMC took effect as from 1 
August 2016 
Literature related to bank loan loss 
BEATTY, A & LIAO, S 2011, ‘Do delays in expected loss recognition affect banks’ 
willingness to lend?’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 52, pp. 1–
20. 
BEATTY, A & LIAO, S 2014, ‘Financial accounting in the banking industry: a 
review of the empirical literature’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
vol. 58, pp. 339–383. 
BOUVATIER, V & LEPETIT, L 2012b, ‘Provisioning rules and bank lending: a 
theoretical model’, Journal of Financial Stability, vol. 8, pp. 25–31. 
BUSHMAN, RM 2014, ‘Thoughts on financial accounting and the banking industry’, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 58, pp. 384–395. 
BUSHMAN, RM & WILLIAMS, CD 2012, ‘Accounting discretion, loan loss 
provisioning, and discipline of banks’ risk-taking’, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, vol. 54, pp. 1–18. 
CHU, T 2004, Accounting changes in a transition economy: the case of Vietnam, 
thesis, Wollongong, University of Wollongong, viewed 12 May 2016, 
Research Direct database. 
EZZAMEL, M & XIAO, JZ 2011, ‘Accounting in transitional and emerging market 
economies’, European Accounting Review, vol. 20, pp. 625–637. 
FUJII, M & KAWAI, M 2010, ‘Lessons from Japan’s banking crisis, 1991–2005’. 
Asian Development Bank Institute, Working Paper Series No. 222. 
IANNOTTA, G & KWAN, S 2014, The impact of reserves practices on bank 
opacity. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper Series. 
KANE, EJ 2000, ‘The dialectical role of information and disinformation in 
regulation-induced banking crises’, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, vol. 8, pp. 
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285–308. 
KARIMIYANA, A, ALIFIAH, MN & NASSERINIA, A 2014, ‘Signaling view of 
loan loss provision in Islamic Banks of Malaysia’, International Journal of 
Management Sciences and Business Research, 2014 ISSN (2226-8235) Vol-
3, Issue 9 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2729083 
LALL, R 2012, ‘From failure to failure: the politics of international banking 
regulation’, Review of International Political Economy, vol. 19, pp. 609–638. 
LAURIN, A & MAJNONI, G 2003, Bank loan classification and provisioning 
practices in selected developed and emerging countries, World Bank 
Publications, Washington, DC, USA. 
NGUYEN ANH TUAN & GONG, G 2012 ‘Vietnamese accounting reform and 
international convergence of Vietnamese Accounting Standards’, 
International Journal of Business & Management, vol. 7, no. 10. Pp. 26-36 
http://ezproxy.uws.edu.au/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?d
irect=true&db=bth&AN=76115799&site=ehost-live&scope=site 
NGUYEN LOC, HOOPER, K & SINCLAIR, R 2013, ‘Conservatism versus change 
in the Vietnamese accounting field?’ Corporate Ownership & Control, vol. 
11, pp. 471–482. 
NICOLETTI, A 2015, The effects of auditors and regulators on bank financial 
reporting: evidence from loan loss provisions. Working paper, Ohio State 
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Appendix 4: Data Translation 
No. English (Translated data) Vietnamese (Original data) 
1 
“Some Members of Parliament have 
questioned that the current NPL ratio is 
much higher under international 
standards or according to some 
international organisations. However, it 
is very hard to say that. There are 
different international standards, and we 
have to mention clearly which standard is 
used to compare.” 
“Một số đại biểu cũng có nói rằng theo 
thông lệ quốc tế hoặc theo một số tổ 
chức quốc tế thì nợ xấu của ngân hàng 
Việt Nam có thể cao hơn rất nhiều. 
Điều đó cũng hết sức khó nói bởi vì 
chúng ta phải theo chuẩn nào.” 
(INFO.VN-NEWS, 2011, translated by 
the author) 
2 
“I have been working in the banking 
system for 30 years. Over the last 30 
years, there have always been two 
figures. One figure is given by credit 
institutions under the regulations of the 
central bank, while another figure comes 
from the central bank through an 
assessment of NPLs at commercial 
banks.” 
“Thực tế này không phải đến hôm nay 
mới phát sinh” mà trong 30 năm ông 
làm ngành ngân hàng, luôn có hai số 
liệu khác nhau trong nội bộ: một do 
các tổ chức tín dụng báo cáo, hai do 
chính NHNN đánh giá.” 
(Vietnamnet, 2012) 
3 
“One very common misunderstanding in 
the Vietnamese press and among many 
experts is that the Vietnamese NPLs 
standards are different from that of 
international standards... First, it should 
be clear that the world has not yet had a 
standard set for NPLs classification; 
perhaps there are some practices 
adopted by many countries and a number 
of guidelines recommended by 
international organisations (e.g., BIS and 
IMF). Decision 493 issued by SBV also 
applies those practices for measuring 
NPL, so one cannot say ‘standard of NPLs’ 
in Vietnam is poor compared with 
‘international standards.’” 
“Một trong những hiểu nhầm rất phổ 
biến trên báo chí VN và cả nhiều 
chuyên gia là tiêu chuẩn nợ xấu của VN 
khác với tiêu chuẩn nợ xấu quốc 
tế…Trước hết cần nói rõ là trên thế giới 
không hề có một bộ tiêu chuẩn nào về 
nợ xấu, có chăng là một số thông lệ 
được nhiều nước sử dụng và một số 
guidelines do các tổ chức quốc tế (BIS, 
IMF) khuyến cáo. QĐ 493 của NHNN 
cũng áp dụng cách tính NPL theo thông 
lệ này, bởi vậy không thể nói "tiêu 
chuẩn nợ xấu" của VN kém "tiêu chuẩn 
quốc tế". Vấn đề nằm ở chỗ khác.” 
(Le Hong Giang, 2012) 
4 
“Can the supervisors operate effectively 
when they are not sure about the figure 
[NPL amount]?”  
“Cơ quan giám sát có thể hoạt động 
hiệu quả không khi mà số liệu không 
nắm chắc được?” 
(Thuy Mien, 2013) 
5 
“NPLs of 3% was just a decoration”  “Nợ xấu về 3% chỉ là con số ảo” 
(Phuong Lam, 2015) 
6 
VAMC is actually just a form of 
“accounting tricks” to put NPLs off the 
balance sheets 
“VAMC thực chất chỉ là một dạng "thủ 
thuật kế toán" để đưa nợ xấu ra khỏi 
bảng cân đối kế toán của các ngân 
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hàng.”  
(Ngan Giang, 2016) 
7 
“spread their loan loss recognition over 
several years rather than recording the 
whole loss at once” 
“giãn được việc ghi nhận lỗ ra vài năm 
thay vì phải làm ngay một lần” 
(Ngan Giang, 2016) 
8 
“The incorrect NPL figures numbers led to 
a leisurely work psychology, resting on 
the belief that the market would soon 
recover, and that, thus, security assets’ 
value will be restored and enterprises will 
repay their debt. However, the reality can 
be exactly the opposite: that it goes not 
in a cycle of 10 years as asserted by Mr 
Sheehan [referring to Japan’s lost 
decade], but in a longer period, one and a 
half or doubled.” 
“Con số nợ xấu không chính xác dẫn tới 
tâm lý “đủng đỉnh”, yên tâm rằng thị 
trường sẽ sớm hồi phục, tài sản bảo 
đảm phục hồi, doanh nghiệp có thể trả 
được nợ. Nhưng thực tế hoàn toàn 
ngược lại khi nó cứ tiếp diễn không 
phải theo chu kỳ hơn chục năm mới xử 
lý xong như ông Sheehan khẳng định, 
mà có thể gấp rưỡi, gấp đôi.” 
(Thuy Mien, 2013) 
9 
"The Government was afraid people 
would suffer if it gave up its control to 
the market” 
“Nhà nước ta rất sợ buông ra thì thị 
trường làm khổ dân” 
(Tran Dinh Thien and Luu Bich Ho, 
2015a) 
10 
“In Vietnam, different beliefs dive in, 
mingle, are not exclusive and do not 
conflict.” 
“Các giá trị được lặn vào, dung hòa lẫn 
nhau; không loại trừ và mâu thuẫn.” 
(Hoang Huong, 2014) 
11 
“The economic socialist-oriented market 
economy is operating following the 
market mechanism with the 
management of the state under ‘the 
leadership of the Communist Party’ and is 
‘striving for the goal of prosperous 
people, a strong country and an 
equitable, democratic and civilised 
society’. The economic socialist-oriented 
market economy has many forms of 
ownership and many economic sectors in 
which the state economy plays a key role. 
The nature of the socialist-oriented 
economy is reflected in the way that the 
state economic sector plays the role of 
leading and actively orienting the 
economy.” 
“Nền kinh tế thị trường định hướng xã 
hội chủ nghĩa vận hành theo cơ chế thị 
trường có sự quản lý của Nhà nước, 
dưới sự lãnh đạo của Đảng Cộng sản 
nhằm hướng đến mục tiêu “dân giàu, 
nước mạnh, dân chủ, công bằng, văn 
minh”. Trong nền kinh tế thị trường 
định hướng xã hội chủ nghĩa có nhiều 
hình thức sở hữu, nhiều thành phần 
kinh tế trong đó kinh tế quốc doanh 
giữ vai trò chủ đạo, dẫn dắt nền kinh 
tế.” 
(Central Economic Committee, 2016) 
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12 
“To the end of the century, it could not be 
known when there was complete 
socialism in Vietnam" 
“Đến hết thế kỷ này không biết đã có 
CNXH hoàn thiện ở Việt Nam hay 
chưa” 
(Thanhnien, 2013) 
13 
“Every five years, one or more state 
research programmes are conducted, 
and in them, there are several addressing 
the question of defining the market 
economy with socialism orientation. By 
assuming that at least five sessions of 
research programmes were conducted in 
25 years, it is possible to estimate the 
number of research projects that have 
attempted to answer that question. 
Further, many other topics that do not 
have the same title are also being 
researched to answer that question. It 
means we have tried hard to find a 
definition that can make us confident and 
satisfied. However, the fact is that until 
now, we have not been clear and still 
have to find the answer.” 
“Cứ 5 năm lại có một hoặc nhiều 
chương trình nghiên cứu nhà nước. 
Trong những chương trình ấy, thường 
có một vài đề tài để trả lời cho câu hỏi 
thế nào là kinh tế thị trường định 
hướng XHCN. Cứ cho là ít nhất có 25 
năm, tức là 5 đợt làm chương trình thì 
có thể hình dung đã có bao nhiêu đề 
tài nghiên cứu phải trả lời: thế nào là 
kinh tế thị trường định hướng XHCN. 
Đến đợt này vẫn còn trả lời tiếp. Thậm 
chí, còn nhiều đề tài khác không có tên 
ấy nhưng cũng để trả lời câu hỏi đó. 
Như thế nghĩa là chúng ta đã rất cố 
gắng để đi tìm một định nghĩa thực sự 
làm chúng ta thấy tin tưởng và hài 
lòng. Nhưng thực tế là đến bây giờ 
chúng ta vẫn chưa rõ, vẫn cứ phải đi 
tìm câu trả lời.” 
 (Tran Dinh Thien and Luu Bich Ho, 
2015) 
14 
“We keep studying that model and have 
not yet found it. That model does not 
exist for seeking” 
“Chúng ta cứ nghiên cứu mô hình đó, 
mà mãi có tìm ra đâu. Làm gì có cái thứ 
đó mà đi tìm” 
(Saigontimes, 2014) 
15 
“Many thanks for your analysis. However, 
for our businesses, what we need most is 
the specific statement for our long-term 
business orientation. … The country’s way 
to develop needs to be stated clearly for 
the public to understand. Why was it 
wavering so that even the general 
secretary of the Communist Party 
[Nguyen Phu Trong, as aforementioned] 
did not know when socialism would be 
completely built in Vietnam?” 
“Rất cám ơn phân tích của ông Tuyển. 
Thế nhưng với doanh nghiệp chúng tôi 
thì cái cần nhất là sự cụ thể để còn 
định hướng làm ăn lâu dài… Con 
đường của ta thì ta có thể nói rõ cho 
dân biết mà lần theo, sao cứ nhấp nháy 
cái mà ngay cả Tổng Bí Thư đã từng 
phát biểu là chưa biết bao giờ xây 
dựng được?” 
(Truong, 2015) 
16 
"What the market economy is, and how 
socialism orientation   is about? They 
need to be specific rather than saying 
generally all the time" 
“Kinh tế thị trường là thế nào, định 
hướng xã hội chủ nghĩa là thế nào, phải 
nói cụ thể, không chung chung nữa” 
(Ha Chinh (2015) 
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17 
“To continue the implementation of the 
socialist objective, it is inevitable to 
maintain the leadership role of the 
Communist Party, and to reject political 
pluralism and multiparty opposition, 
because the leadership of the Communist 
Party is the prerequisite to achieve the 
socialism objective.” 
“Tiếp tục thực hiện mục tiêu xã hội chủ 
nghĩa thì tất yếu phải giữ vững vai trò 
lãnh đạo của Đảng Cộng sản, không 
chấp nhận đa nguyên chính trị, đa đảng 
đối lập, vì đây là nhân tố tiên quyết để 
thực hiện mục tiêu xã hội chủ nghĩa.” 
(Luu, 2014) 
18 
“Under multiparty political systems, 
Government policies are not stable and 
not highly targeted because they depend 
on each party’s policies. When the ruling 
party changes, the above policies also 
change (e.g., the regulatory changes...).” 
 
“Do thể chế chính trị đa đảng, các 
chính sách này không ổn định và tính 
hướng đích không cao do tùy thuộc 
vào chính sách của từng đảng. Khi đảng 
cầm quyền thay đổi thì các chính sách 
nêu trên cũng thay đổi (mức điều tiết 
thay đổi…).” 
(Truong, 2015) 
19 
“Thus, there is a disagreement between 
the socialist solutions and the real life. 
The more implementation of socialist 
solutions, the more negative reactions of 
life” 
“Như vậy là giữa những giải pháp xã 
hội chủ nghĩa và thực tế cuộc sống có 
sự không ăn khớp. Càng đẩy tới các giải 
pháp xã hội chủ nghĩa thì càng vấp phải 
những phản ứng tiêu cực của cuộc 
sống.” 
(Dang, 2016, p.15) 
20 
“In order to have goods for society, it is 
necessary to return the freedom for 
private economy. In order to buy or sell, 
must accept the market economy. But 
with that acceptance, what is the 
socialist regime, what is the central 
planning mechanism, and what is the 
socialist goal?” 
“Muốn có sản phẩm hàng hóa cho xã 
hội thì phải trả lại tự do cho kinh tế cá 
thể, kinh tế tư nhân. Muốn mua được, 
bán được thì phải chấp nhận cơ chế thị 
trường. Nhưng, nếu chấp nhận những 
biện pháp ấy thì còn gì là chế độ công 
hữu xã hội chủ nghĩa, còn gì là cơ chế 
kế hoạch hóa tập trung, còn gì là mục 
tiêu xã hội chủ nghĩa?” 
(Dang, 2016, p. 15) 
21 
“Without renovation [the country] is 
dead” 
"Đổi mới thì sống, không đổi mới thì 
chết" 
(VnExpress,2015) 
22 
“No other way, apart from resolutely 
abolishing the mechanism of 
centralisation, bureaucracy and 
subsidies; implementing the 
decentralisation of management; 
adopting the principles of democracy; 
properly using economic leverages; 
promoting the role of science and 
technology; improving efficiency; and 
“Không có con đường nào khác là phải 
kiên quyết xóa bỏ cơ chế tập trung, 
quan liêu, bao cấp, thực hiện phân cấp 
quản lý theo nguyên tắc tập trung, dân 
chủ, sử dụng đúng đắn các đòn bẩy 
kinh tế, phát huy vai trò của khoa học 
kỹ thuật, mở rộng nâng cao hiệu quả 
kinh tế đối ngoại". 
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expanding foreign economic 
relationships.” 
(Hoang Phuong, 2015) 
23 
“The mechanism of centralization, 
bureaucracy, and subsidies”  
“Cơ chế quản lý tập trung quan liêu, 
hành chính, bao cấp” 
(Nguyen Trong Phuc, 2015) 
24 
“Returning the economy to its economic 
rules” 
 
“Hãy trả về cho sản xuất sự vận hành 
đúng quy luật của nó” 
(Luong Ninh, 2015) 
25 
“Renovation is a vial issue”, or 
“Renovation is prerequisite” 
 
“Đổi mới là một tất yếu khách quan”, 
“Đổi mới được coi là vấn đề có ý nghĩa 
sống còn” 
(Luong Ninh, 2015) 
26 
“Integration is an objective trend of the 
global development, being the 
unavoidable requirement for each 
country in the world today” 
“Hội nhập là xu thế phát triển khách 
quan của tình hình quốc tế, là yêu cầu 
nội tạicủa mỗi quốc gia trong thế giới 
ngày nay.” 
(The Government, 1999) 
27 
“how to harmonize inside [local] with 
outside [global]" is a matter of 
delicateness and cleverness…” 
“việc xử lý thế nào cho “trong ấm ngoài 
êm” là vấn đề tinh tế và khôn khéo” 
(Duy Huu, 2015) 
28 
“isolated and embargoed” “bị cô lập, phong tỏa” 
(Duy Huu, 2015) 
29 
“We adjusted our diplomatic global 
integration policy to reduce tension in the 
region, especially with the neighbouring 
countries, to create a peaceful space for 
the benefit of our reform.” 
Chúng ta điều chỉnh chính sách ngoại 
giao để giảm căng thẳng trong khu vực, 
đặc biệt là với các nước láng giềng, tạo 
môi trường hòa bình phục vụ cho công 
cuộc đổi mới của chúng ta.  
(Hoang ,2017) 
30 
"we have made great achievements, has 
historical significance" 
“chúng ta đã đạt dược những thành 
tựu to lớn, có ý nghĩa lịch sử” 
(Pham Ngoc Quang, 2006, Nguyen 
Thanh Vinh, 2015, Thai, 2016) 
31 
"the right leadership of Communist 
Party" 
“Sự lãnh đạo đúng đắn của Đảng” 
(Pham Ngoc Quang, 2006, Nguyen 
Thanh Vinh, 2015, Thai, 2016) 
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32 
“do not see market where it should be” 
and “do not see State where it should be” 
“chỗ nào cần nhà nước thì không thấy 
nhà nước, chỗ nào cần thị trường thì 
không thấy thị trường.” 
(Tran Dinh Thien and Luu Bich Ho, 
2015a) 
33 
“Although there are many challenges, 
Vietnam still has ‘the golden opportunity’ 
to participate in the WTO. The important 
thing is that we must expend great 
efforts to take advantage of the 
opportunity … We need to restructure 
businesses, including drastically 
reforming SOEs, rapidly implementing 
equitisation and reducing the percentage 
of shares in SOEs equitisation of state, 
and soon transfer all SOEs to operate 
under the Enterprise Law. This is a vital 
element for SOEs to improve themselves 
and improve competitiveness.” 
“Mặc dù có không ít thách thức đặt ra, 
song VN vẫn có “thời cơ vàng” khi vào 
WTO. Điều quan trọng là chúng ta phải 
có năng lực và nỗ lực rất lớn mới có 
thể tận dụng được… Chúng ta cần phải 
sắp xếp lại các lực lượng DN, trong đó 
quyết liệt với việc cải cách DNNN, thực 
hiện nhanh chương trình cổ phần hóa 
(CPH), giảm tỷ lệ cổ phần của nhà nước 
trong DNNN CPH và sớm chuyển toàn 
bộ DNNN sang hoạt động theo Luật 
Doanh nghiệp.” 
(SGGP, 2006) 
34 
“State-owned enterprises play a 
dominant role in the economy... and 
being the core force of state economic 
sector to ensure its leading role in the 
market economy under socialism 
orientation.” 
“Doanh nghiệp nhà nước đóng vai trò 
chủ đạo trong nền kinh tế và ….là lực 
lượng nòng cốt và chủ yếu của kinh tế 
nhà nước trong việc đảm bảo vai trò 
chủ đạo của nó trong nền kinh tế thị 
trường theo định hướng xã hội chủ 
nghĩa” 
(United Nations Development 
Programme, 2006) 
35 
“The state economic sector plays a key 
role, being an important material force 
for the state to orient and adjust the 
economy, setting the environment and 
conditions for developing all economic 
sectors.” 
“Kinh tế Nhà nước giữ vai trò chủ đạo, 
là lực lượng vật chất quan trọng để 
Nhà nước định hướng và điều tiết nền 
kinh tế, tạo môi trường và điều kiện 
thúc đẩy các thành phần kinh tế cùng 
phát triển.” 
(HIDS, 2016) 
36 
“equitisation but not privatization” "Cổ phần hóa nhưng không được tư 
nhân hóa" 
(Hanoingannam, 2014) 
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37 
“I can confirm that under the Vietnamese 
approach, equitisation of state-owned 
enterprises is absolutely not privatisation. 
Since the state now holds over 50% stake 
after the equitisation, these are still 
state-owned enterprises under the 
Enterprise Law. So, do not worry about 
whether it is private or state.” 
“Tôi có thể khẳng định rằng với cách 
làm của VN, cổ phần hóa các doanh 
nghiệp Nhà nước hoàn toàn không 
phải là tư nhân hóa. Với những doanh 
nghiệp Nhà nước nắm giữ trên 50% 
vốn sau khi cổ phần, thì theo Luật 
Doanh nghiệp nó vẫn là doanh nghiệp 
Nhà nước. Vì vậy không nên băn khoăn 
nó là tư nhân hay Nhà nước.” 
(Vo Van Thanh, 2006) 
38 
“The Party and State have advocated the 
development of a multisector economy, 
including private sector development. 
Thus, we are encouraging the 
development of the private economy and 
why do we have to worry about 
privatisation” 
“Đảng và Nhà nước đã có chủ trương 
về phát triển kinh tế nhiều thành phần, 
trong đó có phát triển kinh tế tư nhân. 
Như vậy, chúng ta đang khuyến khích 
phát triển kinh tế tư nhân, sao phải lo 
ngại tư nhân hoá.” 
(Vo Van Thanh, 2007) 
39 
“The banking sector must be one of the 
earliest to open next year. Equitisation 
plans for all state commercial banks were 
outlined, beginning with Vietcombank 
and finally the Agribank.” 
“Có thể nói theo WTO thì ngân hàng là 
một trong những lĩnh vực phải mở cửa 
sớm nhất, vào năm sau. Kế hoạch để 
cổ phần hóa tất cả các ngân hàng 
thương mại Nhà nước đã được vạch 
rõ, bắt đầu từ Ngân hàng Ngoại thương 
và sau cùng là Ngân hàng Nông 
nghiệp.” 
(Vo Van Thanh, 2006) 
40 
“Vietcombank is a tool of the state to 
implement and enforce monetary policy 
besides its mission of running a good 
business” 
“Khẳng định nhiệm vụ của 
Vietcombank là phải kinh doanh tốt, 
đồng thời là công cụ của nhà nước để 
thực thi và triển khai chính sách tiền tệ 
cũng như hoạt động ngân hàng” 
(Vietcombank, 2015) 
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41 
“Since the years before the establishment 
of joint-stock commercial banks, the 
Government has planted its agents in 
each bank and large state-owned 
commercial banks have been instructed 
to contribute capital to joint-stock 
commercial banks to become state 
shareholders in those joint-stock banks. 
The presence of the state-owned 
commercial banks is for limiting the 
activities beyond the legal framework if 
there are weaknesses originating from 
the new joint-stock banks that were 
established.” 
“Từ nhiều năm trước khi việc thành lập 
hệ thống ngân hàng cổphần được thực 
thi, Chính phủ đã chủ trương phải có 
đại diện của mình trong mỗi ngân hàng 
và các ngân hàng quốc doanh lớn đã 
được lựa chọn để góp vốn với tư cách 
cổ đông nhà nước. Sự hiện diệncủa 
những ngân hàng quốc doanh nhằm 
mục đích hạn chế những hoạt động 
vượt ra ngoài khuôn khổ pháp lý nếu 
có cũng như những yếu kém ban đầu 
từ phía các ngân hàng cổ phần mới 
được thành lập.” 
(The Banking Review, 2013) 
42 
“There are slightly different motives in 
this story. There are those who want to 
establish the leading role for the state 
economy, but also those who want our 
economy to be developed quickly in size; 
there are those who want us to have 
economic representatives for 
international talks. Because ultimately a 
prime minister or a president cannot 
negotiate a specific economic problem, 
cannot be the representative of the 
economy. The corporations are 
considered the representatives of the 
economy.” 
“Có những động cơ hơi khác nhau 
trong câu chuyện này. Có những người 
muốn khẳng định kinh tế nhà nước là 
chủ đạo, nhưng cũng có những người 
muốn nền kinh tế của chúng ta trở nên 
chóng có kích thước, cũng có những 
người muốn chúng ta phải có những 
đại diện kinh tế để đối thoại. Bởi vì nói 
cho cùng một ông Thủ tướng hay một 
ông Chủ tịch nước không thể đối thoại 
về những vấn đề kinh tế cụ thể được, 
mà phải có các đại diện của nền kinh 
tế. Các tập đoàn được xem như là 
người đại diện của một nền kinh tế. 
(Vietnamnet, 2010)” 
(Viet Lam and Khanh Linh, 2010) 
43 
“The dominant role of the state economy 
is not reflected in the number of 
enterprises more or less, in the 
proportion of high or low contribution to 
GDP that in place, but it is an important 
material force for the state to navigate 
and regulate the economy, providing the 
environment and conditions for 
promoting the development of all 
business sectors.” 
“Vai trò chủ đạo của nền kinh tế nhà 
nước không phải thể hiện ở số lượng 
doanh nghiệp nhiều hay ít, tỷ trọng 
đóng góp GDP cao hay thấp mà ở chỗ, 
đó là lực lượng vật chất quan trọng để 
Nhà nước định hướng và điều tiết nền 
kinh tế, tạo môi trường và điều kiện 
thúc đẩy các thành phần kinh tế cùng 
phát triển.” 
(Nguyen Quang A, 2010) 
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44 
“Common theory of political science had 
shown: for a caste, a social force or an 
individual, to be able to win, hold and 
exercise its power, it must have the 
power of violence, physical or 
intellectual; in other words, it must have 
‘gun’ and ‘money’ or knowledge and 
culture. In spite of knowledge and culture 
playing an increasingly important role, 
violence and physical and financial power 
are still indispensable in today’s 
conditions.” 
“Lý luận phổ thông của khoa học chính 
trị cũng đã chỉ rõ: một giai cấp, một lực 
lượng xã hội hay một cá nhân, để có 
thể giành, giữ và thực thi quyền lực, 
phải có sức mạnh về bạo lực, vật chất 
hoặc trí tuệ, nói cách khác cần có 
"súng", có "tiền" hoặc có tri thức, văn 
hóa. Tuy trí tuệ hay tri thức, văn hóa 
ngày càng có vai trò quan trọng, nhưng 
bạo lực và vật chất, tài chính vẫn là sức 
mạnh không thể thiếu trong điều kiện 
hiện nay.” 
(Luu, 2014) 
45 
“The majority of SOEs are lent mainly 
without securities, even under ‘orders’ or 
‘indications’ [from the Government 
agencies, politicians, regulators, etc.] 
with huge amounts and being processed 
very fast, not as tightly as when banks 
lend to small and medium businesses. 
Examples are huge government-
mandated loans, such as for Vinashin, 
Vinaline, Electricity Corporation, Coal 
Group and Petroleum Group.” 
“Đa phần các doanh nghiệp nhà nước 
đều được cho vay ở dạng thế chấp chỉ 
một phần; phần tín chấp là chủ yếu, 
thậm chí được vay theo “lệnh”, theo 
“chỉ định” với những khoản vay rất lớn 
mà thủ tục rất chóng vánh, không chặt 
chẽ như khi các ngân hàng cho vay khu 
vực doanh nghiệp nhỏ và vừa. Ví dụ, có 
những khoản vay do Nhà nước chỉ 
định, như cho Vinashin, Vinaline, Tập 
đoàn Điện lực, Tập đoàn Than, Tập 
đoàn Dầu khí, … vay với những món 
vay khổng lồ …” 
(Dang, 2015, p. 24) 
46 
“The problem is that the state has not 
traditionally performed its correct role. 
Investment is not the state’s job, but it 
still rushes forward into investing. 
Developing a competitive market but 
jumping into setting price. Consequently, 
the more the state does, the more 
confusion it causes.” 
“Vấn đề là xưa nay nhà nước không 
làm đúng việc của mình. Đầu tư phát 
triển không phải việc của mình thì cứ 
xông vào đấy. Chẳng hạn cạnh tranh thị 
trường mà cứ nhảy xổ vào điều hành 
giá cả. Kết cục ông càng làm càng rối.” 
 (Tran Dinh Thien and Luu Bich Ho, 
2015a) 
47 
“We would rather lose money for state 
bailout to have stability in the society. It 
would be better than the case that 
people lose money leading to loss of 
confidence, stability and other problems 
that cost more.” 
"Thà mất tiền (nhà nước chi trả-pv) để 
có sự bình ổn trong xã hội sẽ tốt hơn 
nếu người dân mất tiền sẽ dẫn đến 
niềm tin mất, bất ổn xã hội rồi dẫn đến 
nhiều vấn đề khác mà mức chi phí đó 
còn lớn hơn rất nhiều.” 
(Thuy Lien, 2015) 
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48 
“In any case, the rights of legitimate 
depositors will be ensured. Under the 
political regime of Vietnam, there would 
be no story that depositors lose money!” 
“Trong bất kỳ trường hợp nào, sẽ đảm 
bảo bảo mọi quyền lợi của người gửi 
tiền hợp pháp khi tái cơ cấu. Với chế 
độ chính trị của Việt Nam, sẽ không có 
câu chuyện người gửi tiền bị mất tiền!” 
(VnEconomy, 2011) 
49 
“Accounting must meet the requirements 
of economic management at both macro 
and micro levels. That is, it must meet the 
requirements of state management and 
administration of a business, even in a 
department of a business. Accounting 
implements economic management in 
terms of not only monetary values but 
also nonmonetary ones, including 
quantity and quality.” 
 
“Kế toán phải đáp ứng được yêu cầu 
quản lý kinh tế ở cả tầm vĩ mô và vi 
mô. Tức là, đáp ứng được yêu cầu 
quản lý của nhà nước và điều hành ở 
một doanh nghiệp, thậm chí ở một 
phòng của doanh nghiệp. Kế toán 
không những thực hiện quản lý kinh tế 
bằng giá trị, mà còn quản lý bằng hiện 
vật, trong đó có số lượng và chất 
lượng.” 
(Phan Le, 1998a, p. 18) 
50 
“SBV runs accounting operations under 
the chart of accounts and the 
documentary-based system in 
accordance with legal regulations on 
accounting and statistics.” and Article 86 
of the Law on Credit Institutions that  
“Credit institutions shall perform its 
accounting based on the system of 
accounts and financial documents in 
accordance with the laws on accounting 
and statistics.” 
“Ngân hàng Nhà nước thực hiện hạch 
toán theo hệ thống tài khoản kế toán 
và chế độ chứng từ theo quy định của 
pháp luật về kế toán, thống kê.” 
(The National Assembly, 1997b) 
“Tổ chức tín dụng phải thực hiện hạch 
toán theo hệ thống tài khoản, chế độ 
chứng từ theo quy định của pháp luật 
về kế toán, thống kê.” 
(The National Assembly, 1997a) 
51 
“We easily see that the accounting 
system for financial institutions is 
designed very specifically for both 
financial and management accounting 
purposes … both serving the state 
management of monetary policy and 
maintaining consistency with the sector’s 
business activities.” 
“Ta dễ dàng nhận thấy, hệ thống TKKT 
các TCTD rất đặc thù là thiết lập theo 
cơ chế kế toán tài chính nhưng có cả 
tính chất kế toán quản trị (vừa đối nội 
vừa đối ngoại), hay có thể nói là vừa 
quản lý Nhà nước về chính sách tiền tệ; 
đồng thời phải phù hợp với hoạt động 
kinh doanh của ngành.” 
(Ha Cuc, 1998, p. 16) 
52 
“10% on net profits is established as 
‘special reserves’ for risk prevention. This 
fund was established until reaching 100% 
of the actual charter capital at the time 
of provisioning.” 
“Trích tỷ lệ 10% trên lợi nhuận ròng lập 
"Quỹ dự trữ đặc biệt" để dự phòng bù 
đắp rủi ro. Quỹ này được lập cho đến 
khi bằng 100% vốn điều lệ thực có tại 
thời điểm trích lập.” 
(SBV, 1992) 
233 
No. English (Translated data) Vietnamese (Original data) 
53 
“If risk reserve fund is appropriated from 
the net profit, the bank with no gain or 
loss will have no risk reserve fund.” 
“To (1996) lo lắng quỹ dự phòng trích 
lập theo quy định trên không đủ để bù 
đắp rủi ro tín dụng khi phát sinh vì “quỹ 
dự phòng rủi ro được trích lập từ lợi 
nhuận ròng thì những ngân hàng không 
có lãi hoặc lỗ sẽ không có quỹ dự 
phòng rủi ro”” 
(To, 1996, p.11) 
54 
“The creation of a reserve fund risks 
need to be counted as an expense and 
the risk reserve should be seen as a 
factor for calculating lending interest 
rate.” 
 
“Việc hình thành quỹ dự phòng rủi ro 
cần phải được đưa vào chi phí” và 
“khoản này được coi như một yếu tố 
để tính vào giá của dịch vụ cho vay 
(tính vào lãi suất cho vay)” 
(To, 1996, p. 12) 
55 
“Treating loan loss provision as an 
expense affects tax revenues” 
“Trích lập dự phòng hạch toán vào chi 
phí có ảnh hưởng đến nguồn thu thuế” 
(Ba Thanh and Moc Mien, p. 18) 
56 
“Banks can use provision to evade 
taxation” 
“Ngân hàng có thể trích lập dự phòng 
vượt mức để trốn thuế” 
(Ba Thanh and Moc Mien, p. 18) 
57 
“it [treating loan loss provision as an 
expense] is common in many countries" 
“đây [dự phòng] là một thực tế khách 
quan và phổ biến ở nhiều nước” 
(Ba Thanh and Moc Mien, p. 18) 
58 
"The objective of setting up a reserve 
fund for loan loss is also to ensure a 
bank’s profit reflects its business result"  
“Mục tiêu của việc trích lập quỹ dự 
phòng còn để đảm bảo kết quả kinh 
doanh là lợi nhuận của ngân hàng” 
(Ba Thanh and Moc Mien, p. 18) 
59 
“In our country, it was claimed that on 
making provisions, some currently 
profitable banks would turn into loss-
making ones. If people say so, it means 
that they were aware of the risk related 
to the loans that banks issued. If a loan 
was actually believed to be doubtful, 
then making provision for it is necessary; 
there is no need to wait until the real loss 
is incurred and deducted from interest, 
affecting business results. Without 
provisioning, business results shown on 
the balance sheet reflect incorrectly the 
financial position of the bank.” 
“Ở nước ta, có ý kiến cho rằng: nếu 
trích lập dự phòng thì một số ngân 
hàng đang có lãi sẽ chuyển thành lỗ. 
Nếu nói như vậy thì có nghĩa là người 
ta đã nhận thức được rủi ro của các 
món vay mà các ngân hàng đã cấp ra. 
Nếu món vay đã thực sự được dự tính 
là khó đòi, thì việc trích lập dự phòng là 
cần thiết, không cần chờ cho đến khi 
mất thực sự mới trừ khỏi lãi, làm ảnh 
hưởng cục bộ đến kết quả kinh doanh. 
Nếu không trích lập dự phòng, kết quả 
kinh doanh thể hiện trên cân đối phản 
ánh không chính xác vị thế tài chính 
của ngân hàng.” 
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(Ba Thanh and Moc Mien, 1998, p. 18) 
60 
“The figure of [current credit loss] was 
about 300 billion dong, which was at 
least double or triple compared to profit 
of the whole state banking sector.” 
“Con số 300 tỷ đồng ít ra cũng phải gấp 
đôi hoặc gấp 3 lần lợi nhuận của cả 
một hệ thống ngân hàng thương mại 
quốc doanh” 
 (Vu Minh, 1999, p.25) 
61 
“If all profit is used for provision making, 
where is the profit to pay tax to finance 
the state budget, to modernise banking 
technology to catch up with the world 
that is changing hourly and daily and to 
cover many daily bank expenses for 
ensuring its normal operation?” 
 
“Trích lập dự phòng hết cả lợi nhuận 
thì còn đâu để nộp ngân sách nhà 
nước, còn đâu để tính đến chuyện hiện 
đại hóa công nghệ ngân hàng, bắt kịp 
với thế giới đang thay đổi từng ngày 
từng giờ, còn đâu để giải quyết rất 
nhiều khoản chi phí của NH nhằm đảm 
bảo hoạt động bình thường.” 
(Vu Minh, 1999, p.25) 
62 
“If provision is made exceeding the profit 
of the current fiscal year, it means 
financial institutions make provision from 
nothing.” 
 “Nếu giá trị trích lập dự phòng rủi ro 
lớn tới mức vượt quá thu nhập ròng 
của tài khóa năm hiện hành thì vô hình 
chung, đơn vị hoặc TCTD dự phòng 
bằng cái không có.” 
(Dieu, 1999, p. 9) 
63 
“natural disasters, fires, epidemics or 
state policy changes” 
“thiên tai, hoả hoạn, dịch bệnh hoặc do 
Nhà nước thay đổi cơ chế, chính sách” 
(SBV, 1999, article 10) 
64 
“In bank lending activities, credit risk 
owing to subjective reasons, such as 
customers deliberately not repaying, has 
the same opportunity to occur as credit 
risk owing to irresistible reasons, such as 
customers lacking the ability to repay. 
Therefore, we think that even when 
clients deliberately do not fulfil their 
obligations, banks should reserve the 
right to cover that risk by loan loss 
provision.” 
 
“Cần thấy rằng, trong hoạt động tín 
dụng, rủi ro chủ quan, khách hàng cố 
tình không trả nợ và vì vậy, khoản nợ 
không được hoàn trả cũng có cùng cơ 
hội xuất hiện như trường hợp khách 
hàng không có khả năng trả nợ do các 
biến cố bất khả kháng, khách quan. Thế 
nên chúng tôi cho rằng khi khách hàng 
cố tình không thực hiện nghĩa vụ của 
họ một cách chủ quan thì TCTD cũng 
được quyền sử dụng dự phòng để xử lý 
rủi ro.” 
(Pham Phu Quoc, 2000, p. 32) 
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65 
“The remaining balance of loan loss 
provision, after deducting the actual loss 
incurred as at 31 December each year, 
must be reversed to reduce loan loss 
provision expense made during the year.” 
 “Số tiền dự phòng sau khi xử lý rủi ro 
còn lại tại thời điểm 31/12 hàng năm, 
tổ chức tín dụng phải hoàn lại để giảm 
số tiền dự phòng đã trích.” 
(SBV, 1999, article 7) 
66 
“Tax authorities are afraid that the 
stipulation of provision heavily relying on 
subjectiveness will facilitate banks in 
overstating expenses for tax reduction.” 
“Cơ quan thế e ngại việc quy định lập 
dự phòng mang nặng tính chủ quan sẽ 
tạo điều kiện cho ngân hàng khai 
khống chi phí để giảm thuế.” 
(Le Thi Thanh Nhan (2000) 
67 
“It is just as if banks are allowed to 
establish a reserve for covering credit risk 
but are not permitted to store the 
reserve. This paradox makes provisioning 
meaningless; if there is no difference 
between having and not having a 
reserve, the outcome will be the same.” 
 
“Điều này chẳng khác gì TCTD được 
phép trích lập dự phòng rủi ro tín dụng 
nhưng không được phép dự trữ tài 
chính trong việc trích lập ấy. Đây là 
điều nghịch lý làm cho việc trích lập dự 
phòng trở thành vô nghĩa; có cũng vậy 
mà không cũng thế, kết cục cũng sẽ 
như nhau.” 
(Dieu, 1999, p. 10) 
68 
“Provisions under Decision 48, although 
termed ‘provision of assets’ in form, 
have, in substance, absolutely no 
meaning of ‘provision for impairment 
loss’ for representing faithfully the fair 
value of assets in the financial 
statement.” 
“Đối tượng của quy định [Decision 48], 
mặc dù có hình thức trình bày là “Dự 
phòng tài sản”, nhưng về bản chất, 
hoàn toàn không mang ý nghĩa “Dự 
phòng giảm giá” nhằm mục đích làm 
“Tài sản Có” được thể hiện trung thực 
và hợp lý theo giá trị có thể thu hồi 
được trên báo cáo tài chính.” 
(Le Thi Thanh Nhan, 2000, p. 13) 
69 
“Such income is likely taking the current 
financial year profit to make provision for 
credit risk from the previous year. 
Paradoxically, this will increase the 
financial burden for the operations of the 
current year.” 
 
“Như vậy chẳng khác gì lấy thu nhập tài 
chính của năm hiện hành để lập “dự 
phòng” rủi ro tín dụng cho những năm 
trước. Điều nghịch lý này sẽ làm tăng 
thêm gánh nặng tài chính cho hoạt 
động của năm hiện hành.” 
(Dieu, 1999, p. 9) 
70 
“In our opinion, this [provision under 
Decision 48] is a very big blank in the 
regulation of the SBV. This issue should 
be urgently considered...” 
“Theo chúng tôi, đây là một khoảng 
trống rất lớn trong cơ chế của NHNN. 
Cần phải khẩn trương xem xét vấn đề 
này…” 
(Le Thi Thanh Nhan, 2000, p. 13) 
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71 
“the trend of economic integration with 
the region and the world that raises the 
need to integrate with the international 
generally accepted accounting 
practices…” 
“Xu thế hòa nhập với nền kinh tế khu 
vực và thế giới đặt ra yêu cầu cần phải 
hòa nhập với các thong lệ kế toán quốc 
tế được chấp nhận chung.” 
(Le Thi Thanh Nhan, 2000, p. 14) 
72 
“the upcoming birth of the stock market 
in which the users of financial 
statements, including local and foreign 
investors, have the right to ask for 
accounting information that reflects 
faithfully business operations.” 
“Sự ra đời sắp tới của thị trường chứng 
khoán, đối tượng sử dụng báo cáo tài 
chính bao gồm các nhà đầu tư trong 
nước và nước ngoài, có quyền yêu cầu 
phải được cung cấp những thông tin kế 
toán trung thực và hợp lý, phản ánh 
đúng tình hình hoạt động của doanh 
nghiệp.” 
(Le Thi Thanh Nhan, 2000, p. 14) 
73 
“Credit institutions shall not be entitled 
to inform their customers of the risks that 
have been dealt with, except for debts 
that are written off with Government’s 
permission.” 
“Tổ chức tín dụng không được thông 
báo cho khách hàng biết về việc xử lý 
rủi ro, trừ những khoản nợ đã được 
Chính phủ cho phép xóa nợ cho khách 
hàng.” 
(Deputy Governor, 2000, article 4) 
74 
“In the event that a state-owned credit 
institution experiences business loss in a 
year owing to the provisions made in 
accordance with this regulation, that 
credit institution must work out a 
solution plan to submit to the Ministry of 
Finance and the SBV for consideration.” 
“Trường hợp tổ chức tín dụng Nhà 
nước thực hiện việc trích lập dự phòng 
theo Quy định này có thể dẫn tới kết 
quả kinh doanh của năm đó lỗ thì tổ 
chức tín dụng đó phải lập phương án 
khắc phục gửi Bộ Tài chính và Ngân 
hàng Nhà nước xem xét.” 
(Deputy Governor, 2000, article 10) 
75 
“When a loan is not yet due, loss has not 
yet been incurred, but it does not mean 
that the loss will not be incurred. For 
example, if a loan is current but the 
borrower has completely lost the ability 
to pay, and the bank does not have any 
way to recover the debt, it can be 
observed that the loan will never be paid 
despite not being due.” 
“Một khi khoản tín dụng chưa đến hạn 
thanh toán thì tổn thất của khoản tín 
dụng này chưa xảy ra nhưng không có 
nghĩa là sẽ không có thể xảy ra. Chẳng 
hạn, một khoản tín dụng dù chưa tới 
hạn, song nếu TCTD xác định được 
rằng người đi vay đã hoàn toàn mất 
khả năng thanh toán; đồng thời TCTD 
cũng không có biện pháp nào để thu 
hồi nợ, thì cho dù khoản tín dụng này 
chưa tới hạn phải thanh toán cũng có 
thể thấy được rằng nó không bao giờ 
được thanh toán.” 
(Pham Phu Quoc, 2000, p. 31) 
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76 
“Notably, in the 2006–2011 period, the 
regulatory framework and supervision of 
banking activities was constantly being 
modernised. Current regulations of 
Vietnam on ensuring safe operations of 
commercial banks cover all content of 
supervision on capital, credit limit, equity 
investment limit, solvency ratio, quality 
classification of debts and provision for 
risks.” 
“Điểm đáng chú ý là 2006-2011 lại là 
thời kỳ khung pháp lý và giám sát hoạt 
động ngân hàng không ngừng được 
hiện đại hóa. Quy định hiện hành của 
Việt Nam về bảo đảm an toàn hoạt 
động của NHTM đã bao trùm hết các 
nội dung giám sát về vốn, giới hạn tín 
dụng, giới hạn đầu tư góp vốn cổ phần, 
tỷ lệ khả năng chi trả, và phân loại chất 
lượng nợ, trích dựphòng rủi ro.” 
(Nguyen Xuan Thanh, 2012) 
77 
“By adopting Decision 493, banks are 
gradually moving towards the 
assessment and classification of debts 
based on qualitative factors and 
prevention is divided into a general 
provision and specific provision under the 
framework of banking risk provisions of 
Basel 2.” 
“Theo Quyết định 493 của NHNN với 
việc phân loại nợ và trích lập dự phòng 
rủi ro, các TCTD dần tiến tới những 
đánh giá phân loại nợ mang các yếu tố 
định tính và dự phòng được chia thành 
dự phòng chung và dự phòng cụ thể đã 
hướng hoạt động ngân hàng theo 
khuôn khổ dự phòng rủi ro của Basel 
2.” 
(Duong, 2009, p. 31) 
78 
“Decision 493 issued by SBV also applies 
those practices for measuring NPL, so one 
cannot say ‘standard of NPLs’ in Vietnam 
is poor compared with that of 
‘international standards’” 
“QĐ 493 của NHNN cũng áp dụng cách 
tính NPL theo thông lệ này, bởi vậy 
không thể nói "tiêu chuẩn nợ xấu" của 
VN kém "tiêu chuẩn quốc tế.” 
(Le Hong Giang, 2012) 
79 
“Banks, but in fact, their investors and 
economic organisations that own banks, 
can easily disable all safety regulations, 
even if these are the rules under 
international standards. Moreover, that 
disablement would strictly follow current 
laws (but violate the spirit of the law).” 
“Tuy nhiên, các ngân hàng, mà thực 
chất là các nhà đầu tư, tổchức kinh tế 
sở hữu ngân hàng, có thểdễdàng vô 
hiệu hóa tất cả các quy định đảm bảo 
an toàn, cho dù đó là các quy định theo 
chuẩn mực quốc tế. Hơn thế nữa, việc 
vô hiệu hóa các quy định này được làm 
rất đúng luật (nhưng sai tinh thần của 
luật).” 
(Nguyen Xuan Thanh, 2012) 
80 
“At that time, there were many 
controversies that 9% is too high, and 
that banks are difficult to satisfy. 
However, most of the banks had a CAR 
much higher when compared with the 
minimum, except Agribank, according to 
the data for 2011.” 
“Thời điểm đó đã có nhiều tranh cãi 
cho rằng 9% là quá cao, ngân hàng khó 
đáp ứng được. Nhưng sau đó, hầu hết 
các ngân hàng đều ung dung khi mức 
CAR cao hơn nhiều so với mức tối 
thiểu, trừ Agribank, theo số liệu năm 
2011.” 
(NCDT, 2013) 
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81 
“One of the reasons why banks pushed 
higher CAR is the trend of hiding debt. If 
provision were made fully and on time, 
CAR would reduce immediately rather 
than increase.” 
“Một trong những lý do khiến các ngân 
hàng đẩy CAR lên cao chính là xu 
hướng giấu nợ. “Nếu trích lập đầy đủ 
thì ngay lập tức CAR phải giảm xuống 
chứ không thể tăng lên” 
(NCDT, 2013) 
82 
“Many subjects [banks and others] use a 
number of different techniques for not 
complying with credit security 
regulations.” 
“bằng nhiều kỹ thuật khác nhau không 
ít đối tượng không tuân thủ các quy 
định an toàn hoạt động tín dụng” 
 (Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al., 2013) 
83 
“The auditing and inspection to detect 
and handle the problem is very difficult 
due to lack of judicial evidence.” 
“việc kiểm tra, thanh tra để phát hiện 
và xử lý vấn đề sở hữu chéo rất khó 
khăn do thiếu bằng chứng pháp lý” 
(Vu Thanh Tu Anh et al., 2013) 
84 
“The current status is using cross-
shareholding to dodge, but not violate, 
the regulation … Many loans over 1,000 
billion, which have now become NPLs, 
were revealed by the supervision, but 
were not being highlighted because the 
law was not broken.” 
“Nợ xấu phát sinh do ngân hàng cho 
vay rủi ro trái quy đinh và cơ quan 
quản lý buông lỏng giám sát là không 
chỉ đúng bệnh. Nhiều khoản cho vay 
trên 1000 tỷ đồng mà giờ đây trở 
thành nợxấu đều được các cơ quan 
giám sát nắm, nhưng vì không phạm 
luật nên không bị tuýt còi.” 
(Nguyen Xuan Thanh, 2012) 
85 
“The first is that although the regulations 
to ensure safe operation were issued by 
the state, these are disabled by the state. 
That is because the Government is the 
owner of the State Corporations (SOEs) 
and, simultaneously, the controlling 
shareholder of state-owned commercial 
banks (SOCBs), thereby allowing lending 
activities between the two groups to 
escape from the regulations... Violation 
of the monitoring framework resulted in 
the bad loans that the bank had to suffer 
directly. That the lending of SOCBs to 
Vinashin, Vinalines and other major 
projects of SOEs exceeded safety 
regulations is obvious evidence.” 
“Thứ nhất là việc các quy định đảm bảo 
hoạt động an toàn do Nhà nước ban 
hành, nhưng bị chính Nhà nước vô hiệu 
hóa. Đó là do Chính phủ là chủ sở hữu 
của các Tập đoàn, Tổng công ty nhà 
nước (DNNN) đồng thời lại là cổ đông 
chi phối các ngân hàng thương mại 
quốc doanh, từ đó cho phép các khoản 
vay giữa hai nhóm này vượt ra ngoài 
quy định… Vi phạm khung giám sát, 
dẫn đến hậu quả là các khoản nợ xấu 
về sau mà ngân hàng phải gánh chịu 
trực. Việc các ngân hàng thương mại 
quốc doanh cho vay Vinashin, Vinalines 
và nhiều dựán lớn khác của DNNN 
vượt quy định an toàn là những minh 
chứng rõ ràng.” 
(Nguyen Xuan Thanh, 2012) 
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86 
“On 31.12.2011, the bank (i.e., 
Oceanbank) held deposits, loans and 
bond investments in Vietnam 
Shipbuilding Industry (Vinashin) and 
several companies owned by Vietnam 
Shipbuilding Industry, which were 
overdue. However, in 2011, based on the 
written direction of the State regulators 
about considering and restructuring the 
debts of the corporation, Vietnam 
Shipbuilding Industry, the bank has 
implemented the directive, maintaining 
the status quo and not making provision 
for the debts and receivables above. 
Currently, banks are continuing to work 
with Vinashin and the State management 
agencies to plan the treatment and 
recovery of the debts and receivables.” 
"Ngày 31.12.2011, ngân hàng (tức 
Oceanbank) nắm giữ các khoản tiền 
gửi, dư nợ tín dụng và đầu tư trái 
phiếu của ngân hàng với tập đoàn Công 
nghiệp tàu thuỷ Việt Nam (Vinashin) và 
một số công ty thuộc tập đoàn Công 
nghiệp tàu thuỷ Việt Nam đã quá hạn 
thanh toán. Tuy nhiên, trong năm 
2011, căn cứ vào văn bản chỉ đạo của 
cơ quan quản lý nhà nước về xem xét 
khoản nợ, cơ cấu lại các khoản nợ của 
tập đoàn Công nghiệp tàu thuỷ Việt 
Nam, ngân hàng đã thực hiện ý kiến chỉ 
đạo, giữ nguyên trạng thái nợ hiện tại 
và không trích lập dự phòng với các 
khoản nợ và phải thu trên.” 
(Tinmoi, 2012) 
87 
“The SBV processed specifically BIDV’s 
suggestion that the loans related to that 
project [the drainage project] would not 
be counted in complying with the ratios, 
the requirement of not lending over 15% 
of the equity capital, excluding from the 
annual credit growth limit, not classifying 
in credit risk groups as well as not making 
provision for risks related to the project.” 
“Ngân hàng Nhà nước Việt Nam xử lý 
cụ thể các kiến nghị của BIDV về việc 
loại trừ dư nợ cho vay đối với dự án khi 
tính các tỷ lệ an toàn, cho vay dự án 
vượt 15% vốn tự có, không tính trong 
chỉ tiêu tăng trưởng tín dụng hàng năm 
đối với khoản tín dụng phục vụ cho dự 
án, không xác định hệ số rủi ro cũng 
như trích dự phòng rủi ro đối với dự 
án.” 
(Nguyen Van Nen, 2015) 
88 
“The Ministry of Finance implements the 
state management function in finance 
and guidance, supervision and inspection 
of the implementation of the financial 
regime of the Development Bank” 
“Bộ Tài chính thực hiện chức năng 
quản lý nhà nước về tài chính và hướng 
dẫn, kiểm tra, thanh tra việc thực hiện 
chế độ tài chính của Ngân hàng Phát 
triển.” 
(Prime Minister, 2007, article 5) 
89 
“The Development Bank reports the 
audited annual financial statements to 
the Prime Minister and the Ministry of 
Finance, the SBV, the Ministry of Planning 
and Investment.” 
 
“Ngân hàng Phát triển phải báo cáo 
Thủ tướng Chính phủ và gửi cho Bộ Tài 
chính, Ngân hàng Nhà nước Việt Nam, 
Bộ Kế hoạch và Đầu tư kết quả kiểm 
toán báo cáo tài chính hàng năm.” 
(Prime Minister, 2007, article 29) 
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90 
“There are many causes leading to the 
“very bad” situation in VDB. However, 
most importantly, it is that VDB is 
“bipolar”, being a bank and also not a 
bank at the same time.” 
“Nguyên nhân dẫn đến tình trạng “rất 
xấu” ở VDB có rất nhiều. Song, quan 
trọng nhất là, VDB là một thể “lưỡng 
cực”, vừa là một ngân hàng, lại cũng 
không phải là ngân hàng.” 
(Cong Thuong, 2013) 
91 
“This makes many people think 100% of 
investment loans and export loans to the 
State through VDB were almost no risk!” 
“Điều này khiến nhiều người nghĩ rằng, 
100% dư nợ tín dụng đầu tư và xuất 
khẩu của Nhà nước qua VDB gần như 
không có rủi ro!” 
(Nguyen Hoai, 2011a) 
92 
“The bank is a complete nonprofit 
organisation, which mainly carries out 
lending for investment and export 
activities under the direction of the 
Government. The problem is that, since it 
operates without profits, VDB cannot 
have funds for making provisions.” 
 
“Ngân hàng này hoạt động hoàn toàn 
phi lãi, chủ yếu thực hiện nhiệm vụ 
cung cấp tín dụng đầu tư và tín dụng 
xuất khẩu theo chỉ đạo của Chính phủ. 
Một vấn đề đặt ra, nếu hoạt động phi 
lãi thì tất nhiên, VDB không thể lấy đâu 
ra nguồn để trích lập dự phòng rủi ro.” 
(Nguyen Hoai, 2011a) 
93 
“One Basel principle for capital adequacy 
requirement is to make provision 
corresponding with the level of risk, 
rather than waiting until the risks incur 
and record the loss without reserve to 
cover that loss.” 
 
“Một nguyên tắc của Basel đối với an 
toàn vốn là phải trích lập dự phòng 
tương ứng mức độ rủi ro, chứ không 
phải đợi đến lúc rủi ro xảy ra mới hạch 
toán vào chi phí thì không thể lấy đâu 
ra nguồn bù đắp.” 
(Nguyen Hoai, 2011a) 
94 
“VDB is similar to a time bomb.” 
 
“VDB không khác gì quả bom nổ 
chậm.” 
(Nguyen Hoai, 2011a) 
95 
“The Ministry of Finance acknowledged 
that, with the current regulations, it is 
difficult to force the mechanism of 
autonomy and self-responsibility of VDB 
leaders because the Finance Ministry 
cannot supervise the activities of the 
central bank better than the SBV, but the 
SBV also could not fully implement this 
duty.” 
“Bộ Tài chính cũng thừa nhận rằng, với 
những quy định hiện hành, rất khó 
buộc được cơ chế tự chủ, tự chịu trách 
nhiệm của lãnh đạo VDB vì Bộ Tài chính 
không thể giám sát hoạt động của VDB 
tốt hơn NHNN, nhưng NHNN lại không 
được thực hiện đầy đủ quyền này.” 
(Cong Thuong, 2013) 
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96 
“Since the capital fund and operation 
mechanism of VDB are under the Ministry 
of Finance ‘management’, when asking 
SBV about VDB’s funds, how it operates, 
how much it has disbursed and for which 
project and how it sets provision for loan 
loss, all SBV staff, even the highest 
leaders, all answered ‘We do not know’!” 
 
“Tuy nhiên, do nguồn vốn, cơ chế hoạt 
động trực thuộc Bộ Tài chính “quản” 
nên nếu có hỏi Ngân hàng Nhà nước 
rằng: nguồn vốn VDB và cơ chế hoạt 
động như thế nào, giải ngân bao nhiêu, 
cho dự án nào, tỷ lệ trích lập quỹ dự 
phòng rủi ro ra sao thì kể cả lãnh đạo 
vụ nghiệp vụ đến lãnh đạo cao nhất 
của Ngân hàng Nhà nước đều trả lời 
“không biết”!” 
(Nguyen Hoai, 2011a, Nguyen Hoai, 
2011b) 
97 
“One other remarkable issue, Decision 
44/2007/QD-TTg regulates: ‘Within 120 
days after the fiscal year end date, VDB 
shall disclose financial statements in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
law’. However, although having already 
operated for 5 years, the ‘Annual Report’ 
on its portal is still blank.” 
 
“Một vấn đề đáng lưu ý khác, Quyết 
định 44/2007/QĐ-TTg quy định: “Trong 
thời hạn 120 ngày, kể từ ngày kết thúc 
năm tài chính, VDB phải công khai các 
báo cáo tài chính theo quy định của 
pháp luật”. Tuy nhiên, dù hoạt động đã 
5 năm nay, nhưng ở mục “báo cáo 
thường niên” trên cổng thông tin của 
ngân hàng này vẫn trắng xóa.” 
(Nguyen Hoai, 2011a) 
98 
“The Government guarantee for the loan 
business is to create favourable 
conditions for businesses to raise large 
funds, for which, sometimes, credit 
institutions require a Government 
guarantee as security … Moreover, the 
cost of the loan guaranteed by the 
Government will be lower than a normal 
commercial loan … The issuance of 
Government guarantees for foreign loans 
serves urgent investment projects, 
especially in periods when domestic 
capital is insufficient to meet the demand 
for investment and development needs.” 
 
“Việc Chính phủ cấp bảo lãnh cho các 
doanh nghiệp vay vốn là để tạo điều 
kiện cho các doanh nghiệp có thể huy 
động được nguồn vốn có giá trị lớn mà 
đôi khi các tổ chức tín dụng đòi hỏi việc 
thu xếp vốn cho các dự án phải có bảo 
lãnh của Chính phủ… Bên cạnh đó, chi 
phí của khoản vay có bảo lãnh của 
Chính phủ sẽ thấp hơn so với trường 
hợp doanh nghiệp trực tiếp vay thương 
mại thông thường… Việc cấp bảo lãnh 
Chính phủ cho các doanh nghiệp vay 
vốn nước ngoài thực hiện các dự án 
đầu tư cấp bách, trọng điểm của Nhà 
nước có ý nghĩa quan trọng nhất là 
trong các giai đoạn nguồn vốn trong 
nước không đủ đáp ứng cho nhu cầu 
đầu tư phát triển.” 
(Bao Bao, 2015) 
99 
“Consequently, it is clear that economic 
efficiency is very low [by investing in 
SOEs] … This is a huge expense.” 
“Hậu quả rõ ràng là hiệu quả nền kinh 
tế rất thấp... Đây là một sự trả giá rất 
lớn.” 
(Tran Dinh Thien, Luu Bich Ho, 2015) 
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100 
“Debts of SOEs that were guaranteed by 
the Government could threaten the 
national financial security.” 
“khoản nợ của các DNNN được Chính 
phủ bảo lãnh có nguy cơ đe dọa an 
ninh tài chính quốc gia nếu các doanh 
nghiệp này hoạt động không hiệu quả, 
không có khả năng trả nợ.” 
(Bao Bao, 2015) 
101 
“For every $5, the public debt has $1 loan 
guarantee contract for state-owned 
enterprises or corporations.” 
“Cứ 5 đồng nợ công thì có 1 đồng bảo 
lãnh vay cho tập đoàn, TCT Nhà nước” 
(Bao Bao, 2015) 
102 
“Assuming that we have a good control 
system, losses or disasters up to the first 
few trillion might be incurred undetected. 
However, allowing the loss to extend to 
80,000 billion means that the system has 
problems. We do not have in the 
Government administration system an 
alarm mechanism sensitive enough to be 
able to prevent a disaster at the 
beginning. So, we definitely have to 
acknowledge that not only individual 
faults resulted in this failure, but that it 
also was a failure of system quality, and 
that system failure is the lack of an alarm 
system for the financial risk. The Vinashin 
phenomenon revealed to the Party, the 
Government and Parliament that if there 
were more intelligent thieves, they might 
make off with all national assets, because 
we do not have such an alarm system.” 
 
“Thử đặt vấn đề, nếu chúng ta có một 
hệ thống kiểm soát thật tốt thì cũng có 
thể thua lỗ, tai họa cũng có thể đến, 
nhưng đến trong một vài nghìn tỷ đầu 
tiên. Còn để kéo dài tới tỷ thứ 80.000 
thì có nghĩa là hệ thống có vấn đề. 
Chúng ta không có trong hệ thống nhà 
nước của mình một cơ chế báo động 
đủ nhạy cảm để có thể ngăn chặn tai 
họa ở một giai đoạn đầu tiên. Cho nên, 
dứt khoát phải khẳng định rằng không 
có lỗi cá nhân tuyệt đối trong sai lầm 
này, mà đây là một lỗi có chất lượng hệ 
thống, và lỗi hệ thống ấy chính là thiếu 
hệ thống báo động về các tai họa tài 
chính. Hiện tượng Vinashin bộc lộ cho 
Đảng, Chính phủ, Quốc hội của chúng 
ta hiểu rằng, nếu có những tên kẻ trộm 
thông minh hơn thì nó có thể khoắng 
hết tài sản quốc gia, bởi vì chúng ta 
không có hệ thống báo động như vậy.” 
(Khanh Linh, 2010) 
103 
“SBV builds software for remotely 
monitoring NPLs independently and 
objectively. The result is always different 
from reports of commercial banks. For 
example, in 2006, commercial banks 
reported NPLs of 3.7% whereas SBV’s 
figure was 7%.” 
 
“NHNN xây dựng một phần mềm giám 
sát nợ xấu từ xa một cách hoàn toàn 
độc lập và khách quan. Kết quả bao giờ 
cũng lệch so với báo cáo của các 
NHTM. Ví dụ, năm 2006, báo cáo nợ 
xấu NHTM là 3,7%, còn kết quả của 
NHNN là 7%.” 
(Le Ha, 2015) 
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104 
“Should the state disburse credit through 
the commercial banking system because 
the risk management structure of 
commercial banks is safer than that of 
VDB? Commercial banks have their 
internal risk management system 
because they are inspected by the SBV 
and have to publish their annual financial 
statements through an independent 
audit...” 
 
“Nên giải ngân tín dụng nhà nước 
thông qua hệ thống ngân hàng thương 
mại nhà nước vì cấu trúc quản trị rủi ro 
của ngân hàng thương mại an toàn hơn 
so với VDB. ngân hàng thương mại có 
hệ thống quản trị rủi ro nội bộ, chịu sự 
thanh kiểm tra của Ngân hàng Nhà 
nước, hàng năm phải công bố báo cáo 
tài chính qua kiểm toán độc lập…” 
(Nguyen Hoai, 2011b) 
105 
“I believe that Vinashin was the 
consequence of the global economic crisis 
but the system error was the root of that 
phenomenon, the error from the 
superstructure, from the policy of the 
Central Executive Committee of the 
Political Bureau, stemming from the 
point of view that socialist society must 
be based on ‘... the public ownership 
regime of main production means’. This 
model derives from the radical theory 
that private ownership of the production 
means is the source of exploitation. This 
extreme theory resulted in an economic 
model that lacks motivation, and thus 
was denied in reality. The Government 
had implemented this policy following 
the ideology of the Communist Party.” 
“Tôi cho rằng Vinashin vừa là hậu quả 
của khủng hoảng kinh tế toàn cầu, vừa 
có căn nguyên sâu xa bắt nguồn từ lỗi 
của hệ thống, lỗi từ gốc, từ chủ trương 
của Ban Chấp hành Trung ương và của 
Bộ Chính trị xuất phát từ quan điểm 
rằng: xã hội xã hội chủ nghĩa phải được 
xây dựng dựa trên "... chế độ công hữu 
về tư liệu sản xuất chủ yếu". Mô hình 
này lại xuất phát từ một lý thuyết cực 
đoan cho rằng: tư hữu về tư liệu sản 
xuất là nguồn gốc của mọi sự bóc lột. 
Từ một lý thuyết cực đoan đi tới một 
mô hình kinh tế không có động lực mà 
thực tế cuộc sống đã bác bỏ. Chính phủ 
là người thực thi chủ trương đó của 
Đảng về mặt nhà nước.” 
(Vietnamnet, 2010) 
106 
“Here, capital fund (from the state 
budget) is abundant, interest rates are 
low (owing to the mechanism of 
subsidised interest rates) and the 
repayment period and other loan 
conditions are easier than in commercial 
banks.... It is time to reconsider the policy 
of ‘special deals’ that VDB made because 
that policy is for a nonmarket economy.” 
 
“Nguồn vốn (từ ngân sách) ở đây dồi 
dào, lãi suất thấp (do cơ chế được cấp 
bù lãi suất) và thời gian trả nợ cũng 
như điều kiện vay đôi khi dễ hơn nhiều 
so với ở các ngân hàng thương mại…Đã 
đến lúc cần xem xét lại những chính 
sách “ưu đãi đặc biệt” về tín dụng mà 
VDB đang thực hiện. Bởi, những chính 
sách đó là phi kinh tế thị trường.” 
(Cong Thuong, 2013) 
107 
“It is necessary to study how to transfer 
gradually the lending guarantees to 
commercial banks.” 
“nghiên cứu chuyển dần sang kênh bảo 
lãnh của các ngân hàng thương mại” 
(Prime Minister, 2016, article 2) 
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108 
“The difference between two figures is 
owing to computational and statistical 
data obtained from two different 
sources. Specifically, the NPL ratio of 
4.9%, equivalent to 133,060 billion, was 
reported by the credit institution. The 
figure of 17.4% was from the inspection 
authorities after auditing all NPLs hidden 
in corporate bonds, credit trusts and 
restructured debts, including two 
‘shipwrecks’, Vinashin and Vinalines. 
Therefore, the total bad debt [NPL] 
actually amounted to 465,000 billion.” 
 
“Sở dĩ có 2 tỷ lệ nợ xấu là do được 
đánh giá, tính toán, thống kê số liệu 
qua 2 nguồn khác nhau. Cụ thể, tỷ lệ 
nợ xấu 4,9%, tương đương 133.060 tỉ 
đồng là theo báo cáo của các tổ chức 
tín dụng (TCTD) còn con số 17,4% là 
của cơ quan thanh tra - giám sát sau 
khi đã soi chiếu nợ xấu cả trong hoạt 
động mua trái phiếu doanh nghiệp; ủy 
thác cấp tín dụng; các khoản nợ xấu 
tiềm ẩn do cơ cấu lại và kể cả nợ của 
hai “con tàu đắm” Vinashin và 
Vinalines nên tổng nợ xấu thực chất 
lên tới 465.000 tỉ đồng.” 
(Tieu Phong, 2015) 
109 
“bank NPLs may rise to 10%, 20%, or 
even higher”  
“áp Thông tư 02 (nợ xấu) có thể lên 
10%, 20%, thậm chí cao hơn.” 
(VnEconomy, 2013a) 
110 
“We fully support the steps of the SBV in 
the implementation of Circular 02 to be 
closer to international standards in risk 
provisioning.” 
"Chúng tôi hoàn toàn ủng hộ các bước 
đi của Ngân hàng Nhà nước trong việc 
thực hiện Thông tư 02 nhằm làm cho 
gần hơn với chuẩn mực quốc tế về dự 
phòng rủi ro" 
(Vietnamplus, 2013) 
111 
 “One year postponement of Circular 02 
has its historic role as creating favourable 
conditions for businesses, banks in 
difficult times …” 
“but also cannot be delayed too long. The 
view of our advisory bodies are still 
applying Circular 02 on 01 June 2014.” 
“Thông tư 02 đã hoãn 1 năm do vai trò 
lịch sử của nó là tạo điều kiện cho DN, 
khách hàng, NH trong giai đoạn khó 
khăn.” 
“…Tuy nhiên, không thể để hoãn lâu 
hơn được. Quan điểm của cơ quan 
tham mưu, cơ quan giám sát tư vấn 
cho Thống đốc là hoãn đến tháng 
6/2014 sẽ áp dụng triệt để Thông tư 
này.” 
 (Vu Hanh, 2013) 
112 
“Circular 02 will still be applied from the 
landmark date 01/06/2014, but several 
criteria and contents are expected to be 
amended for gradual implementation.” 
“Thông tư 02 sẽ vẫn được áp dụng 
đúng mốc hẹn từ 1/6/2014, nhưng một 
số chỉ tiêu và nội dung dự kiến sẽ có lộ 
trình phù hợp để từng bước thực 
hiện.” 
(VnEconomy, 2013b) 
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113 
“It was made in accordance with the 
actual conditions of the market and the 
economy of our country.” 
“giải pháp cơ cấu lại nợ không phải là 
giải pháp duy nhất để xử lý nợ xấu, 
nhưng đây là một trong các giải pháp 
quan trọng, phù hợp với điều kiện thực 
tế của thị trường và nền kinh tế nước 
ta” 
(SBV, 2013) 
114 
“By restructuring, the enterprises were 
supported by not having to pay penalty 
rates for overdue loans and by ensuring 
they could continue borrowing from 
banks for running their businesses, thus 
reducing the escalation of NPLs.” 
“thông qua biện pháp cơ cấu lại thời 
hạn trả nợ, một khối lượng lớn dư nợ 
tín dụng được giữ nguyên nhóm. Nhờ 
vậy, doanh nghiệp đã được hỗ trợ giảm 
bớt khó khăn tài chính do không phải 
trả lãi phạt và đảm bảo điều kiện tiếp 
tục có thể vay vốn ngân hàng.” 
(SBV, 2013d) 
115 
“Report on situations of time 
restructuring for debt payment” 
“Báo cáo tình hình thực hiện cơ cấu lại 
thời hạn trả nợ” 
(Deputy Governor, 2014, p. 7) 
116 
“Will not use the state budget for bad 
debts [NPLs] solving”  
“Không dùng tiền ngân sách xử lý nợ 
xấu” 
(Quang Vu, 2014, VnEconomy, 2013d, 
Vietnamnet, 2013) 
117 
“Now, we want money flowing into 
production. So just lift ‘blood clot’, and 
new blood will flow back into circulation. 
The picture is very clear. Taking out the 
‘blood clot’ based on the market principle 
is very easy; just sell bad debts [NPLs] 
and it is completed. However, there is no 
market buyer currently, so we just need 
the state for the last purchase of bad 
debts [NPLs] sold via the VAMC 
organisation.…” 
 
“Giờ muốn tiền chảy vào sản xuất, chỉ 
có cách nhấc “cục máu đông” này ra thì 
máu mới lưu thông trở lại. Bức tranh 
rất rõ. Nhưng lấy "cục máu đông" này 
theo nguyên tắc thị trường thì rất dễ. 
Chỉ cần bán “béng” đi là xong. Vấn đề 
thị trường mua-bán nợ không được, 
không có người mua. Trong khi vai trò 
Nhà nước phải là người mua bán cuối 
cùng vì thế VAMC phải đứng ra mua…” 
(Cong Ly, 2015) 
118 
“But we do not have money for bad debts 
[NPLs] purchase”  
“Nhưng ta không có tiền, ngân sách 
không cho chúng tôi một đồng nào nên 
không thể mua đứt được.” 
(Cong Ly, 2015) 
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119 
“Vietnam cannot handle bad debts [NPLs] 
by the state budget as in many other 
countries” 
“Việt Nam không thể áp dụng biện 
pháp xử lý nợ xấu bằng nguồn ngân 
sách nhà nước như Chính phủ nhiều 
nước trên thế giới” 
(VnEconomy, 2013c) 
120 
“Solving bad debts [NPLs] via VAMC 
mechanism in Vietnam is much different 
from [the practice in] other countries 
because Vietnam does not use the state 
budget to purchase bad debts [NPLs].” 
“Ở Việt Nam hiện đang sử dụng 
phương thức Chính phủ đứng ra xử lý 
nợ xấu thông qua VAMC. Tuy nhiên, 
điểm khác biệt lớn nhất so với các 
nước là Việt Nam không dùng tiền 
ngân sách để mua đứt bán đoạn nợ 
xấu.” 
(Quang Canh, 2014) 
121 
“I [VAMC] bought your bad debts [NPLs], 
but actually, you [banks] mortgaged your 
bad debts [NPLs] for borrowing from me 
… You have five years to solve your bad 
debts [NPLs]. I hope that in five years, 
your business would be better and you 
have money to pay your borrowings 
[from VAMC] … That solution can 
removed the ‘blood clot’ [NPLs] and the 
state will not lose money.” 
 
“Tôi mua tài sản này của anh nhưng 
thực chất là anh thế chấp tài sản này 
vào đây cho tôi và tôi cho anh vay ra 
một phần tiền. Theo Nghị định 53 của 
Chính phủ, các NH có 5 năm để xử lý. 
Hy vọng trong 5 năm đó tình hình tốt 
lên, NH có điều kiện trả lại tiền đó và 
lấy lại tài sản về rồi tự xử lý... Đó là bài 
toán có thể gỡ được "cục máu đông" 
mà Nhà nước không mất tiền.” 
(Cong Ly, 2015) 
122 
“The international organizations have 
agreed the VAMC mechanism is 
acceptable in this difficult situation.” 
“các tổ chức quốc tế cho rằng, trong 
bối cảnh khó khăn sự thành lập và hoạt 
động VAMC là chấp nhận được” 
(Quang Canh, 2014) 
123 
“Currently, NPLs not only seriously affect 
the credit system, but also adversely 
affect the whole economy. Therefore, 
fast and complete solving of this problem 
is not only the desire of the banking 
sector but also the wish of the political 
system. This is an important, urgent 
mission to remove the bottlenecks in the 
economy, creating the conditions that 
promote economic development.” 
 
“Nợ xấu giờ đây không chỉ ảnh hưởng 
nghiêm trọng đến hệ thống các TCTD, 
mà còn ành hưởng rất xấu đến cả nền 
kinh tế. Chính vì vậy, xử lý nhanh, dứt 
điểm nợ xấu không chỉ là mong muốn 
của ngành Ngân hàng mà còn là mong 
muốn của cả hệ thống chính trị. Đây là 
nhiệm vụ quan trọng và cấp bách để có 
thể khơi thông những ách tắc trong 
nền kinh tế, tạo điều kiện thúc đẩy kinh 
tế phát triển.” 
(Tapchitaichinh, 2016) 
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124 
“The key problem is to have a mechanism 
to remove legal difficulties. 80% of the 
NPLs remaining at VAMC are mainly 
debts with difficulties in collection, most 
of which are related to legal procedures 
associated with the properties.” 
“Vấn đề mấu chốt là phải có cơ chế 
tháo gỡ về mặt pháp lý. 80% số nợ xấu 
còn lại tại VAMC chủ yếu là những 
khoản nợ khó khăn trong xử lý, mà hầu 
hết là có những vướng mắc về pháp lý, 
thủ tục do nó gắn liền với các tài sản.” 
(Hoang Yen, 2016) 
125 
“The bad debt [NPLs] will only worsen if 
not solved. In Vietnam, the number of 
bad debts [NPLs] is too large; thus, only 
the Government’s intervention can solve 
the ‘clot’ [NPLs problem] for the 
economy.” 
 
“Nợ xấu sẽ chỉ ngày càng xấu thêm nếu 
như không được xử lý. Riêng ở Việt 
Nam, con số nợ xấu đã quá lớn, cần có 
sự can thiệp, cần “bàn tay” của nhà 
nước mới có thể giải quyết được “cục 
máu đông” này cho nền kinh tế”. 
(Bach Hop, 2016) 
126 
“Because the Vietnamese NPL rate is at 
an alarming level, causing ‘congestion’ in 
the market capital flows, which is the 
major reason that interest rates are 
unlikely to fall.” 
 
127 
“reducing the competitiveness of 
domestic enterprises in the international 
market.” 
“khiến sức cạnh tranh của các doanh 
nghiệp trong nước bị mất đi.” 
(Thuy, 2016) 
128 
“No need of additional money at this 
time. VAMC has even not yet used any 
penny of the amount of 2,000 billion 
dong already granted by the Government 
for NPLs solving because no agreement 
could have been made between VAMC 
and credit institutions for selling their 
NPLs to the market.” 
“VAMC không cần thêm tiền. Bởi với số 
tiền tươi thóc thật 2.000 tỷ đồng hiện 
có, VAMC còn chưa đụng tới một đồng 
nào vì chưa thỏa thuận được với các Tổ 
chức tín dụng để mua nợ xấu theo thị 
giá.” 
(Bach Hop, 2016) 
129 
“What VAMC needs now is a clear legal 
framework. Specifically, VAMC needs a 
debt trading market that it can operate. 
A legal framework to stipulate clearly the 
responsibility in case a debt is solved at 
loss [lower than its book value]. Is that 
loss sale problematic? Will that loss be 
allowed to be covered by provision in the 
credit institution? Will the credit 
institution be allowed to record the loss 
gradually over years to reduce financial 
pressure [as the provision rule currently 
applied for VAMC debts]?” 
 
“Điều mà VAMC cần hiện nay là hành 
lang pháp lý thông thoáng, rõ ràng. Cụ 
thể, VAMC cần có một thị trường mua 
bán nợ đã được vận hành. Hành lang 
pháp lý đảm bảo quy rõ trách nhiệm 
mua bán dưới giá gốc thế nào cũng 
như trường hợp thoái vốn Nhà nước, 
dưới giá gốc có vấn đề gì không? Có 
cho phép các Tổ chức tín dụng bù đắp 
quỹ dự phòng rủi ro vào phần thiếu hụt 
không? Phần thiếu hụt trong trích lập 
dự phòng rủi ro, Tổ chức tín dụng có 
được trích trong nhiều năm để giảm áp 
lực về tài chính?” 
(Bach Hop, 2016) 
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130 
“who would bear the loss incurred in the 
sale of NPLs”  
“Ai sẽ bù lỗ và chia lãi với VAMC khi 
mua nợ xấu về?” 
(Ngan Giang, 2016) 
131 
“About VAMC, this organisation does not 
bear any risk related to the resale of 
debts purchased earlier. According to the 
current regulation, all gain or loss from 
the sale of bad debts [NPLs] would be 
transferred to the banks that sold those 
debts to VAMC earlier.” 
 
“Về VAMC tổ chức này hoàn toàn 
không chịu rủi ro thua lỗ khi bán lại các 
khoản nợ xấu đã mua về trước đó. 
Theo quy định, tất cả các khoản lời lỗ 
từ bán nợ xấu sẽ được chuyển hết cho 
ngân hàng đã bán khoản nợ xấu đó cho 
VAMC.” 
(Ngan Giang, 2016) 
132 
“Banks tend to hide bad debts [NPLs] 
because disclosing bad debts [NPLs] and 
making provision for them will truncate 
bank equity capital, leading to them 
being recapitalised by either the issuance 
of additional shares or no dividend 
payment. In case their financial health is 
too bad, leading to the risk of crisis, the 
Government has to recapitalise them 
using state budge t... Of course, 
recapitalisation by the state budget fund 
can incur a risk of loss that would be 
charged to taxpayers. That is the price 
we pay for the neglect of 
management/supervision by state 
management agencies giving rise to too 
risky loans in commercial banks. 
Therefore, instead of focusing on ‘bad 
debts [NPLs] solving’, [the authorities] 
should ‘convict’ the state 
agencies/individuals who did not fulfil 
their previous management 
responsibilities.” 
“Có điều, các ngân hàng luôn có xu 
hướng giấu nợ xấu vì nếu công khai và 
trích lập dự phòng họ sẽ bị cụt vốn, 
dẫn đến phải tái cơ cấu vốn 
(recapitalize) thông qua phát hành 
thêm cổ phiếu hoặc không chia cổ tức. 
Trong trường hợp quá xấu dẫn đến 
nguy cơ khủng hoảng, nhà nước mới 
cần trợ giúp tái cơ cấu vốn bằng tiền 
ngân sách… Tất nhiên, khi tái cơ cấu 
vốn bằng tiền ngân sách nhà nước có 
rủi ro sẽ lỗ và đó đúng là thiệt hại cho 
tiền thuế của người dân. Đó là cái giá 
phải trả cho sự lơ là quản lý/giám sát 
của cơ quan quản lý nhà nước trước đó 
dẫn đến các NHTM đã cho vay quá rủi 
ro. Do vậy, TS. Giang cho rằng thay vì 
cứ chăm chăm "xử lý nợ xấu" cần phải 
"xử lý" những cơ quan/cá nhân không 
hoàn thành trách nhiệm quản lý trước 
đó.” 
(Ngan Giang, 2016) 
133 
“The blame for the bad debts [NPLs] 
problem is not to be assigned only to 
firms, or banks, but it is also the fault of 
the Government, of the policy and of the 
market economy.” 
“Nợ xấu không chỉ là tội của DN, hay 
NH mà trong đó còn có cả lỗi của Chính 
phủ, lỗi của chính sách, nền kinh tế thị 
trường.” 
(Thanh Huyen, 2016) 
134 
“Parliament is a legislative body; if it 
makes a wrong decision or policy, it must 
also recognise the weaknesses, but we 
cannot discipline the whole Parliament, 
especially with the criminal discipline. 
Even the Chairman of the Parliament is 
not the head but the general coordinator, 
“Quốc hội là cơ quan lập pháp, nếu 
đưa ra quyết định, chủ trương sai cũng 
phải nhận khuyết điểm, nhưng không 
thể đem cả quốc hội ra kỷ luật, nhất là 
kỷ luật hình sự. bản thân chủ tịch Quốc 
hội cũng không phải người đứng đầu 
Quốc hội mà là người điều phối chung, 
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the chairperson to maintain contact 
among 500 delegates. So, we cannot 
discipline 500 delegates or the chairman 
for their wrong voting … [He emphasised] 
Parliament is the people [Vietnamese 
citizens], and the people vote and hence 
must accept the wrong decision rather 
than seeking who to discipline.” 
chủ tọa, giữ mối liên hệ 500 đại biểu. vì 
thế, không thể vì cả 500 đại biểu bỏ 
phiếu mà kỷ luật cả 500 vị hay kỷ luật 
ông chủ tịch… Quốc hội tức là dân, dân 
quyết sai thì dân chịu, chứ kỷ luật ai.” 
(Linh Thu, 2014) 
135 
“NPLs caused by banks and businesses, 
thus they have to bear” 
“Nợ xấu do ngân hàng và doanh nghiệp 
gây ra,thì ngân hàng và doanh nghiệp 
phải tự gánh chịu.” 
(Thuy Lien, 2016) 
136 
“State budget belongs to People 
[Vietnamese citizens], no matter from 
taxes or borrowings money; so we cannot 
force People to pay for what they do not 
owe. Using state budget to pay for that 
loss means taking money from the poor 
to pay for the rich.” 
“Tiền ngân sách là tiền của dân dù là 
tiền thuế hay tiền đi vay, không thể bắt 
người dân trả nợ cho cái mà họ không 
nợ. Như vậy là lấy tiền của người 
nghèo chia cho người giàu” 
 (Nguyen Thoan, 2016) 
137 
“The use of state budget, as well as 
public money, to ‘save’ the banks from 
their own mistake in management is 
paradoxical. Vietnam has confirmed it 
will implement the market mechanism; 
therefore, let the market solve its 
problems.” 
 
“Dùng tiền của ngân sách, cũng là tiền 
của người dân để “cứu” các ngân hàng 
do họ có lầm lỗi khi quản lý là nghịch 
lý. Hơn nữa, Việt Nam đã khẳng định 
thực hiện cơ chế thị trường, và theo đó 
thì thị trường phải tự giải quyết vấn đề 
của nó.” 
(Lan Huong, 2016) 
138 
“It [the Government] blames only banks 
for causing bad debts [NPLs], thus 
treating them as criminals, refusing to 
amend regulations, not using the state 
budget to solve bad debts [NPLs] …, [the 
Government] should not question why 
the process of bad debts [NPLs] is slow.” 
“Nếu cứ đổ hết lỗi cho ngân hàng gây 
ra nợ xấu, xử lý hình sự tràn lan nợ 
xấu, từ chối sửa luật để xử lý nợ xấu, 
không dùng ngân sách để xử lý nợ xấu, 
để ngân hàng “đơn thương độc mã” xử 
lý nợ xấu… thì “đừng thắc mắc” tại sao 
việc xử lý nợ xấu lại chậm” 
(Ha Tam, 2016) 
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139 
“We believe that the main treatment 
method is still using net operating 
income of commercial banks to process 
[to make provision] until when the book 
value of bad debts [NPLs] equals the 
market valuation. At that time, bad debts 
[NPLs] will be handled by selling/buying 
through market.” 
“Chúng tôi cho rằng cách thức xử lý 
chính vẫn là tiếp tục sử dụng thu nhập 
hoạt động thuần của NHTM để xử lý 
cho đến khi giá trị sổ sách của nợ xấu 
giảm xuống bằng với định giá trên thị 
trường. Và nợ xấu sẽ được xử lý thông 
qua thị trường mua bán nợ.” 
 (Nguyen Minh, 2016) 
140 
“The world includes developed countries, 
developing countries and undeveloped 
countries, but Vietnam is perhaps the 
most distinctive model. It’s the country 
that refuses to develop! So much, so 
much ODA has been invested in Vietnam, 
reaching nearly 90 billion USD over 20 
years, but so far, it has not developed, it 
just might be... [it] refused to develop!” 
“Trên thế giới chia ra gồm nước phát 
triển, nước đang phát triển, nước 
chậm phát triển nhưng Việt Nam có lẽ 
là mô hình đặc biệt nhất. Đó là nước… 
không chịu phát triển! Đầu tư nhiều 
đến thế, ODA nhiều đến thế (20 năm 
qua lượng ODA đổ vào Việt Nam lên 
tới gần 90 tỉ USD) nhưng đến bây giờ 
vẫn không phát triển được thì chỉ có 
thể là… không chịu phát triển!” 
(Hai Chau, 2015) 
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